;radle  of 

THE  WAR 

H.CHARLES  WOODS,  FR.G.S. 


HiSTORtU 


THE   CRADLE  OF  THE   WAR 


Other  ^orhs  by  the  Same  Hutbor 


THE  DANGER  ZONE  OF  EUROPE 

WASHED  BY  FOUR  SEAS 

LA  TURQUIE  ET  SES  VOISINS 

WAR  AND  DIPLOMACY  IN  THE  BALKANS 


?i. 


THE 
CRADLE  OF  THE   WAR 

THE  NEAR  EAST  AND  PAN-GERMANISM 


BY 
H.  CHARLES  WOODS,  F.R.G.S. 

(Lectubeb  before  the  Lowell  Institute  1917-1918) 


WITH  FOREWORD  BY  A.  LAWRENCE  LOWELL 

PBEBIDENT  OF   HABVARD   UNIVERSITY 


NON-REFER-f 


cqWVAD'Q3S 


BOSTON 
LITTLE,  BROWN,  AND  COMPANY 

1918 


EIST.  I 


Copyright,  1918, 
By  Little,  Brown,  and  Company. 


All  rights  reserved 


,  Nnrtonoti  Preaa 

Set  up  and  clectrotyped  by  J.  S.  Gushing  Co.,  Norwood,  Mass.,  U.S.A. 

Presswork  by  S.  J.  Parkhill  &  Co.,  Bostoa,  Mass.,  U.S.A. 


MY   MOTHER    AND   FATHER 

WHOSE   DEVOTED    ENCOURAGEMENT 

HAS   BEEN   MY   CONSTANT   SUPPORT 

IN   A    STUDY    OF   THE   PROBLEMS 

HEREIN    DISCUSSED 


38421S 


FOREWORD 

Americans  regard  the  Balkan  question  much  as 
Lincoln  in  his  Second  Inaugural  Address  described  their 
view  of  slavery.  "All  know",  he  said,  "that  this 
interest  was  somehow  the  cause  of  the  war.  .  .  . 
Neither  party  expected  for  the  war  the  magnitude  or 
the  duration  which  it  has  already  attained.  Neither 
anticipated  that  the  cause  of  the  conflict  might  cease 
when,  or  even  before,  the  conflict  itself  should  cease. 
Each  looked  for  an  easier  triumph  and  a  result  less 
fundamental  and  astounding." 

There  is,  however,  this  difference  between  slavery 
and  the  Balkan  question,  that  slavery,  as  we  now  see, 
was  the  real  and  only  cause  of  the  Civil  War.  Without 
the  difference  in  social  institutions  the  North  and 
South  would  never  have  been  in  armed  conflict,  and 
in  spite  of  the  blunders  of  reconstruction  the  abolition 
of  slavery  has  removed  all  danger,  and  suspicion  of  a 
danger,  of  war  between  the  two  sections  of  the  coun- 
try. Whereas  the  Balkan  question,  in  its  narrower 
sense,  was  rather  the  occasion  than  the  cause  of  the 
struggle  that  is  now  raging.  Nevertheless,  the  Near 
East  has  long  been  a  source  of  anxiety  to  European 
statesmen,    a   storehouse   of   explosive   material    that 

vii 


viii  FOREWORD 

might  at  any  time  start  a  general  conflagration.  It 
will  so  remain  until  its  problems  are  settled  upon  a 
rational  and  permanent  basis  and  until  the  danger  of 
Teutonic  domination  has  been  removed. 

The  United  States  will  be  compelled  to  take  part  in 
the  settlement  of  these  problems.  But  at  present  its 
people  are,  in  most  cases,  wholly  unfamiliar  with  the 
racial,  religious,  political  and  geographical  factors  that 
lie  beneath  the  questions  to  be  solved.  They  ought, 
therefore,  to  welcome  a  book  which  portrays  the  recent 
history  and  condition  of  the  peninsula  and  of  its  com- 
ponent nationalities,  by  a  writer  who  has  studied  his 
subject  on  the  spot. 

A.  Lawrence  Lowell. 

Harvard  University,  Cambridge 
June  12,  1918 


PREFACE 

A  PRELIMINARY  duty  of  the  author  of  a  modern 
vohune,  and  especially  of  one  dealing  almost  exclu- 
sively with  events  which  have  led  up  to,  or  taken 
place  during,  the  world's  greatest  war,  seems  to  be  to 
explain  the  reasons  for  which  the  book  has  been  written, 
to  state  the  methods  by  which  the  information  con- 
tained in  it  has  been  acquired,  and  to  assist  the  reader, 
who  has  neither  time  nor  desire  to  make  close  acquaint- 
ance with  the  whole  of  its  pages,  to  discover  at  a 
glance  what  particular  sections  will  be  of  the  greatest 
interest  to  him. 

Before  performing  this  duty,  I  will,  however,  give 
the  reasons  which  have  prompted  me  to  call  this  book 
"The  Cradle  of  the  War."  For  many  years,  and  more 
especially  since  the  re-establishment  of  the  Ottoman 
Constitution  in  1908,  the  numerous  problems  con- 
nected with  the  Near  East  have  been  a  source  of 
continual  danger  to  the  world's  peace.  This  was  due 
in  part  to  the  fact  that  the  Balkan  Peninsula  and  Asia 
Minor  might  at  any  time  be  the  scenes  of  insurrection, 
massacre,  or  local  conflict,  and  in  part  —  a  larger  part 
—  to  the  international  rivalry  which  has  existed  for 
years  concerning  a  future  domination  over  many  of 
the  areas  in  question. 

These  localities,  together  with  the  waterways  which 
they  control,  form  the  great  and  only  corridor  from 


X  PREFACE 

west  to  east  and  from  north  to  south,  and  they  con- 
stitute the  natural  highway  from  Central  Europe  to 
Asia  and  from  Russia  to  the  Mediterranean.  Thus, 
ever  since  the  birth  of  her  Mittel-Europa  scheme, 
Germany  has  been  determined  to  push  open  the 
Near-Eastern  door,  in  order  to  be  able  to  strike  a 
deadly  blow  at  the  very  vitals  of  the  British  Empire, 
and  at  the  same  time  automatically  to  prevent  Russia 
from  expanding  towards  warm  water.  As  I  shall 
endeavour  to  show,  therefore,  it  is  not  so  much  the 
murder  of  the  Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand  and  his 
Consort  at  Serajevo  on  June  28,  1914,  as  the  develop- 
ments preceding  and  following  that  occurrence  which 
make  the  Near  East  the  region  of  primary  existence 
of  the  present  conflict  —  the  area  in  which  many  of 
its  most  important  events  have  been  sheltered  and 
nurtured. 

In  the  manner  that  a  little  cot  is  made  ready  for  the 
expected  child,  so  did  the  enemy  prepare  for  the  war 
which  he  was  designing.  This  preparation,  in  progress 
from  the  time  of  the  accession  of  the  present  Emperor 
to  the  throne  in  1888,  was  carried  out  by  the  gradual 
development  of  Germanic  influence  and  power  in 
Turkey,  and  by  a  constant  and  determined  opposi- 
tion to  the  establishment  of  stable  conditions  in  the 
Near  East.  From  the  moment  of  the  birth  of  his 
war  child,  too,  the  Kaiser  has  been  an  ever  vigilant 
mother,  for  instead  of  allowing  the  real  primary  cause 
of  the  world  conflict  to  be  forgotten,  he  has  consistently 
rocked  the  "cradle"  in  the  apparent  hope  that  she 
who  performs  this  task  rules  the  world. 

My  most  important  object  in  publishing  this  volume 
is  to  explain  to  the  wide  public,  now  interested  in  the 


PREFACE  xl 

subject,  the  importance  of  a  situation  which  is  not 
always  clearly  understood  by  those  who  have  not  had 
the  opportunity  of  visiting  the  Near  East.  In  par- 
ticular I  hope  to  prove  that,  as  the  enemy  has  con- 
sistently worked  for  the  establishment  of  Germanic 
control  throughout  the  East,  any  peace  which  failed 
to  put  an  end  to  the  danger  of  the  success  of  such  an 
object,  and  any  arrangement  which  would  be  ineffec- 
tive in  setting  up  an  anti-Germanic  barrier  there, 
must  be  considered  as  entirely  unsatisfactory  from  the 
Allied  and  American  standpoint. 

The  book  itself,  which  is  based  upon  the  manuscript 
from  which  I  drew  the  notes  for  my  course  of  lectures 
upon  "War  and  Diplomacy  in  the  Balkans  ",  delivered 
before  the  Lowell  Institute  at  Boston  during  the 
winter  of  1917-1918,  makes  no  pretension  to  be  a 
continuous  account  of  all  the  events  which  have 
taken  place  during  the  period  which  it  covers.  It 
claims  merely  to  point  out  the  meaning  of  some  of 
the  questions  which  have  led  up  to  and  influenced 
the  present  situation.  Moreover,  whilst  I  have  been 
a  constant  visitor  to  the  countries  about  which  I  am 
writing,  and  whilst  I  liave  had  numerous  conversations 
with  many  of  the  most  prominent  men  mentioned  in 
the  text,  I  have  endeavoured  to  bring  my  local  knowl- 
edge of  the  countries  and  of  their  peoples  to  bear 
instead  of  depending  upon  information  furnished  by 
statesmen,  political  chiefs,  or  historians,  who,  however 
honest  they  may  wish  to  be,  are  almost  invariably 
possessed  of  some  national  prejudice  or  personal  feel- 
ing which  prevents  them  from  seeing  this  great  workl 
question  with  that  fairness  which  is  so  necessary  if 
we  are  to  be  in  a  position  to  grasp  its  true  present 


xii  PREFACE 

and  future  significance.  As  far  as  possible,  too,  I 
have  attempted  to  produce  facts  in  preference  to  ex- 
pressions of  personal  opinion,  for,  under  existing  cir- 
cumstances, it  is  a  clear  and  impartial  judgment  by 
the  public  rather  than  the  verdict  of  a  particular 
man  which  will  lead  to  the  amelioration  of  conditions 
which  must  be  terminated  by  the  present  War. 

Of  the  twelve  chapters  of  which  the  volume  is  com- 
posed the  first  is  given  up  to  a  summary  of  the  events 
which  occurred  during  the  sixty  years  preceding  the 
outbreak  of  the  War  —  a  summary  in  course  of  which 
I  have  sought  to  point  out  that  the  so-called  settle- 
ment, which  followed  the  Balkan  Wars,  was  of  such 
an  unsatisfactory  nature  as  merely  to  prepare  the 
way  for  a  renewed  conflagration.  Chapters  II  to  VII 
inclusive  are  devoted  to  accounts  of  recent  develop- 
ments, in  the  various  Balkan  States  and  in  Turkey, 
and  in  particular  to  reviews  of  the  causes  which  have 
led  the  different  countries  in  question  to  assume  their 
individual  war  policies.  In  the  course  of  these  sec- 
tions I  have  alluded  to  the  value  of  the  Serbo-Monte- 
negrin  resistance  of  1914-1915,  to  the  meaning  and 
importance  of  the  Mesopotamian  and  Syrian  cam- 
paigns, and  to  the  reasons  responsible  for  the  Rou- 
manian defeat  and  for  the  situation  existing  in  Greece 
during  the  greater  part  of  the  War. 

Chapters  VIII  and  XI,  which  respectively  contain 
accounts  of  the  Military  Highways  of  the  Balkans 
and  of  the  Bagdad  Railway,  accounts  founded  upon 
recent  papers  which  I  have  read  before  The  Royal 
Geographical  Society,  are  in  some  ways  more  detailed 
and  more  comprehensive  than  are  certain  other  sec- 
tions of  the  book,  and  this  because  the  war  importance 


PREFACE  xiii 

of  these  communications  is  such  as  specially  to  merit 
their  careful  and  attentive  study. 

In  Chapters  IX  and  X  no  attempt  is  made  to  pro- 
vide detailed  accounts  of  the  progress  of  the  Dar- 
danelles and  Salonica  campaigns.  Here  my  principal 
idea  has  been  to  suggest  the  objects  and  results  of 
those  undertakings,  and  to  utilize  my  personal  knowl- 
edge of  the  areas  in  question  for  the  purpose  of  trying 
to  make  clear  the  numerous  geographical  and  military 
difficulties  with  which  these  operations  were  or  are 
beset. 

Throughout  these  pages  repeated  reference  is  made 
to  the  fact  that,  for  years,  the  Central  Powers  have 
worked  not  for  stable  government  but  for  unrest  in 
the  East.  Nevertheless  I  have  devoted  my  last 
chapter  to  the  subject  of  the  Mittel-Europa  scheme, 
for  the  importance  of  that  question  and  especially  of 
its  latest  developments  in  Roumania  and  Russia  is 
such  as  to  necessitate  its  individual  and  separate 
consideration.  In  this  section,  too,  I  have  included 
a  few  pages  about  the  future  —  a  future  which  must 
entail  the  establishment  of  conditions  likely  to  result 
in  local  peace  and  accord,  and  therefore  in  a  guarantee 
that  no  excuse  will  exist  for  outside  interference  on  the 
part  of  those  possessed  of  aggressive  and  tyrannical 
designs. 

Among  other  reasons  the  fact  that  they  are  far  too 
numerous  prevents  me  from  tendering  my  thanks  by 
name  to  all  those,  belonging  to  the  countries  about 
which  I  have  written,  in  England  and  in  America, 
who  have  given  me  their  valuable  assistance  during 
the  years  I  have  followed  the  development  of  events 
in  the  Near  East.     I   wish,  however,  to  signify  my 


xiv  PREFACE 

appreciation  to  those,  who,  by  their  attendance  at 
and  by  their  interest  shown  in  my  lectures  at  home 
and  in  America,  have  stimulated  me,  an  Englishman, 
far  from  home,  to  undertake  the  difficult  task  of  the 
preparation  of  such  a  book  as  this  in  war  time.  I 
must  also  take  this  opportunity  of  expressing  my 
thanks  to  The  Royal  Geographical  Society  for  the 
permission  given  to  reproduce  the  several  maps,  pre- 
pared for  my  original  papers,  by  that  Society,  to  the 
American  Board  of  Foreign  Missions  for  the  many 
courtesies  shown  to  me  by  its  representatives  in  the 
East  and  in  America,  and  to  the  British  Pictorial 
Service  for  the  provision  of  certain  of  the  illustrations 
included  in  this  volume. 

H.  Charles  Woods. 

New  York,  July  11,  1918. 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 

Foreword  by  A.  Lawrence  Lowell vii 

Preface ix 

List  of  Illustrations xxi 


The  Near  East  before  the  Great  War  ....  1 
Historical  summary  of  events  prior  to  the  re-establish- 
ment of  the  Ottoman  Constitution  in  1908  —  American 
missions  in  Turkey  —  Earlier  German  intrigues  —  The 
advent  of  the  New  Regime  in  Turkey  —  The  Bulgarian 
declaration  of  independence  —  The  annexation  of  Bosnia 
and  Herzegovina  by  Austria  —  Effect  of  the  Young  Turk- 
ish revolution  in  the  Ottoman  Empire  —  Reasons  for 
Christian  discontent  with  the  New  Regime  —  The  Turco- 
Italian  war  —  Formation  of  the  Balkan  League  —  The 
first  Balkan  war  —  Differences  between  Bulgaria  and  her 
neighbours  —  The  second  Balkan  war  —  Pan-German 
policy  from  1908-1913. 

n 

Serbia  and  Montenegro  in  the  War  ....  41 
Necessity  for  an  outlet  on  the  Adriatic  —  Results  of 
the  Balkan  wars  —  The  murder  of  the  Archduke  Franz 
Ferdinand  — The  Potsdam  Conference  of  July  5,1914  — 
The  Austrian  ultimatum  —  Campaigns  of  1914-1915  — 
The  typhus  scourge  —  Attitude  towards  Bulgaria  —  Re- 
treat to  the  Adriatic  —  The  role  of  Serbia  in  1914  —  Re- 
cent Montenegrin  history  —  Montenegro  and  the  War. 


xvi  CONTENTS 

m 

PAGE 

Turkey  and  the  War 59 

Turco-Greek  relations  —  Growth  of  German  influence 
at  Constantinople  —  Scheme  for  Armenian  reforms  — 
Situation  immediately  after  the  outbreak  of  War  — 
Germanic  intrigues  —  Allied  difficulties  —  Arrival  of 
Gochen  and  Breslau  at  Constantinople  —  Events  im- 
mediately leading  to  the  entry  of  Turkey  into  the 
European  conflagration  —  The  Armenian  massacres  of 
1915  —  The  Russo-Turkish  operations  in  northeastern 
Asia  Minor  —  The  Mesopotamian  campaign  —  The 
British  advance  in  Palestine. 

IV 

Bulgaria  and  the  War 89 

Recent  history  —  Effect  of  the  Balkan  Wars  — 
Concessions  required  by  Bulgaria  —  Importance  of 
geographical  position  —  Value  to  both  groups  of  belliger- 
ents —  Negotiations  preceding  the  entry  of  Bulgaria  into 
the  War  —  Attitude  of  the  Allies. 


Roumania  and  the  War 105 

Special  position  of  Roumania  —  The  Bessarabian, 
Transylvanian,  and  Dobrudjan  questions  —  Difficulties 
after  the  outbreak  of  the  War  —  German  determination 
to  force  Roumania  into  the  War  on  one  side  or  other  — 
Events  of  1916  —  Roumanian  military  system  —  The 
plan  of  campaign  —  Russian  faitldessness  —  Peace 
terms  imposed  by  the  Central  Powers. 

VI 

Greece  and  the  War 127 

Recent  history  —  M.  Venezelos  and  King  George  — 
The  protective  rights  of  England,  France,  and  Russia  — 


CONTENTS  xvii 

PAGE 

The  Graeco-Serbian  Treaty  —  The  mentality  of  the 
Greeks  —  The  attitude  of  King  Constantine  —  Patriot- 
ism of  M.  Venezelos  —  The  Aegean  Island  question  — 
First  struggle  between  the  King  and  M.  Venezelos  — 
Second  retirement  of  M.  Venezelos  —  Allied  attitude 
towards  Greece  —  Abdication  of  King  Constantine  — 
Return  to  power  of  M.  Venezelos. 

vn 

Albania  and  the  Albanians 153 

Importance  of  the  country  —  Creation  of  the  Prin- 
cipality —  General  geographical  description  —  Nation- 
ality, religion,  and  language  —  The  Balkan  Wars  — 
Regime  of  Prince  William  of  Wied  —  The  European  War 
—  The  Italian  occupation  of  the  south  —  The  future. 

vni 

Military  Highways  of  the  Balkans  .  .  .  .174 
General  description  of  the  Balkan  Peninsula  — 
Turkish  opposition  to  railways  —  The  Danube  as  a 
thoroughfare  for  military  traffic,  and  as  an  obstacle  to 
through  communication  —  The  Belgrade-Constanti- 
nople trunk  route  —  The  Nish-Salonica  railway  —  The 
Luleh  Burgas-Salonica  and  the  Salonica-Monastir 
lines  —  Roumanian  railways  —  Serbian  railways  —  Bul- 
garian railways  —  Turkish  communications  —  Bosnian 
railways  —  Commmiications  between  the  Adriatic  coast 
and  the  interior  —  Railways  and  roads  between  Old 
Greece  and  the  remainder  of  the  peninsula  —  Routes 
leading  into  Bulgaria  from  the  south  and  southwest. 

IX 

The  Dardanelles  Campaign 215 

Importance  of  position  of  Constantinople  —  General 
objects  of  the  campaign  —  The  land  defences  of    the 


xviil  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Turkish  capital  —  The  Bosphorus  and  its  defences  — 
Description  of  the  Dardanelles  —  The  Peninsula  of 
Gallipoli  and  its  defences  —  The  Asiatic  coast  and  its 
defences  —  Disadvantageous  position  of  an  attacking 
fleet  —  Earlier  naval  operations  —  Events  following 
landings  of  April  25  —  The  Suvla  Bay  operations  — 
Three  misconceptions  —  Necessity'  for  withdrawal  of 
expeditionary  force  —  Results  achieved. 

X 

The  Riddle  of  Salonica 244 

Objects  of  the  undertaking  —  General  description 
of  Macedonia  —  Port  and  town  of  Salonica  —  The 
climate  —  Importance  of  the  Vardar  Valley  —  Area 
immediately  surrounding  city  —  Significance  of  the 
Rhodope  Balkans  —  Country  to  the  northwest  of  Salo- 
nica—  Original  Allied  attempt  to  advance  up  the  Vardar 
Valley  —  The  passive  defence  of  Salonica  —  The  ad- 
vance upon  and  capture  of  Monastir  —  Difficulties  of 
the  campaign  —  Results. 

XI 

The  Bagdad  Railway  and  the  War  ....    271 

Military  importance  of  line  —  Earlier  suggestions 
for  a  railway  across  Asiatic  Turkey  —  Pan-German 
reasons  for  a  line  from  the  Bosphorus  to  the  Persian 
Gulf  — ■  Present  state  of  completion  —  Historical  and 
political  accomits  of  the  line  —  Smyrna-Afiun  Karahissar 
railway  —  Smyrna-Aidin  and  Mudania-Brusa  lines  — 
Bagdad  railway  concession  of  1903  —  The  Taurus 
section  —  Concession  for  railway  to  and  port  of  Alex- 
andretta  —  The  Amanus  section  —  Anglo-Germano- 
Turkish  negotiations,  1913-1914  —  Facilities  for  travel 
—  Cost  of  the  railway  to  Turkey  —  The  great  southern 
arm  or  Syrian  railways  —  Bearing  of  coming  im- 
provements upon  Allied  operations  —  The  future. 


CONTENTS  xix 

XII 

PAGE 

MiTTEL-EuROPA 310 

The  Lichnowsky  disclosures  —  Changed  Germanic 
objects  after  the  outbreak  of  the  War  —  Methods 
employed  for  their  realization  —  Enemy  successes  in 
the  East  —  Necessity  for  the  creation  of  an  Anti- 
German  barrier  —  True  basis  of  a  permanent  Balkan 
peace  —  Salonica  and  Constantinople  after  the  War 
—  The  future  of  Turkey. 

Postscript 337 

Some  Useful  Publications  on  the  Same  Subject   .        .    339 
Index 343 


LIST  OF   ILLUSTRATIONS 


Turkish  Prisoners  in  Bagdad  ..... 

M.  Gueshoff 

The  Serbian  Parliament  House  at  Belgrade     .         .         .         . 

The  Old  Turkish  Palace  at  Nish 

Bitlis,  an  Important  Town  in  Eastern  Asia  Minor  . 

Reading    the   British   Proclamation    to   the   Inhabitants   of 


Frontispiece 

PACING    PAGE 

.       22 


42 
42 
76 

88 


Jerusalem,  after  the  Capture ..... 

M.  Tak6  Jonescu 108 

M.  Venezelos 136 

Durazzo  from  the  Sea      ........  156 

Berat,  a  Picturesque  Town  in  Southern  Albania      .         .         .  208 

The  Rock-like  Coast  of  the  Gallipoli  Peninsula        .         .         .  236 

The  Village  of  Bulair 236 

The  Arch  of  Galerius  at  Salonica 250 

British  Mountain  Battery  Going  into  Position  on  the  Salonica 

Front 208 


Baron  Marshal  von  Bieberstein 

MAPS 

The  Military  Highways  of  the  Balkans  . 
Southern  Part  of  the  Gallipoli  Peninsula 
The  Bagdad  Railway  and  Its  Tributaries 
The  Railways  of  Syria  and  Palestine 
The  Balkan  States  ..... 


310 


170 
226 
27L 
304 
360 


THE  CRADLE  OF  THE  WAR 


THE  NEAR  EAST  BEFORE  THE 
GREAT   WAR 

History  has  proved  that  In  the  past  the  Near  East 
has  been  both  the  scene  of  and  the  reason  for  war  after 
war.  Consequently  throughout  the  last  few  decades, 
and  especially  from  the  time  of  the  re-estabiishment  of 
the  Ottoman  Constitution  in  the  year  1908,  the  polit- 
ical and  military  situations  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula 
and  in  Asiatic  Turkey  have  been  questions  of  all- 
preponderating  importance.  This  has  been  due  in 
part  to  the  continued  state  of  unrest  prevailing  there, 
in  part  to  the  rivalry  existing  in  Europe  concerning  the 
futures  of  these  areas,  and  in  part  —  a  greater  part  — 
to  the  intrigues  of  the  Central  Powers,  who  finally 
brought  about  the  present  war.  In  short  the  Near 
East,  which  was  the  immediate  cause  and,  when  coupled 
with  the  Pan-German  desire  for  domination  from 
Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf,  to  a  great  extent  the 
actual  reason  of  the  present  conflagration,  has  been  for 
many  years  "  The  Danger  Zone  of  Europe"  —  a  "  danger 
zone"  which  in  its  turn  has  played  an  all-important 
role  in  events  which  have  taken  place  since  the  summer 
of  1914, 


2  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE   WAR 

In  order  to  be  able  to  arrive  at  a  proper  under- 
standing of  the  problems  existing  there  immediately 
prior  to  the  outbreak  of  the  present  war,  it  is  necessary 
very  briefly  to  refer  to  various  historical  events  which 
have  taken  place  in  connection  with  that  area  during 
the  last  half-centiu"y.  The  Crimean  War,  undertaken 
as  it  was  in  support  of  Turkey  against  Russia,  con- 
stituted the  substitution  of  the  anti-Russian  and  pro- 
Turkish  policy  of  Lord  Palmerston  for  the  opposite 
programme  advocated  by  Mr.  Bright,  who  championed 
the  cause  of  peace  and  of  the  Oriental  Christians. 
During  the  ensuing  twenty  years,  with  the  exception  of 
the  constitution  of  the  Bulgarian  Exarchate  in  1870 
and  the  consequent  spiritual  independence  of  the  Bul- 
garian from  the  Orthodox  Greek  Church,  no  develop- 
ments of  far-reaching  significance  occurred.  In  1875, 
however,  when  a  revolution  against  Turkish  authority 
broke  out  in  Herzegovina  and  to  a  certain  extent  in 
Bosnia,  it  appeared  probable  that  the  explosion  would 
spread  throughout  the  Balkans.  That  revolution  was, 
however,  localised,  and  it  was  not  until  1877,  as  a 
result  of  the  massacre  of  Bulgarians  in  the  present 
kingdom  of  Bulgaria  in  1876,  that  Russia  took  up 
arms  to  protect  the  Slavs  of  the  south  and  waged 
a  war  which  constitutes  an  event  of  far-reaching 
importance. 

Whilst  the  actual  results  of  that  war  were  that  the 
Sultan  lost  a  considerable  area  of  his  European  do- 
minions, that  the  Principality  of  Bulgaria  and  the 
Province  of  Eastern  Roumelia  were  created,  that  the 
independence  of  Serbia  and  of  Roumania  from  Turkish 
suzerainty  was  recognised,  and  that  part  of  Armenia 
was  annexed  to  Russia,  the  real  bearing  of  that  cam- 


THE  NEAR  EAST  BEFORE  THE  GREAT  WAR  3 

paign  upon  the  future  history  of  this  part  of  the  world 
is  bound  up  not  so  much  with  these  results  as  with 
what  would  have  been  its  consequences  had  Russia 
been  left  undisturbed  to  settle  her  differences  with 
Turkey.  A  preliminary  treaty  was  signed  between  the 
representatives  of  the  Tsar  on  the  one  hand  and  those 
of  the  Sultan  on  the  other  on  March  17,  1878. 
Known  as  the  Treaty  of  San  Stefano,  in  Europe  it 
created  a  large  Bulgaria  and  in  Asia  it  practically  freed 
the  Armenians  from  Turkish  yoke.  But  that  agree- 
ment did  not  meet  with  the  approval  of  the  British 
Government,  which  feared  that  Bulgaria  would  become 
a  puppet  state  of  Russia,  and  that  the  expansion  of 
Muscovite  power  in  Asia  would  constitute  a  menace  to 
the  British  position  in  the  East.  The  results  were 
that  a  convention,  known  as  the  Cyprus  Convention, 
by  which  Great  Britain  guaranteed  the  integrity  of 
the  Ottoman  Empire,  in  exchange  for  the  Sultan's 
promise  to  introduce  the  necessary  reforms  in  his 
dominions,  and  for  the  lease  of  the  Island  of  Cyprus, 
was  signed  between  the  British  and  Turkish  govern- 
ments, and  that  a  European  Congress  was  summoned 
at  Berlin  in  June,  1878.  The  Treaty  of  Berlin,  which 
was  the  outcome  of  that  Congress,  handed  back  large 
districts  of  what  is  known  as  Macedonia  in  European 
Turkey,  inhabited  almost  exclusively  by  Bulgarians, 
to  Turkey,  and,  although  nominally  insisting  upon  re- 
forms in  that  area  and  in  Armenia,  in  fact  left  the 
people  of  those  unhappy  districts  at  the  mercy  of  the 
Ottoman  authorities.  In  short,  whilst  the  Russo- 
Turkish  Campaign  of  1877-1878  was  really  the  first 
war  fought  for  the  independence  of  Macedonia  and 
Armenia,   its   results   and   the   manner   in   which   the 


4  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE   WAR 

Great  Powers  allowed  Turkey  to  ignore  her  obligations 
of  reform  were  the  direct  causes  of  the  events  which 
led  up  to  the  Balkan  conflagrations  of  1912  and  1913 
—  conflagrations  which  in  their  turn  left  the  way  ready 
for  the  present  war. 

With  the  British  support  of  Bulgaria  in  1885,  when 
Eastern  Roumelia  was  incorporated  in  that  country, 
with  the  attitude  taken  up  by  the  British  Government 
during  the  Armenian  Massacre  crisis  of  1894-1896, 
and  with  the  granting  to  Crete  of  an  autonomous 
regime  in  1897,  there  occurred  a  nominal  change  of 
policy.  But  even  after  that  no  serious  attempts  were 
made  by  Europe  to  prevent  the  prolongation  of  a  reign 
of  terror  in  Macedonia  and  Armenia  —  a  reign  of  ter- 
ror which  was  rapidly  becoming  unbearable.  In  1903 
there  came  the  massacres  in  Macedonia  —  massacres 
which,  be  it  known,  were  accepted  as  constituting  the 
slaughter  of  a  Bulgarian  and  not  of  a  Serbian  popula- 
tion —  and  the  beginning  of  a  new  British  policy  arising 
not  from  Russian  but  from  German  danger.  Later  in 
that  year  there  was  formulated  an  arrangement  known 
as  the  Murzteg  Scheme  of  Reforms  —  a  scheme  which 
gave  Austria  and  Russia  the  predominating  share  in 
the  control  of  Macedonia  but  which  admitted  the 
presence  and  support  of  the  other  Great  Powers,  By 
it  and  by  the  agreements  subsequently  made,  all  sorts 
of  reforms  were  promised.  Civil  assessors  were  pro- 
vided, and  European  officers,  representing  all  the 
Great  Powers  except  Germany,  who  did  not  participate, 
were  appointed  for  the  purpose  of  seeing  that  these 
reforms  were  actually  carried  out  by  the  Ottoman 
Government.  This  scheme,  which  constituted  a  tardy 
effort  on  the  part  of  Europe  to  see  that  the  treaty 


THE  NEAR  EAST  BEFORE  THE  GREAT  WAR  5 

obligations  of  Turkey  were  actually  fulfilled,  was 
however  treated  as  a  scrap  of  paper ;  the  hands  of 
the  international  officials  were  tied,  and  the  state  of 
Macedonia  daily  grew  worse  and  worse.  In  Armenia, 
too,  the  lot  of  the  people  gradually  became  more 
dreadful,  for  whilst  reforms  were  discussed  and  pro- 
posed, Turkey,  profiting  by  the  differences  always 
existing  between  the  Great  Powers,  endeavoured 
slowly  to  annihilate  this  unhappy  race. 

It  was  during  this  troublous  period  that  the  Ameri- 
can Board  of  Commissioners  for  Foreign  Missions, 
which  has  its  headquarters  in  Boston,  established 
numerous  posts,  hospitals,  and  schools  in  Asia  Minor, 
and  began  to  perform  such  indefatigable  work  for  the 
amelioration  of  the  Ottoman  Christians.  The  repre- 
sentatives of  this  organisation,  many  of  whom  I  have 
been  privileged  to  meet,  and  much  of  whose  work  I 
have  been  able  to  watch,  have  devoted  themselves  with 
untiring  devotion  and  under  conditions  of  complete 
self-denial,  to  the  task  of  bettering  the  lives  of  and 
educating  the  peoples  who,  as  a  consequence,  have 
grown  to  realise  the  true  meaning  of  Western  culti- 
vation and  civilisation.  In  short,  the  existence  of  the 
Robert  College  at  Constantinople  and  of  the  College 
for  Girls  in  the  same  city,  which  are  not  directly  under 
the  control  of  the  above-mentioned  Board,  together 
with  the  judgment  and  the  high-mindedness  of  the 
American  missionaries,  are  largely  responsible  for  the 
facts  that  the  name  of  the  United  States  has  grown 
to  be  spoken  of  with  reverence,  and  that  America  is 
respected  throughout  Armenia,  Bulgaria,  and  Albania. 

Whilst  the  policies  of  England  and  Russia  during 
the  thirty  years  following  the  signature  of  the  Treaty 


6  THE   CRADLE  OF^  THE   WAR 

of  Berlin  may  be  described  as  those  of  procrastination, 
the  Central  Powers  and  particularly  Germany  were 
working  and  intriguing  for  the  maintenance  of  a  state 
of  unrest  in  the  East  destined  to  prepare  the  way  for 
the  eventual  realisation  of  their  policies.  Indeed, 
ever  since  the  accession  of  the  present  Emperor  to  the 
throne  in  1888  that  ruler  has  been  carefully  develop- 
ing his  influence  in  the  East.     One  year  later,  and  in 

1889,  His  Majesty  paid  his  first  visit  to  Constantinople 
—  a  visit  more  or  less  connected  with  the  then  recent 
grabbing  of  the  Scutari-Ismid  railway  and  with  the 
concession  for  the  prolongation  of  that  line  to  Angora 
as  a  German  concern.     Directly  afterwards,  early  in 

1890,  by  the  "Dropping  of  the  Pilot"  there  was  in  the 
retirement  of  Bismarck  a  clear  reversal  of  the  policy 
based  upon  the  assertions  of  that  statesman  to  the 
effect  that  the  whole  Eastern  question  was  "not 
worth  the  bones  of  a  Pomeranian  Grenadier."  Be- 
fore and  particularly  after  the  appointment  of  Baron 
Marshal  von  Bieberstein,  who  had  then  been  a  personal 
friend  of  the  Kaiser's  for  many  years,  as  Ambassador 
in  Constantinople  in  1897,  Germanic  policy  was  run 
with  the  sole  object  of  securing  concessions  in  and  gain- 
ing the  favour  of  Turkey.  Indeed  although  so  far  as 
the  Balkan  States  were  concerned  the  Kaiser  at  this 
time  endeavoured  to  screen  his  intentions  behind  a 
nominally  Austrian  programme,  he  was  really  pre- 
paring the  way  for  the  realisation  of  his  Pan-German 
dreams  in  the  Near  and  Middle  Easts.  Thus  the 
power  of  Von  der  Goltz  Pasha,  who  introduced  the 
present  military  system  into  Turkey  in  1886,  and  of 
his  pupils  was  greatly  increased  until  the  Ottoman 
army  was  finally  completely  under  Germanic  control. 


THE  NEAR  EAST  BEFORE  THE   GREAT  WAR     7 

After  the  Turco-Greek  War  of  1807,  the  Government 
of  Berlin  favoured  Turkey  in  the  settlement.  In  1898 
the  Emperor  paid  his  second  visit  to  the  Ottoman 
Empire  —  a  visit  nominally  undertaken  as  a  peaceful 
pilgrimage  to  Jerusalem  but  an  excursion  really  decided 
upon  as  an  elaborately  arranged  coup  de  thedtre.  It 
was  during  that  visit  that  the  German  ruler  even  went 
so  far  as  to  proclaim  himself  the  friend  of  the  Sultan 
and  of  all  the  Moslems  who  venerated  him  "for  al- 
ways"—  a  declaration  no  doubt  in  part  responsible 
for  the  Bagdad  Railway  concession  which  almost 
immediately  followed.  In  the  later  nineties,  too, 
whilst  reserving  their  right  to  a  voice  in  its  final  settle- 
ment, Germany  and  Austria  withdrew  from  the  Concert 
of  Europe,  so  far  as  concerned  the  Cretan  question, 
thereby,  of  course,  securing  the  good  will  of  the  ex- 
Sultan.  Abdul  Hamid's  refusal  to  introduce  reforms 
in  his  administration,  continued  unrest  in  his  European 
dominions,  and  the  appointment  of  European  officers 
to  the  Macedonian  gendarmerie  in  1906,  were  all  in 
their  turns  utilised  to  further  the  enemy's  cause.  In 
short,  whilst  divergencies  of  opinion  among  the  Great 
Powers  in  regard  to  the  Eastern  question  would,  in 
any  case,  have  rendered  combined  action  in  favour  of 
reforms  most  difficult,  the  definite  support  given  by 
Germany  to  the  Sultan,  with  the  express  purpose  of 
securing  a  powerful  ally  when  "The  Day"  came, 
actually  encouraged  that  ruler  in  the  maintenance  of 
a  regime  which  finally  became  an  actual  disgrace  to  the 
whole  civilised  world. 

So  much  for  the  events  which  took  place  during  the 
period  preceding  the  developments  which  immediately 
led  to  the  Young  Turkish  Revolution  of  July,   1908. 


8  THE  CRADLE  OF  THE  WAR 

The  way  for  that  revolution  was  made  ready  by  the 
fact  that  the  atrocities  and  misgovernment  permitted 
by  the  Sultan  had  created  a  state  of  things  which  was 
not  only  intolerable  to   all  the  subject  races   of  the 
Empire,  but  also  to    the  more   liberal-minded  Turks 
themselves.     The  actual  outbreak  of  1908  resulted  in- 
directly from  the  existence  of  the  Anglo-French  and 
the  Anglo-Russian   ententes,   which  came  into  being 
respectively  in  1904  and  1907,  and  directly  from  the 
meeting  of  King  Edward  with  the  ex-Tsar  at  Reval, 
on  June  9,  1908.     It  was  that  meeting  which  decided 
the   Committee  of  Union   and  Progress,   then   still  a 
secret  organisation,  to  take  immediate  action.     That 
action  was  rendered  possible  by  the  spreading  of  untrue 
propaganda  in  the  Ottoman  army  to  the  effect  that  the 
British  policy  bound  up  with  the  Crimean  War  had 
been  reversed,  and  that  England  and  Russia  had  now 
united  with  the  object  of  bringing  about  the  dismem- 
berment of  Turkey.     In  addition,  the  Albanians,  who 
were  holding  a  Congress  at  Ferisovitch  in  the  follow- 
ing month,  were  utilised  by  the  Young  Turks  to  de- 
mand from  Abdul  Hamid  a  constitution,  the  meaning 
of    which    they    did    not    understand.     This    demand, 
which  was  embodied  in  a  telegram,  nominally  from  the 
Albanians,  but  really  concocted  by  the  Committee  of 
Union  and  Progress  assembled  at  Uskub,  and  addressed 
to  the  Sultan,  finally  convinced  His  Majesty,  who  de- 
pended upon  but  none   the  less  feared   his  Albanian 
Guard,   that   a   constitution    must   be   granted.     The 
decree    actually    establishing   the    New   Regime    was 
signed  at  the  end  of  July,  1908. 

Internationally  and  locally  the  Young  Turkish  Revo- 
lution, the  annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  by 


THE  NEAR  EAST  BEFORE  THE  GREAT  WAR  9 

Austria-Hungary,  and  the  declaration  of  independence 
by  Bulgaria  which  followed  that  revolution,  mark  an 
all-important  epoch  in  the  development  of  affairs  in 
the  Balkans,  and  in  European  history,  which  for  years 
has  been  so  closely  bound  up  with  the  situation  in  the 
Near  East.  Internationally  speaking,  whilst  the  revo- 
lution in  Turkey  for  a  time  caused  the  Ottoman  Gov- 
ernment to  turn  towards  England  instead  of  towards 
Germany,  the  annexation  of  Bosnia  and  the  inde- 
pendence of  Bulgaria  are  of  primary  importance,  and 
therefore  I  will  begin  by  a  brief  reference  to  the  mean- 
ing of  these  events. 

As  a  result  of  a  cabinet  council  held  at  Rustchuk 
during  the  night  of  October  4-5,  the  actual  decla- 
ration of  Bulgarian  independence  was  made  by  King 
Ferdinand  at  Turnovo,  the  ancient  capital  of  Bul- 
garia, on  October  5,  1908.  Prior  to  this  whether  or 
not  any  formal  agreement  had  been  arrived  at  be- 
tween the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  and  Prince 
Ferdinand  concerning  the  annexation  of  the  then 
only  *' occupied"  provinces  and  the  declaration  of 
Bulgarian  independence  has  always  been  far  from 
clear.  However  this  may  be,  and  however  vehemently 
both  the  parties  who  tore  up  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  in 
October,  1908,  may  deny  that  any  arrangement  was 
made,  it  is  certain  that  when  Prince  Ferdinand  ar- 
rived at  Budapest  on  September  23,  he  was  received 
by  the  Emperor  Francis  Joseph  with  royal  honours. 
There  is  no  doubt,  too,  that  the  proclamation  of  Bul- 
garian independence,  at  an  early  date,  was  actually 
decided  upon  by  Prince  Ferdinand  during  his  visit 
to  Vienna  at  the  end  of  September.  The  question 
whether,  and  if  so  when.  Count  Aehi'enthal  was  actually 


10  THE  CRADLE  OF  THE  WAR 

officially  informed  of  the  Bulgarian  programme  is 
extremely  delicate.  Although,  on  October  3,  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Foreign  Minister  officially  denied 
to  the  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna  all  knowledge  of 
the  impending  declaration  of  Bulgarian  independence, 
yet  the  Ambassador  of  the  Dual  Monarchy  in  Paris, 
when  presenting  the  letter  announcing  the  forth- 
coming annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  to 
President  Fallieres  on  October  3,  actually  informed 
His  Excellency  of  the  imminent  declaration  of  Bul- 
garian independence.  Whatever  may  have  been  the 
knowledge  officially  possessed  by  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian Government  as  to  the  imminence  of  the  Bul- 
garian declaration  of  independence  it  is  therefore 
probable  that  Prince  Ferdinand,  possibly  even  in 
possession  of  Austro-Hungarian  assurances  that  a 
declaration  of  independence  would  subsequently  be 
permitted  if  the  Bulgarian  people  remained  calm  during 
what  was  expected  would  only  be  formalities  concern- 
ing the  annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  may 
have  considered  it  advisable  to  make  good  his  oppor- 
tunity, and  effect  his  national  couj)  d'etat,  while  the 
statesmen  of  the  Dual  Monarchy  were  still  putting  the 
finishing  touches  upon  their  arrangements  for  the 
formal  annexation  of  the  already  "occupied "provinces. 
By  far  the  most  important  international  results  of 
the  annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  on  October 
7,  1908,  were  what  may  be  described  as  the  throwing 
back  of  the  Dual  Monarchy  into  the  arms  of  Germany, 
and  the  accentuation  of  the  division  already  becoming 
clearly  marked  between  the  Triple  Entente  and  the 
Triple  Alliance.  The  policy  of  Count  Aehrenthal, 
which  seems  to  have  been  framed  with  the  idea  that 


THE  NEAR  EAST  BEFORE  THE  GREAT  WAR  U 

the  annexation  of  the  two  ah*eady  "occupied"  provinces 
would  be  a  mere  formality,  will  probably  be  handed 
down  in  history  as  one  of  the  greatest  mistakes  ever 
made  in  statesmanship.  Instead  of  strengthening  the 
European  position  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Govern- 
ment, the  annexation,  apparently  made  in  ignorance 
of  its  immediate  and  far-reaching  consequences,  forced 
the  Government  of  the  late  Emperor  to  turn  to  Ger- 
many for  diplomatic  assistance  —  assistance  which 
was  given  but  only  at  the  expense  of  Austria  once  more 
becoming  the  mere  puppet  of  her  northern  neighbour, 
intsead  of  being  able  to  develop  her  own  independent 
existence.  Moreover,  as  I  shall  show  elsewhere,  the 
policy  of  Count  Aehrenthal  went  a  long  way  towards 
increasing  the  tension  already  existing  between  Austria- 
Hungary  and  Serbia  —  a  tension  as  a  result  of  which 
it  was  certain  that,  at  the  given  moment,  Russia  would 
come  to  the  support  of  her  little  Slav  brothers.  It  was 
these  consequences  which  so  greatly  enhanced  the  dif- 
ficulties accruing  between  Austro-Hungary  and  Russia 
during  the  Balkan  Wars  —  difficulties  which  were  in 
part  responsible  for  the  unsatisfactory  arrangement 
of  1913. 

The  settlement  between  Turkey  and  Bulgaria,  fol- 
lowing the  declaration  of  independence  by  King 
Ferdinand  on  October  5,  1908,  in  a  way  constituted  a 
set-off  to  the  annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina, 
because,  whilst  the  Russian  Government  lost  prestige 
at  home  and  abroad  as  the  result  of  its  inability  to 
come  to  the  assistance  of  Serbia,  it  gained  international 
reputation  and  strengthened  its  position  in  both  direc- 
tions by  stepping  into  the  breach  between  Bulgaria 
and  Turkey.     In  February,  1909,  and  therefore  when 


12  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE  WAR 

the  crisis  between  these  two  countries  had  been  in 
progress  for  four  months,  a  deadlock  in  the  negotiations 
had  been  reached.  Russia  then  addressed  a  circular 
Note  to  the  Great  Powers,  signifying  her  willingness  to 
come  to  some  arrangement  with  the  two  parties  con- 
cerned —  an  arrangement  which  would  make  good  to 
Turkey  the  difference  between  the  sum  already  ten- 
dered to  and  that  claimed  by  her.  Finally,  and  about  a 
month  later,  the  Muscovite  Government  cancelled 
part  of  the  then  remaining  seventy-four  instalments 
of  the  1878  war  indemnity  due  to  her  from  Turkey, 
and  accepted  in  exchange  the  approximately  82,000,000 
francs  already  tendered  to  Turkey  by  Bulgaria.  By 
this  arrangement  Russia  may  have  been  temporarily  and 
materially  the  loser,  but  she  thereby  gained  credit  in 
the  arena  of  European  diplomacy  by  preventing  an 
outbreak  of  hostilities  in  the  Balkans  —  an  outbreak 
which  in  all  probability  it  would  have  been  impossible 
to  localise. 

To  summarise  and  to  give  any  comprehensive  idea 
of  the  meaning  of  the  Young  Turkish  Revolution  in 
what  was  then  the  Ottoman  Empire  itself,  or  to  de- 
scribe the  effect  of  that  movement  in  the  countries 
bordering  upon  Turkey,  are  questions  of  the  utmost 
difficulty.  In  July,  1908,  as  I  have  already  said,  the 
Young  Turks  successfully  brought  about  a  coup  cVHat, 
which,  though  it  endowed  the  people  with  a  nominal 
constitution,  in  fact  created,  in  the  form  of  the  Com- 
mittee of  Union  and  Progress,  a  hidden  and  secret 
government  even  more  autocratic  than  that  of  Abdul 
Hamid.  Much  has  been  written  upon  the  subject  of 
the  organisation  and  work  of  that  Committee,  and 
though  many  be  the  conversations  which  I  have  had 


THE  NEAR  EAST  BEFORE  THE  GREAT  WAR    13 

with  its  prominent  members,  I  can  assert  here,  without 
fear  of  contradiction,  that  but  very  few,  except  the 
inner  and  secret  ring  of  Young  Turks  themselves,  even 
now  understand  more  than  the  vaguest  details  of  the 
manner  in  which  this  mysterious  organisation  attained 
its  power,  spread  its  influence,  and,  from  the  moment 
of  the  change  of  regime  in  1908,  kept  the  entire  govern- 
ment of  the  country  in  its  hands.  All  that  need  be 
said  here,  therefore,  is  that  this  body,  which  on  various 
occasions  has  made  a  pretence  of  coming  out  into  the 
open  and  becoming  an  ofiicial  organisation,  has  never- 
theless really  existed  as  a  secret  group  of  individuals, 
the  exact  roles  and  powder  of  whom  nobody  has  ever 
been  able  to  discern  with  certainty.  Thus  whilst  we 
have  all  heard  a  great  deal  about  the  influence  and 
prestige  of  men  like  Enver  and  Talaat  Pashas,  the 
outside  world  knows  but  little  of  others,  such  as  Doctor 
Nazim,  who  really  constitute  and  are  the  secret  in- 
fluence behind  the  throne.  This  all-important  poli- 
tician scarcely  ever  appears  in  public,  his  name  rarely 
figures  in  the  papers,  and  he  has  never  taken  a  govern- 
mental post.  In  conversation  he  appears  most  mod- 
erate, most  liberal,  and  quite  honest.  But  his  never 
changing  one-sidedness,  his  secret  chauvinism,  and  his 
determination  to  ignore  the  true  meaning  of  Liberalism, 
render  him  absolutely  typical  of  the  Young  Turk 
mentality,  and  in  fact  make  him  the  personification 
and  the  actual  backbone  of  the  Committee  of  Union 
and  Progress  itself. 

The  outstanding  feature  of  the  situation  in  the 
Ottoman  Empire  is  the  fact  that  its  ruling  nation, 
the  Turks,  constitutes  only  a  minority  of  the  inhabit- 
ants, and  that  they  liav^e  formed,  and  do  form,  an  army 


14  THE  CRADLE  OF  THE   WAR 

of  occupation  in  the  country  which  they  purport  to 
govern.  This  means  either  that  there  can  be  no 
LiberaKsm  or  Constitutionahsm  in  the  country,  or 
that  its  ruhng  caste  would  be  outnumbered  and  out- 
voted by  the  various  ahen  races  of  which  the  population 
is  so  largely  composed.  When  the  Young  Turks  came 
into  power,  they  proclaimed  as  their  motto  "Liberty, 
Fraternity,  and  Equality ",  and  asserted  that  what 
they  wished  to  bring  about  was  a  state  of  feeling  by 
which  the  former  differences  between  Turks,  Greeks, 
Bulgarians,  Arabs,  etc.  should  be  obliterated  —  a 
state  of  feeling  in  which  there  would  only  be  "Otto- 
mans." But  the  so-called  "  Ottomanisation "  of  the 
Empire  really  meant  the  attempted  "  Turcification " 
of  the  subject  races  —  an  attempted  "Turcification" 
which  has  constituted  and  still  constitutes  the  funda- 
mental basis  of  the  struggle  which  has  been  and  is  in 
progress  in  the  dominions  of  the  Sultan. 

The  historical  events  of  the  years  1908-1912  are  so 
closely  bound  up  with  the  internal  situation  in  Turkey 
that  I  propose  to  discuss  them  all  in  connection  with 
that  situation,  and  to  divide  my  remarks  into  three 
sections,  each  devoted  to  a  more  or  less  clearly  defined 
stage  in  the  development  of  Near-Eastern  affairs. 
The  first  stage  is  that  which  may  be  said  to  have  lasted 
for  approximately  a  year  from  the  time  of  the  advent 
to  power  of  the  Young  Turks.  During  it  the  in- 
stigators of  the  New  Regime  did  something  to  im- 
prove the  everyday  conditions  of  life  by  bringing  about 
the  downfall  of  many  of  Abdul  Hamid's  spies,  by  in- 
creasing personal  security,  and,  up  to  a  point,  by  al- 
lowing freedom  of  speech  and  of  the  press.  These 
changes,  together  with  the  promise  of  equality  for  all 


THE   NEAR  EAST   BEFORE  THE  GREAT  WiVR    15 

Ottomans,  created  in  the  minds  of  the  non-Turkish 
inhabitants  feelings  of  expectancy  for  the  future.  The 
leaders  of  the  bands  came  in  from  the  mountains  and, 
on  receiving  a  guarantee  of  a  general  amnesty,  decided 
to  throw  in  their  lot  with  the  so-called  reformers.  At 
first  a  kind  of  millennium  seemed  to  have  come.  As  a 
result  of  this,  when  I  visited  Macedonia  in  the  sum- 
mer of  1909,  I  found  that  everybody  hoped  that  some 
real  reforms  would  be  introduced,  that  the  Government 
would  take  the  leaders  of  the  various  races  into  its 
confidence,  and  that  the  Christian  populations  would 
be  permitted  to  play  their  part  in  the  direction  of  the 
country,  and  to  work  out  the  manner  in  which  reform 
should  be  executed  in  the  best  interests  of  the  Empire 
as  a  whole. 

The  Committee  not  only  refrained  from  living  up 
to  these  hopes,  but,  having  obtained  an  enormous 
majority  in  the  Chamber,  it  openly  filled  the  whole 
Ministry  and  all  the  government  appointments  with 
men  recruited  from  its  ranks.  No  endeavours  were 
made  to  devote  adequate  sums  of  money  to  the  con- 
struction of  roads  or  railways  other  than  those  required 
for  strategical  purposes.  In  spite  of  the  early  and  un- 
doubted loyalty  of  the  leaders  of  the  various  Christian 
races,  the  Armenians  of  the  Cilician  Plain  were  butch- 
ered in  thousands  in  April,  1909,  and  a  determined 
policy  destined  to  withdraw  many  of  the  privileges, 
possessed  in  a  greater  or  lesser  degree  by  all  the  Chris- 
tian races  of  the  Empire,  was  inaugurated.  Educa- 
tional and  religious  freedom  were  curtailed,  a  brigandage 
law  was  put  into  operation  in  Macedonia  before  it  was 
even  passed  by  the  Chamber,  and  the  enforced  sur- 
render of  arms  was  so  brutally  carried  out  that  a  reign 


16  THE  CRADLE  OF  THE  WAR 

of  terror  was  soon  created,  as  terrible  as  that  which 
existed  prior  to  1908.  The  Bulgarians  were  oppressed 
because  of  the  fear  of  the  support  which  might  accrue 
to  them  from  their  already  freed  brethren  of  the  king- 
dom of  Bulgaria ;  the  Greeks  were  persecuted  on  ac- 
count of  the  then  state  of  the  Cretan  question,  and  the 
Albanians  were  maltreated  because  of  their  desire  to 
proclaim  the  existence  of  their  nationality  and  to  im- 
prove their  education.  In  short,  so  rapidly  and  so 
disastrously  did  things  develop  that  when  I  returned 
to  Macedonia,  early  in  1910,  I  found  the  condition  of 
things  much  worse  than  it  had  been  only  six  months 
previously.  Instead  of  expectancy  there  was  hope- 
lessness, and  in  place  of  loyalty  there  was  natural  dis- 
trust. 

The  second  stage  in  the  development  of  the  internal 
situation  in  Turkey  extended  approximately  from  the 
beginning  of  the  year  1910  until  the  end  of  1911. 
When  I  was  in  Turkey  in  the  winter  of  1909-1910,  as 
I  have  already  explained,  the  non-Turkish  elements 
of  the  population  were  not  slow  to  abuse  the  New 
Regime.  Albanians,  Greeks,  Bulgars,  and  Serbs  alike 
complained,  and  with  reason,  that  the  elections  had 
been  gerrymandered,  and  that  the  Young  Turks  had 
not  fulfilled  their  promises  made  in  1908.  But  in  1909 
these  people  did  not  assert  that  the  Moslem  population 
was  being  armed  by  the  Government,  that  men  were 
being  illegally  arrested,  that  Turkish  bands  were 
being  secretly  formed  for  the  purpose  of  exterminating 
people  believed  to  be  in  relation  with  revolutionaries, 
and  that  Christians,  marked  down  for  death,  were 
being  assassinated  by  order  of  the  Committee  of 
Union  and  Progress.     During  a  tour  in  Macedonia  and 


THE  NEAR  EAST  BEFORE  THE  GREAT  WAR  17 

Albania  after  the  outbreak  of  the  Turco-ItaHan  War, 
men  of  all  nationalities  informed  me,  I  have  every 
reason  to  believe  correctly,  that  the  Turkish  Govern- 
ment or,  perhaps  more  correctly,  the  predominating 
clique  of  the  Committee  was  actually  sanctioning,  or 
at  least  conniving  at,  this  state  of  things. 

At  that  time  the  situation  in  Macedonia  was  there- 
fore as  bad,  if  not  worse,  than  that  existing  prior  to  the 
Constitution.  Instead  of  the  promised  equality  for 
all  nationalities,  the  non-Turkish  elements  of  the 
population  hud,  so  to  speak,  been  placed  beyond  the 
pale  of  common  justice.  Christians  were  expelled 
from  their  farms  in  order  to  be  replaced  by  Mouhaggirs 
(Moslem  emigrants)  from  Bosnia  and  Bulgaria.  A 
systematic  and  organised  campaign  for  the  murder  of 
a  large  number  of  Bulgarians  was  instituted.  In 
short,  the  Constitutioji  had  been  reduced  to  nothing 
but  a  name.  Moreover,  whereas  under  the  Old 
Regime  the  people  enjoyed  a  certain  protection  from 
Europe  under  various  schemes  of  reform  sanctioned 
and  undertaken  by  the  Great  Powers,  and  whereas 
their  religious  chiefs  were  then  treated  with  a  certain 
deference  by  the  Constantinople  Government,  two 
years  after  the  establishment  of  the  Constitution  these 
advantages  had  been  done  away  with  and  instead  no 
amelioration  in  the  actual  system  of  government  had 
been  introduced.  Upon  this  point  the  feeling  of  the 
population  seems  to  have  been  well  expressed  in  a 
memorandum,  drawn  up  by  the  Committee  of  the 
Bulgarian  Internal  Organisation,  and  handed  to  the 
Consuls  of  Great  Britain,  Russia,  Austria-Hungary, 
and  France,  on  October  31,  1911.  After  discussing 
various  aspects  of  the  situation   in   Macedonia,   this 


18  THE  CRADLE   OF  THE  WAR 

document  declared  that:  "Comparing  the  present 
state  of  things  to  that  which  existed  during  the  last 
four  years  of  the  reign  of  Abdul  Hamid,  when  there 
was  in  Macedonia  a  European  Control,  and  when  the 
country  enjoyed  a  certain  financial  autonomy,  the 
people  find  the  present  situation  much  more  abominable 
and  much  more  insupportable." 

In  Albania  the  fundamental  causes  of  unrest  —  the 
attempted  denationalisation  of  the  people  —  were  the 
same  as  in  Macedonia.  The  system  employed  by  the 
authorities  and  the  attitude  adopted  by  the  inhabit- 
ants were,  however,  somewhat  different.  The  Young 
Turks,  in  place  of  the  secret  persecution  adopted  in 
Macedonia,  almost  immediately  took  open  measures 
to  endeavour  to  reduce  these  warlike  mountaineers, 
who  had  always  enjoyed  a  sort  of  semi-independence, 
to  a  state  of  humble  obedience  to  the  Central  Govern- 
ment. The  result  of  this  was  that  the  Albanian  ques- 
tion, which  was  perhaps  the  most  important  problem 
for  solution  by  the  Government,  at  once  became  a 
burning  question,  and  that  the  attitude  of  the  Turkish 
chauvinists  brought  about  an  almost  immediate  and 
continuous  revolution.  In  the  summer  of  1910  an 
insurrection,  which  had  for  its  causes  the  above-men- 
tioned policy  of  the  Young  Turks  and  also  the  brutal 
measures  taken  by  Djavid  Pasha  in  Albania  in  1908 
and  1909,  broke  out  in  the  vilayets  of  Scutari  and 
Uskub.  That  insurrection,  which  was  rife  almost 
from  end  to  end  of  Northern  Albania,  necessitated 
the  sending  of  a  considerable  Turkish  expeditionary 
force  which,  although  partially  successful,  carried  out 
its  work  with  such  brutality  that  the  seeds  were  sown 
for  the  Malissori  Revolution  which  took  place  during 


THE  NEAR  EAST  BEFORE  THE  GREAT  WAR  19 

the  summer  of  the  followmg  year.  That  revolution, 
which  began  early  in  1911  and  lasted  until  the  autumn, 
was  really  the  beginning  of  the  end  so  far  as  the  Young 
Turks  were  concerned,  for  it  proved  that  the  Albanians, 
disorganised  and  divided  as  they  were,  could  wring 
from  the  Government  concessions  —  concessions  which 
though  never  honestly  carried  out,  nevertheless  showed 
to  Europe  and  to  the  neighbouring  Balkan  States 
that  nothing  could  be  accomplished  in  Turkey  other- 
wise than  by  force. 

This  was  the  situation  in  the  Ottoman  Empire 
itself  at  the  time  of  the  outbreak  and  during  the  early 
months  of  the  Turco-Italian  War.  Beyond  its  Eu- 
ropean frontiers,  the  neighbours  of  Turkey  were  wait- 
ing with  anxiety  the  development  of  events  in  the 
Balkan  Peninsula  and  elsewhere.  The  governments 
responsible  for  the  foreign  policies  of  Greece,  Serbia, 
Montenegro,  and  Bulgaria,  all  of  whose  Leaders  I  saw 
at  the  time,  whilst  professedly  anxious  for  the  im- 
mediate reestablishment  of  peace  and  for  the  main- 
tenance of  the  "Status  Quo",  were  still  more  concerned 
in  making  certain  that,  in  view  of  the  attitude  of 
Europe,  their  particular  country  should  not  be  the 
first  to  disturb  the  peace  of  this  ever  Danger  Zone  of 
Europe.  The  positions  of  all  these  Ministers  were 
extremely  difficult,  for  they  were  each  threatened  by 
a  like  danger  —  a  danger  due  to  the  fact  that  the 
more  chauvinistic  politicians  of  each  country  were  in 
favour  of  a  forward  policy  drawni  up  with  the  object 
of  endeavouring  immediately  to  better  the  lot  of  their 
brothers  domiciled  across  the  Ottoman  frontier.  In 
Greece  the  Government  was  faced  by  the  complica- 
tions of  and  consequent   upon   the   Cretan   question. 


20  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE   WAR 

At  Belgrade  the  situation  was  particularly  Intricate, 
because  the  Serbian  Administration  was  forced  either 
quietly  to  witness  the  ill-treatment  of  the  Serbs  in 
Turkey  by  their  Moslem  fellow  countrymen  or  else 
to  draw  the  attention  of  Europe  to  a  situation  of  dis- 
order in  the  Ottoman  Empire,  by  way  of  which  alone 
Serbia  could  gain  access  to  the  sea.  At  Cettlnje  the 
Montenegrin  authorities  were  in  daily  danger  of  find- 
ing themselves  in  the  awkward  dilemma  of  either 
refusing  readmisslon  to  the  discontented  Albanians, 
or  of  facing  the  dangerous  situation  to  be  created  by 
a  fresh  Albanian  immigration.  At  Sofia  the  King  and 
his  advisers  were  not  only  compelled  to  study  the 
feelings  of  the  powerful  section  of  the  population  which 
interests  itself  almost  exclusively  in  the  welfare  of  the 
Macedonian  Bulgars,  but  they  were  also  menaced  by 
the  attitude  of  the  people  who  thought  that  the  time 
had  come  for  the  employment  of  the  powerful  Bul- 
garian army,  in  order  to  solve  once  and  for  all  the 
Macedonian  question.  Thanks,  however,  to  the  far-see- 
ing and  moderate  attitudes  adopted  by  M.  Venezelos, 
by  the  late  M.  Milovanovitch,  by  M.  Gregovitch,  and  by 
M.  Gueshoff ,  the  policies  of  Greece,  Serbia,  Montenegro, 
and  Bulgaria  were  so  shaped  that  none  of  those  coun- 
tries rushed  into  war  in  the  autumn  of  1911,  and  they 
therefore  had  time  adequately  to  prepare  for  and  to 
make  the  arrangements  necessary  for  the  first  Balkan 
campaign. 

We  now  come  to  the  third  stage  —  the  negotiations 
and  events  actually  bound  up  with  the  formation  of 
the  Balkan  League  —  negotiations  which  partially 
overlapped  the  second  stage  and  to  which  I  will  allude 
in    their    chronological    order.     M.    Gueshoff   begame 


THE   NEAR  EAST   BEFORE  THE  GREAT  WAR    21 

Bulgarian  Premier  in  March,  1911.  Shortly  after- 
wards and  in  May,  tentative  overtures  were  made  to 
him  through  the  medium  of  Mr.  James  D.  Bourchier 
—  the  well-known  correspondent  of  The  Times  in  the 
Balkans  —  who  was  then  in  Athens.  From  that 
time  onwards,  whilst  relations  between  Bulgaria  and 
Greece  were  certainly  improved,  nothing  was  done 
until  October,  when  the  Greek  Minister  at  Sofia  in- 
formed M..  Gueshoff  that  Greece  would  be  prepared 
to  support  Bulgaria  in  case  she  were  attacked  by 
Turkey,  provided  the  latter  country  were  willing  to 
enter  into  a  corresponding  undertaking.  The  Gov- 
ernment of  Bulgaria,  then  threatened  by  the  mobili- 
sation of  the  Ottoman  army  which  took  place  on  the 
outbreak  of  the  Turco-Italian  War,  agreed  to  those 
proposals,  but  nothing  definite  was  then  done  to  in- 
corporate them  in  treaty  form. 

The  beginning  of  that  war  found  M.  Gueshoff  at 
Vichy,  but  he  returned  immediately  to  Bulgaria, 
holding  a  conference  with  ]\I.  Milovanovitch,  then 
Serbian  Premier,  in  the  train  and  on  his  way  through 
that  country.  That  conference  established  a  basis  for 
the  ensuing  negotiations  which  were  conducted  be- 
tween M.  Gueshoff  and  M.  Spalaikovitch,  who  was 
appointed  to  represent  Serbia.  These  negotiations, 
which  took  the  form  of  proposals  and  counter  proposals 
upon  the  subject  of  the  future  of  Macedonia  and  other 
matters  of  importance,  continued  in  Sofia,  Belgrade, 
and  Paris,  to  which  latter  place  M.  Milovanovitch 
went  with  the  King  of  Serbia,  until  the  two  countries 
finally  signed  a  definite  Treaty  of  Alliance  and  a  Secret 
Annex  —  which  are  published  in  full  by  M.  Gueshoff 
in  his  book  entitled  "The  Balkan  League" — on  March 


22  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE  WAR 

14,  1912.  That  Treaty,  which  was  defensive  in  char- 
acter, definitely  guaranteed  the  support  of  each  party 
to  the  other  in  the  event  of  one  of  them  being  attacked 
by  one  or  more  States,  or  in  the  event  of  any  Great 
Power  attempting  to  invade  or  annex  any  part  of 
then  Turkey  in  Europe  in  a  manner  contrary  to  the 
vital  interests  of  either  party.  Over  and  above  these 
stipulations,  undertakings  were  entered  into  binding  the 
two  signatories  not  to  conclude  peace  independently 
and  arranging  for  the  immediate  formulation  of  a 
military  convention  which  was  signed  about  six  weeks 
later. 

The  Secret  Annex,  which  has  turned  out  to  be  really 
more  important  than  the  Treaty  itself,  foresaw  the 
probability  that  internal  or  external  difficulties  in 
Turkey  itself  might  render  the  maintenance  of  the 
Status  Quo  impossible  and  fixed  the  terms  upon  which 
action  might  then  be  taken.  In  addition  it  definitely 
decided  the  future  distribution  of  any  areas  acquired 
either  as  a  result  of  the  defensive  treaty  or  of  what 
may  be  called  the  oflFensive  annex.  Whilst  all  terri- 
torial gains  were  to  constitute  common  property,  their 
repartition  was  to  take  place  upon  a  definite  basis. 
Serbia  recognised  the  right  of  Bulgaria  to  the  territory 
east  of  the  Rhodopes  and  the  River  Struma,  whilst 
Bulgaria  recognised  the  similar  right  of  Serbia  to  the 
territory  north  and  west  of  the  Schar  Mountains. 
With  regard  to  the  area  lying  between  these  two 
boundaries,  if  the  two  governments  became  convinced 
that  the  formation  of  an  autonomous  province  were 
impossible,  then  Serbia  undertook  to  ask  for  nothing 
beyond  a  line  drawn  from  Mount  Golem  on  the  north- 
east  to   Lake   Ochrida   on   the    southwest.     Bulgaria 


M.    GUESHOFF 


THE  NEiVR   EAST  BEFORE  THE  GREAT  WAR    23 

promised  to  accept  this  line,  if  His  Majesty  llie  Tsar, 
who  was  to  be  requested  to  arbitrate,  decided  in  its 
favour.  As  autonomy  was  not  then  possible,  the 
meaning  of  this  agreement  was  that  the  Serbs  were 
to  claim  nothing  beyond  the  Mount  Golem-Lake 
Ochrida  line,  that  the  Bulgarians  were  to  claim  nothing 
to  the  north  and  west  of  the  Schar  Mountains,  and  that 
all  disputes  concerning  the  district  between  these  two 
lines,  known  as  the  "Contested  Zone",  were  "to  be 
submitted  to  the  final  decision  of  Russia  as  soon  as 
one  of  the  contracting  parties  declared  that,  in  his 
opinion,  an  agreement  by  direct  negotiations  is  im- 
possible." 

The  military  convention  subsequently  signed  be- 
tween Bulgaria  and  Serbia  —  a  convention  later  fol- 
lowed by  various  agreements  between  the  respective 
General  Staffs  —  defined  the  military  liabilities  of  the 
two  countries  towards  one  another  in  case  of  a  de- 
fensive or  offensive  war  and  laid  down  the  obligations 
of  the  respective  parties  in  the  case  of  a  declaration  of 
war  upon  Bulgaria  by  Roumania,  and  of  Austrian  or 
Turkish  attacks  upon  Serbia.  The  number  of  troops 
to  be  furnished  by  the  respective  countries  and  certain 
arrangements  as  to  their  distribution  were  foreseen. 
All  manner  of  arrangements  were  made  to  endeavour 
to  secure  the  smooth  working  of  the  Alliance  and  to 
prevent  the  development  of  any  friction  between  the 
commands  or  between  the  armies  themselves.  In 
fact,  had  it  not  been  for  the  inherent  rivalry  existing 
between  the  two  peoples  and  for  their  almost  irreconcil- 
able aspirations,  the  arrangements  made  upon  paper 
were  so  little  short  of  perfect  that  one  might  have 
expected  that  they  would  operate  in  war  almost  as 


24  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE   W/VR 

smoothly  as  the  most  formal  arrangement  governing 
the  relations  of  two  countries  in  peace  time. 

During  the  period  of  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  negotia- 
tions, conversations  were  in  progress  between  the  Bul- 
garian Government  and  the  Hellenic  representative  at 
Sofia.  These  conversations  failed  to  materialise  until 
after  the  signature  of  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  Treaty  largely 
because  the  Greeks  were  slow  to  accept  the  principle 
of  autonomy  for  Macedonia  advocated  by  Bulgaria  — 
a  principle  based  on  the  Twenty-third  Article  of  the 
Treaty  of  Berlin.  However,  in  May,  1912,  the  Hel- 
lenic Government  agreed  to  the  Bulgarian  proposals, 
and  a  definite  Treaty  was  signed  at  Sofia  on  the  twenty- 
ninth  of  that  month.  That  Treaty,  also  published  by 
M.  Gueshoff,  guaranteed  to  each  of  its  signatories  the 
support  of  the  other  in  case  of  war  with  Turkey,  but 
it  made  no  arrangement  whatever  as  to  the  future 
distribution  of  the  territories  to  be  acquired  in  a 
common  war.  It  was  followed  three  months  later  by 
a  military  convention  which  set  out  the  respective 
liabilities  of  the  two  countries  —  a  convention  signed 
immediately  before  the  outbreak  of  the  first  Balkan 
War. 

There  now  remains  only  the  question  of  the  re- 
lations between  Montenegro  and  her  neighbours.  That 
country,  which  had  been  on  very  strained  terms  with 
Serbia  for  some  years,  greatly  improved  her  relations 
with  Bulgaria  as  a  result  of  the  personal  visit  paid 
by  King  Ferdinand  to  King  Nicholas  on  the  occasion 
of  the  latter  proclaiming  himself  king  of  his  country 
in  August,  1910,  and  as  a  consequence  of  the  ability 
displayed  by  M.  Kolousheff  —  the  Bulgarian  Minis- 
ter at  Cettinje.     Notwithstanding  this,  there  was  no 


THE  NEAR  EAST   BEFORE  THE  GREAT  WAR    25 

written  undertaking  between  Bulgaria  and  Montenegro 
at  the  time  of  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  and  the  agree- 
ment between  the  two  countries,  which  is  possessed  of 
no  far-reaching  poHtical  importance,  consisted  in  an 
oral  undertaking  between  the  Bulgarian  Minister  at 
Cettinje  and  King  Nicholas,  who  concluded  it  during 
September,  1912. 

It  is  impossible  and  unnecessary  here  to  enter  into 
details  concerning  the  events  which  immediately  pre- 
ceded or  took  place  during  the  first  Balkan  campaign. 
By  the  middle  of  August  the  situation  in  the  Ottoman 
Empire  had  become  so  critical  that  the  Austrian  Gov- 
ernment proposed  a  scheme  of  administrative  decen- 
tralisation for  European  Turkey.  About  a  month 
later  the  Turks  ordered  a  general  mobilisation  —  a 
mobilisation  replied  to  by  the  four  Balkan  States. 
Diplomatic  correspondence  passed  between  the  Great 
Powers  and  Turkey  and  Bulgaria,  and  between  the 
two  last-named  countries.  Montenegro  declared  war 
on  October  8  —  a  declaration  which  was  followed 
ten  days  later  by  the  other  three  States.  Thencefor- 
ward the  war  may  be  considered  as  having  been  di- 
vided into  four  more  or  less  independent  campaigns  — 
those  in  Thrace,  in  Central  and  Northern  Macedonia, 
in  Northern  Albania  and  the  sanjak  of  Novibazar, 
and  in  Southern  Albania  and  Southern  Macedonia. 
In  the  first  of  these  areas,  where  the  fighting  was  far 
more  severe  than  anywhere  else,  the  Bulgarians  con- 
tained the  fortress  of  Adrianople  and  made  a  rapid 
advance  to  the  Chatalja  Lines,  which  they  reached  in 
less  than  a  month.  In  the  second  the  Serbians  moved 
by  way  of  the  Vardar  valley  and  across  the  Turco- 
Serbian  frontier  lying  to  the  west  of  it,  fought  a  great 


26  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE  WAR 

and  successful  battle  at  Komanovo  on  October  24, 
reached  the  seacoast  early  in  November  and  entered 
Monastir  on  the  eighteenth  of  that  month.  In  the 
third  the  Montenegrins  advanced  into  the  sanjak  of 
Novibazar  and  into  Northern  Albania,  moving  upon 
Scutari  along  the  northeastern  and  southwestern  shores 
of  the  lake  of  that  name.  And  lastly  the  Greeks, 
while  detaching  a  force  to  attack  Janina,  struck  across 
the  Turco-Greek  frontier  in  the  direction  of  Salonica 
—  a  city  which  they  entered  on  November  9,  thereby 
becoming  the  victors  in  the  race  in  progress  between 
them  and  the  Serbian  army  coming  by  way  of  the 
Vardar  valley  and  the  Bulgarian  forces  advancing 
through  Ishtib  and  across  the  Rhodope  Balkans, 
Early  in  December,  when  Adrianople,  Scutari,  and 
Janina  —  the  three  great  fortresses  of  Turkey  in 
Europe  —  still  remained  in  Ottoman  hands,  an  armis- 
tice was  concluded  —  an  armistice  which  led  to  the 
first  peace  congress  of  London,  which  assembled  on 
the  thirteenth  of  that  month.  That  congress  which 
sat  intermittently  for  about  a  month  proved  abortive, 
primarily  because  the  Turks,  partly  as  a  result  of  a 
couj)  d'etat  in  Constantinople,  refused  to  agree  to  the 
allied  demands  for  the  cession  of  Adrianople  and  for 
the  establishment  of  a  frontier  satisfactory  to  Bulgaria 
in  Thrace,  and  to  a  lesser  degree  because  the  Ottoman 
Government  was  loath  to  agree  to  a  fair  settlement  in 
regard  to  the  futures  of  the  Aegean  Islands  and  of 
Crete. 

During  the  first  phase  of  the  Balkan  struggle  two 
important  developments  had  taken  place  which  were 
destined  greatly  to  influence  the  future  trend  of  events 
in  Southeastern  Europe.     I  refer  to  the  international 


THE  NEAR  EAST  BEFORE  THE  GREAT  W.VR  27 

crisis  arising  out  of  the  attitude  of  the  Dual  Monarchy, 
secretly  supported  by  Germany,  upon  the  Adriatic 
question,  and  to  the  differences  already  existing  be- 
tween Serbia  and  Bulgaria.  In  regard  to  the  first  of 
these  questions,  Austria  had  taken  up  the  attitude 
that  on  no  account  would  she  permit  the  permanent 
occupation  by  Serbia  of  the  territories  which  she  had 
conquered  on  the  east  of  the  Adriatic.  The  adoption 
of  this  policy  resulted  in  the  convocation  of  the  London 
Ambassadorial  Conference  which  in  its  turn  agreed  to 
the  principle  of  autonomy  for  Albania.  This  naturally 
constituted  a  great  disappointment  for  Ser})ia  —  a 
disappointment  which  in  part  led  to  her  bad  relations 
with  Bulgaria,  and  to  her  subsequent  attempts  to 
secure  compensation  at  the  expense  of  that  country. 
Serbia,  in  face  of  Russian  advice,  bowed  her  head  to 
the  inevitable,  but  instead  of  recognising  that  her 
disappointment  was  due  to  the  international  situation, 
she  endeavoured  to  suggest  that  it  resulted  from 
the  attitude  assumed  by  Bulgaria.  Hard  as  was  her 
case,  this  contention  was  not  justified,  for  whilst  the 
Serbo-Bulgarian  Treaty  definitely  bound  Bulgaria  to 
support  Serbia  in  case  she  were  attacked  by  Austria, 
it  made  no  mention  of  assistance  in  securing  for  her 
a  port  on  the  Adriatic  or  of  any  obligation  to  render 
diplomatic  support  to  Serbia,  who  in  fact  evacuated 
and  was  not  militarily  driven  back  from  the  Adriatic 
coast. 

Early  in  February,  1913,  when  the  second  phase 
of  the  first  Balkan  war  began,  the  relations  existing 
between  Bulgaria  and  Serbia  were  therefore  far  from 
satisfactory.  Militarily  speaking,  the  ensuing  events, 
during   which  once  more  the   heaviest   share   of   the 


28  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE  WAR 

fighting  fell  to  the  Bulgarians,  were  for  the  most  part 
concerned  with  the  capture  of  Adrianople  and  Janina 
—  which  were  taken  respectively  at  the  end  and  at  the 
beginning  of  March  —  and  with  the  siege  of  Scutari, 
which  fell  into  Montenegrin  hands  under  somewhat 
mysterious  circumstances,  towards  the  end  of  April. 
During  this  time,  however,  diplomatic  conditions  were 
going  from  bad  to  worse.  The  assassination  of  the 
King  of  Greece  on  March  18  had  removed  from  the 
arena  of  Balkan  politics  a  man  whose  influence  had 
always  been  used  in  favour  of  moderation.  The  po- 
sition as  between  Serbia  and  Bulgaria  had  also  become 
considerably  aggravated,  for  instead  of  the  more  or 
less  secret  and  unofficial  claims  already  made  by  the 
former  country,  the  Government  of  King  Peter,  which 
was  justified  in  making  a  point  of  the  fact  that  Serbia 
had  voluntarily  furnished  an  important  contingent  for 
the  operations  at  Adrianople,  now  officially  urged  that 
the  Treaty  of  1912  "must  undergo  an  amicable  re- 
vision." So  early  as  March,  too,  Serbia  began  to  nego- 
tiate with  Greece  for  the  purpose  of  concluding  a  de- 
fensive treaty  against  Bulgaria. 

The  second  Peace  Congress  which  sat  in  London  in 
May  therefore  met  in  an  atmosphere  bristling  with 
difficulties  and  uncertainty.  No  secret  was  made  of 
the  fact  that  the  relations  existing  between  the  Bul- 
garians on  the  one  side  and  the  Serbs  and  the  Greeks 
on  the  other  were  far  from  cordial.  The  international 
and  local  situations  were  also  greatly  complicated  by 
the  facts  that  the  Serbs  and  Greeks  hesitated  to  sign 
the  terms  of  peace  prepared  by  the  Ambassadorial 
Conference  and  by  the  highly  dangerous  situation 
which  then  existed  in  regard  to  the  future  possession 


THE  NEAR  EAST  BEFORE  THE  GREAT  WAR  29 

of  Scutari.  After  a  great  deal  of  delay,  Sir  Edward 
Grey,  probably  knowing  that  Serbia  and  Greece  were 
retarding  matters  in  order  to  perfect  their  own  agree- 
ment against  Bulgaria,  made  a  communication  to  the 
peace  delegates  which  necessitated  their  either  coming 
to  terms  at  once  or  preparing  to  leave  London.  Finally 
the  definite  treaty  of  peace,  known  as  the  Treaty  of 
London,  was  signed  on  May  30  on  the  basis  of  the 
terms  proposed  by  the  Great  Powers  some  six  weeks 
earlier. 

By  this  time  the  relations  existing  between  the 
allies  had  become  extremely  critical.  Serbia  was 
openly  demanding  the  revision  of  the  Serbo-Bulgarian 
Treaty  because  she  contended  that  circumstances  un- 
foreseen in  it  had  arisen,  and  that  she  had  mobilised 
a  larger  army  than  was  incumbent  upon  her,  and  be- 
cause she  urged  that  it  was  due  to  her  assistance  that 
Adrianople  had  fallen.  Greece,  with  whom  there  was 
no  agreement  upon  the  subject,  was  also  pegging  out 
claims  in  Macedonia.  But  the  real  fact  of  importance 
was  that  early  in  1913,  before  the  conclusion  of  the 
first  war  and  on  the  initiative  of  Greece,  that  country 
and  Serbia  entered  into  a  secret  arrangement  in  re- 
gard to  the  division  of  spoils  secured  from  Turkey. 
The  basis  of  that  arrangement  was  that  the  Greeks 
would  raise  no  objection  to  the  Serbian  retention  of 
Monastir  —  allotted  to  Bulgaria  by  the  Serbo-Bul- 
garian Treaty  of  1912  —  provided  the  Government  of 
King  Peter  were  willing  to  sanction  the  incorporation 
of  Salonica  in  the  Hellenic  Kingdom.  That  arrange- 
ment was  followed  by  the  more  formal  Graeco-Serbian 
Treaty,  which  we  now  know  to  have  been  signed  on 
June  1,  1913,  and  therefore  two  days  after  the  con- 


30  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE  WAR 

elusion  of  the  London  Peaee  Conferenee  — -  a  treaty 
which  obviously  strengthened  the  hands  of  Serbia 
and  enabled  her  to  make  claims  from  Bulgaria  — 
claims  which  otherwise  she  would  never  have  been  in 
a  position  to  formulate. 

It  is  not  possible  here  to  discuss  in  detail  the  argu- 
ments put  forward  by  the  various  Balkan  claimants 
prior  to  the  outbreak  of  the  second  war.  There 
probably  were  conditions  justifying  Serbia  in  thinking 
that  she  was  entitled  to  suggest  modifications  in  her 
treaty  with  Bulgaria.  But  even  if  the  spirit  of  that 
treaty  had  not  been  fully  acted  up  to  by  the  latter 
country,  even  if  Serbia  had  performed  more  than  her 
legal  obligations,  and  even  if  she  had  been  compelled 
to  accept  a  European  decision  which  constituted  a 
great  setback  to  her  national  aspirations,  the  Govern- 
ment of  King  Peter  was  still  bound  by  the  letter  of  a 
document  to  which  it  had  agreed.  In  other  words, 
whilst  Serbia  would  certainly  have  been  reasonable  in 
making  amicable  suggestions  to  Bulgaria,  she  had  no 
right  to  formulate  actual  demands  even  as  a  result  of 
gratuitous  assistance  concerning  which  she  had  made 
no  preliminary  bargain.  Moreover,  as  I  have  already 
said,  one  of  the  most  important  clauses  in  the  1912 
agreement  specially  foresaw  the  danger  of  a  dispute  be- 
tween the  allies  and  decided  that,  in  such  a  case,  both 
parties  should  submit  to  the  arbitration  of  the  Tsar. 
M.  Gueshoff,  the  Bulgarian  Premier,  who  resigned  on 
May  30,  up  to  that  time  repeatedly  expressed  the 
willingness  of  his  Government  to  adopt  this  course 
which  was  not  then  accepted  by  Serbia.  Subsequently, 
when  both  parties  had  agreed  to  arbitration,  but  when 
things  had  already  gone  too  far  for  recourse  to  this 


THE  NEAR  EAST  BEFORE  THE  GREAT  WAR      31 

method  of  settling  the  dispute,  an  attack  was  made, 
contrary  to  the  decision  of  the  Sofia  Government  and 
without  the  consent  of  the  Cabinet,  by  part  of  the  Bul- 
garian army,  acting  by  the  order  of  General  Savoff 
or  of  some  superior  War-Lord,  upon  the  forces  of  its 
still  nominal  allies.  Whilst  no  condemnation  of  those 
responsible  for  this  attack  can  be  too  severe,  the  fact 
that  Serbia,  supported  by  Greece,  refused  to  listen 
to  the  calming  telegrams  despatched  by  M.  Sazonoff, 
then  Russian  Foreign  Minister,  and  declared  war  on 
Bulgaria,  clearly  proves  that  these  two  new  allies  were 
not  averse  to  accepting  a  challenge  for  which  they  were 
by  this  time  prepared  —  a  challenge  in  which  they 
were  supported  by  a  military  contingent  supplied  by 
Montenegro. 

During  the  first  Balkan  war,  Roumania  played  no 
military  part,  contenting  herself  by  claiming  and 
securing  compensation  at  the  expense  of  Bulgaria. 
In  the  second  campaign,  however,  that  country,  no 
longer  withheld  by  Russia,  invaded  the  territory  of 
her  Balkan  neighbour,  nominally  with  the  object  of 
maintaining  the  balance  of  power  in  the  Balkans,  but 
really  for  the  purpose  of  wresting  from  Bulgaria  an  are«a 
of  territory,  the  possession  of  which  she  had  deeply 
coveted  for  years.  This  action  was  largely  responsible 
for  the  subsequent  bad  relations  between  the  two 
countries  —  bad  relations  which,  as  I  shall  show  else- 
where, constituted  the  fundamental  reason  of  the  down- 
fall of  Roumania  during  the  European  conflagration. 

The  second  Balkan  war  was  terminated  by  the 
Treaty  of  Bucharest,  signed  in  that  city  on  August  10, 
1913.  That  Treaty  robbed  Bulgaria  of  a  large  part  of 
Macedonia,  which  went  to  her  under  the  Serbo-Bul- 


32  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE   WAR 

garian  Agreement  of  1912,  and  allotted  to  Greece, 
Kavala  and  Salonica,  besides  the  large  districts  lying 
respectively  to  the  south  and  immediately  to  the 
north  of  the  Salonica-Monastir  Railway.  It  also  gave 
to  Serbia  and  Greece  a  contiguous  frontier  and  al- 
lowed to  Bulgaria  only  a  stretch  of  the  Aegean  coast 
which  possessed  no  practicable  port  and  towards  which 
there  was  no  adequate  or  suitable  line  of  communica- 
tion. Moreover,  on  the  north  Bulgaria  lost  not  only 
Silistria  and  the  district  which  would  have  gone  to 
Roumania  under  the  frontier  rectification  arranged  by 
the  Protocol  of  Petrograd,  but  also  a  further  area  of 
territory  on  the  south  of  the  Dobrudja  (including  the 
towns  of  Turtukeuie  and  Dobric),  thereby  establishing 
the  frontier  as  running  from  the  more  or  less  im- 
mediate neighbourhood  of  Rustchuk  on  the  Danube 
to  that  of  Varna  on  the  Black  Sea.  These  divisions  — 
unnatural  and  unfair  as  they  were  —  are  those  which 
made  the  Treaty  of  Bucharest  not  an  instrument  of 
peace  but  of  future  war. 

During  the  second  Balkan  war,  the  Treaty  of  Lon- 
don, signed  between  the  former  allies  and  Turkey,  was 
torn  up  by  the  latter  country,  who  reoccupied  Adri- 
anople  whilst  the  Bulgarians  were  engaged  elsewhere, 
and  therefore  practically  without  opposition.  This 
"scrap  of  paper"  action  by  the  Ottoman  Government 
created  an  entirely  new  situation  so  far  as  Turkey  and 
Bulgaria  were  concerned,  and  left  those  two  countries 
to  negotiate  independent  terms  of  peace  after  the 
conclusion  of  the  Treaty  of  Bucharest.  Those  terms 
were  embodied  in  the  Treaty  of  Constantinople,  signed 
on  September  twenty-fifth.  They  substituted  for  the 
Enos-Midia  line,   agreed  to  in   London,   a   boundary 


THE  NEAR  EAST  BEFORE  THE  GREAT  WAR   33 

which  practically  followed  the  old  Turco-Bulgarian 
frontier  from  the  Black  Sea  to  Mustafa  Pasha,  turning 
thence  in  a  southerly  direction,  and  subsequently 
hugging  the  bank  of  the  Maritza  as  far  as  its  mouth 
and  the  Aegean  coast.  In  addition  to  the  fact  that  the 
Bulgarians  thereby  lost  Kirk  Kilissa,  Adrianople,  and 
Demotika  and  a  large  part  of  Thrace,  the  great  sig- 
nificance of  this  frontier  was  that  it  left  Dede  Agatch 
—  the  only  Aegean  port  possessed  by  Bulgaria  —  un- 
provided with  railway  connection  with  the  remainder 
of  that  country  except  by  a  line  which  ran  for  some 
miles  through  Turkish  territory.  An  arrangement 
was  subsequently  made  between  the  two  Governments 
as  to  the  use  of  this  line,  but  that  arrangement  ob- 
viously proved  unsatisfactory  to  Bulgaria,  and  as  I 
shall  show  elsewhere,  it  was  subsequently  abrogated 
by  the  cession  of  the  territory  in  question  to  Bulgaria 
just  before  the  entry  of  that  country  into  the  present 
war. 

During  much  of  this  time  and  throughout  the  winter 
of  1912-1913  and  the  spring  and  summer  of  the  latter 
year,  the  international  situations  and  the  actual  position 
in  the  Balkans  were  highly  critical  as  the  result  of 
events  in  and  connected  with  the  new  Principality  of 
Albania.  I  have  already  said  that,  as  a  consequence 
of  the  attitude  of  Austria,  the  autonomy  of  that  State 
was  recognised  in  principle  by  the  Ambassadorial 
Conference  in  December,  1912.  Four  months  later, 
and  during  the  second  stage  of  the  first  Balkan  war, 
Scutari,  the  most  important  town  in  the  whole  coun- 
try, fell  into  the  hands  of  the  INIontenegrins,  who  at 
first  absolutely  declined  to  leave  it.  The  policy  thus 
taken  up  by  King  Nicholas  was  in  entire  opposition 


34  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE   WAR 

to  the  programme  of  the  Central  Powers,  and  for  a 
moment  it  seemed  destined  to  lead  to  a  European  war. 
Subsequently,  however,  it  was  agreed  by  the  Great 
Powers  that  certain  other  areas,  the  population  of 
which  is  predominatingly  Albanian,  should  be  in- 
cluded in  Serbia  or  Montenegro,  and  that  Scutari 
should  remain  Albanian.  Following  upon  this  agree- 
ment that  city  was  occupied  by  contingents  landed 
from  the  international  blockading  fleets  under  the 
command  of  a  British  admiral  —  Sir  Cecil  Burney  — 
and  these  contingents  remained  in  occupation  of  the 
city  and  its  immediate  surroundings  up  to  the  very  eve 
of  the  outbreak  of  the  present  war. 

Over  and  above  the  Scutari  question  the  position 
and  future  of  Albania  were  of  predominating  impor- 
tance, for  it  was  during  and  immediately  after  this 
period  that  Europe  was  called  upon  to  choose  a  ruler 
for  the  State  which  she  had  created  and  to  fix  the 
positions  of  her  northern  and  southern  frontiers, 
which  run  through  areas,  the  nationality  of  whose 
inhabitants  it  is  not  easy  to  decide.  Indeed  so  difficult 
was  the  delimitation  of  the  southern  frontier,  where 
Italy  voiced  the  legitimate  aspirations  of  the  Albanians 
almost  as  fervently  as  did  Austria  in  the  north,  that 
the  problem  was  only  settled  by  the  decision  of  the 
Powers  to  the  effect  that  the  questions  of  the  southern 
Albanian  frontier  and  of  the  future  ownership  of  the 
Aegean  Islands,  both  of  which  were  in  their  hands, 
should  be  interdependent.  The  result  of  this  decision 
was  that  Greece,  whose  claims  in  the  Aegean  were  as 
reasonable  as  her  demands  in  Southern  Albania  were 
unjustifiable,  secured  all  the  Aegean  Islands  occupied 
by  her  during  the  Balkan  Wars,  except  Imbros,  Tene- 


THE  NEAR  EAST  BEFORE  THE  GREAT  WAR      35 

dos,  and  Castellorizzo,  which,  owing  to  their  proximity 
to  the  Dardanelles,  were  allotted  to  Turkey,  and  that 
she  (Greece)  was  practically  compelled  to  accept  an 
Epirus  frontier,  with  which  she  has  remained  as  dis- 
satisfied as  have  the  Turks  with  the  distribution  of 
the  Aegean  Islands. 

From  an  international  standpoint  the  development 
of  events  in  the  Balkans,  between  the  summer  of  1908 
and  the  close  of  the  Balkan  Wars,  is  of  far-reaching 
significance.  The  Young  Turkish  Revolution  of  1908, 
which  at  first  seemed  destined  greatly  to  minimise 
Germanic  prestige  and  power  at  Constantinople,  really 
resulted  in  an  opposite  effect,  for  in  spite  of  the  sup- 
port of  England  for  Turkey  during  the  Bosnian  and 
Bulgarian  crisis  of  1908  and  1909  a  gradual  reaction 
subsequently  set  in.  This  was  due  in  part  to  the 
cleverness  and  regardlessness  of  Baron  Marshal  von 
Bieberstein  and  in  part  to  the  circumstances  arising 
out  of  the  policy  adopted  by  the  Young  Turks.  For 
instance,  whilst  the  Germans  ignored  the  necessity  for 
reforms  in  the  Ottoman  Empire,  so  long  as  the  Turks 
favoured  a  Teutonic  programme,  it  was  impossible  for 
the  British  Government  or  the  British  public  to  look 
with  favour  upon  a  regime  which  worked  to  maintain 
the  privileged  position  of  Moslems  throughout  the 
Empire,  which  did  nothing  to  punish  those  who  in- 
stigated the  massacre  of  the  Armenians  of  Cilicia  in 
1909,  and  which  was  intent  upon  disturbing  the  "Status 
Quo"  in  the  Persian  Gulf  and  upon  changing  the  situ- 
ation of  Egypt  to  the  Turkish  advantage.  Such  in- 
deed became  the  position  that  even  the  Turco-Italian 
War,  which  might  well  have  been  expected  to  shake 
the   confidence   of   the   Ottoman   Government   in   the 


36  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE   WAR 

bona  fides  of  Italy's  ally,  did  not  seriously  disturb  the 
intimate  relations  which  were  gradually  developing 
between  Berlin  and  Constantinople.  Here  again 
enemy  foresight  was  displayed,  for  in  addition  to  the 
Austrian  objection  to  the  inauguration  of  any  Italian 
operations  in  the  Balkans,  the  German  Government, 
when  the  position  of  Baron  Marshal  von  Bieberstein 
had  become  seriously  compromised  as  a  result  of  the 
Italian  annexation  of  Tripoli,  which  he  could  not  pre- 
vent, suddenly  found  it  convenient  to  transfer  that 
diplomatist  to  London  and  to  replace  him  by  another, 
perhaps  less  able,  but  certainly  none  the  less  successful 
in  retaining  a  grasp  over  everything  which  took  place 
in  the  Ottoman  Capital. 

This  brings  us  to  the  period  immediately  preceding 
the  outbreak  of  the  Balkan  Wars  —  wars  which  for 
different  reasons  all  Europe  primarily  desired  to  pre- 
vent and  subsequently  to  localise.  The  Central 
Powers,  on  their  side,  naturally  feared  the  disruption 
of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  before  they  were  ready  to 
derive  the  full  advantages  from  such  an  event,  and, 
acting  through  the  mouthpiece  of  the  Austrian  Govern- 
ment, took  the  lead  in  proposing  decentralisation  for 
European  Turkey  in  August,  1912,  On  the  other 
hand,  no  doubt  representing  the  Triple  Entente,  which 
was  honestly  in  favour  of  the  maintenance  of  the  "Sta- 
tus Quo"  and  of  peace,  Russia  repeatedly  counselled  the 
Balkan  allies  not  to  push  matters  to  extremes.  Later 
and  after  the  Turks  had  ordered  a  general  mobilisation 
—  a  mobilisation  replied  to  by  the  Balkan  States  — 
the  Great  Powers  addressed  Notes  to  the  Governments 
of  Turkey  and  of  the  Balkan  States  advocating,  in  the 
first  direction,  the  introduction  of  reforms,  and  stating, 


THE  NEAR  EAST  BEFORE  THE  GREAT  WAR      37 

in  the  second,  that  should  war  break  out  they  would 
"tolerate  at  the  end  of  the  conflict  no  modifications 
of  the  present  Status  Quo  in  the  Balkans." 

•  These  Notes  were  subsequently  treated  as  mere  scraps 
of  paper  both  by  the  senders  and  the  recipients.  More- 
over, whilst  as  a  result  of  the  ensuing  campaigns  the 
area  of  Turkey  in  Europe  was  in  fact  reduced  in  size 
from  65,350  square  miles  to  10,880  square  miles,  the 
Balkan  Wars  at  one  time  seemed  destined  to  terminate 
in  a  manner  even  more  disadvantageous  to  Germany. 
Thus,  if  the  four  States  —  Bulgaria,  Greece,  Monte- 
negro and  Serbia  — -  who  fought  in  the  first  war  had  con- 
tinued on  good  terms  with  one  another,  the  whole 
Balance  of  Power  in  Europe  would  almost  certainly 
have  been  changed.  Instead  of  the  Ottoman  Empire, 
which  prior  to  the  outbreak  of  those  hostilities  was 
held  by  competent  authorities  to  be  able  to  provide 
a  vast  army,  then  calculated  to  number  approximately  a 
million  and  a  quarter  men,  there  would  have  sprung 
up  a  friendly  group  of  countries  which  in  the  near 
future  could  easily  have  placed  in  the  field  a  combined 
army  approximately  amounting  to  at  least  a  million 
all  told.  As  the  interests  of  such  a  confederation, 
which  might  well  have  been  joined  by  Roumania,  would 
have  been  on  the  side  of  the  then  Triple  Entente,  the 
Central  Powers  at  once  realised  that  its  formation  or 
its  continued  existence  would  mean  for  them  not  only 
the  loss  of  Turkey,  but  also  the  gain  for  their  enemies 
of  four  or  five  allies,  most  of  whom  had  already  proved 
their  power  in  war. 

The  Kaiser  was  not  then  prepared  to  make  war,  his 
fleet  was  not  ready,  his  Zeppelins  were  not  perfected, 
and  the  enlargement  of  his  Kiel  Canal  was  not  com- 


38  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE   WAR 

pleted.  In  exerting  a  restraining  influence  in  Austria, 
Germany  therefore  then  contented  herself  by  creating  a 
favorable  situation  for  the  future.  The  Ambassadorial 
Conference,  under  the  chairmanship  of  Sir  Edwai'd 
Grey,  succeeded  in  temporarily  maintaining  the  so- 
called  Balance  of  Power  in  Europe,  and  it  may  also 
have  been  the  means  of  localising  the  Balkan  conflict. 
But  Germany,  acting  through  the  mouthpiece  of 
Vienna,  encouraged  the  rivalry  which  existed  between 
Bulgaria  and  her  former  allies  —  a  rivalry  which  ended 
in  the  second  Balkan  war.  That  war,  and  particularly 
the  fatal  Treaty  of  Bucharest,  favoured  as  it  was  by 
Germany,  led  not  to  a  settlement,  but  simply  to  a 
holding  in  suspense  of  the  numerous  Near-Eastern 
questions  which  had  been  the  means  of  shaking  the 
European  concert  to  its  very  foundation.  In  short, 
whilst  Germany  did  not  manage  to  preserve  the  integ- 
rity and  to  protect  the  interests  of  her  friend  Turkey, 
by  separating  the  former  allies  she  did  bring  about  the 
establishment  of  a  state  of  things  enabling  her  in  this 
present  war  to  utilise  the  support  of  the  Ottoman  Gov- 
ernment to  almost  as  great  an  advantage  as  if  there 
had  been  no  Balkan  campaign  at  all. 

To  summarise  and  to  recapitulate  the  causes  and 
the  results  of  the  Balkan  Wars  it  may  be  said  that 
the  first  campaign  would  probably  not  have  occurred 
had  the  Young  Turks  made  any  endeavours  to  intro- 
duce in  Macedonia  and  Albania  even  some  of  the  re- 
forms by  the  promise  of  which  they  at  first  secured  not 
only  the  good  will  of  Europe  but  also  that  of  the  subject 
races  of  the  Ottoman  Empire.  As  far  as  the  second 
war  is  concerned,  that  would  certainly  not  have  taken 
place  had  it  not  been  for  German  intrigue  which  en- 


THE  NEAR  EAST  BEFORE  THE  GREAT  WAR  39 

couraged  rivalry  between  the  Balkan  States,  and  had 
the  former  alHes,  one  and  all,  displayed  a  greater  spirit 
of  moderation  towards  one  another.  With  regard  to 
the  results  of  these  campaigns,  over  and  above  those 
to  which  I  have  already  referred,  the  entry  of  Roumania 
into  the  arena  of  Balkan  politics  and  the  birth  of  the 
autonomous  Albanian  State,  were  events  of  primary 
significance. 

From  a  local  standpoint,  Turkey,  reduced  from  the 
position  of  a  European  power  of  high  importance  to 
that  of  an  Asiatic  State,  jx)ssessed  only  an  outpost 
on  the  European  side  of  the  Straits.  Bulgaria,  who 
undoubtedly  accomplished  very  much  the  hardest 
work  in  and  provided  the  greatest  number  of  troops 
for  the  first  war,  gained  but  relatively  little  from  a 
campaign  which  never  could  have  been  thought  of, 
begun,  or  carried  out  without  her  co-operation.  Serbia, 
although  achieving  success  on  the  south  and  east, 
was  left  still  without  a  free  access  to  the  sea  —  an  ac- 
cess for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  which  she  really  joined 
the  Balkan  League.  Montenegro,  who  had  secured 
big  gains,  obtained  neither  Scutari  nor  a  port  to  re- 
place Antivari,  commanded  as  it  is  by  the  Austrian 
fortress  of  Spitza.  Greece,  who  made  the  smallest 
sacrifice  in,  but  gained  the  greatest  benefit  from,  the 
war,  did  not  secure  possession  of  all  the  territory 
which  she  coveted  in  Southern  Albania,  and  she  re- 
mained face  to  face  with  a  continued  Turkish  menace 
as  a  result  of  her  acquisition  of  the  Aegean  Islands. 
For  these  reasons  it  was  certain  that  Bulgaria  would 
seize  the  first  opportunity  of  endeavouring  to  redeem 
her  position,  that  war  between  Serbia  and  her  most 
hated  neighbour  —  Austria  —  could  not  long  be  post- 


40  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE  WAR 

poned,  and  that  Turkey  would  intrigue  in  Europe  and 
threaten  the  Greeks  with  the  object  of  trying  to  regain 
possession  of  the  Aegean  Islands.  In  short,  the  so- 
called  settlement  of  1913  really  left  the  situation  in 
the  Balkans  more  unnatural  and  more  beset  by  dangers 
than  had  been  the  case  even  during  the  worst  years 
of  the  reign  of  Abdul  Hamid. 


II 

SERBIA   AND    MONTENEGRO   IN    THE    WAR 

Although  the  European  Concert  prevented  an 
immediate  outbreak  of  war  as  a  result  of  the  Balkan 
campaigns,  the  facts,  which  I  have  already  given,  must 
be  sufficient  to  prove  that  the  events  of  the  years 
1912-1913  created  a  merely  temporary  situation,  the 
dangers  and  complications  of  which  it  is  impossible 
to  exaggerate.  Almost  all  the  numerous  and  impor- 
tant questions  which  had  previously  existed  remained 
unsettled.  Moreover,  whilst  a  sort  of  a  new  Balkan 
alliance,  composed  of  Serbia,  Montenegro,  Greece, 
and  Roumania,  was  supposed  to  have  sprung  into  exist- 
ence, the  interests  of  these  countries  were  so  diverse 
that  it  was  impossible  to  hope  that  they  would  be  of 
mutual  and  immediate  assistance  to  one  another  in 
case  of  a  fresh  upheaval  brought  by  certain  of  the  ques- 
tions still  unsettled.  Thus  although  the  long-talked-of 
war  cloud  had  burst,  although  two  of  the  most  wonder- 
ful campaigns  of  modern  history  had  been  fought,  and 
although  the  much-desired  hostilities  had  been  localised, 
little  if  anything  had  really  been  done  to  solve  the 
countless  problems  which  for  years  had  not  only  en- 
dangered the  peace  of  the  Near  East  but  also  that  of 
all  Europe. 


42  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE   WAR 

With  regard  to  Serbia  the  question  of  an  outlet  to 
the  Adriatic  has  been  the  foundation  of  everything 
which  has  taken  place  for  the  last  ten  years.  This  is 
the  case  because,  being  an  agricultural  country  in  which 
large  numbers  of  cattle  and  pigs  are  reared,  she  must 
have  a  free  and  continuous  means  of  exporting  her 
livestock  without  being  placed  in  ever  recurring  danger 
of  the  imposition  of  an  embargo  rather  for  political 
than  for  commercial  or  sanitary  purposes.  The  crisis 
of  the  years  1908-1909,  concerning  the  annexation  of 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  entirely  resulted  from  the 
justifiable  claim  made  by  the  little  Slav  State,  namely, 
that  she  should  receive  compensation  for  what  she 
felt  was  a  blow  to  her  great  aspiration  —  the  creation 
of  a  Greater  Serbia  with  its  own  access  to  the  sea. 
Again  whilst  in  1912  Serbia  was  undoubtedly  led  to 
risk  her  national  existence  and,  for  the  moment,  to 
forget  her  rivalry  with  Bulgaria,  with  the  avowed 
object  of  improving  the  lot  of  the  Serbs  then  domiciled 
in  Turkey,  the  fact  that  she  hoped  to  secure  a  seaport 
at  that  time  was  certainly  possessed  of  a  far-reaching 
influence  upon  her  policy.  Consequently  although 
the  Balkan  Wars  resulted  in  the  dominions  of  King 
Peter  being  nearly  doubled  in  size,  yet  as  that  object 
was  not  realised,  these  wars  ended  in  a  way  which 
was  at  bottom  completely  unfavourable  to  a  people 
who  have  played  such  a  valiant  part  in  the  European 
conflict.  Thus  when  I  visited  Belgrade  in  the  late 
autumn  of  1913,  I  noticed,  instead  of  the  blissful  joy 
which  one  would  have  expected  to  find  existing  among 
a  people  who  had  then  fought  two  victorious  cam- 
paigns and  added  such  enormous  territories  to  their 
country,  that  a  kind  of  mysterious  gloom   seemed  to 


^ 

^^H^^^^BM^^ijrV--.  . ' 

^1 

The  SerbiaxV  Parliament  House  at  Belgrade 


1 

li/i//  ^iii 

n 

The  Old  Turkish  Palace  at  Nish 


Krori,  a  I'hotc.grapli  l.y  tho  Autli. 


SERBIA  AND   MONTENEGRO   IN   THE   WAR    43 

prevail  in  all  directions.  Whilst  no  Serbian  denied  it, 
none  could  or  would  explain  its  real  reason.  It  was 
that  everybody  knew  it  would  be  impossible  to  pursue 
and  to  develop  the  national  policy  of  the  country,  and 
especially  to  make  an  advance  towards  the  sea,  with- 
out a  serious  conflict  with  the  most  important  and  the 
strongest  of  Serbian  enemies  —  Austria. 

So  far  as  Serbia  was  concerned  after  the  Balkan 
Wars  the  real  source  of  danger  therefore  grew  more 
than  ever  to  be  the  daily  increasing  difficulties  between 
the  then  Triple  Alliance  and  Triple  Entente  and  partic- 
ularly between  Austria-Hungary  and  Russia.  Indeed 
it  was  almost  certain  that  the  Ministers  of  the  Dual 
Monarchy  would  not  continue  long  to  look  with  favour 
upon  a  peace  which,  so  long  as  it  lasted,  had  upset 
their  whole  recent  policy.  Thus  whilst  Austria-Hun- 
gary had  prevented  Serbia  from  obtaining  an  outlet 
upon  the  Adriatic  and  whilst  she  had  created  Albania, 
she  had  not  succeeded  in  avoiding  the  establishment  of 
a  common  frontier  between  Serbia  and  Montenegro  — 
a  common  frontier  which  was  to  be  one  of  the  reasons 
for  the  improvement  in  the  relations  between  those 
two  countries.  These  changes  were  entirely  opposed 
to  the  interests  of  the  Dual  Monarchy,  for  in  addition 
to  the  fact  that  they  established  a  Slav  barrier,  though 
not  a  sufficient  barrier,  to  an  Austro-German  advance 
towards  the  southeast,  they  increased  the  prestige  and 
power  of  Serbia  and  Montenegro  among  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Slavs  in  a  manner  destined  still  further  to 
complicate  the  task  of  the  government  of  the  Emperor 
Francis  Joseph.  With  regard  to  Russia,  who  lost 
a  considerable  amount  of  influence  in  the  Balkans 
and  particularly  in  Serbia,  as  a  result  of  her  inability 


44  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE   WAR 

to  champion  the  Adriatic  interests  of  that  country 
during  the  crisis  of  1912-1913,  it  was  apparent  that  at 
any  given  moment  the  Ministers  of  the  Tsar  might 
find  (as  they  subsequently  did  find)  themselves  in 
a  position  in  which  it  would  be  quite  impossible  for 
them  quietly  to  witness  any  further  interference  with 
the  national  development  of  the  "Little  States",  who 
certainly  did  not  receive  all  the  support  which  they 
expected  would  be  forthcoming  from  Petrograd  during 
the  negotiations  of  1913. 

That  Austria  was  at  once  opposed  to  the  benefits 
secured  by  Serbia  during  the  second  Balkan  war  is 
now  proved,  for  we  know,  from  the  speech  made  by 
Signor  Giolitti  in  the  Italian  Chamber  in  December, 
1914,  that  the  day  before  the  signature  of  the  Treaty 
of  Bucharest  and  on  August  9,  1913,  the  Government 
of  the  Dual  Monarchy  communicated  to  Italy  and  to 
Germany  its  intention  of  taking  action  against  Serbia. 
This  action  was,  however,  prevented  by  the  opposition 
of  Italy  and  presumably  also  by  that  of  Germany,  who, 
believing  the  time  to  be  unfavourable,  opposed  a  for- 
ward policy  on  the  part  of  her  ally  throughout  the 
Balkan  Wars.  The  result  was  that  whilst  the  policies 
of  Germanic  Powers  certainly  received  a  certain  set- 
back by  the  defeat  of  Turkey,  Count  Berchtold  was 
entitled  to  claim  a  temporary  diplomatic  success  as 
consequences  of  the  destruction  of  the  original  Balkan 
League  and  of  the  creation  of  a  situation,  in  which, 
when  the  supposedly  proper  time  for  action  had  ar- 
rived, it  would  require  a  mere  spark  to  ignite  not  only 
the  Balkan  but  also  the  European  fire.  That  spark 
was  the  murder  of  Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand  and  his 
consort  at  Serajevo  on  Sunday,  June  28,  1914.     But 


SERBIA  AND   MONTENEGRO   IN  THE   WAR    45 

that  event,  dangerous  as  in  any  case  it  would  have 
been  from  a  local  standpoint  and  so  far  as  the  relations 
between  Austria  and  Serbia  were  concerned,  was 
really  inflammatory  because  it  fell  at  a  moment  when 
the  Emperor  William  and  his  advisers,  who  were  not 
ready  for  war  during  the  Bosnian  annexation  crisis  or 
the  Balkan  Wars,  thought  that  Great  Britain  was 
fully  occupied  with  the  situation  in  Ireland,  that  the 
internal  situation  in  Russia  was  such  as  to  prevent 
that  country  from  effectively  supporting  Serbia,  and 
that  Italy  would  at  least  maintain  her  neutrality. 

The  Kaiser,  who  had  just  performed  the  opening 
ceremony  of  the  enlargement  of  the  Kiel  Canal  —  a 
ceremony  at  which  the  British  fleet  was  represented  — 
returned  immediately  to  Berlin,  in  which  city  I  arrived 
two  days  after  the  murder.  Ignoring  altogether  va- 
rious subsequently  published  accounts  of  ensuing 
events,  such  as  that  which  appeared  in  The  Times  on 
July  28,  1917,  and  particularly  that  excellent  narrative 
of  Mr.  Morgenthau,  formerly  American  ambassador  to 
Turkey,  which  constitute  absolute  proof  that  war  was 
definitely  decided  upon  at  an  Imperial  Conference  held 
at  Potsdam  on  July  5  —  I  was  always  convinced  that 
some  such  decision  was  taken  in  Berlin  at  that  time. 
The  atmosphere  which  then  prevailed  —  an  atmosphere 
which  was  deliberately  created  —  was  represented  by 
such  statements  as  the  necessity  for  the  "chastisement  of 
Serbia  "  —  statements  made  in  the  press,  in  the  cafes,  and 
in  the  trains.  Thus  whilst  later  an  artificial  feeling  of 
calm  was  in  its  turn  promoted,  and  whilst  the  Emperor 
left  Berlin  on  July  6  fora  yachting  cruise,  purposely  to 
throw  dust  in  the  eyes  of  Europe,  no  doubt  has  ever  ex- 
isted in  my  mind  that  the  Austrian  ultimatum,  delivered 


46  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE   WAR 

at  Belgrade  on  July  23,  was  actually  concocted  in  Ber- 
lin within  a  week  of  the  murder  of  the  Archduke,  and 
that  no  amends  on  the  part  of  Serbia  for  an  atrocity 
for  which  her  Government  at  least  was  not  responsible 
would  have  affected  the  course  of  events  which  were 
definitely  planned  in  Berlin  two  or  three  weeks  before 
any  mobilisation  measures  were  taken  in  France, 
Russia,  or  Great  Britain.  If  any  further  proof  of  the 
above  suggestions  be  required,  it  may  perhaps  be  found, 
at  least  in  part,  in  the  fact  that  to  the  student  of  Euro- 
pean affairs  it  was  obvious,  as  soon  as  the  notorious 
ultimatum  had  been  delivered,  that  its  conditions 
were  so  irrevocable  as  to  show  that  Austria  this  time 
was  not  acting  alone  or  in  opposition  to  the  will  of 
Germany. 

Moreover,  whilst  it  was  equally  certain  from  the 
outset  that,  whatever  were  the  organisations  which 
brought  about  the  death  of  the  heir  apparent  to  the 
Austro-Hungarian  throne,  the  Government  of  the 
Dual  Monarchy  would  surely  seize  the  opportunity 
of  demanding  an  explanation  from  Serbia,  the  wording 
of  the  document  which  gave  birth  to  the  War  was  so 
harsh  and  so  unreasonable  as  to  make  Vienna  unlikely 
to  have  been  its  birthplace.  Thus  when  Serbia,  within 
the  specified  time,  accepted  "in  principle"  (only  with 
the  reservations  to  be  expected  from  the  Government 
of  a  Sovereign  State)  the  demands  of  her  enemy,  and 
when  Austria  immediately  broke  off  diplomatic  rela- 
tions, it  was  perfectly  clear  that  the  latter  country 
acted  not  upon  her  own  initiative  but  at  the  instiga- 
tion and  with  the  direct  support  of  Germany.  This 
being  the  case,  all  that  need  be  said  here  is  that  within 
five  days  from  the  time  of  the  delivery  of  the  original 


SERBIA  AND   MONTENEGRO  IN  THE   WAR    47 

ultimatum,  Serbia  and  Austria  were  at  war,  and  that 
nothing  which  was  or  was  not  done  by  England,  France, 
or  Russia  would  have  been  likely  to  avoid  the  explosion 
in  which  all  the  Great  Powers,  except  Italy,  immediately 
became  involved. 

From  the  time  of  the  outbreak  of  the  hostilities 
between  Austria  and  Serbia  on  July  28,  until  the 
subjugation  of  that  country  by  the  enemy  in  the  late 
autumn  of  1915,  events  in  the  dominions  of  King  Peter 
may  be  said  to  have  been  divided  into  three  stages. 
The  first  lasted  from  the  beginning  of  the  war  approxi- 
mately until  the  end  of  1914.  The  Austrians  directed 
their  first  efforts  against  Belgrade,  only  separated  from 
enemy  territory  by  the  Save  and  Danube,  hostilities 
being  practically  confined  during  the  first  ten  days  to  a 
bombardment  of  that  city  and  to  the  partial  destruc- 
tion of  the  Save  bridge  by  the  Serbians.  On  or  about 
August  12,  however,  the  enemy  began  a  real  attack  — 
an  attack  delivered  upon  the  capital  and  also  against 
the  northern  and  western  frontiers  of  Serbia  protected 
by  the  above-mentioned  rivers  and  by  the  Drina. 
The  attack  from  across  the  Danube  never  seriously 
developed,  and  Belgrade  was  not  then  taken.  The 
Austrians,  on  the  other  hand,  having  entered  Serbia 
in  the  northwestern  corner  of  that  country,  were 
eventually  defeated  between  Shabatz  and  Losnitza 
in  an  engagement  known  as  the  Battle  of  Jadar,  which 
took  place  about  the  middle  of  August.  Partly  as 
an  indirect  result  of  this  Serbian  victory,  and  partly 
as  a  consequence  of  the  situation  in  Russia,  the  invad- 
ing armies  were  then  driven  back  or  withdrew  into 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  Early  in  September  the 
forces  of  Serbia  and  Montenegro  united  in  these  prov- 


48  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE  WAR 

inces,  the  first-mentioned  occupying  Vishegrad  on  the 
Serbo-Bosnian  frontier  and  contingents  of  the  two 
countries  ultimately  advancing  to  the  immediate 
neighbourhood  of  Serajevo. 

During  the  first  half  of  September  a  second  invasion 
of  Serbia  took  place.  This  time  the  Austrians,  who 
had  brought  up  reinforcements,  moved  across  the 
River  Drina.  The  left  or  northern  flank  of  this  force 
was  defeated,  the  right  subsequently  being  driven 
back  in  every  district  save  one  during  very  hard  fight- 
ing which  occurred  in  the  second  week  of  September, 
For  the  two  following  months  the  position  was  practi- 
cally one  of  stalemate,  neither  side  seriously  advancing 
or  retiring  across  the  Austro-Serbian  frontier.  But  in 
November,  and  after  the  entry  of  Turkey  into  the 
war,  the  Austrians  came  on  in  great  force  and  shelled 
the  Serbians  out  of  their  trenches,  compelling  them 
to"  retire  from  their  frontier  and  from  Valievo  and  to 
remove  their  headquarters  from  that  town  to  Kraguye- 
vatz.  The  Serbians  then  took  up  positions  along  a 
range  of  hills  extending  in  a  more  or  less  southerly 
direction  from  Belgrade,  later  surrendering  that  city, 
from  which  the  Government  had  removed  to  Nish 
directly  after  the  outbreak  of  hostilities.  On  Decem- 
ber 3,  however,  when  fresh  troops  had  been  brought 
up  and  more  ammunition  become  available,  the  gal- 
lant old  King,  who  in  spite  of  his  age  and  physical 
condition  took  the  field  himself,  made  a  fiery  and 
patriotic  speech,  which  cheered  on  the  army  to  victory. 
The  Austrian  centre  was  pierced  and  the  right  or 
southern  flank  was  completely  routed.  At  first  the 
enemy's  left  or  north  flank  was  only  frustrated  in 
its   endeavours   to   drive  home  its  attacks   upon   the 


SERBIA  AND   MONTENEGRO   IN  THE  WAR    49 

Serbian  right.  But  this  latter  section  of  his  Hne, 
which  had  advanced  too  slowly,  soon  suffered  the  fate 
of  the  right,  and  the  Austrian  rout  became  general 
about  December  tenth.  The  Serbians  took  up  the 
pursuit  immediately  and,  as  the  distances  are  short, 
Valievo  was  regained  on  the  eighth,  and  Belgrade  re- 
taken, after  a  desperate  battle,  on  December  four- 
teenth. In  short,  within  a  fortnight  from  the  time  of 
the  loss  of  the  capital,  that  city  was  not  only  once  more 
in  Serbian  hands  but  the  army  of  King  Peter  had  won 
a  victory  which,  it  was  said,  had  cost  the  enemy  some 
sixty  thousand  in  killed  and  wounded. 

The  second  stage  in  the  development  of  affairs  in 
Serbia  is  that  concerned  with  the  events  which  occurred 
between  the  enemy  defeat  in  December,  1914,  and  the 
Austro-Bulgarian  advance  which  took  place  in  the 
autumn  of  the  following  year.  Whilst  this  was  a 
period  of  almost  complete  military  quiescence,  it  was 
an  epoch  during  which  events  of  far-reaching  impor- 
tance took  place  in  and  connected  with  Serbia.  To 
begin  with,  it  was  then  that  the  country,  the  sanitary 
conditions  in  which  were  quite  impossible,  was  afflicted 
by  a  scourge  of  typhus.  So  severe  indeed  was  the 
epidemic  and  so  terrible  were  the  sufferings  of  the  army 
and  people  that  this  may  be  called  the  typhus  phase 
of  the  war  —  a  phase  during  which,  if  credible  eye- 
witnesses can  be  believed,  some  two  hundred  thousand 
victims  perished  in  the  course  of  a  few  months.  Indeed 
the  fact  that  the  whole  nation  was  not  blotted  out  and 
that  it  did  not  practically  cease  to  exist  was  largely 
due  to  the  medical  assistance  sent  to  Serbia  by  America 
and  by  Great  Britain.  The  Serbian  army  was  not 
equipped  with  proper  hospital  arrangements  and  sup- 


50  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE   WAR 

plies,  and  facilities  for  the  maintenance  of  the  neces- 
sary cleanliness  were  non-existent.  In  short,  it  was 
only  after  the  arrival  of  foreign  Red  Cross  missions, 
especially  that  of  Lady  Paget  and  those  accompanied 
by  Doctors  Strong,  Jackson,  and  their  colleagues,  many 
of  whom  came  from  Boston,  that  some  sort  of  sani- 
tary conditions  were  established  and  that  Serbia  was 
practically  cleaned  up.  Among  other  measures  taken 
by  these  gentlemen  was  the  establishment  of  a  system 
of  wash-trains.  People  undressed  in  tents,  carried 
their  clothes  to  one  car,  got  washed  and  inspected  in 
another,  and  then  went  back  to  receive  their  clean 
bundle  of  garments.  When  the  work  had  been  com- 
pleted in  one  district,  the  train  was  moved  on  to  another. 

Throughout  the  greater  part  of  this  period  most 
important  diplomatic  negotiations  were  in  progress 
with  regard  to  the  Balkans.  In  February,  Italy,  whose 
attitude  towards  the  Adriatic  problem  has  often  been 
resented  by  the  Serbs  almost  if  not  quite  as  keenly 
as  is  that  of  Austria-Hungary  towards  the  Southern 
Slav  question,  once  again  took  measures  which  mate- 
rially influenced  the  Balkan  situation  to  the  advantage 
of  Serbia.  More  than  three  months  before  that  coun- 
try entered  the  war,  the  Government  of  King  Victor 
Emanuel  informed  Austria  that  it  would  regard  any 
further  action  in  the  Balkans  by  the  Dual  Monarchy  as 
an  unfriendly  act.  Though  this  may  not  have  been  the 
object,  the  effect  of  such  an  action  was  to  prevent 
a  renewed  attack  against  the  Serbs,  when  they  were 
in  the  throes  of  the  typhus  scourge. 

During  the  first  nine  months  of  1915,  and  particu- 
larly during  the  summer  and  early  autumn  of  that 
year,  the  Serbians  were  passing  through  a  most  critical 


SERBIA  AND   MONTENEGRO   IN   THE   WAR    51 

period  in  their  history.  This  was  due,  on  the  one 
hand,  to  the  internal  disaffection  which  prevailed  in 
large  parts  of  Southern  Serbia,  and  which  resulted  from 
the  attitude  of  the  Government  towards  the  alien  popu- 
lation of  the  districts  annexed  after  the  Balkan  Wars, 
and  on  the  other  to  the  negotiations  then  in  progress 
between  the  Allies  and  the  Balkan  States  in  regard 
to  the  provision  of  concessions  for  Bulgaria  —  con- 
cessions almost  certainly  destined  to  have  brought 
that  country  into  the  War  against  Turkey  and  the 
Central  Powers.  Serbia,  instead  of  recognising  that 
her  future  prosperity  and  even  her  independent  exist- 
ence can  be  assured  only  by  the  defeat  of  Austria  and 
of  Germany,  and  not  by  the  success  of  her  own  arms 
alone,  failed  to  see  the  necessity  for  subordinating  her 
immediate  interests  to  the  good  of  the  Allied  cause. 
In  other  words,  for  months  the  Serbian  Government, 
or  more  correctly  the  Military  Party,  exalted  by  tem- 
porary victory,  turned  a  deaf  ear  to  the  suggestions 
that  they  should  concede  to  Bulgaria  at  least  some  of 
the  disputed  areas  of  Macedonia  —  areas  which  that 
country  was  determined  to  try  to  secure,  by  peace  or 
by  war,  during  the  present  conflagration.  The  result 
of  this  attitude,  together  with  the  policies  of  the  then 
neutral  Greece  and  Roumania,  was  that,  in  place  of 
accepting  the  necessity  for  what  would  certainly  have 
been  difficult  and  disagreeable  sacrifices,  other  and 
less  wise  counsels  were  followed  —  counsels  which 
have  been  largely  responsible  for  the  almost  immediate 
subjugation  of  Serbia  and  for  the  condition  in  which 
that  country  now  finds  herself. 

As  I  shall  show,  when  I  come  to  discuss  the  above- 
mentioned  negotiations  at  greater  length  in  connec- 


52  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE   WAR 

tion  with  Bulgaria,  there  were  faults  not  only  in  the 
attitudes  of  the  Balkan  States  but  also  in  the  Allied 
diplomacy.  These  faults  do  not,  however,  justify  the 
wholesale  criticisms  of  those  who  have  never  realised 
the  difficulties  of  the  Balkan  situation,  and  in  partic- 
ular they  do  not  make  reasonable  the  contention  that 
the  Allies  tried  to  or  did  sacrifice  Serbia  in  1915.  Once 
Bulgaria  entered  or  was  on  the  point  of  entering  the 
War  on  the  other  side,  no  measures  which  could  have 
then  been  taken  would  have  saved  the  army  of  King 
Peter  from  total  defeat.  Thus  even  did  Serbia  pro- 
pose, as  her  advocates  state  that  she  did  propose, 
to  attack  Bulgaria  before  the  army  of  that  country 
was  fully  mobilised,  and  even  had  the  Allies  advised 
her  (Serbia)  not  to  take  these  measures,  which  has  been 
denied  officially,  such  would  have  been  good  advice, 
for  had  the  Serbian  army  advanced  towards  the  east 
at  the  time  in  question,  nothing  could  have  saved  it 
from  defeat  at  the  hands  of  Austria  and  of  Bulgaria 
—  defeat  in  an  area  where,  instead  of  being  able  to 
be  evacuated  from  the  Albanian  coast,  the  Allies  would 
have  been  powerless  to  come  to  its  assistance.  In 
short,  as  it  was  not  feasible  for  Great  Britain  and  for 
France  to  undertake  a  Balkan  expedition  and  to  land 
troops  in  neutral  Greece,  as  Serbia  suggested,  during 
the  complicated  negotiations  preceding  the  entry  of 
Bulgaria  into  the  War,  the  failure  to  save  Serbia  was 
not  due  to  any  military  fault  on  the  part  of  the  Allies, 
but  to  the  strategic  position  of  our  enemies,  to  their 
overwhelming  strength,  and  to  the  enormous  geographi- 
cal and  political  difficulties  which  then  existed  in  the 
Balkans. 

The  third  stage  in  the  development  of  events  in 


SERBIA  AND   MONTENEGRO   IN   THE   WAR    53 

Serbia  begins  from  the  entry  of  Bulgaria  into  the  War 
in  October,  1915.  Prior  to  and  at  that  time  the  Austro- 
Germans  concentrated  in  strength  on  the  west  bank 
of  the  River  Drina  and  to  the  north  of  the  Save  and 
Danube.  Immediately  after  the  rupture  of  relations 
between  the  Allies  and  Bulgaria,  Von  Mackensen  ad- 
vanced from  the  first-mentioned  area,  whilst  other 
enemy  forces  crossed  into  Serbian  territory  to  the  south- 
west of  Belgrade  and  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the 
point  where  the  Morava  flows  into  the  Danube.  A 
few  days  later,  and  on  October  14,  two  more  or  less 
independent  Bulgarian  forces  advanced  into  Serbia, 
the  one  directed  on  Nish  and  Pirot  and  into  the  north, 
or  old  part,  of  that  country,  and  the  other  aimed  at 
Uskub  and  at  the  areas  of  Macedonia  coveted  by  the 
Bulgarians.  The  Austro-German-Bulgarian  armies 
operating  in  the  north  soon  established  connection, 
and  Belgrade  having  been  taken  on  October  10,  the 
arsenal  town  of  Ki*aguyevatz  as  well  as  Nish  —  the 
temporary  capital  —  were  in  enemy  hands  by  the 
end  of  the  first  week  in  November.  The  Allied  forces 
based  upon  Salonica  were  unable  seriously  to  influence 
the  situation,  and  by  the  middle  of  that  month  the 
whole  of  the  Serbian  army  which  had  not  already  been 
captured  was  in  retreat  towards  the  Adriatic.  The 
Government,  temporarily  established  at  Prisrend,  was 
subsequently  forced  to  move  to  Scutari,  where  it 
remained  until  the  evacuation  of  that  town  in  the  face 
of  the  enemy.  Finally  during  the  closing  weeks  of 
1915,  and  after  passing  through  hardships  which  it  is 
impossible  to  describe,  all  that  remained  of  the  Serbian 
army  was  transferred  by  the  Allied  fleets  from  the 
Albanian  coast  to  Corfu,  where  it  was  re-equipped  and 


54  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE  WAR 

reclothed  in  order  to  prepare  it  for  its  future  and  valiant 
role  in  the  Salonica  campaign.  Thus,  with  the  occu- 
pation of  all  old  Serbia  by  Austro-Bulgarian  forces 
and  with  the  capture  by  the  Bulgarians  of  almost  all 
the  areas,  including  Monastir,  which  they  had  coveted 
for  years,  temporarily  ended  the  independence  of  Serbia 
—  an  independence,  the  re-establishment  of  which  is 
still  one  of  the  fundamental  aims  for  which  the  Allies 
are  waging  war. 

With  the  exception  of  Monaco,  San  Marino,  and 
Andorra,  Montenegro  is  the  smallest  independent 
State  in  Europe.  This  independence  was  formally 
recognised  by  Turkey  and  the  other  Great  Powers 
who  signed  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  in  the  year  1878. 
The  kingdom  now  has  an  area  of  approximately  5600 
square  miles  and  a  population  of  about  516,000  souls. 
Although  the  country  possesses  a  House  of  Assembly, 
the  rule  of  King  Nicholas  has,  for  all  practical  pur- 
poses, always  been  absolute.  In  his  own  words,  His 
Majesty  is  both  ruler  of  Montenegro  and  father  of  its 
inhabitants.  Elsewhere  Cettinje — the  capital  —  would 
be  little  more  than  a  village.  Its  population  only  num- 
bers about  four  thousand.  The  country  is  poor,  and 
derives  most  of  its  revenue  from  land  taxes,  customs,  and 
monopolies.  During  the  reign  of  King  Nicholas,  who  as- 
cended the  throne  of  Montenegro  in  the  year  1860,  sev- 
eral wars  have  even  threatened  to  blot  out  the  country 
from  the  map  of  Europe.  Thus  in  1862  the  campaign 
against  Turkey  was  attended  by  disastrous  results  for 
Montenegro.  In  1878,  by  the  non-acceptance  of  the 
Treaty  of  San  Stefano  by  the  Great  Powers,  Montenegro 
lost  advantages  which  would  otherwise  have  been  hers. 


SERBIA  AND   MONTENEGRO   IN   THE   WAR    55 

Indeed,  in  that  year  and  by  the  Treaty  of  BerHn, 
Prince  Nicholas  was  compelled  to  hand  over  Dulcigno 
to  Turkey,  to  cede  Spitza,  which  dominates  the  port 
of  Antivari,  to  Austria,  and  to  accept  the  condition 
imposed  upon  him  by  which  the  port  of  Antivari  and 
all  the  waters  of  Montenegro  should  remain  closed  to 
ships  of  war,  and  that  certain  police  functions,  along 
the  coast  of  Montenegro,  should  be  carried  out  by 
Austria-Hungary.  Whilst  Dulcigno  was  returned  to 
Prince  Nicholas  in  1880,  the  disadvantageous  position 
created  by  the  remaining  clauses  of  the  29th  Article 
of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  were  not  only  never  forgotten 
by  the  people,  but  they  were  also  the  reason  largely 
responsible  for  the  Austro-Montenegrin  crises  which 
arose  between  1878  and  1909.  In  this  latter  year, 
however,  although  no  changes  were  made  in  regard 
to  Spitza,  it  was  arranged  between  King  Nicholas  and 
the  Austrian  Government,  through  the  medium  of 
Italy,  that  all  restrictions  formerly  placed  upon  the 
sovereign  rights  of  Montenegro  along  her  coast  should 
be  removed,  and  that,  although  Antivari  was  to  retain 
the  character  of  a  commercial  and  unfortified  port, 
yet  it  was  to  be  open  to  ships  of  war.  It  is  to  this 
change,  made  directly  after  the  Bosnian  crisis  of  1908- 
1909,  that  reference  was  made  in  the  published  version 
of  the  original  Treaty,  reported  to  have  been  made  be- 
tween Italy  on  the  one  side  and  Great  Britain,  France, 
and  Russia  on  the  other,  just  before  the  entry  of  Italy 
into  the  War  when  it  said,^  in  speaking  of  the  neutralisa- 
tion of  parts  of  the  eastern  coast  of  the  Adriatic,  that 

1  Tliis  Treaty,  now  reported  to  have  been  replaced  by  another,  was 
printed  in  Current  Uistory  —  a  monthly  magazine  of  the  ^ etc  York  Times 
for  March,  1918. 


56  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE   WAR 

*'  Montenegro  rights  are  not  to  be  infringed  in  so  far  as 
they  are  based  on  the  declaration  exchanged  between 
the  contracting  parties  in  April  and  May,  1909." 

Although  the  Balkan  Wars  brought  about  the  annex- 
ation of  an  area  of  territory  which  more  or  less  doubled 
Montenegro  in  size,  yet  the  result  of  these  wars  was 
not  entirely  favourable  to  that  country.  Amongst 
other  reasons,  this  was  due  to  the  facts  that  the  Mon- 
tenegrins then  failed  to  realise  their  great  national 
aspiration  —  the  permanent  possession  of  Scutari  — 
and  that  the  prestige  of  the  Serbian  royal  family  and 
of  the  Serbians  as  fighters  was  so  greatly  increased 
that  everything  Serbian  became  extremely  popular 
in  Montenegro.  Whilst  prior  to  these  wars  the  rela- 
tionship existing  between  the  two  countries  was 
often  far  from  cordial,  subsequently  the  position  was 
so  changed  that  the  shortcomings  of  the  Montenegrin 
dynasty  and  the  probability  of  a  union  between  the 
two  States  were  openly  discussed  in  Cettinje.  The 
formation  of  a  common  diplomatic  service  and  of  a 
combined  army  was  already  under  consideration  during 
the  early  months  of  1914,  Under  such  circumstances, 
even  had  not  the  War  broken  out,  it  was  unlikely  that 
Montenegro  could  long  have  continued  to  maintain  an 
independent  existence.  These  conditions,  together  with 
a  long-standing  hatred  of  Austria,  prompted  the  Mon- 
tenegrins to  throw  in  their  lot  with  Serbia  almost  directly 
after  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  between  that  country 
and  the  Dual  Monarchy.  From  that  time  until  the  end 
of  1915  the  role  of  King  Nicholas'  army  consisted  in  the 
defence  of  his  frontiers  and  in  making  raids  into  Herze- 
govina and  Bosnia — raids  which  at  first  occupied  a  cer- 
tain number  of  enemy  troops.     In  June,  1915,  King 


SERBIA  AND   MONTENEGRO   IN  THE  WAR    57 

Nicholas  once  more  took  possession  of  and  annexed 
Scutari,  from  which  he  had  been  compelled  to  retire  at 
the  time  of  the  Balkan  Wars.  Prior  to  the  month  of 
December,  however,  there  was  no  important  fighting, 
for  it  was  only  when  Serbia  had  been  subjugated  that 
the  enemy  made  any  real  endeavour  to  conquer  a 
country,  the  importance  of  which  was  due  rather  to 
the  strategical  strength  of  its  position  and  particularly 
to  that  of  the  Lovtchen  Mountain,  which  dominates 
and  commands  the  Austrian  naval  base  at  Cattaro, 
than  to  the  efficiency  or  power  of  resistance  of  its  army. 
It  was,  therefore,  only  during  the  early  days  of  Janu- 
ary, 1916,  when  the  enemy  was  compelled  to  clear 
up  the  situation  in  Montenegro,  in  order  to  be  able  to 
develop  to  the  full  the  advantages  he  had  gained  in 
Serbia,  and  to  be  in  a  position  to  advance  into  Albania, 
that  the  Austrians  seriously  bombarded  Mount  Lov- 
tchen. Partly  owing  to  the  fact  that  its  defenders  pos- 
sessed no  heavy  artillery,  which  was  necessary  in  order 
to  make  full  use  of  the  great  natural  strength  of  this 
position,  and  partly  as  a  result  of  circumstances,  which 
were  not  clear,  the  resistance  of  the  Montenegrins  was 
soon  at  an  end,  and  on  January  11  the  great  national 
stronghold  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  who  actually 
entered  Cettinje  three  days  later.  King  Nicholas,  ac- 
companied by  some  of  his  Ministers  and  by  part  of  his 
army,  fled  to  Albania,  His  Majesty  himself  ultimately 
taking  refuge  in  France.  Other  members  of  the  royal 
family  and  of  the  Government  remained  behind,  capitu- 
lating to  the  enemy  under  conditions  to  which  it  is  bet- 
ter to  make  no  reference  here.  Thus  temporarily  ended 
the  independent  existence  of  a  country,  the  personal 
bravery  of  whose  inhabitants  is  above  all  reproach. 


58  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE   WAR 

The  great  importance  of  the  earher  role  of  Serbia, 
and  to  a  lesser  degree  of  Montenegro,  in  the  War  is 
that  these  countries  contained  and  occupied  Austrian 
forces  which  would  otherwise  have  been  available  for 
use  against  Russia  before  the  army  of  that  country 
was  effectively  mobilised  and  at  a  time  when  every 
available  Allied  man  in  the  east  was  of  value,  in  that 
his  presence  necessitated  the  detachment  of  Germans 
from  the  west,  where  the  situation  in  France  was  highly 
critical  for  months.  Serbia,  having  suffered  in  the 
two  Balkan  campaigns  casualties  amounting  to  over 
seventy-six  thousand  of  all  ranks  (of  whom  more  than 
thirty  thousand  were  killed  or  died  of  wounds  or  from 
disease) ,  put  into  the  field  at  least  three  hundred  thou- 
sand men  on  the  outbreak  of  this  war,  Montenegro, 
who  lost  about  ten  thousand  in  killed  and  wounded 
during  the  events  of  1912-1913,  furnished  the  Allies 
with  approximately  thirty  thousand  men  on  the  out- 
break of  the  European  conflagration.  For  this  and  for 
the  gallant  way  in  which  the  two  little  Slav  States 
fought  during  the  first  eighteen  months  of  the  present 
war,  they  deserve  credit,  almost  if  not  equal,  to  that 
which  must  be  bestowed  upon  the  Serbians  for  their 
subsequent  valour  at  Salonica  —  a  valour  which  I 
shall  discuss  in  connection  with  that  campaign. 


Ill 

TURKEY  AND  THE  WAR 

To  describe  the  existing  state  of  things  in  Turkey 
or  to  outline  the  reasons  for  them  is  always  an  ex- 
tremely difficult  task.  This  is  particularly  the  case 
in  regard  to  the  period  which  intervened  between  the 
close  of  the  Balkan  Wars,  that  is  to  say,  between  the 
signature  of  the  Turco-Bulgarian  Treaty  of  Constan- 
tinople in  September,  1913,  and  the  outbreak  of  the 
European  War.^  In  general,  all  that  can  be  said, 
therefore,  is  that  the  Committee  of  Union  and  Progress, 
which  has  constituted  the  only  real  power  in  the  country 
ever  since  1908,  occupied  a  stronger  position  than  that 
which  it  had  held  at  any  time  after  the  months  which 
immediately  followed  the  re-establishment  of  the  Con- 
stitution. Not  only  was  the  Government  completely 
in  its  hands,  but  for  the  moment,  at  least,  all  practical 
opposition  had  disappeared.  Indeed  that  Enver  Pasha 
and  his  supporters  had  "reconquered"  Adrianople,  and 
thus  broken  the  time-honoured  rule  that  territory  once 
taken  from  Turkey  by  a  Christian  State  shall  never 
again  pass  under  Ottoman  rule,  regained  for  the  Com- 
mittee all  the  prestige  which  it  would  otherwise  have 

'  The  developments  of  this  period  and  those  connectofl  with  the  entry  of 
Turkey  into  the  War,  besides  events  which  followed  it,  are  ably  and  fully 
chronicled  by  the  ex-Araerican  Ambassador  at  Constantinople  under  the 
title  "Ambassador  Morgenthau's  Story." 


60  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE   WAR 

lost,  as  a  result  of  the  losses  suffered  during  the  first 
Balkan  war.     In  short,  the  army,  always  the  backbone 
of  the  New  Regime,  was  more  completely  in  the  hands 
of  the  Young  Turks  than  had  ever  been  the  case  before. 
In  spite  of  the  effect  of  the  reoccupation  of  Adrianople 
and  of  the  amicable  arrangements  made  between  the 
two  countries  as  to  the  position  of  the  Turco-Bulgarian 
frontier,  the  Turks  were  smarting  under  losses  suffered 
in  a  war  during  which  the  Great  Powers  had  said  that 
there  should  be  no  modifications  in  the  Balkan  "Status 
Quo"  existing  in  1912.     This  was  particularly  the  case 
in  regard  to  the  results  of  the  decision  of  the  London 
Ambassadorial  Conference  as  to  the  future  ownership 
of  the  Aegean  Islands  captured  by  Greece  during  the 
first  Balkan  war.     In  order  to  realise  the  meaning  of 
this  question  to  Turkey  and  to  Greece,  it  is  necessary 
to  remember  what  has  happened  in  the  Aegean  during 
the  last  few  years.     The  Turco-Italian  War  of  1911- 
1912  terminated  by  the  Treaty  of  Lausanne,  signed 
on  October  15  of  the  latter  year,  resulted  in  the  — 
nominally  temporary  —  retention  of  about  twelve  of 
the  islands,  including  Rhodes,  situated  off  the  south- 
western corner  of  Asia  Minor.     These  were  not,  there- 
fore, conquerable  by  Greece  in  1912  or  1913,  and  that 
country  was  only  able  to  occupy  the  islands  actually 
under  Turkish  rule.     Whilst  leaving  the  question  of 
the  Dodecannese  Islands  (those  in  the  hands  of  Italy) 
still   undecided,   it   was   therefore  in   regard   to   those 
which  changed  hands  during  the  Balkan  Wars  that 
the  Turco-Greek  crisis  of  1913-1914  arose. 

The  Ambassadorial  Conference  decided  that  all  the 
islands  occupied  by  Greece,  except  Imbros,  Tenedos, 
and  Castellorizzo,  which  are  located  close  to  the  outer 


TURKEY  AND   THE  WAR  61 

entrance  of  the  Dardanelles,  should  be  retained  by 
Greece.  Turkey,  who  was  not  satisfied  with  that 
decision,  by  which  she  lost  the  important  islands  of 
Chios,  Mitylene,  and  Samos,  situated  only  just  off  the 
coast  of  Asia  Minor,  never  really  accepted  it  and  con- 
tinued to  agitate  both  at  home  and  abroad  for  the 
possession  of  territories  without  which  she  said  that 
the  Asiatic  power  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  would  be 
endangered.  Greece,  on  the  other  hand,  naturally 
refused  to  listen  to  arguments  entirely  opposed  to  the 
principle  of  nationality,  and  not  only  retained  the 
islands  allotted  to  her,  but  never  really  vacated  those 
which  were  to  be  Turkish. 

This  situation  existed  up  to  and  after  the  outbreak 
of  the  European  War.  In  the  early  summer  of  1914, 
the  Turks  instituted  a  systematic  persecution  and 
massacre  of  the  Greeks  domiciled  in  Ottoman  territory, 
a  massacre  which  greatly  inflamed  the  sentiments  of 
the  Greeks  throughout  the  civilised  world.  On  and 
after  the  month  of  June,  the  Turco-Greek  crisis  was 
rendered  more  acute  by  the  annexation  of  Chios  and 
Mitylene  by  Greece  and  by  the  purchase  by  the  same 
country  of  two  good  and  modern  battleships,  Lemnos 
and  Kilkis  (formerly  Idaho  and  Mississippi),  which 
they  secured  from  America  during  the  summer. 
Launched  in  the  year  1905  and  completed  in  the 
year  1908,  these  ships,  which  are  each  of  fourteen 
thousand  tons,  forestalled  the  arrival  of  the  two 
Turkish  dreadnoughts  then  being  built  in  England 
for  the  Ottoman  Government,  and  thus  enabled  the 
Greeks  to  assume  an  attitude  which  would  not  other- 
wise have  been  possible.  As  a  consequence  of  these 
events,  the  outbreak  of  the  war  found  the  relations 


62  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE   WAR 

existing  between  the  two  countries  so  strained  that 
the  pohcies  of  each  of  them  were  temporarily  influenced 
by  a  desire  that  the  European  conflagration  should  be 
utilised  in  order  to  favour  the  national  aspirations  of 
the  parties  concerned. 

From  a  semi-internal  point  of  view,  the  three  all- 
important  questions  connected  with  Turkey  during 
this  period  were  the  gradually  improving  relations 
between  that  country  and  Bulgaria,  the  augmentation 
of  Germanic  influence  at  Constantinople,  and  the 
negotiations  in  progress  between  Europe  and  the 
Ottoman  Government  in  reference  to  reforms  for  Ar- 
menia. In  regard  to  the  flrst  of  these,  it  is  sufficient 
to  say  that  as  a  result  of  the  Balkan  Wars,  both  Tur- 
key and  Bulgaria  had  suffered  in  a  manner  which 
naturally  made  these  countries  of  greater  importance 
to  and  brought  them  into  closer  sympathy  with  one 
another.  Moreover,  as  for  different  reasons  they 
were  both  the  most  ardent  enemies  of  Greece,  it  was 
obvious  that  they  would  work  for  the  development 
of  a  policy  likely,  sooner  or  later,  to  enable  each  of 
them  to  reacquire  territories  which  they  coveted.  In 
this  connection,  too,  it  is  necessary  to  remember  that 
early  in  1914,  Enver  Pasha,  a  former  military  attache 
at  Berlin  and  an  ardent  pro-German,  was  appointed 
Turkish  Minister  of  War,  and  that,  at  about  the  same 
time,  General  Liman  von  Sanders,  a  German  general, 
was  nominated  to  the  command  of  the  1st  Turkish 
Army  Corps  with  powers  and  with  a  staff  which  made 
him  practically  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Ottoman 
army.  In  short,  the  secret  influence  of  Germany, 
ever  present  at  Constantinople,  once  more  lost  no 
opportunity    of    developing    the    already    favourable 


TURKEY  AND   THE   WAR  63 

ground,  partly  created  by  the  protests  of  the  British 
and  Russian  Government  against  the  Turkish  re- 
occupation  of  Adrianople,  to  an  advantage  of  which 
she  was  to  reap  the  benefit  soon  after  the  outbreak 
of  the  European  War. 

Between  the  Balkan  Wars  and  the  outbreak  of 
the  European  conflagration,  there  occurred  in  Turkey 
one  other  development  which,  though  it  never  really 
materialised,  is  none  the  less  possessed  of  significance. 
I  refer  to  the  arrangements  made  between  Russia, 
acting  on  behalf  of  the  Great  Powers,  and  the  Ottoman 
Government  concerning  the  introduction  of  reforms 
in  Armenia.  This  agreement,  which  was  arrived  at 
in  February,  1914,  and  which  was  based  on  the  ar- 
rangements nominally  made  in  1878,  recognised  the 
special  position  of  the  Armenians  in  six  vilayets  (prov- 
inces) of  Eastern  Asia  Minor,  and  placed  those  dis- 
tricts which  were  to  be  divided  into  two  groups,  under 
two  inspectors  general,  chosen  from  the  subjects  of 
two  European  States  and  appointed  by  the  Ottoman 
Government  on  the  recommendation  of  the  Powers. 
There  was  to  be  a  mixed  gendarmerie,  Christians  and 
Moslems  were  to  enjoy  the  same  privileges  in  regard 
to  representation  in  the  local  government,  and  the 
interests  of  the  Armenians  were  to  be  properly  voiced 
in  the  Ottoman  Parliament  by  an  adequate  number  of 
deputies. 

According  to  this  arrangement  the  inspectors  gen- 
eral, whose  powers  and  duties  constituted  the  key 
to  the  question,  were  to  be  named  for  a  period  of  ten 
years,  and  their  engagement  was  not  to  be  revocable 
during  that  period.  When  the  appointments  were 
made,  the  Turks,  however,  ignored  this  and  added  a 


64  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE  WAR 

clause  in  the  final  agreements  with  the  so-called  in- 
spectors, one  of  whom  was  Dutch  and  the  other  Nor- 
wegian, stating  that  the  Government  could  terminate 
its  contract  at  any  time  by  the  payment  of  one  year's 
salary,  thereby  once  more  turning  a  scheme  for  Ar- 
menian reform  into  a  mere  farce.  In  the  end,  after 
the  employees  in  question  had  been  detained  for 
some  time  at  Constantinople,  they  went  to  their 
posts,  but  on  the  outbreak  of  the  War,  which  occurred 
directly  after  their  arrival,  their  appointments  were 
cancelled,  the  Armenians  being  left  to  look  forward 
and  to  anticipate  a  reign  of  terror,  which,  when  in- 
augurated, proved  worse  than  anything  which  had 
previously  taken  place  in  the  annals  of  their  history. 
On  the  outbreak  of  the  War,  therefore,  there  existed 
in  Turkey  a  state  of  uncertainty  and  of  unrest  which 
made  Constantinople  the  most  important  neutral 
centre  in  Europe,  —  a  centre  where  for  three  months 
a  great  diplomatic  battle  was  in  progress  between 
the  representatives  of  the  Central  Powers  on  the 
one  side  and  those  of  the  Allies  on  the  other.  To 
understand  the  nature  of  this  struggle  it  is  necessary 
once  more  to  remember  that  for  years  Germany  had 
left  no  stone  unturned  in  preparing  the  way  to  secure 
Ottoman  support  at  the  crucial  moment.  She  had 
ignored  the  necessity  for  and  stood  in  the  way  of  re- 
forms in  Macedonia  and  Armenia.  She  had  provided 
the  money  and  constructed  railways  which  at  the 
same  time  appealed  to  the  Turkish  imagination  and 
furthered  the  policy  of  the  "  Turcification "  of  the 
various  subject  races  of  the  Empire.  And  lastly, 
both  before  as  during  and  after  the  Balkan  Wars, 
she  had   planned   and   done   her   utmost   to   increase 


TURKEY   AND   THE   WAR  65 

the  general  and  perhaps  not  unnatural  Turkish  fear 
and  hatred  of  Russia  —  fear  and  hatred  which  I  have 
already  shown  were  directly  responsible  for  the  Revolu- 
tion of  1908,  and  which  constitute  the  governing  fea- 
ture of  the  foreign  policy  pursued  alike  by  the  Old 
and  by  the  Young  Turks.  These  factors  in  the  situa- 
tion were  responsible  for  the  existence  of  an  extremely 
favourable  ground  for  the  intrigues  of  the  enemy,  who 
scorned  no  methods,  however  underhand,  provided 
he  could  secure  the  support  of  a  country  whose  as- 
sistance he  realised  would  be  invaluable  to  him. 

The  position  of  the  Allies  was  far  more  difficult  than 
that  of  the  Central  Powers.  Instead  of  a  policy  run 
by  one  man  —  the  Kaiser  —  for  one  object  —  German 
aggression  —  they  were  compelled  to  endeavour  to 
create  a  position  which  would  react  not  only  in  their 
own  favour,  but  also  in  that  of  those  most  closely 
concerned  in  it.  The  task  of  allies,  too,  is  always 
complicated  by  the  fact  that  whilst  they  are  obliged 
to  act  in  common  agreement,  each  is  naturally  pos- 
sessed of  her  own  vital  interests  and  special  friend- 
ships. In  Turkey  this  had  its  effect  in  various  stages 
of  the  development  of  events,  and  the  Germans,  never 
slow  to  profit  by  our  difficulties  and  especially  by  the 
fact  that  no  Turk,  Old  or  New,  would  wish  to  support 
the  cause  of  Russia,  persuaded  the  Ottoman  Govern- 
ment that  were  the  Allies  to  win  the  war,  sooner  or 
later  the  Empire  would  be  split  up,  and  that  no  promise 
made  to  it  would  be  of  any  avail.  Thus  whilst  the 
accuracy  of  published  statements  to  the  effect  that  a 
definite  and  absolute  Treaty  of  Alliance  was  signed 
between  Germany  and  Turkey  on  or  before  August  4, 
1914,  seems  open  to  great  doubt,  there  is  good  reason 


66  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE  WAR 

to  believe  that  there  was  a  concrete  understanding 
between  Germany  and  certain  of  the  more  important 
members  of  the  Committee  of  Union  and  Progress  — 
an  understanding  about  which  the  Sultan,  the  then 
Grand  Vizier,  and  such  men  as  Ahmed  Djemal  Pasha, 
then  Minister  of  Marine,  knew  nothing.  From  the 
moment  of  the  outbreak  of  the  European  War,  there- 
fore, the  Allies  might  have  foreseen,  even  if  that  treaty 
had  not  been  concluded  in  a  definite  form,  that  the 
circumstances  were  such  as  to  prevent  them  from 
being  able  to  provide  Turkey  with  concessions  or 
guarantees  which  would  prevent  her  from  being  en- 
ticed by  the  Germanic  promises  concerning  the  re- 
conquest  of  Egypt  and  of  other  territories  which 
she  had  lost,  from  throwing  in  her  lot  ultimately 
with  the  enemy.  The  principal  reasons  which  made 
this  eventuality  so  probable  were  not  that  the  people 
disliked  England  and  France  or  that  they  admired 
Germany,  but  because  the  more  chauvinistic  elements 
of  the  population,  such  as  Talaat  and  Enver  Pashas, 
were  undoubtedly  anxious,  as  they  believed,  to  rid 
themselves  of  the  Russian  danger,  and  because  they 
seemed  to  think  that  to  side  with  Germany  would 
enable  them  to  inflict  some  damage  upon  Greece,  from 
whom  they  were  anxious  to  regain  the  Aegean  Islands. 
Upon  neither  of  these  two  vital  questions  was  the 
position  of  the  Allies  a  favourable  one,  for  whilst  at 
that  time  they  were  bound  to  treat  with  respect  any 
claims  or  propositions  made  by  Russia,  they  were 
almost  equally  powerless  to  support  the  reversal  of  a 
decision  for  which  they  themselves  were  principally 
responsible. 

Throughout  the  first   three  months  of  the  War  the 


TURKEY  AND  THE   WAR  67 

Germans,  who  were  thus  provided  with  advantageous 
ground  upon  which  to  work,  spared  no  pains  to  drag 
Turkey  into  the  War.  The  legitimate  confiscation 
by  England  of  the  two  Turkish  dreadnoughts  in 
building  in  British  yards  was  badly  handled,  and 
its  reasons  were  so  inadequately  explained,  that  the 
Germans  were  able  to  utilise  this  measure  to  inflame 
public  opinion  among  the  people  who  had  actually 
subscribed  a  large  proportion  of  the  funds  to  pay  for 
these  vessels.  Soon  after  this,  Admiral  Limpus  and 
all  the  officers  of  the  British  Naval  Mission  were  re- 
placed in  their  executive  command  by  Turkish  officers, 
being  ordered  to  continue  work  at  the  Ministry  of 
Marine,  should  they  remain  in  Turkey.  As  this 
measure  was  obviously  part  of  the  enemy's  plan  of 
intrigue  —  an  intrigue  destined  to  give  the  German 
officers  who  arrived  with  and  subsequent  to  Goeben 
full  control  of  the  Ottoman  fleet  —  the  British  Gov- 
ernment subsequently  withdrew  its  representatives, 
who  thus  left  Constantinople  under  circumstances 
which  can  hardly  have  added  to  Allied  prestige. 
Later  on  the  capitulations  which  date  back  for  cen- 
turies, and  which  alone  were  responsible  for  the  safety 
of  Europeans  domiciled  in  Turkey,  were  abolished. 
The  foreign  ambassadors,  including  those  of  the  Cen- 
tral Powers,  protested,  but  considering  the  relations 
then  and  subsequently  existing  between  the  Germanic 
and  Ottoman  Governments,  there  can  be  no  doubt 
that  the  representative  of  the  Kaiser  knew  full  well 
that  even  the  nominal  breaking  loose  of  the  Turkish 
Government  from  a  system  of  control,  which  was  vital 
to  the  whole  civilised  world,  was  but  a  part  of  the 
game  in  which  he  was  actually  the   chief   actor.     As 


68  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE  WAR 

a  matter  of  fact,  at  the  end  of  April,  1916,  it  was 
formally  announced  that  Turkey  had  taken  the  place 
of  Italy  in  the  Triple  Alliance,  and  that  she  "had  re- 
gained her  independence  by  entering  upon  equal  terms" 
into  that  alliance.  In  spite  of  this  declaration  and  of 
the  explanation  then  given  that  in  none  of  the  minor 
agreements  concluded  was  there  any  trace  of  the  old 
capitulation  rights,  it  is  obvious,  as  matters  of  con- 
sular jurisdiction  and  of  the  right  of  residence  were 
dealt  with,  that  the  Germans  secured  in  fact,  if  not 
in  name,  the  privileges  which  they  had  lost  just  prior 
to  the  intervention  of  Turkey.  During  this  period, 
too,  Ottoman  intrigue  became  rife  from  end  to  end 
of  Albania,  and  Turkey  was  persuaded  to  mobilise 
—  a  measure  which  she  was  not  in  a  financial  position 
to  undertake,  and  a  measure  which  could  only  have 
been  directed  against  the  Allies. 

But,  though  it  happened  earlier  than  some  of  the 
above-mentioned  events,  the  all-important  feature  and 
the  real  turning  point  in  the  whole  situation  was  the 
arrival  at  Constantinople  of  the  German  Goeben  and 
Breslau  in  the  middle  of  August,  The  so-called  pur- 
chase of  these  vessels  placed  the  Turks  in  a  position 
which  naturally  justified  them  in  thinking  that  they 
were  a  match  for  any  naval  force  which  they  were 
likely  to  meet  in  the  Black  Sea  ^  From  then,  and 
until  the  outbreak  of  war,  the  entire  attention  of  the 
German  representative  at  Constantinople  and  of  the 
Turkish  Government  was  directed  towards  the  rapid 
conveyance  of  German  men  and  war  material  to  the 

1  Mr.  Morgenthau  says  that  the  German  Ambassador  at  Constantinople 
never  made  any  secret  of  the  fact  that  the  ships  still  remained  German 
property. 


TURKEY  AND  THE  WAR  69 

shores  of  the  Bosphorus.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  shortly 
after  Turkey  entered  the  war  arena,  there  were  at 
least  twelve  thousand  Germans  and  Austrians  in  the 
Ottoman  dominions.  This  vast  army  of  supporters  and 
instructors  was  collected  largely  owing  to  the  fact  that 
men,  who  should  have  returned  to  their  own  countries 
for  military  service,  either  remained  in  or  went  to  Con- 
stantinople, it  being  understood  that  their  presence 
there  would  ultimately  be  more  valuable  to  the  common 
cause  than  would  have  been  their  return  home. 

It  is  this  weighty  question  of  Goeben  and  Breslau 
and  above  all  the  manner  in  which  it  was  treated  by 
the  Allies,  which  constituted  the  greatest  mistake 
made  in  connection  with  the  then  situation  at  Con- 
stantinople. Leaving  out  of  account  the  reasons  for 
which  these  ships  were  able  to  escape  from  their  place 
of  refuge  in  Sicily  —  reasons  the  real  nature  of  which 
we  do  not  even  now  know  —  the  Allies,  instead  of 
grasping  the  fact  then  and  there  in  the  month  of 
August,  1914,  that  the  then  arrival  of  Goeben  would 
enable  Germany  to  rush  Turkey  into  the  War,  and 
instead  of  immediately  following  her  into  the  Dar- 
danelles, not  as  the  enemies  of  Turkey,  but  as  a  peace- 
ful precaution  and  as  the  protectors  and  friends  of  the 
true.  Ottoman  people,  continued  to  ignore  the  fact 
that  the  so-called  purchase  of  these  vessels  was  a 
purely  bogus  and  prearranged  matter,  destined  not 
only  to  give  the  enemy  complete  control  of  the  direc- 
tion of  affairs  in  Constantinople  but  also  to  provide 
the  Turks  with  ships  of  a  type  and  possessed  of  a 
fighting  power  which  entirely  altered  and  influenced 
what  might  otherwise  have  ])een  the  course  of  the 
Dardanelles  operations. 


70  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE  WAR 

Space  is  too  short  to  enable  me  to  describe  the 
details  of  the  manner  in  which  Germany  actually 
rushed  Turkey  into  war.  Sufficient  be  it,  therefore, 
to  say  that  the  Germans  finally  endeavoured  to  tele- 
graph instructions  to  the  Turkish  staff  at  Erzerura 
without  consulting  all,  or  even  most,  of  the  members 
of  the  Ottoman  Government,  and  that  the  outbreak 
of  hostilities  was  postponed  owing  to  the  fact  that 
the  telegram  was  intercepted  by  a  vigilant  post- 
office  clerk.  Later,  and  on  October  28,  the  Turks 
made  an  incursion  into  the  Sinai  Peninsula,  and  the 
Germans  succeeded,  on  the  same  day,  in  launching 
a  naval  attack  upon  Odessa,  and  upon  other  of  the 
Russian  Black  Sea  ports  —  an  attack  which  was 
the  immediate  cause  of  war.  That  attack,  which  was 
carried  out  without  the  knowledge  of  several  members 
of  the  cabinet  and  certainly  without  the  consent  of 
Ahmed  Djemal  Pasha,  resulted  in  the  immediate 
demand  of  their  passports  by  the  Allied  ambassadors 
and  in  the  open  establishment  of  a  state  of  war  with 
Turkey. 

Before  approaching  an  account  of  the  military 
events  dealt  with  in  this  chapter,  brief  mention  must 
be  made  of  the  shocking  and  atrocious  Armenian 
massacres  in  progress  during  the  year  1915.  These 
massacres  were  more  prolonged  and  more  systematic 
than,  and,  in  many  ways,  entirely  different  to,  those 
which  took  place  in  the  late  nineties  in  Armenia  and 
in  Constantinople,  or  in  the  Adana  neighbourhood  in 
1909.  In  former  years,  on  the  occasion  of  a  massacre, 
it  was  the  men  and  the  male  children  who  were  for 
the  most  part  butchered,  and  the  outbreaks,  whilst 
beginning   and   ending   almost   by   clockwork   and  at 


TURKEY  AND  THE  WAR  71 

fixed  hours,  took  the  form  of  killing  people  in  their 
homes.  This  was  dreadful,  more  dreadful  than  can 
be  imagined  by  any  one  who  has  not  seen  it,  but  it 
was  not  so  terrible  as  what  took  place  in  1915.  At 
that  time,  instead  of  murdering  the  people  where 
they  happened  to  be,  and  then  destroying  or  stealing 
their  property,  a  regular  campaign  for  the  purpose  of 
exterminating  the  Armenian  race  was  inaugurated. 
The  leading  men  of  each  town  or  village  were  first 
seized,  tortured,  and  killed.  Later  the  whole  popu- 
lation, in  many  cases  made  up  of  well-to-do  people 
possessed  of  good  houses,  and  including  the  women, 
the  feeble,  and  the  young,  were  forced  to  leave  their 
homes  and  belongings,  and  to  march  on  foot  towards 
the  south  and  into  the  desert,  going  they  knew  not 
where.  These  people,  unprovided  with  clothing  or 
food,  were  ill  treated  by  their  guards,  and  abused 
by  the  Moslem  inhabitants  of  the  districts  through 
which  they  passed.  The  consequence  was  that,  ex- 
posed to  the  cold  and  to  the  heat,  some  fell  by  the 
roadside,  perishing  where  they  lay,  and  others,  during 
transportation  do^vn  the  rivers  Euphrates  and  Tigris, 
were  pushed,  dead  or  alive,  from  the  rafts  on  which 
they  had  already  suffered  from  privation  for  days. 

From  an  internal  standpoint,  these  massacres  meant 
that  the  Turks  ridded  themselves  of  approximately 
one  million,  that  is  to  say,  one  half  of  the  Armenians 
formerly  estimated  to  have  lived  in  the  Ottoman 
Empire,  and  that  they  thereby  temporarily  went  a 
long  way  towards  accomplishing  their  object  of  solv- 
ing the  Armenian  question,  by  massacre.  Externally 
and  internally  these  atrocities,  carried  out  in  a  manner 
difiFerent  to  the  system  formerly  employed,  prove  two 


72  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE  WAR 

things.  First,  they  show  that  the  Germans,  whose 
attention  was  drawn  to  the  matter  both  in  America 
and  in  Constantinople,  not  only  took  no  steps  to  pre- 
vent a  slaughter  of  innocents,  but  that  they  must 
have  been  actually  the  moving  spirit  in  events  so 
outrageous  that  they  would  not  have  been  perpe- 
trated by  even  the  Turks  alone.  Secondly,  they 
indicate  the  necessity,  when  the  proper  time  comes, 
of  bringing  home  the  responsibility  for  this  atrocious 
conduct  to  the  quarter  where  it  rests,  and  of  seeing 
that,  on  the  declaration  of  peace,  arrangements  are 
made  concerning  the  future  status  of  Armenia  and  of 
the  Armenians  which  will  for  ever  prevent  the  re- 
currence of  such  an  outbreak. 

As  the  operations  at  the  Dardanelles  are  dealt  with 
in  a  special  section  of  this  volume,  I  will  turn  at  once 
to  the  three  other  principal  campaigns  in  which  Turkey 
has  been  engaged  since  the  beginning  of  the  War. 
Partly  owing  to  the  fact  that  her  frontier  is  no  longer 
contiguous  to  that  of  Greece,  and  partly  because  the 
Ottoman  fleet  has  never  been  able  to  leave  the  Dar- 
danelles, Turkey  could  make  no  endeavour  to  re- 
conquer the  Aegean  Islands,  which,  I  have  already 
said,  was  one  of  her  great  aspirations  at  the  beginning 
of  the  War.  For  the  same  reason,  that  is,  because  its 
communications  by  sea  were  completely  interrupted, 
the  Ottoman  Government  has  been  compelled  to 
undertake  operations  in  areas  with  which  it  could 
maintain  connection  by  land — ^  areas  which  for  obvious 
reasons  were  those  situated  in  Northeastern  Asia 
Minor,  at  the  head  of  the  Persian  Gulf,  and  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  the  Turco-Egyptian  frontier. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  Caucasian  campaign  the 


TURKEY  AND   THE   WAR  73 

Russians  advanced  into  Turkey  by  three  practically 
distinct  routes,  namely,  those  which  led  upon  Erzerum, 
that  running  past  Mount  Ararat  and  through  Bayazid, 
and  that  leading  across  the  Persian  frontier  and  towards 
the  lake  and  town  of  Van.  Three  weeks  after  the  entry 
of  Turkey  into  the  War,  the  Russians  secured  posses- 
sion of  Kuprukeuie,  situated  about  halfway  between 
the  Turkish  frontier  and  Erzerum.  Immediately  after 
that,  acting  on  the  usual  German  rule  of  taking  the 
offensive  at  the  first  possible  moment,  the  Turks  began 
to  advance  from  the  direction  of  Erzerum,  and  con- 
tinued to  do  so  until  the  Ottoman  forces  were  de- 
feated during  the  early  part  of  January,  1915,  at  and 
near  Sarikamish,  near  the  borders  of,  but  within, 
Russian  territory.  This  victory,  however,  cost  the 
Russians  something  elsewhere,  for  they  were  obliged 
temporarily  to  withdraw  from  Tabriz,  which  they 
soon  recaptured,  and  from  certain  rich  districts  of 
Persia.  From  that  time  onwards,  up  to  the  appoint- 
ment of  the  Grand  Duke  Nicholas  as  Commander-in- 
Chief  in  the  Caucasus  in  the  late  summer  of  1915, 
there  was  a  lull  in  Eastern  Asia  Minor,  for  it  was 
not  until  considerably  after  the  arrival  of  that  General 
that  operations  in  this  area  began  to  assume  propor- 
tions of  serious  importance. 

Nevertheless  the  Russian  Generalissimo,  who  was 
responsible  for  the  military  plan  of  campaign  not  only 
in  Armenia  but  also  on  the  Persian  frontier,  began 
at  once  carefully  to  prepare  the  way  for  his  main 
advance  upon  Erzerum  by  consolidating  his  position 
and  pushing  forward  his  line  between  lakes  Van  and 
TJrumiah  during  the  closing  months  of  1915.  Early 
in  January  of  the  following  year,  and  therefore  in  the 


74  THE  CRADLE  OF  THE   WAR 

depth  of  winter,  a  definite  and  determined  blow  was 
struck  in  the  direction  of  Erzerum.  After  a  large 
Ottoman  army  had  been  defeated  in  the  field,  the 
Russian  commander  brought  up  heavy  guns  by  way 
of  mountain  roads  which  had  always  been  considered 
to  be  well-nigh  unpassable  in  winter.  Such  was  his 
skill  that  the  actual  attacks  upon  Erzerum  having 
begun  about  the  twentieth  of  January,  the  greatest 
Ottoman  fortress  in  Asia  Minor  actually  fell  into 
Muscovite  hands  on  February  16,  and  therefore 
after  a  bombardment  of  little  over  three  weeks.  This 
capture  was  one  of  the  biggest  military  and  political 
victories  which  had  then  been  won  by  the  Allies  in 
the  East  since  the  beginning  of  the  War. 

After  the  fall  of  Erzerum  a  Russian  force  advanced 
through  extremely  difficult  country  and  along  the 
Black  Sea  coast  towards  Trebizond,  which  port  was 
taken  after  a  week's  severe  fighting  about  the  middle 
of  April.  This,  too,  constituted  a  gain  of  some  sig- 
nificance, for  in  addition  to  the  fact  that  the  loss  of 
Trebizond  was  a  great  moral  blow  to  Turkey,  its 
possession  by  Russia  enormously  facilitated  her  means 
of  communication.  Thus,  instead  of  being  compelled 
to  rely  entirely  upon  the  road  which  passes  through 
Erzerum  to  Trebizond,  —  a  road  the  whole  of  which 
was  not  in  their  hands  until  considerably  after  the 
capture  of  that  city,  —  she  was  able  to  utilise  the  port 
as  a  means  of  connection  between  her  bases  on  the 
north  and  east  of  the  Black  Sea  and  her  forces  en- 
gaged in  Northeastern  Asia  Minor. 

Slightly  before  the  capture  of  Trebizond,  the  left 
of  the  Russian  line,  which  at  the  time  of  the  fall  of 
Erzerum    ran    approximately    from    that    place   to    a 


TURKEY  AND   THE   WAR  75 

point  just  to  the  northeast  of  Mush  and  from  there 
to  hikes  Van  and  Uruniiah  and  on  to  the  Persian 
frontier,  was  advanced  in  such  a  way  as  to  include 
the  towns  of  Biths  and  Mush,  which  were  taken  re- 
spectively early  and  late  in  March,  1916.  With  the 
capture  of  Baiburt  on  the  post  road  from  Erzerum 
to  Trebizond  in  June,  of  Erzingan,  the  great  military 
centre,  in  July,  and  of  Gumushhane  in  August,  1916, 
the  high-water  mark  of  the  Russian  advance  was 
reached.  It  resulted  in  the  occupation  of  the  whole 
of  the  route  from  Erzerum  to  Trebizond,  which  is 
one  of  the  most  important  roads  in  this  part  of  the 
Ottoman  Empire,  and  in  the  establishment  of  a  line 
running  from  a  point  on  the  Black  Sea  coast,  located 
a  few  miles  to  the  west  of  Trebizond,  through  Erzingan, 
Kighi,  Mush,  the  Bitlis  Gap,  thence  round  to  south  of 
Lake  Van  to  Lake  Urumiah  —  a  line  which  though  it 
was  never  actually  continuous  was  nevertheless  a 
definite  and  well-connected  front  in  the  possession  of 
the  army  of  the  ex-Tsar. 

Although  the  Russians  withdrew  along  certain 
portions  of  this  front  during  1917,  with  the  following 
modifications  they  held  approximately  the  above- 
mentioned  line  until  about  the  time  of  the  peace 
developments  with  Germany.  Between  the  Black 
Sea  coast  and  Kighi,  lying  about  halfway  between 
Erzingan  and  Mush,  there  was  no  material  modifica- 
tion. To  the  southwest  of  that  town,  however,  the 
Russians  lost  certain  mountain  positions.  In  May, 
1917,  too,  they  withdrew  from  Mush,  thereby  sacri- 
ficing a  place  of  considerable  significance.  Moreover, 
further  to  the  southeast  they  retired  from  the  head 
of   the   Billis    Gap,  through  which    an    all-important 


76  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE   WAR      . 

road  runs  to  Diarbekr.  Part  of  the  area  between 
this  place  and  Lake  Van,  however,  remained  in  Rus- 
sian hands,  as  did  also  the  city  of  Van,  from  which 
point  the  line  ran  in  a  southeasterly  direction  to  and 
across  the  Turco-Persian  frontier,  near  which  it  turned, 
finally  reaching  the  neighbourhood  of  Kermanshah. 
Thus,  whilst  the  earlier  changes  which  took  place 
resulted  in  the  loss  of  certain  points  and  areas  of 
strategical  importance,  and  whilst  the  Russian  and 
British  forces  based  on  Mesopotamia,  instead  of 
being  in  actual  touch  as  they  were  at  one  time,  were 
now  separated  by  a  considerable  distance,  the  posi- 
tion of  the  Muscovite  front  in  Asia  at  first  suffered 
proportionately  less  as  a  result  of  the  Russian  Revolu- 
tion than  did  that  of  the  Russian  army  in  Europe. 
In  short,  it  was  only  at  the  time  of  the  signature  of 
the  so-called  peace  with  Germany  that  the  definite 
evacuation  of  the  conquered  districts  of  Asia  Minor 
began  to  make  itself  so  painfully  apparent. 

Events  are  changing  so  rapidly  that  it  is  impossible 
to  chronicle  exactly  what  has  taken  place  in  the  neigh- 
bourhood of  the  Russo-Turkish  frontier  during  the  last 
few  months.  Sufficient  therefore  be  it  to  say  that  by 
the  Treaty  signed  between  these  two  countries  at  Brest- 
Litovsk  on  March  3d  —  a  Treaty  which  is  rightly  not 
acknowledged  by  the  Allies  —  Russia  undertook  to 
withdraw  from  the  Ottoman  territory  which  she 
occupied  and  also  to  evacuate  the  districts  of  Erivan, 
Kars  and  Batum.  The  meaning  of  this  is  that  the 
areas  annexed  by  Russia  after  the  war  of  1877-1878  are 
handed  back  to  their  former  owner,  that  their  popula- 
tion is  left  practically  at  the  mercy  of  the  Turks,  and 
that  once  these  new  possessions  were  really  subdued  by 


r-^ 


K 
H 


< 

X 


TURKEY  AND   THE   WAR  77 

tlie  enemy  he  would  have  gone  a  long  way  towards 
the  establishment  of  a  new  route  into  Persia  and  in 
the  direction  of  the  Indian  frontier.  Armenian  and 
Georgian  contingents,  formed  from  the  local  popula- 
tion and  from  the  native  elements  of  the  Russian  Army 
still  loyal  to  the  Allied  Cause,  have  done  their  utmost 
to  resist  this  subjugation.  If  it  can  be  maintained 
that  resistance,  which  is  obviously  worthy  of  encourage- 
ment by  the  Allies,  is  of  the  highest  importance,  for  it 
might  be  the  means  of  preventing  or  at  least  of  delay- 
ing the  realisation  of  Germanic  designs  in  this  direction. 
On  the  other  hand,  should  this  be  impossible,  owing  to 
the  difficulty  of  combating  organised  and  well  armed 
forces  with  irregulars,  not  adequately  provided  with 
guns  and  war  materials,  then  the  future  of  the  area 
situated  between  the  Black  Sea  and  the  Caspian  — 
an  area  which  cannot  be  left  under  German  domination 
—  will  remain  to  be  decided,  not  by  the  temporary 
arrangement  made  between  the  Central  Powers  and 
Russia,  but  by  the  terms  of  an  ultimate  and  fair  peace. 
The  second  area  of  Turkish  operations  is  that 
situated  between  the  head  of  the  Persian  Gulf  and 
Bagdad  —  that  is,  the  theatre  of  the  Mesopotamian 
campaign.^  Here,  as  in  the  Caucasus  and  on  the 
Egyptian  frontier,  the  Turkish  policy,  aggressive  as 
it  was  or  would  have  been,  was  directed  with  the 
object  of  threatening  the  British  position  on  the 
Persian  Gulf,  of  seizing  Koweit  and  of  pushing  for- 
ward into  Southern  Persia  with  the  principal  purpose 
of  occupying  the  oil  fields.     These  Persian  oil  fields, 

^  A  great  many  aspects  of  this  campaign  are  discussed  in  the  Report  of 
the  Mesopotamia  Commission  presented  to  Parliament  in  1917  and  pub- 
lished as  a  Blue  Book  numbered  C  8610. 


78  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE   WAR 

which  are  of  great  vahie,  lie  in  the  neighbourhood  of 
Ahwaz  and  Shustar,  and  therefore  within  about 
eighty  miles  of  the  Turco-Persian  frontier.  They 
are  connected  with  Muhammera  —  actually  on  the 
Shat-el-Arab  —  by  a  pipe  line  belonging  to  the  Anglo- 
Persian  Oil  Company.  The  destruction  of  this  line 
was  one  of  the  most  important  Turkish  objectives  in 
this  locality. 

Before  reviewing  the  actual  operations  which  have 
taken  place  in  this  area,  it  may  be  well  to  indicate 
the  geography  of  the  country  in  question.  The 
southeastern  part  of  Mesopotamia  (it  is  inore  correct 
to  call  this  district  Babylonia)  lies  between  the  lower 
reaches  of  the  rivers  Tigris  and  Euphrates.  In  shape 
this  area  may  be  compared  to  that  of  an  old-fashioned 
pointed  bottomed,  soda-water  bottle,  lying  half  over 
towards  the  left-hand  side.  The  neck  of  that  bottle, 
which  measures  about  thirty-five  miles  in  width,  is 
situated  between  Bagdad  on  the  Tigris  and  Feluja 
on  the  Euphrates.  Its  pointed  base  is  at  Kurna  — 
the  town  at  which  the  two  rivers  unite  their  waters 
—  waters  which  flow  thence  for  a  distance  of  about 
one  hundred  miles  to  the  Persian  Gulf  under  the  name 
of  the  Shat-el-Arab.  As  a  sort  of  label  line  extending 
practically  across  the  thickest  part  of  the  bottle,  where 
it  measures  about  one  hundred  and  ten  miles,  there  is 
the  Shat-el-Hai  Canal,  which  leaves  the  Tigris  at 
Kut-el-Amara  and  meets  the  Euphrates  at  Nasrieh. 
This  canal  is  navigable  for  small  boats. 

If  we  accept  this  rough  analogy,  it  is  possible  to 
utilise  it  in  order  to  explain  the  various  stages  into 
which  the  campaign  has  been  practically  divided. 
They  are : 


TURKEY  AND  THE   WAR  79 

(1)  The  British  advance  by  way  of  Basra  to  Kurna 
and  the  consequent  seizure  of  the  base  of  the  bottle. 
This  stage  was  rapidly  accomplished,  for  Basra  was 
occupied  on  November  22,  1914,  approximately  three 
weeks  after  the  entry  of  Turkey  into  the  war,  and 
Kurna  fell  on  the  ninth  of  the  following  month. 

(2)  The  pushing  forward  by  way  of  the  Euphrates 
to  Nasrieh  at  the  southern  end  of  the  "label",  or 
Shat-el-Hai  Canal,  and  by  way  of  the  Tigris  to  Kut- 
el-Amara  at  the  northern  end  of  the  same  waterway. 
The  former  place  was  taken  on  July  25,  and  the  latter 
was  reached  on  September  28,  1915. 

(3)  The  further  attempted  push  up  the  neck  of  the 
bottle  towards  Bagdad,  the  retreat  from  Ctesiphon 
in  November,  1915,  and  the  siege  of  Kut  which 
lasted  from  December  7,  1915,  until  its  fall  on  April  29, 
1916. 

(4)  The  operations  which  followed  the  surrender  of 
General  Townshend,  including  the  taking  of  Bagdad, 
and  the  advance  which  has  taken  place  since  the  cap- 
ture of  that  town  in  March,  1917. 

Whilst  from  the  first  the  British  were  obliged  to 
assume  what  may  be  called  a  tactical  offensive,  they 
were  acting,  so  to  speak,  strategically  on  the  defensive 
so  long  as  they  were  only  trying  to  block  the  Turkish 
advance  into  areas  which  were  and  are  of  vital  im- 
portance to  them.  By  those  who  can  only  look  at 
maps  it  is  argued  that  the  British  object  would  have 
been  achieved  and  that  they  should  have  contented 
themselves  with  the  accomplishment  of  the  first  stage 
and  with  the  occupation  of  Kurna.  But  militarily 
this  would  not  have  been  sufficient.  Owing  to  its 
position  at  the  junction  of  the  two  rivers,  this  place 


80  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE   WAR 

would  have  been  open  to  an  attack  from  the  north  by 
way  of  the  Tigris  and  from  the  west  along  the  Eu- 
phrates. Moreover  as  was  proved  by  the  determined 
Turkish  thrust  into  Persia  and  upon  Ahwaz  —  a  thrust 
the  effects  of  which  were  put  an  end  to  by  the  opera- 
tions conducted  by  General  Gorringe  in  Persian  terri- 
tory during  May,  1915  —  the  enemy  would  still  have 
been  able  to  attack  the  Persian  oil  fields.  In  addition, 
so  long  as  Nasrieh,  on  the  Euphrates,  was  not  occupied, 
not  only  Kurna  but  Basra  itself  were  and  would  have 
been  open  to  the  danger  of  an  attack  from  the  direction 
of  that  place,  which  in  nonflooded  times  is  the  starting 
point  of  a  land  route  towards  the  southeast.  This 
means  that  the  accomplishment  of  the  first  stage  in 
the  campaign  would  not  have  been  suflScient  under  the 
circumstances. 

The  second  stage  began  with  an  advance  up  the 
Tigris  to  Amara,  which  fell  into  General  Gorringe's 
hands  on  June  4,  1915,  and  with  the  subsequent  attack 
upon  Nasrieh,  which  was  occupied  on  July  twenty-fifth. 
It  continued  with  the  further  advance  from  Amara 
to  Kut-el- Amara  —  an  advance  entailing  a  forward 
movement  of  one  hundred  and  fifty  miles  measured 
along  the  banks  of  the  Tigris.  The  whole  of  these 
operations  were  accomplished  under  conditions  of 
the  utmost  difficulty,  for,  in  addition  to  the  heavy 
opposition  put  up  by  the  Turks  and  to  the  geographical 
obstacles,  to  which  I  will  refer  again  later  on,  light- 
draft  river  boats  had  to  be  collected,  prepared,  and 
armoured  to  carry  the  expedition  through  an  area 
where  railways  were  then  nonexistent. 

Thus  far  the  operations  in  Mesopotamia  went  fairly 
well,   at   least   from   the   purely   military   standpoint. 


TURKEY  AND   THE   WAR  81 

Then  came  the  third  stage  In  the  campaign,  the  fatal 
dash  for  Bagdad  —  a  dash  which  with  the  forces 
available  and  the  inadequate  preparations  was  not 
warrantable.  Moreover,  in  addition  to  its  being  un- 
justifiable for  these  reasons,  it  was  in  any  case  a  mis- 
take because  the  holding  and  the  properly  defending 
of  Kut-el-Amara  would  probably  have  prevented  any 
serious  Turkish  incursions  into  Southern  Persia,  and 
because,  even  had  the  advance  of  the  winter  of  1915 
resulted  in  the  occupation  of  Bagdad,  the  British 
expeditionary  force  might  well  have  been  unable  to 
hold  a  place  having  so  large  a  population  with  a  force 
numbering  only  from  fifteen  to  seventeen  thousand 
men.  The  net  consequences  of  this  error  were  that 
the  retirement  to  and  the  fall  of  Kut  resulted  in  a 
serious  setback  to  British  prestige  in  the  East,  that 
the  losses  incurred  in  endeavouring  to  relieve  that 
place  immediately  prior  to  April  29,  1916,  had  no 
corresponding  advantage,  and  that  reinforcements, 
which  could  otherwise  have  been  brought  up  fresh 
from  the  base  for  an  advance  upon  Bagdad  during 
the  spring  and  summer  of  that  year,  were  compelled 
to  retake  the  Sanaiyat  and  other  positions,  lying  to 
the  southeast  of  Kut  and  to  which  the  Turks  had 
advanced,  before  once  more  inaugurating  our  final 
and  successful  advance  upon  Bagdad. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  fourth  stage  and  during  the 
hot  season  after  the  fall  of  Kut  in  1916,  the  British 
Army  suffered  much  from  sickness,  and  the  transport 
arrangements,  though  improving,  were  still  inade- 
quate. From  May,  therefore,  when  the  surrender  of 
General  Townshend  made  it  unnecessary  immediately 
to  push  forward  on  the  Tigris,  the  British  policy  in 


82  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE  WAR 

Mesopotamia  was  defensive.  Sir  Percy  Lake,  acting 
on  orders  from  home,  was  directed  to  maintain  as 
forward  a  position  as  could  be  made  tactically  secure 
and  to  be  ready  to  take  advantage  of  any  weakening 
on  the  Turkish  front.  These  instructions  were  strictly 
adhered  to,  and  he  and  his  successor,  Sir  Stanley  Maude, 
confined  themselves  during  the  summer  and  autumn  of 
that  year  to  developing  their  river  and  railway  com- 
munications and  to  improving  their  general  supply 
organisation.  As  a  result  of  this,  when  active  opera- 
tions were  resumed  very  early  in  1917,  the  advance 
to  and  the  capture  of  Bagdad  on  March  11  were  ac- 
complished in  a  highly  satisfactory  manner.  These 
operations  and  those  which  took  place  subsequent  to 
the  British  entry  into  the  city  have  gone  a  long  way 
towards  redeeming  the  effect  of  the  mistakes  which 
were  made  earlier  in  the  campaign.  Indeed,  in  spite 
of  every  effort  to  minimise  its  importance,  the  fact 
that  the  British  under  General  Sir  W.  R.  Marshall 
have  now  pushed  up  the  Tigris  for  miles  beyond 
Bagdad,  in  addition  to  establishing  themselves  to  the 
northeast  and  to  the  west  and  northwest  of  that  city, 
must  have  had  an  influence  in  Turkey,  only  surpassed 
by  the  capture  of  Jerusalem. 

There  is  no  space  or  reason  here  to  enter  into  a  dis- 
cussion of  the  manner  in  which  the  Mesopotamian 
operations,  and  particularly  the  earlier  operations, 
were  conducted.  The  accounts  which  have  appeared 
in  the  press  and  the  report  of  the  British  Mesopotamia 
Commission,  appointed  to  inquire  into  those  opera- 
tions, are  sufficient  to  prove  that  political  and  military 
miscalculations  occurred,  that  inadequate  preparations 
were  made,  and  that  the  scope  of  the  expedition  was 


TURKEY  AND   THE   WAR  83 

never  sufficiently  defined  in  advance.  These  are  short- 
comings for  which  severe  condemnation  is  deserved. 
Nevertheless  whilst  it  is  not  my  intention  to  try  to 
make  excuses  for  such  mistakes,  if  we  are  only  to 
apportion  blame  where  blame  be  due,  and  in  fairness 
to  those  concerned,  we  must  recognise  that  the  diffi- 
culties to  be  overcome  in  Mesopotamia  were  and  are 
enormous.  The  treacherous  climate  and  the  alterna- 
tion of  sweltering  heat  and  bitter  cold  made  the  regular 
supply  of  warm  clothing,  double  tents,  mosquito  nets, 
and  other  requisites  an  absolute  necessity.  Moreover 
the  same  conditions,  which  had  for  their  result  a  large 
amount  of  sickness,  were  responsible  for  the  desirability 
of  the  provision  of  an  abnormal  amount  of  hospital 
accommodation  —  accommodation  which  in  its  turn 
depended  upon  the  adequate  organisation  of  a  suffi- 
cient transport  —  transport  which  included  not  only 
the  provision  and  equipment  of  river  steamers  but  the 
conversion  of  Basra  into  such  a  port  as  would  make 
it  an  adequate  base  of  operations  for  a  large  inland 
military  operation. 

Ignoring  altogether  the  immense  burden  of  the 
tonnage  question,  and  of  transporting  troops  from 
England  or  other  parts  of  the  British  Empire  to  the 
Persian  Gulf,  once  arrived  there  the  difficulties  to  be 
overcome  were  enormous.  Bagdad  is  distant  from 
the  sea  five  hundred  and  seventy  miles.  Until  the 
construction  of  railways,  which  did  not  exist  during 
the  earlier  stages  of  the  operations,  the  sole  means  of 
communication  was  by  way  of  the  Shat-el-Arab  and 
the  Tigris.  Below  Basra,  which  is  situated  on  the 
former  channel  and  about  seventy  miles  from  the  sea, 
vessels  drawing  up  to  nineteen  feet  of  water  can  navi- 


84  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE   WAR 

gate.  Above  that  town,  where  in  1914  there  were 
practically  no  quays  or  warehouses,  transport  is  de- 
pendent upon  river  boats,  the  draft  of  which  must 
not  exceed  seven  and  a  half  feet  for  the  trip  to  Kurna 
and  three  and  a  half  for  Aniara  and  beyond.  Over 
and  above  a  few  vessels  owned  by  Messrs.  Lynch,  these 
river  steamers  did  not  exist,  and  many  of  them  had 
to  be  collected  from  the  rivers  Hoogli  and  Irawadi. 
The  Tigris  twists  and  turns  with  sharp  bends  and 
hairpin  corners,  leaving  in  places  little  or  no  room 
for  vessels,  and  particularly  for  those  towing  barges, 
to  pass  one  another.  The  stream  runs  at  about  four 
knots  an  hour,  and  it  is  difficult  for  steamers  without 
independent  paddles  to  avoid  striking  the  banks  when 
going  round  the  corners.  No  proper  charts  are  or 
can  be  available  for  the  Tigris,  because  the  channel  is 
constantly  changing,  owing  to  the  shifting  of  the  sand. 
Indeed,  so  marked  is  this  that  in  peace  time,  when 
there  was  a  regular  bi-weekly  service  up  and  down  the 
river,  the  ships  were  always  either  navigated  by  differ- 
ent local  pilots  or  by  men  who  were  compelled  upon 
each  journey  to  make  inquiries  at  the  various  stations 
as  to  the  ever-changing  conditions. 

The  influence  of  the  floods,  which  would  in  any 
case  have  interfered  with  the  movement  of  troops 
in  the  neighbourhood  of  the  Tigris,  was  rendered  far 
greater  because  of  the  existence  of  "deep  cuts"  (irri- 
gation ditches)  which  in  peace  time  are  used  for 
watering  the  areas  situated  near  the  banks  of  the 
river.  Some  of  these  ditches  naturally  became  auto- 
matically filled  by  the  rise  of  the  river,  but  others 
were  able  to  be  put  into  operation  by  those  who  held 
the  key  of  the  system  by  which  they  were  worked. 


TURKEY  AND   THE  WAR  85 

Throughout  the  earher  operations,  therefore,  the 
Turks,  who  could  choose  their  own  positions  for  de- 
fence, were  possessed  of  an  enormous  advantage 
over  the  British  who  at  times  had  to  push  forward 
at  all  costs.  In  addition,  as  I  shall  show  elsewhere, 
whilst  our  difficulties  grew  greater  and  greater  as  our 
communications  became  longer  and  longer,  the  ob- 
stacles to  be  overcome  by  the  enemy  were  daily  de- 
creasing, owing  to  the  existence  and  continued  im- 
provement in  the  Bagdad  Railway,  by  means  of  which 
he  was  able  to  convey  troops  across  a  considerable 
length  of  the  area  which  separates  Constantinople 
from  Bagdad. 

If  we  ignore  the  Arabian  Independentist  Move- 
ment and  the  proclamation  and  attitude  of  the  Grand 
Shereef  of  Mecca,  which  are  more  important  politically 
than  militarily,  we  now  come  to  the  last  theatre  of 
war  in  which  the  Turks  have  been  engaged,  namely, 
the  area  lying  to  the  east  of  the  Egyptian  frontier 
and  in  Palestine.  Here  we  were  at  first  presented 
with  an  example  of  what  is  practically  a  new  feature 
of  warfare  —  namely  the  necessity  for  the  conveyance 
of  a  force  of  considerable  size  across  a  practically 
waterless  desert  which  has  an  average  width  of  about 
one  hundred  and  forty  miles.  The  operations  in  this 
area  began  directly  after  the  entry  of  Turkey  into 
the  War,  by  the  shelling,  by  H.  M.  S.  Minerva,  of 
the  fort  and  troops  at  Akaba  where  preparations 
were  being  made  for  an  advance  upon  Egypt.  Sub- 
sequently the  British  abandoned  the  Turco-Egyptian 
frontier,  withdrawing  to  the  line  of  the  Suez  Canal, 
where  entrenchments  were  dug.  The  Turks,  who 
had   loudly   proclaimed   the  reconquest  of   their   lost 


86  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE   WAR 

territory,  then  (that  is  to  say,  early  in  1915)  advanced 
across  the  desert  by  several  different  routes,  and 
with  a  force  of  about  twelve  thousand  men  ultimately 
reached  the  immediate  neighbourhood  of  the  canal 
during  the  opening  days  of  February,  1915.  Allowed 
to  approach  the  very  bank  of  this  water  line,  and  to 
bring  up  their  bridging  material,  the  enemy  was,  how- 
ever, completely  routed  on  February  second  and 
third  (leaving  about  five  hundred  dead  and  over  six 
hundred  prisoners),  as  a  result  of  an  attack  delivered 
by  mixed  British  troops  and  of  the  fire  of  British 
and  French  warships  stationed  in  the  canal  itself. 

For  more  than  a  year  there  was  no  important  de- 
velopment on  the  Egyptian  frontier,  but  in  April, 
1916,  the  British  once  more  advanced  into  the  desert, 
fighting  actions  with  the  Turks  in  various  areas  — ■ 
actions  which  ended  in  no  decision  of  far-reaching 
importance  for  either  side.  About  four  months  later, 
the  enemy  took  the  offensive,  making  a  general  attack 
in  the  neighbourhood  of  Katia,  near  the  Mediterranean 
coast  early  in  August.  He  was,  however,  decisively 
defeated,  losing  four  thousand  prisoners  and  thirteen 
hundred  killed  out  of  a  total  force  of  eighteen  thou- 
sand men.  The  consequence  of  this  was  that,  during 
the  rest  of  the  year,  the  British  were  able  gradually  to 
reconquer  Egyptian  territory,  finally  occupying  El- 
Arish  on  the  Mediterranean  and  other  places  to  the 
south  of  it  at  the  end  of  December.  As  a  result  of 
this  success  an  advance  was  made  into  Southern 
Palestine  early  in  1917,  but  that  advance  was  not 
carried  out  in  sufficient  strength  to  enable  it  to  be 
permanently  maintained  and  the  attempts  to  capture 
Gaza,   in   March,   failed.     From   that   time   onwards. 


TURKEY  AND   THE   WAR  87 

particularly  during  the  hot  weather,  the  campaign 
lapsed  into  stagnancy,  and  it  was  only  in  November 
that  Beersheba,  Gaza,  and  Jaffa  were  captured,  with 
the  result  that  the  way  was  made  ready  for  an  advance 
upon  Jerusalem,  which  fell  into  British  hands  early 
in  December. 

That  event  undoubtedly  constitutes  the  most  im- 
portant Allied  success  gained  in  the  East  since  the 
beginning  of  the  War.  From  a  military  standpoint 
the  occupation  of  the  Holy  City  gives  the  British  a 
base  of  operations  on  the  east  of  the  Egyptian  desert 
and  thus  enables  them  to  pursue  with  greater  facility 
their  further  campaign  towards  the  north  and  east. 
In  the  former  direction,  we  can  now  look  upon  an 
advance  to  Damascus  or  even  Aleppo,  and  the  conse- 
quent cutting  of  the  Bagdad  Railway,  near  the  latter 
place,  as  a  matter  of  practical  consideration.  In  the 
latter  area,  that  is,  just  across  the  Jordan,  is  the  Hedjaz 
Railway  —  a  line  which  for  years  has  been  the  only 
connecting  link  between  Arabia  and  the  remainder  of 
Turkey.  Its  protection  by  the  Turks,  or  even  its 
partial  occupation  by  the  British,  are  obviously  ques- 
tions of  far-reaching  importance  to  the  respective 
parties. 

The  moral  effect  of  the  capture  of  Jerusalem  must 
be  as  great,  if  not  greater,  than  the  military,  for  the 
occupation  of  that  city,  following  upon  that  of  Bagdad, 
cannot  fail  to  affect  the  mentality  of  the  Turks,  who 
have  always  regarded  these  places  as  of  great  im- 
portance. Moreover,  although  Moslems  consider 
Mecca  and  Medina  as  their  two  most  Holy  Cities, 
Jerusalem  is  also  held  by  them  as  a  sacred  place,  for 
they    reverence    Christ,    Moses,    and    Abraham    only 


88  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE  WAR 

after  Mohammed.  In  addition,  and  over  and  above 
this,  the  British  success  in  Palestine  must  have  a 
further  influence  because  one  of  the  strongest  claims 
of  the  Sultans  of  Turkey  to  the  position  of  Caliph,  or 
head  of  the  Moslem  religion,  is  due  to  the  fact  that 
for  years  they  have  been  the  guardians  of  the  three 
Holy  Cities.  The  King  of  Hedjaz  is  in  undisputed 
possession  of  Mecca  and  Medina ;  therefore,  with  the 
fall  of  Jerusalem,  which  had  been  in  Mohammedan 
hands  since  1243,  the  Turks  lose  a  place  which  they 
recognise  to  be  of  significance  from  numerous  stand- 
points. 


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3 


IV 
BULGARIA  AND  THE   WAR 

Although  the  object  of  this  account  is  neither  to 
summarise  the  history  of  Bulgaria  nor  to  describe 
the  rapid  development  of  that  country  during  the  last 
forty  years,  yet  it  is  interesting  to  recall  the  fact 
that  modern  Bulgaria  is  the  youngest  independent 
State,  except  Albania,  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula.  Thus 
it  was  only  in  the  year  1878,  after,  and  as  a  result  of, 
the  Russo-Turkish  War,  that  Northern  Bulgaria  was 
created  a  principality  under  the  suzerainty  of  the 
Sultan,  and  that  Eastern  Roumelia  was  formed  into 
an  autonomous  province  under  a  Christian  governor- 
general.  From  the  time  of  the  union  of  the  two 
States  in  1885  until  the  declaration  of  their  final 
independence  in  1908,  the  prosperity  of  the  country 
gradually  increased.  Again  from  that  moment  until 
the  outbreak  of  the  first  Balkan  war  in  October,  1912, 
the  Bulgarians  continued  to  work  for  the  develop- 
ment of  their  national  power  and  for  the  realisation 
of  their  great  aspiration  —  the  union  of  the  Mace- 
donian Bulgars  under  the  rule  of  King  Ferdinand. 

Prior  to  the  Balkan  Wars  the  g-rea  of  the  kingdom 
of  Bulgaria  was  approximately  38,000  square  miles, 
and  the  population  numbered  about  4,S'>7,000  souls. 
As  a  result  of  these  wars,  an  area  roughly  including 


90  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE   WAR 

8600  square  miles  was  taken  from  Turkey,  but  Bul- 
garia was  compelled  to  sacrifice  2687  square  miles  of 
territory  to  Roumania.  Consequently  the  net  change 
was  that  the  size  of  the  country  was  only  increased 
in  such  a  way  that  it  now  has  an  area  of  about  43,300 
square  miles  and  a  population  of  somewhat  over 
4,750,000  souls.  This  means  that  Bulgaria,  who  pro- 
vided the  largest  army  for  the  first  war,  gained  by  far 
the  least  from  a  campaign  which  could  never  have 
been  carried  out  without  her  co-operation. 

As  a  result  of  the  so-called  settlement  of  the  year 
1913,  Bulgaria,  deprived  of  the  legitimate  fruits  of 
her  original  and  all-important  victories  in  Thrace, 
where  she  met  and  defeated  the  greater  part  of  the 
Turkish  Army,  naturally  continued  to  remain  on  the 
most  strained  terms  with  Serbia  and  Greece.  The 
Treaty  of  London,  signed  between  the  Balkan  allies 
and  Turkey  in  1913,  was  torn  up  by  the  latter  country, 
who,  in  spite  of  protests  from  both  the  British  and  the 
Russian  Governments,  reoccupied  Adrianople  during 
the  second  Balkan  war.  Notwithstanding  this,  it 
was  claimed  by  some  that  the  formation  of  the  then 
so-called  new  Balkan  Alliance,  made  up  of  Serbia, 
Montenegro,  Greece,  and  Roumania,  was  as  favourable, 
if  not  more  favourable,  to  the  cause  of  the  then  Triple 
Entente  than  would  have  been  the  continued  existence 
of  the  original  League,  formed  of  Serbia,  Bulgaria, 
Greece,  and  Montenegro.  Others,  and  amongst  them 
the  Austrians  and  the  Germans,  were  not  slow  to 
realise  that  however  friendly  to  Serbia  her  new  allies 
might  be,  with  the  exception  of  Montenegro  those 
so-called  allies  were  not  likely  immediately  to  engage 
in  a  war  in  which  they  had  no  direct  interest. 


BULGARIA   AND  THE   WAR  91 

From  the  moment  of  the  outbreak  of  the  War,  and 
particularly  after  the  entry  of  Turkey,  until  Bulgaria 
threw  in  her  lot  on  the  side  of  the  Central  Powers, 
the  key  to  the  situation  in  the  latter  country  lay  in 
the  fact  that  King  Ferdinand  and  his  Government 
were  determined  to  utilise  the  present  conflagration 
in  order  to  try  to  regain  at  least  some  of  the  losses 
suffered  in  1913.  For  them  this  was  not  so  much  a 
European  as  a  third  Balkan  war  for  the  independence 
of  the  Bulgars,  subject  to  alien,  this  time  principally 
Serbian  and  Greek,  rules.  It  was  certain,  therefore, 
that  they  would  not  throw  in  their  lot  with  any  side 
or  countries  which  did  not  promise  to  give  them  a 
large  section  of  Southern  Macedonia  and  also  as 
secondary  conditions  to  restore  to  them  a  section  of 
the  Dobrudja  and  at  least  part  of  Turkish  Thrace. 
In  other  words,  the  bitter  antagonism  felt  by  Bulgaria 
towards  Serbia,  Greece,  and  Roumania,  and  particularly 
towards  the  first-mentioned  country,  outweighed  the 
traditional  hostility  towards  Turkey  and  weakened  the 
ties  of  friendship  with  Russia,  whose  attitude  towards 
tlie  Serbo-Bulgarian  dispute  of  1913  was  far  from 
popular  at  Sofia.  Consequently  so  long  as  her  future 
was  not  adequately  secured  elsewhere,  Bulgaria  was 
unlikely  to  take  up  arms  against  Turkey  because  her 
only  accesses  to  the  sea  were  by  way  of  her  Black 
Sea  ports  —  rendered  useless  owing  to  the  closing  of 
the  Dardanelles  —  and  through  Dede  Agatch,  the  rail- 
way to  which  port,  according  to  the  Treaty  of  Con- 
stantinople of  September,  1913,  ran  for  some  miles 
through  Ottoman  territory.  From  the  moment  of 
the  outbreak  of  the  War  the  great  question,  therefore, 
was  whether  Serbia,  Greece,  and  Roumania  would  or 


92  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE   WAR 

could  be  persuaded  to  restore  to  Bulgaria  areas  of 
territory  which  she  considered  should  be  hers,  and 
whether  the  Allies  would  guarantee  her  possession  of 
districts  of  now  Ottoman  territory,  which  they  actually 
agreed  should  be  allotted  to  her  during  the  negotia- 
tions of  the  year  1913. 

Whilst,  so  far  as  I  know,  no  detailed  official  state- 
ment was  published  on  the  subject,  the  conditions 
required  by  Bulgaria  soon  became  pretty  clear.  On 
the  west  the  Government  of  King  Ferdinand  was 
intent  upon  the  recognition  of  the  Serbo-Bulgarian 
Treaty  of  March,  1912,  as  a  basis  for  discussion  —  a 
basis  which  would  have  meant  the  cession  by  Serbia 
of  considerable  areas  of  her  southern  territory  annexed 
after  the  Balkan  Wars.  On  the  south,  whilst  claims 
were  made  to  all  the  district  lying  between  the  Graeco- 
Bulgarian  frontier,  the  Struma  Valley,  and  the  Aegean, 
satisfaction  would  probably  have  been  provided  by  a 
rectification  of  that  frontier  in  such  a  manner  as  to 
give  to  Bulgaria  at  least  the  whole  of  the  Mesta  Valley 
and  the  port  of  Kavala.  On  the  north,  where  Rou- 
mania  had  claimed,  secured,  and  afterwards  seized 
territory  on  the  south  of  the  Dobrudja,  the  Bulgarian 
Government  would  undoubtedly  have  agreed  to  leave 
to  that  country  the  territory,  including  the  town  of 
Silistria,  ceded  to  her  by  the  Petrograd  Protocol  of 
May,  1913,  provided  the  more  southerly  area  actually 
seized  by  Roumania  during  the  second  Balkan  war 
had  been  restored  to  its  former  owners.  With  regard 
to  the  East  and  in  Turkey,  there  was  obviously  no 
question  of  negotiation  with  the  Allies,  and  there  the 
only  arrangement  which  could  therefore  have  been 
expected  by  Bulgaria  was  the  giving  to  her  of  a  free 


BULGARIA   AND  THE   WAR  93 

hand  to  occupy  and  retain  a  part  of  Thrace,  say  that 
situated  northwest  of  the  Enos-Midia  Hne. 

The  enormous  war  importance  of  Bulgaria  is  bound 
up  largely  with  her  geographical  position.  As  a  re- 
sult of  the  Balkan  campaigns  she  became  the  only 
State  with  a  frontier  contiguous  to  that  of  Turkey 
in  Europe.  She  was,  therefore,  the  sole  country 
which  could  attack  or  through  which  a  land  attack 
could  be  made  upon  the  European  dominions  of  the 
Sultan.  Equally  well,  it  was  through  Bulgaria  alone 
that  officers,  technical  experts,  and  supplies  could  be 
sent  as  they  were  sent,  from  Central  Europe  to  Con- 
stantinople. To  the  Allies,  this  meant  that  in  1915 
the  support  of  "Fox"  Ferdinand  would  have  carried 
with  it  an  immediate  Bulgarian  advance  into  Thrace, 
which  in  itself  would  probably  have  resulted  in  an 
immediate  collapse  of  Turkish  resistance  on  the  Pe- 
ninsula of  Gallipoli.  In  addition,  with  the  entry  of 
Bulgaria  into  the  War  upon  our  side,  we  could  not 
only  have  utilised  Dede  Agatch  and  Porto  Lagos  for 
the  disembarkation  of  armies  destined  to  be  able  to 
impose  terms  of  peace  at  the  very  gates  of  the  Otto- 
man capital,  but  arrangements  would  then  undoubtedly 
have  been  arrived  at  by  which  Allied  or  Greek  troops 
could  have  advanced  from  Salonica  or  Kavala  by  way 
of  the  territory  of  Tsar  Ferdinand. 

Owing  to  her  central  position,  Bulgaria's  value 
was,  therefore,  out  of  all  proportion  even  to  the  high 
fighting  efficiency  of  her  military  machine.  Thus  we 
have  already  seen  that  the  rapid  subjugation  of  Serbia 
was  largely  due  to  her  action.  Equally  well,  had 
Roumania  entered  the  War  against  Austria  or  Ger- 
many during  the  first  year  of  the  European  eonflagra- 


94  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE   WAR 

tlon  and  consequently  sent  the  greater  part  of  her 
forces  to  undertake  a  campaign  in  Transylvania  or 
in  the  Bukovina,  the  Bulgarians  would  have  been 
able,  as  they  subsequently  were  able,  to  make  their 
influence  most  unpleasantly  felt  along  both  banks  of 
the  Danube.  And  lastly,  had  Greece  either  provided 
a  force  for  the  support  of  Serbia,  or  inaugurated  war- 
like operations  at  the  Dardanelles  or  elsewhere,  the 
Bulgarians  always  could,  as  they  did,  easily  advance 
to  Kavala  and  into  the  Greek  district  which  lies  be- 
tween the  rivers  Mesta  and  Struma. 

The  above  remarks  are  sufficient  to  indicate  not 
only  what  was  the  importance  of  Bulgaria  in  reference 
to  the  Dardanelles,  but  also  that  her  position  enabled 
her  practically  to  immobilise  the  military  forces  of 
her  neighbours  and  to  be  the  means  of  providing  or 
of  preventing  the  establishment  of  through  communi- 
cation between  Central  Europe  and  Constantinople. 
The  arrival  at  an  understanding  between  the  Allies 
and  the  Government  of  Sofia,  during  the  first  year 
of  the  War,  would  therefore  probably  have  meant  an 
augmentation  of  the  Allied  armies  by  at  least  one 
million  two  hundred  thousand  men  and  that  the 
armies  composed  of  these  men  would  have  been  in 
a  position  to  act  in  exactly  the  areas  where  their 
presence  would  have  been  most  valuable  against  the 
enemy.  Four  hundred  thousand  Bulgarians  would 
have  advanced  into  Turkey,  with  the  result  already 
indicated.  In  spite  of  the  attitude  of  King  Con- 
stantine,  M.  Venezelos,  then  Prime  Minister,  could 
at  that  time  have  carried  the  people  of  Greece  with 
him  in  favour  of  a  mobilisation  of  an  army  of  at  least 
two  hundred  thousand  to  be  employed  in  some  cam- 


BULGARIA   AND   THE   WAR  d5 

paigii.  Five  liundred  thousand  Roumanians  could 
have  immediately  crossed  the  Austrian  frontier.  By 
occupying  the  Bukovina  and  Transylvania,  under  cir- 
cumstances in  which  there  would  have  been  no  danger 
of  Bulgarian  aggression  from  the  rear,  they  would 
not  only  have  furthered  the  cause  of  the  Allies,  and 
particularly  that  of  Russia,  but  they  might  well  have 
formed  an  effective  link  between  the  Muscovite  and 
the  Serbian  forces. 

So  much  for  the  value  of  Bulgaria  to  the  Allies  —  a 
value  which  on  its  side  naturally  made  her  attitude 
of  great  significance  to  the  enemy.  Indeed  by  the 
maintenance  of  the  neutrality,  but  still  more  by  the 
support  of  that  country,  which  rendered  the  conquest 
of  her  neighbours  a  feasible  proposition,  the  Central 
Powers  gained  one  of  their  greatest  assets  in  the  War. 
It  enabled  them  to  develop  to  the  full  advantage  the 
utility  of  Turkey  and  thus  to  threaten  the  British 
positions  in  Mesopotamia  and  in  Egypt.  It  enor- 
mously expedited  the  sending  of  submarines  overland 
to  be  put  together  in  Constantinople  or  elsewhere, 
and  it  facilitated  the  establishment  of  bases,  without 
which  the  work  of  these  underwater  craft  would  have 
been  greatly  curtailed  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean. 
When  coupled  with  the  consequent  necessity  for  the 
British  withdrawal  from  the  Dardanelles,  it  constituted 
a  moral  victory  of  far-reaching  importance  at  home  and 
abroad.  And  last  but  not  least  it  resulted  in  the  in- 
auguration of  the  Salonica  campaign  and  the  conse- 
quent employment  of  troops  which  would  otherwise 
have  been  available  elsewhere. 

The  above  remarks  are  sufficient  to  prove  the  im- 
portance of  Bulgaria  to  both  groups  of  belligerents 


96  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE  WAR 

and  to  indicate  the  lines  along  which  alone  she  might 
have  been  brought  into  the  War  upon  the  Allied  side. 
Whilst  there  are  some  who  state,  I  have  reason  to 
believe  without  foundation,  that  an  arrangement  was 
arrived  at  between  the  Central  Powers  and  Bulgaria 
so  early  that  even  such  concessions  as  I  have  outlined 
would  not  have  brought  her  into  the  War  upon  our 
side,  there  are  others  who  say  that  in  any  case  such 
concessions  were  out  of  proportion  to  the  value  of 
King  Ferdinand's  position  and  army  in  the  War,  and 
that  they  would  have  reacted  too  unfairly  upon  his 
neighbours  to  be  feasible  of  arrangement.  In  discuss- 
ing the  matter  quite  openly,  therefore,  I  must  ask 
my  readers  to  believe  that  my  sole  object  is  to  explain, 
that  in  addition  to  the  real  interest  of  all  our  Balkan 
friends  being  the  achievement  of  a  general  Allied 
success,  rather  than  a  local  victory,  each  of  the  Balkan 
States  would  have  furthered  her  own  immediate 
objects  and  stood  to  gain  by  the  making  of  sacrifices 
which  for  the  moment  would  and  might  have  been 
most  difficult. 

Our  little  ally,  Serbia,  who  in  1915  had  already 
fought  so  well  and  so  bravely,  would  have  been  far 
more  than  repaid  for  any  sacrifices  of  territory  rendered 
necessary  by  the  recognition  of  the  Serbo-Bulgarian 
Treaty  and  Conventions  signed  before  the  outbreak 
of  the  first  Balkan  war,  by  the  earlier  and  certain 
acquisition  and  annexation  of  territory  which  we  still 
contend  will  be  hers  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  and  by 
the  possession  of  a  proper  outlet  upon  the  Adriatic. 
Greece,  to  whom  the  retention  of  Kavala  was  always 
largely  a  question  of  amour  propre,  could  have  been 
supplied   with   more   than    an   equivalent   amount  of 


BULGARIA  AND  THE   WAR  97 

territory  elsewhere,  had  she  ceded,  as  M.  Venezelos 
was  at  one  time  wilhng  to  cede,  an  area,  the  posses- 
sion of  which  was  and  is  vital  to  the  whole  future 
prosperity  of  Bulgaria.  Roumania  would  have  been 
amply  compensated  for  any  losses  which  she  might 
have  suffered  in  the  Dobrudja  by  the  fact  that  she 
would  have  been  free  to  undertake  and  safe  in  under- 
taking operations  which  later  on  proved  at  least  tem- 
porarily disastrous  to  her. 

From  the  moment  of  the  outbreak  of  the  War,  and 
particularly  from  the  time  of  the  entry  of  Turkey  into 
the  theatre  of  hostilities,  Bulgaria  was  therefore  in 
possession  of  "goods"  which  were  worth  a  high  price 
alike  to  the  Central  Powers  and  to  the  Allies.  The 
former,  who  realised  the  necessity  of  preparing  the 
way  for  military  action,  from  the  first  left  no  stone 
unturned  to  develop  an  already  advantageous  situa- 
tion in  order  at  least  to  maintain  the  neutrality  and, 
if  possible,  to  secure  the  support  of  Bulgaria.  The 
situation  was  favourable  for  Germanic  intrigue,  be- 
cause, as  a  result  of  the  events  of  1913,  the  relations 
between  Bulgaria  and  Turkey  had  rapidly  improved, 
and  because,  whilst  the  former  country  had  aspira- 
tions, both  across  her  eastern  and  southeastern  frontiers 
and  beyond  her  western  and  southwestern  boundaries, 
her  claims  in  Thrace  were  of  much  less  importance 
to  her  than  those  in  Macedonia.  What  happened 
therefore  was  that,  although  Germany  devoted  herself 
to  endeavouring  to  secure  the  good  will  of  Bulgaria, 
she  (Germany)  also  did  what  was  equally  important, 
and  wrung  from  Turkey  concessions  of  the  greatest 
value  to  the  Government  of  King  Ferdinand.  Thus 
whilst   many   arguments   and   statements   have   been 


98  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE   WAR 

used  and  made  to  the  contrary,  and  whilst  the  visit 
of  Prince  Hohenlohe  and  of  the  Duke  of  Mecklenburg- 
Schwerin  to  Sofia  in  the  summer  of  1915  had  a  most 
important  effect,  I  have  reason  to  believe  that  no 
definite  agreement  existed  between  the  Government 
of  King  Ferdinand  and  the  Central  Powers  until  the 
very  eve  of  the  entry  of  Bulgaria  into  the  War.  In- 
deed, friendly  as  the  relations  gradually  became  be- 
tween Turkey  and  Bulgaria,  it  was  really  only  the 
cession  by  the  former  country  of  the  area  of  Thrace 
through  which  the  railway  runs  from  Mustafa  Pasha 
to  Dede  Agatch,  the  preliminary  agreement  which 
was  arrived  at  in  July,  that  made  it  practically  im- 
possible for  the  Allies  to  expect  to  be  able  to  bring 
Bulgaria  into  the  War  against  Turkey. 

The  position  of  the  Allies  originally  was  and  it 
gradually  became  far  more  difficult  than  that  of  the 
enemy.  To  begin  with,  there  was  always  Russia 
in  the  background,  who,  whilst  supporting  Serbia  on 
the  one  hand,  was  regarded  with  actual  suspicion  by 
Bulgaria  on  the  other.  Moreover,  instead  of,  like 
Germany,  being  able  to  negotiate  with  one  party  — 
Turkey  —  for  concessions  to  Bulgaria,  England,  France, 
Russia,  and  later  Italy,  were  compelled  to  approach 
Serbia,  Greece,  and  Roumania,  against  all  of  which 
countries,  as  I  have  already  shown,  the  Government 
of  Sofia  had  far-reaching  claims.  Moreover,  King- 
Ferdinand,  who  had  never  forgiven  Russia  for  her 
attitude  towards  him  during  the  years  which  elapsed 
directly  after  his  arrival  in  Bulgaria,  was  not  sorry 
to  be  able  to  utilise  the  enemy  victories  in  Poland 
as  an  argument  in  favouring  a  pro-German  policy. 
The   net   results,   therefore,    were   that   when   tardily 


BULGARIA  AND  THE  WAR  99 

and  too  late  the  Allies  recognised  the  necessity  of 
endeavouring  to  secure  the  neutrality,  if  not  the  active 
support  of  Bulgaria,  the  ground  for  negotiation  was 
extremely  unfavourable  and  that  country  had  already 
set  a  price  upon  herself  which  it  was  far  from  easy  to 
pay. 

Throughout  the  spring  and  summer  of  1915,  a  con- 
stant exchange  of  ideas  was  in  progress.  Early  in 
May  the  Bulgarian  Government  outlined  the  condi- 
tions upon  which  it  would  be  prepared  to  join  the 
Allies  —  conditions  which  were  more  or  less  in  ac- 
cordance with  those  which  I  have  already  suggested. 
On  May  29,  the  Triple  Entente,  supported  by  Italy, 
replied  to  these  proposals  but  were  unable  to  provide 
full  satisfaction,  owing  to  the  attitude  of  Serbia, 
Greece,  and  Roumania,  who  were  in  possession  of 
the  most  important  areas  in  question.  On  June  15 
the  Bulgarian  Premier  called  upon  the  diplomatic 
representatives  of  the  Entente  Powers  at  Sofia  and 
presented  to  them  a  Note  in  which  his  Government 
asked  for  further  particulars  regarding  these  proposals. 

A  definite  and  fatal  hitch  then  ensued,  and  it  was  not 
until  a  month  later  and  in  July,  that  really  determined 
efforts  were  made,  and  that  pressure  was  brought  to 
bear  upon  Serbia  to  accede  to  at  least  part  of  the  Bul- 
garian demands.  In  August  this  pressure  had  the 
result  of  making  that  country  give  serious  considera- 
tion to  the  suggestions  of  the  Allies  and  particularly 
to  those  of  Great  Britain,  and,  after  a  secret  session 
in  the  Chamber,  certain  concessions  were  agreed  to 
by  the  Government  of  King  Peter.  But  satisfactory 
as  might  these  concessions  have  been,  had  they  been 
suggested  voluntarily  and  many  months  earlier,  they 


100  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE   WAR 

proved  useless  at  the  time  at  whicli  they  were  made. 
To  begin  with,  they  did  not  satisfy  the  full  claims  of 
Bulgaria  from  an  actual  territorial  standpoint  and, 
instead  of  carrying  with  them  the  immediate  hand- 
ing over  of  at  least  part  of  the  areas  in  dispute, 
they  only  made  conditional  promises  as  to  the  future 
—  promises  which  the  Bulgarians  contended  would  be 
less  likely  to  be  fulfilled  by  a  victorious  than  by  a 
hard-pressed  Serbia.  Moreover,  although  the  claims 
against  Greece  and  Roumania  were  less  vital,  the  fact 
that  Bulgaria's  northern  and  southern  neighbours 
made  no  sign  of  following  the  tardy  example  of  Serbia 
certainly  had  an  adverse  effect  upon  the  policy  of  the 
Sofia  Government.  And,  last  but  not  least,  as  I  have 
already  said,  by  this  time  Bulgaria  had  already  ar- 
rived at  the  preliminary,  if  not  the  final,  agreement 
as  to  the  concessions  of  the  above-mentioned  area  by 
Turkey  —  a  concession  which  not  only  gave  the  former 
country  free  and  unhindered  access  to  Dede  Agatch, 
but  also  put  Sofia  in  railway  connection  with  Southern 
or  new  Bulgaria  with  which  communication  had  for- 
merly to  be  maintained  either  by  a  railway  passing 
through  Ottoman  territory  or  by  roads  running  right 
across  the  Rhodope  Balkans. 

It  is  unnecessary  here  to  discuss  the  details  of  the 
manner  in  which  Bulgaria  entered  the  War,  or  to  try 
to  arrive  at  conclusions  as  to  the  exact  moment  at 
which  a  definite  agreement  was  made  between  that 
country  and  the  Central  Powers.  Orders  for  a  general 
mobilisation  were  given  on  September  19,  and  it  was 
subsequently  reported,  though  the  correctness  of  this 
report  is  open  to  doubt,  that  German  officers  were 
arriving   in   Bulgaria   to   take   over   the   direction   of 


BULGARIA  AND   THE   ^VAR  101 

various  departments  and  to  play  the  same  kind  of 
role  as  their  fellow  countrymen  had  played  in  Turkey 
prior  to  the  entry  of  that  country  into  the  War.  The 
result  of  this  mobilisation,  which  was  claimed  by 
Bulgaria  to  mean  only  the  maintenance  of  an  armed 
neutrality,  was  that  on  October  4  the  Government 
of  Petrograd  delivered  an  ultimatum  at  Sofia,  and 
that  immediately  afterwards  the  diplomatic  repre- 
sentatives of  Great  Britain,  France,  and  Russia  left 
that  city. 

From  the  time  of  the  entry  of  Bulgaria  into  the 
War,  the  only  historical  events  connected  with  that 
country,  which  are  possessed  of  European  importance, 
are  these  bound  up  with  the  subjugation  of  Serbia, 
with  the  Salonica  campaign,  and  with  the  conquest  of 
Roumania.  As  most  of  those  events  took  place  be- 
yond the  frontiers  of  Bulgaria,  they  are  discussed  in 
other  sections  of  this  volume.  All  that  remains  to 
be  said  here,  therefore,  is  that  whilst  Bulgaria  has 
shown  herself  a  faithful  follower  and  a  powerful  sup- 
porter of  Kaiserism,  signs  have  often  not  been  wanting 
to  prove  that  she  has  played  her  game  not  so  much  to 
further  the  cause  of  the  Central  Powers  as  to  conquer 
and  to  hold  the  territories  which  she  covets  at  the 
smallest  loss  to  herself  in  men  and  money.  Thus 
whilst  reports  have  appeared  to  the  effect  that  Bul- 
garians have  arrived  at  various  parts  situated  beyond 
the  confines  of  the  Balkans,  no  confirmation  of  these 
reports,  the  truth  of  which  is  highly  unlikely,  has  ever 
been  forthcoming.  In  short,  as  various  statesmen  of 
Bulgaria  have  often  suggested,  that  country  entered 
the  War  not  because  she  wished  to  support  the  policy 
of  the  Central  Powers  or  to  oppose  that  of  the  Allies, 


10^  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE  WAR 

but  solely  with  the  object  of  realising  her  national 
aspirations  —  aspirations  which  had  been  temporarily 
frustrated  by  the  second  Balkan  war  and  by  the 
Treaty  of  Bucharest  which  terminated  it. 

I  have  endeavoured  to  enumerate  as  impartially  as 
is  possible  the  events  which  led  to  the  entry  of  Bul- 
garia into  the  War.  In  so  doing,  whilst  recognising 
the  difficulties  which  existed,  I  have  tried  to  make  no 
secret  of  the  faults  in  Allied  statesmanship  —  faults 
which  resulted  in  what  is  one  of  the  greatest  diplomatic 
defeats  suffered  during  the  War.  To  summarise  these 
faults,  it  may  be  said  that  the  importance  of  Bulgaria 
and  of  the  re-formation  of  a  Balkan  alliance  favourable 
to  the  Allies  was  not  recognised  until  so  late  that  the 
demands  of  the  Sofia  Government  had  been  aug- 
mented to  a  point  making  them  exceedingly  diflScult 
of  gratification.  When  the  desirability  for  action  had 
been  realised,  instead  of  accepting  the  fact  that  the 
price  for  "the  delivery  of  valuable  goods"  is  always 
high,  no  definite  line  of  policy  appears  to  have  been 
followed.  Two  courses  were  open.  It  was  feasible, 
first,  to  approach  Serbia,  Greece,  and  Roumania  in 
order  either  to  ascertain  what  concessions  they  were 
willing  to  provide  or  to  tell  them  the  nature  of  the 
concessions  insisted  upon  by  the  Allies.  With  some- 
thing definite  in  hand,  conversations  might  then  have 
been  entered  into  with  Bulgaria,  who  would  thereby 
have  been  forced  to  disclose  her  attitude  one  way  or 
the  other.  And  second,  it  was  practicable  to  ascertain 
from  Bulgaria  her  conditions,  and  then  to  decide 
whether  these  conditions  should  be  forced  upon  her 
neighbours.  Instead  of  the  adoption  of  these  alterna- 
tives, a  sort  of  halfway  course  of  negotiating  first  with 


BULGARIA  AND  THE  WAR  103 

one  party  and  then  with  the  other  seems  to  have  been 
adopted  —  a  system  which  in  the  end  permitted  the 
running  out  of  the  sands  and  gave  the  enemy  time  to 
bring  about  a  definite  arrangement  between  Turkey 
and  Bulgaria. 

The  fundamental  basis  of  the  whole  question  was, 
and  is,  that  no  Balkan  statesman,  be  he  Roumanian, 
Greek,  Serbian,  or  Bulgarian,  can  or  will  make  sacri- 
fices until  he  finds  himself  compelled  to  do  so.  Equally 
well  no  Balkan  Government  can  or  will  accept  less 
than  it  demands  until  the  necessity  for  the  adoption 
of  such  a  course  arises.  This  is  the  case,  because 
were  they  to  do  so  they  would  lay  themselves  open 
to  a  charge  by  the  military  and  chauvinistic  parties, 
—  a  charge  which  would  result  in  their  fall.  On  the 
other  hand,  once  the  leader  of  a  government  is  in  a 
position  to  affirm  to  his  followers  and  supporters  that 
external  pressure  has  forced  him  to  concede  a  point, 
however  important,  then  and  only  then  can  he  hope 
to  pass  through  an  internal  crisis  unscathed.  For 
example,  in  1912  and  very  soon  after  the  most  explicit 
statements  by  the  Belgrade  Government  upon  the 
necessity  for  a  port  upon  the  Adriatic,  orders  were 
given  for  the  withdrawal  of  its  army  from  that  coast, 
and  this  because  of  the  influence  which  came  from 
abroad  and  particularly  from  Russia.  It  is  this  state 
of  things  —  this  mentality  —  which  made  it  so  neces- 
sary for  the  Allies  in  1914-1915  to  adopt  a  policy  so 
firm,  so  uncompromising,  and  on  the  face  of  it  so  even 
brutal  towards  all  the  Balkan  States  that  it  would 
probably  have  enabled  each  of  the  Cabinets  to  accept 
a  programme  destined  to  further  the  real  and  ultimate 
interests  of  countries,  which,  were  an  enemy  victory 


104  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE   WAR 

to  be  realised,  would  sooner  or  later  be  face  to  face 
with  the  Austro-German  danger  —  a  danger  which 
has  ruined  the  prosperity  of  Serbia  for  years.  In 
short,  whilst  she  must  now  be  ranked  among  and 
treated  as  one  of  our  enemies,  we  are  compelled  to 
recognise  that  the  policy  adopted  by  Bulgaria  resulted 
not  only  from  her  illegitimate  claims,  but  also  from 
the  obduracy  of  her  neighbours  —  obduracy  which  has 
unfortunately  been  largely  responsible  for  disasters 
which  all  of  them  have  now  suffered  to  a  greater  or  a 
lesser  degree. 


ROUMANIA  AND   THE   WAR 

RouMANiA  —  the  largest  country  in  or  immediately 
connected  with  the  Balkan  Peninsula  —  is  made  up 
of  the  provinces  of  Wallachia  and  Moldavia,  formally 
united  under  the  name  Roumania  in  December,  1861. 
She  occupies  a  position  of  immense  strategical  impor- 
tance, for  the  most  part  on  the  north  of  the  Danube 
and,  so  to  speak,  wedged  in  between  Austria-Hungary, 
Russia,  and  Bulgaria,  because,  being  composed  of 
two  arms  or  horns,  she  controls  the  routes  to  the  south 
and  east.  The  province  of  Wallachia,  which  runs  in 
a  more  or  less  easterly  and  westerly  direction,  together 
with  the  Dobrudja,  bars  the  way  from  Central  Europe 
into  Bulgaria.  Moldavia,  which  spreads  out  practi- 
cally north  and  south,  constitutes  a  bridge  between 
Austria-Hungary  and  Southern  Russia, 

For  these  reasons  Roumania  forms  a  sort  of  link 
between  East  and  West.  Geographically,  it  is  usual 
to  consider  the  country  as  situated  without  and  to 
the  north  of  the  Balkan  Peninsula,  and  therefore  her 
interests  may  be  called  semi-international  and  semi- 
Balkan.  As  far  as  the  first  of  these  is  concerned,  the 
policy  of  Roumania  has  been  and  is  bound  up  with 
the  fact  that  it  is  practically  necessary  for  her  to  main- 
tain good   relations   either   with  the   Central   Powers 


lOG  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE  WAR 

or  with  Russia,  and  that  it  was  and  is  obviously  desk- 
able  that  her  friends  should  be  those  destined  to  be 
the  victors  in  the  War.  This  is  the  case  principally 
because  single-handed  she  is  not  in  a  position  to  wage 
war  with  a  Great  Power,  and  because  for  years  she  has 
been  desirous  of  securing  possession  either  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  districts  inhabited  by  Roumanians 
or  of  the  area  of  Russian  Bessarabia  which  she  covets. 
The  real  key  of  what  has  taken  place  since  the  outbreak 
of  the  European  War  therefore  lies  in  the  fact  that 
Roumania,  like  all  the  •  other  Balkan  countries  and 
peoples,  wished  to  utilise  the  occasion  to  realise  one 
or  perhaps  both  the  aspirations  which  rest  so  close  to 
the  heart  of  every  patriotic  citizen.  From  a  Balkan 
standpoint,  on  the  other  hand,  the  most  important 
thing  is  that  nothing  should  take  place  which  would 
in  any  way  threaten  the  general  interests  of  Roumania 
or  so  strengthen  the  positions  of  her  Balkan  neighbours 
as  to  affect  these  interests. 

In  order  to  understand  the  position  of  Roumania, 
it  is  necessary  therefore  to  realise  the  full  meaning  to 
her  of  the  Bessarabian,  the  Transylvanian,  and  the 
Dobrudjan  questions.  So  far  as  the  first  of  these  is 
concerned,  as  Bessarabia  contains  a  Roumanian  popu- 
lation of  only  somewhat  under  a  million,  the  aspira- 
tions of  Roumania  to  acquire  at  least  a  part  of  that 
province  were  based  upon  historical  grounds,  and  upon 
the  manner  in  which  this  area  has  changed  hands  since 
Napoleonic  times.  By  the  Peace  of  Bucharest,  signed 
in  1812,  the  principalities  of  Moldavia  and  Wallachia 
were  restored  to  the  Sultan  with  the  exception  of  Bes- 
sarabia, which  was  added  to  Russia.  In  1856,  that 
is  to  say  after  the  Crimean  War,  the  southern  portion 


ROUMANIA  AND   THE   WAR  107 

of  Bessarabia  was  restored  to  IVIoldavIa,  and  the  two 
prliu'ii)a]ities,  still  under  the  suzerainty  of  the  Sultan, 
were  placed  under  the  collective  guarantee  of  the 
European  Powers.  Thus  matters  stood  until  after 
the  Russo-Turkish  War  of  1877  and  1878,  when  Rou- 
mania,  who  had  been  of  the  most  material  assistance 
to  the  former  country,  anticipated  that  she  would 
secure  compensation  at  the  expense  of  Turkey,  and 
that  she  would  also  retain  at  least  the  Bessarabian 
area  allotted  to  her  Moldavian  province  in  1856. 
Not  so,  however,  for  the  Russians  not  only  prevented 
the  Roumanians  from  being  represented  at  the  sign- 
ing of  the  preliminary  treaty  of  San  Stefano  in  March, 
1878,  but  they  also  secured  the  exclusion  of  their  dele- 
gates from  the  sittings  of  the  Berlin  Conference  until 
the  representatives  of  the  Great  Powers  responsible 
for  the  final  Treaty  of  Berlin,  signed  in  July,  1878,  had 
already  decided  in  favour  of  the  Russian  claim  and 
recognised  the  independence  of  Roumania  from  Turkey 
only  on  the  condition  that  the  former  country  restored 
to  Russia  that  portion  of  Bessarabia  which  had  been 
given  to  Moldavia  in  1856.  Since  that  time  the  owner- 
ship of  this  area  has  therefore  been  a  very  burning 
question  in  Roinnania. 

The  Roumanian  dislike  of  Austria-Hungary  and  the 
aspiration  to  acquire  areas  now  belonging  to  that 
country  depend  upon  the  fact  that  there  are  domiciled 
near  Init  outside  their  frontier  and  in  the  Dual  Mon- 
archy almost  four  million  Roumanians.  The  great 
majority  of  these  people  live  in  Transyh^ania,  but 
there  are  also  a  considerable  number  in  the  Bukovina 
and  some  in  what  is  known  as  the  Banat,  situated 
across  the  Danube  from  the  northern  frontier  of  Ser- 


108  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE  WAR 

bia.  The  treatment  of  these  people  by  their  alien 
government  and  the  natural  desire  for  the  union  of 
the  Roumanian  race  has  been  the  keystone  of  the 
foreign  policy  of  those  Roumanian  statesmen  such 
as  M.  Take  Jonescu,  who  formerly  advocated  a  policy 
of  friendship  for  Russia  and  who,  from  the  moment 
of  the  outbreak  of  the  War,  advocated  a  definite  pro- 
allied  policy  on  the  part  of  their  country.  In  other 
words,  whilst  the  case  is  much  less  strong  than  that 
of  France  in  regard  to  Alsace  Lorraine,  the  sentiments 
of  every  patriotic  Roumanian  have  been  bound  up 
with  the  position  in  Transylvania  for  many  a  year. 
As  I  will  explain  later  on,  it  is  largely  these  sentiments 
which  prompted  the  Roumanian  Government  to  adopt 
a  strategically  wrong  policy  in  advancing  across  its 
northern  and  western  frontiers  in  the  autumn  of  1916, 
and  it  is  these  sentiments  which  must  make  the  peace 
terms  imposed  by  the  Central  Powers  so  very  bitter 
of  acceptance  by  every  patriotic  Roumanian. 

So  much  for  the  questions  which  for  years  have  in- 
fluenced the  policy  of  Roumania  towards  Russia  and 
Austria-Hungary.  Turning  to  her  attitude  towards 
the  Balkans,  although  her  final  independence  of  Turk- 
ish suzerainty  was  recognised  by  the  Treaty  of  Berlin 
in  1878,  Roumania  played  but  little  part  in  Balkan 
affairs  until  1910,  when  she  was  supposed  to  have 
entered  into  some  kind  of  treaty  arrangement  with 
Turkey  concerning  her  attitude  in  case  of  war  in  the 
Near  East.  However  this  may  be,  and  whatever  may 
have  been  this  arrangement,  the  army  of  the  late  King 
Carol  did  not  take  the  field  during  the  first  Balkan 
war,  Roumania  at  that  time  contenting  herself  by 
seizing  the  opportunity  of  securing  compensation  from 


M.  Take  Jonescu 

M.  Take  Jonescu,  who  i.s  one  of  Roumania's  leading  statesmen,  has  always 
been  well  known  for  his  moderate  and  far-seeing  opinions.  A  great  lawyer 
by  profession,  at  a  very  early  stagein  the  War  he  expressed  iiimself  openly 
in  favor  of  Roumania's  support  of  the  Allies  and  of  a  good  understanding 
between  Serbia  and  Bulgaria, 


ROUMANIA  AND   THE   WAR  109 

Bulgaria  in  the  Dobrudja,  thus  once  more  raising  the 
question  of  that  province. 

The  Dobrudja  is  the  district  which  hes  between  the 
Black  Sea  and  the  lower  reaches  of  the  Danube,  which 
separate  it  from  Russia  and  from  the  remainder  of 
Roumania.  The  northern  section  of  the  province  is 
mostly  made  up  of  an  alluvial  tract  of  country  produced 
by  the  action  of  this  river,  whilst  the  southern  part  is 
more  barren,  being  composed  largely  of  steppe  and 
treeless  territory.  The  whole  district  is  strategically 
of  great  importance  because  of  its  relations  with  the 
Danube,  because  it  constitutes  a  sort  of  gateway 
into  the  Balkans,  and  because  it  now  contains  the  port 
of  Constanza  (Kustendji)  and  a  railway  completed 
since  the  beginning  of  the  War.  As  early  as  Roman 
times  forts  were  built  from  the  Danube,  near  Cerna 
Voda  (Tchernavoda),  to  the  Black  Sea,  near  Constanza. 
As  a  result  of  constant  invasion,  the  population  is 
mixed,  being  composed  of  the  remnants  of  the  races 
which  have  passed  through  it  at  various  periods. 

From  the  point  of  view  of  present-day  politics,  the 
Dobrudja  question  depends  upon  events  which  have 
taken  place  since  the  Russo-Turkish  War  of  1877- 
1878.  After  that  war,  its  northern  part  was  given  to 
Roumania  as  compensation  for  the  loss  of  Bessarabia. 
The  Bulgaro-Roumanian  frontier  was  delimited  by  a 
European  Commission  which,  in  spite  of  protests 
from  Russia,  fixed  a  boundary  running  from  just  to 
the  east  of  Silistria  on  the  Danube  to  near  Mangalia 
on  the  Black  Sea  and  thus  treated  comparatively 
favourably  the  claims  of  Roumania.  This  settlement 
led  to  ill  feeling,  for  whilst  Roumania  contended  that 
her  frontier  was  not  strategically  such  as  to  enable 


110  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE   WAR 

her  to  defend  her  port  at  Constanza  and  the  great 
Cerna  Voda  bridge  across  the  Danube,  which  was 
subsequently  constructed,  Bulgaria  rightly  argued 
that  the  population  of  the  Dobrudja  was  largely  Bul- 
garian in  nationality.  This  state  of  things  was  in 
part  responsible  for  the  fact  that  Roumania  did  not 
throw  in  her  lot  with  the  Balkan  States  against  Turkey 
in  1912.  Indeed,  instead  of  so  doing,  it  was  during 
this  period  that  she  entered  the  diplomatic  arena  and 
claimed  the  cession  by  Bulgaria  of  a  stretch  of  territory 
on  the  south  of  the  Dobrudja.  As  Bulgaria  naturally 
resented  these  concessions,  the  question  was  referred 
to  an  Ambassadors'  Conference  at  Petrograd,  which 
decided  that  Bulgaria  should  cede  the  town  of  Silistria 
to  Roumania,  and  that  the  frontier  of  the  two  countries 
should  once  more  be  delimited  by  a  commission.  This 
settlement,  embodied  in  what  is  known  as  the  Proto- 
col of  Petrograd,  was  arrived  at  early  in  May,  1913. 

But  as  the  claims  of  Roumania  were  not  thereby 
satisfied,  and  as  the  wringing  of  this  concession  from 
Bulgaria  naturally  created  great  resentment  among 
Bulgarians,  the  relations  existing  between  the  two 
countries  at  the  time  of  the  outbreak  of  the  second 
Balkan  war  were  far  from  cordial.  The  result  was  that 
Roumania,  then  no  longer  withheld  by  Russia,  invaded 
Bulgaria,  nominally  with  the  object  of  maintaining 
the  balance  of  power  in  the  Balkans,  but  really  for  the 
purpose  of  wresting  from  Bulgaria  a  still  further  area 
of  territory  on  the  south  of  the  Dobrudja.  This  ac- 
tion on  the  part  of  Roumania,  who  was  easily  able  to 
cross  the  Danube  and  to  advance  to  the  very  gates 
of  Sofia,  whilst  the  Bulgarian  army  was  occupied  else- 
where, resulted  in  the  fact  that  the  country  was  in- 


ROUMANIA   AND  THE  WAR  111 

creased  in  size  from  an  area  of  just  over  50,700  square 
miles  to  one  of  just  under  53,500  square  miles,  and 
that  her  population  of  just  over  7,230,000  souls  was 
added  to  by  about  280,000  inhabitants. 

Geographically,  politically,  and  militarily,  this 
gave  to  Roumania  more  than  that  rectification  of  her 
Dobrudja  frontier,  which  she  had  wanted  ever  since 
the  signing  of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin,  for  it  secured  for 
her  a  boundary  running  in  a  northwesterly  direction 
from  the  immediate  vicinity  of  Varna  on  the  Black 
Sea  to  a  point  on  the  Danube  located  about  halfway 
between  Silistria  and  Rustchuk,  Endorsed  by  the 
fatal  Treaty  of  Bucharest,  which  terminated  the 
second  Balkan  campaign,  this  change,  which  was 
supposed  to  be  going  to  enable  Roumania  to  defend 
herself  against  an  attack  from  the  south,  was  in  its 
turn  responsible  for  the  bad  relations  which  existed 
between  Roumania  and  Bulgaria  prior  to  and  after 
the  beginning  of  the  European  conflagration. 

From  the  moment  of  the  outbreak  of  the  War, 
therefore,  the  position  of  Roumania  was  an  extremely 
difficult  one.  On  the  one  hand  that  country  could 
not  afford  to  take  sides  with  Russia  or  Austria-Hungary 
unless  she  were  absolutely  guaranteed  the  strongest 
material  assistance  from  the  group  of  belligerents 
which  she  supported.  On  the  other,  the  statesmen  of 
Bucharest  recognised  that  so  long  as  the  attitude  of 
Bulgaria  remained  undecided,  any  war  move  by  Rou- 
mania might  lay  that  country  open  to  an  attack  on 
the  part  of  her  southern  neighbour  —  an  attack 
prompted  by  the  events  of  1913.  Moreover,  to  add 
to  the  above-mentioned  international  difficulties,  it 
is  now  known  that  some  thirty  years  ago  Roumania 


112  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE   WAR 

joined  Germany  in  a  defensive  alliance  which  was 
almost  identical  in  form  to  that  which  existed  between 
Italy  and  the  Central  Powers. 

The  late  King  Carol,  who  belonged  to  the  House  of 
Hohenzollern,  and  who  was  pro-German,  was  firmly 
convinced  that  the  obligations  and  interests  of  his 
country  placed  her  on  the  side  of  the  Central  Powers. 
Strengthened,  however,  by  the  declaration  of  neutral- 
ity by  Italy,  and  really  knowing  that  Germany  and 
Austria  were  the  aggressors,  the  Crown  Council  as- 
sembled at  Sinaia,  directly  the  War  began,  to  discuss 
the  future  attitude  of  the  country,  refused  to  support 
the  expressed  opinion  of  the  King,  and  decided  that 
Roumania  should  remain  a  peaceful  spectator  of  events 
in  progress  around  her.  Later  on  and  after  the 
death  of  King  Carol  in  October,  1914,  most  far-seeing 
statesmen,  particularly  M.  Take  Jonescu,  who  had 
always  believed  in  friendship  with  Bulgaria  and  who 
from  the  beginning  had  been  in  favour  of  war  upon  the 
side  of  the  Allies,  began  to  see  that,  if  Roumania  were 
to  be  in  a  position  to  realise  her  larger  aspirations,  she 
must  also  be  prepared  to  adopt  a  definite  policy  and 
to  make  sacrifices  in  the  south,  as  a  result  of  which 
she  would  secure  a  free  hand  in  the  north  and  west. 

It  was  during  the  time  preceding  the  Muscovite 
retreat,  which  began  in  May,  1915,  that  Russia,  who 
could  then  have  minimized  the  difficulties  in  any  case 
besetting  Roumania,  should  have  made  agreements 
with  that  country  which  would  have  induced  her  to 
enter  the  War  and  at  the  same  time  have  compensated 
her  for  concessions  to  Bulgaria  in  the  Dobrudja. 
Such  a  Muscovite  policy  would  have  strengthened  the 
hands  of  the  Roumanian  statesmen  who  then  recognised 


ROUMANIA  AND   THE   WAR  113 

that  the  maintenance  of  the  Treaty  of  Bucharest  had 
become  or  was  becoming  no  longer  necessary.  Had 
it  been  adopted  by  the  Government  of  Petrograd,  it 
is  probable  that  Roumania,  instead  of  remaining  a 
more  or  less  disinterested  spectator,  during  the  Allied 
negotiations  with  Serbia,  Greece,  and  Bulgaria  of  the 
summer  of  1915,  might  well  have  utilised  her  all-impor- 
tant influence  with  Serbia  and  Greece  in  favour  of  the 
reconstitution  of  the  Balkan  League,  and  that  she 
might  even  have  taken  the  initiative  and  openly  proved 
the  bona  fides  of  her  attitude  by  giving  up  at  least  part 
of  the  territory  which  she  acquired  as  a  result  of  the 
Balkan  Wars.  The  result  of  such  action  would  have 
been  far-reaching,  for  it  would  not  only  have  definitely 
and  permanently  secured  the  neutrality  of  Bulgaria,  at 
least  so  far  as  Roumania  was  concerned,  but  it  would 
have  compelled  Serbia  and  Greece  to  see  the  necessity 
for  the  adoption  of  policies  destined  most  likely  ac- 
tually to  have  brought  Bulgaria  into  the  War  on  the 
side  of  the  Allies. 

From  the  time  of  the  entry  of  Bulgaria  into  the 
War  a  new  position  was  created  in  Europe  and  parti- 
cularly in  the  Balkans  —  a  position  so  advantageous 
to  the  enemy  that  it  remained  only  essential  for  him 
to  bring  about  its  military  consolidation  by  the  defeat 
of  Serbia  and  by  the  shaping  of  the  policies  of  Greece 
and  of  Roumania  to  suit  his  strategical  plan.  The 
Germans  recognised  that  the  key  of  the  situation  then 
lay  in  Roumania,  owing  to  her  geographical  position 
and  particularly  to  the  fact  of  her  being  practically 
in  control  of  the  Lower  Danube.  Indeed,  if  any 
definite  proof  were  required,  the  terms  of  peace  imposed 
upon    Roumania,    particularly    those    by    which   that 


114  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE   WAR 

country  is  to  be  compelled  to  facilitate  the  trans- 
port of  enemy  troops  to  the  Black  Sea  coast,  consti- 
tute absolute  proof  that,  from  the  moment  she  had 
gained  Bulgaria,  Germany  was  determined,  owing  to 
the  importance  of  Roumania  as  a  corridor  toward 
the  south  and  east,  to  bring  about  her  entry  into  the 
War  on  one  side  or  the  other.  She  bullied  in  the  hope 
of  securing  her  support.  When  success  in  this  direc- 
tion proved  impossible,  the  Central  Powers  played 
their  cards  to  achieve  not  the  continued  neutrality, 
but  the  actual  hostility,  of  Roumania,  and,  as  there 
is  little  reason  to  doubt,  utilized  the  influence  which 
they  possessed  in  Russia  for  the  purpose  of  persuading 
that  country  to  bring  nominally  friendly  pressure  to 
bear  upon  the  desired  opponent.  The  object  of  this 
policy  was  that  the  enemy  realised  the  significance 
of  Roumania  as  a  route  to  the  south  and  east,  and 
that  he  believed  the  strength  required  for  the  subjuga- 
tion of  that  country  would  be  well  expended,  con- 
sidering the  results  to  be  achieved.  From  an  initial 
standpoint  and  so  far  as  the  south  was  concerned,  the 
Central  Powers  could  not  get  control  of  the  Danube 
and  of  the  approaches  to  Bulgaria  across  and  by  way 
of  it  except  by  the  occupation  of  at  least  Wallachia 
and  the  Dobrudja  —  a  control  which  at  once  gave 
them  a  partially  alternative  route  eastward  to  that 
provided  by  the  main  railway  from  Belgrade  to  Con- 
stantinople, the  whole  of  which  fell  into  their  hands 
with  the  entry  of  Bulgaria  and  the  subjugation  of 
Serbia  in  the  autumn  of  1915.  More  indirectly  and 
probably  looking  ahead,  the  enemy  no  doubt  realised 
that  the  full  benefits  of  the  defeat  of  Russia  or  of 
her  exit  from  the  War  could  not  be  achieved  so  long  as 


ROUMANIA  AND   THE  WAR  115 

Roumania  remained  neutral  and  so  long  as  the  com- 
munications running  towards  the  south  and  east 
through  Moldavia  could  not  be  utilised  for  the 
transport  of  his  men  and  material. 

So  nmch  for  the  events  connected  with  the  entry 
of  Roumania  into  the  War  which  took  place  on  August 
27,  1916.  In  order  to  understand  the  events  which 
followed  —  events  very  fully  described  by  John  Buchan 
in  Nelson's  "History  of  the  War",  Volume  17  —  it 
is  necessary  once  more  to  refer  to  the  nature  and 
position  of  the  northwestern  frontier  of  the  country. 
Starting  from  the  north,  that  frontier  makes  a  semicir- 
cular sweep  round  the  crests  of  the  Carpathians  and 
Transylvanian  Alps  in  such  a  way  that  Transylvania 
juts  out  into  Roumanian  territory  in  the  form  of  a 
sharp  salient.  This  frontier,  which  has  a  length  of 
about  four  hundred  miles,  is  crossed  by  six  important 
passes  —  the  Vulcan,  the  Rotherturm,  the  Torsburg, 
the  Predeal,  the  Buzeu,  and  the  Gyimes.  Of  these 
the  Rotherturm,  the  Predeal,  and  the  Gyimes  passes 
are  traversed  by  railways,  whilst  roads  run  through 
the  remainder  and  through  other  mountain  gaps  of 
lesser  significance. 

Directly  after  Roumania  threw  in  her  lot  with  the 
Allies,  her  army  advanced  into  enemy  territory  by 
way  of  many  of  these  routes.  The  Austrians,  recog- 
nising the  weakness  of  their  position  —  weakness  due 
to  the  above-mentioned  salient  —  performed  what 
was  really  and  not  only  nominally  a  strategic  retreat 
and  for  about  three  weeks  continued  to  withdraw, 
contenting  themselves  only  by  delaying  the  militarily 
unsound  and  far  too  rapid  Roumanian  advance.  By 
the  end  of  the  third  week  in  September,  therefore,  the 


116  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE   WAR 

Roumanians  had  occupied  a  band  or  belt  of  enemy 
territory  running  right  across  Transylvania,  their 
centre  having  pushed  forward  about  sixty  miles, 
whilst  their  right  and  left  flanks  had  advanced  re- 
spectively about  twenty-five  and  about  ten  miles. 

During  this  time  events  on  the  south  and  on  the 
Danube  front  had  begun  to  take  a  serious  turn.  A  Bul- 
garian force,  augmented  by  two  Turkish  divisions  and 
supported  by  a  German  contingent,  acting  under  the 
command  of  Von  Mackensen,  had  been  collected  on 
the  south  of  that  river.  During  the  opening  days  of 
September,  that  force  advanced  across  the  Roumanian 
frontier  and  into  the  area  of  the  Dobrudja  annexed 
by  that  country  after  the  Balkan  Wars.  No  serious 
Roumanian  resistance  was  encountered  and  by  the  ninth 
of  that  month  not  only  Turtukeuie  but  also  Silistria, 
together  with  a  large  number  of  prisoners  and  a  great 
deal  of  booty,  were  in  Bulgarian  hands.  A  few  days 
later,  the  German  general,  whose  advance  was  greatly 
furthered  by  the  Bulgarian  railways  which  exist  in 
this  area,  had  pushed  forward  to  a  line  from  which 
the  railway  from  Cerna  Voda  to  Constanza  was  im- 
mediately threatened.  The  Roumanians,  realising 
their  danger,  hurried  troops  from  the  Carpathian 
front  to  the  Dobrudja,  and  after  a  battle,  in  which 
they  were  supported  by  Russian  and  Serbian  contin- 
gents (these  latter  composed,  according  to  Colonel 
Buchan,  of  Jugo-Slavs  taken  prisoner  by  Russia), 
and  commanded  by  a  Muscovite  general,  the  enemy 
was  temporarily  thrown  back  for  a  distance  of  about 
ten  miles. 

By  approximately  September  20,  when  the  Rouma- 
nians found  themselves  held  up  in  Transylvania,  their 


ROUMANIA  AND  THE   WAR  117 

position  in  the  Dobrudja  had  therefore  become  highly 
precarious.  But  what  was  more  important  and  more 
disastrous  was  that  by  that  time,  too,  a  great  Austro- 
Germanic  force,  under  the  command  of  Von  Fal- 
kenhayn,  had  been  concentrated  in  the  East  by  the 
direction  of  Von  Hindenburg,  who  became  the  Kaiser's 
Chief  of  the  General  Staff  during  the  closing  days  of 
August.  That  drive  began  a  few  days  later  with  an 
enemy  attack  against  the  Roumanian  left  centre  near 
Hermannstadt  —  an  attack  which  more  or  less  pene- 
trated, encircled,  or  turned  the  RoumJinian  position 
and  compelled  the  forces  of  that  country  hastily  to 
retreat  towards  the  east,  for  the  Rotherturm  Pass, 
upon  which  they  depended  for  their  communications 
with  Wallachia,  fell  into  enemy  hands  on  the  twenty- 
sixth. 

From  that  time  onwards  things  moved  apace,  partly 
because  the  Roumanians  were  ill  provided  with  guns 
and  munitions,  partly  because  success  is  necessary  to 
the  maintenance  of  the  morale  of  such  an  army,  and 
partly  because  the  task  besetting  Roumania  was 
altogether  too  great  for  her.  Early  in  October  the 
forces  of  King  Ferdinand  were  defeated  on  the  centre 
of  their  position,  and  by  the  end  of  the  first  week  in 
that  month  Kronstadt  was  re-taken  by  the  Austro- 
Germans.  These  enemy  successes  were  followed  bj' 
a  very  rapid  advance  towards  the  Carpathians,  espe- 
cially in  the  area  lying  to  the  south  and  southwest  of 
Kronstadt  —  an  advance  which  gave  to  the  enemy 
the  Torsburg  Pass  by  October  14,  Predeal  being  bom- 
barded and  destroyed  about  the  same  time.  The 
Roumanians,  however,  were  able  to  offer  serious 
resistance  at  this   latter  point,   and   the  enemy   was 


118  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE  WAR 

considerably  delayed  in  his  attempt  to  reach  Bucharest 
by  means  of  the  main  line  which  passes  through  Sinaia 
and  Ployesti.  Farther  north  too,  and  on  the  Mol- 
davian frontier,  the  Roumanians  managed  to  hold  up 
the  enemy,  and  their  resistance  was  furthered  by  the 
extension  of  the  Russian  battle  line  in  a  southerly 
direction  and  by  the  handing  over  of  the  defence  of 
the  northern  frontier  of  Moldavia  to  the  Russians, 
who  took  over  the  area  lying  to  the  north  of  the  Gyimes 
Pass. 

By  October  20  the  position  in  the  south  had  once 
more  become  very  serious,  for,  whilst  attempts  had 
previously  taken  place  by  both  sides  to  effect  cross- 
ings of  the  Danube,  it  was  only  at  about  that  time  that 
Von  Mackensen  inaugurated  a  further  serious  drive 
in  the  Dobrudja.  Constanza  —  the  great  Roumanian 
port  on  the  Black  Sea  —  was  occupied  two  days  later, 
and  Cerna  Voda  and  its  long  bridge,  which  was  not 
adequately  destroyed  by  the  Roumanians  during  their 
hasty  retreat,  fell  into  Bulgarian  hands  almost  immedi- 
ately. This,  together  with  the  enemy's  subsequent 
advance  towards  the  north,  greatly  strengthened  his 
position,  for  it  gave  him  the  practical  command  of  a 
long  stretch  of  the  Lower  Danube  and  also  facilities 
for  the  passage  of  that  river  which  he  did  not  previ- 
ously possess. 

These  events  constituted  the  beginning  of  the  end. 
During  the  closing  days  of  October  and  the  first  half 
of  November,  the  Austro-Germans  advanced  from  the 
north  with  a  semi-encircling  movement,  and,  pushing 
forward  their  right  wing  into  Western  Wallachia, 
Crajova,  an  important  railway  junction,  was  occupied 
on    the    twenty-first,    thus    practically    isolating    the 


ROUIVLVNIA  AND   THE   WAR  119 

Roumanian  forces  which  were  still  holding  Orsova, 
consequently  making  their  successful  retreat  impos- 
sible. At  about  this  time  Von  Falkenhayn  was  begin- 
ning to  push  forward  through  the  more  easterly  passes 
and  on  the  twenty-seventh  Von  Mackensen,  coming 
from  the  south,  occupied  Giurgevo,  on  the  left  bank 
of  the  Danube,  thereby  having  made  it  unsafe  for  the 
Roumanians  to  take  up  a  defensive  line  along  the  River 
Aluta. 

A  glance  at  the  map  therefore  will  show  that  although 
Bucharest  has  always  been  described  as  an  entrenched 
camp,  and  although  it  was  defended  by  a  girdle  of 
forts  which  run  round  the  city,  it  was  powerless  to 
resist  an  encircling  movement  which  had  successfully 
hemmed  it  in  on  every  side  except  the  northeast.  The 
resistance  attempted  on  the  line  of  the  Arjish  River, 
which  runs  across  the  southwest  front  of  the  city, 
proved  useless,  and  Bucharest  and  Ployesti  fell  into 
enemy  hands  on  December  sixth.  From  that  time 
onwards  the  retreat  became  a  rout,  and  the  Govern- 
ment, Allied  Legations,  and  banks  having  been  removed 
to  Jassy,  which  became  the  temporary  capital,  no  resist- 
ance was  made  until  the  Roumanians  reached  the 
line  of  the  Lower  Sereth,  which  flows  into  the  Danube 
at  Galatz.  The  enemy,  on  the  other  hand,  made  no 
serious  attempt  to  penetrate  that  line,  for  he  had 
already  achieved  his  primary  object  of  securing  the 
control  of  the  whole  of  the  Lower  Danube  as  far  as 
Braila  —  a  control  which  gave  him  free  access  to 
Bulgaria  and  by  way  of  that  country  to  Turkey.  Thus 
matters  stood,  with  the  Allied  front  extending  along 
the  Carpathians  and  the  Rivers  Trotush,  Sereth,  and 
Danube,   from    the   Gyimes  Pass    on  the  northwest 


120  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE   WAR 

to  a  point  just  to  the  north  of  SuHna  on  the  Black  Sea 
on  the  southeast,  until  the  events  which  immediately 
preceded  the  fatal  and  brutal  peace  finally  imposed 
upon  Roumania  by  the  Central  Powers  in  May, 
1918. 

The  above-described  developments  were  partly  the 
result  of  events  which  had  taken  place  prior  to  the 
entry  of  Roumania  into  the  War.  and  partly  the  conse- 
quence of  local  and  international  causes,  the  nature  of 
which  are  worthy  of  brief  examination  here.  Locally 
speaking,  the  fundamental  question  consists  not  so 
much  in  what  the  Roumanians  did  or  did  not  do,  but 
in  the  fact  that  those  who  remembered  their  magnifi- 
cent conduct  and  the  great  part  which  they  played 
in  the  Russo-Turkish  War  of  1877  expected  far  too 
much  from  them  in  the  European  War.  Thus,  whilst 
the  Bulgarians  began  to  form  a  modern  army  directly 
after  the  liberation  of  the  principality  in  1878,  and 
whilst  the  Serbs  commenced  to  bring  their  fighting 
machine  up  to  date  during  the  early  years  of  this 
century,  the  Roumanians  did  not  introduce  the  regu- 
lations necessary  for  the  creation  of  an  efficient  military 
force  until  1908.  By  the  law  of  that  year,  which 
constitutes  the  basis  of  the  present  organisation, 
service  in  the  semi-permanent  army,  where  men  only 
served  for  intermittent  periods  and  then  passed  into 
the  reserve,  instead  of  spending  at  least  two  continuous 
years  with  the  colours,  was  finally  abolished,  except 
in  the  case  of  certain  cavalry  units.  Helpful  and 
necessary  as  was  this  reform,  it  is  markedly  apparent, 
as  the  military  liability  of  a  Roumanian  lasts  for  twenty- 
one  years,  that  eight  years  had  been  all  too  little  for 
the  adequate  development  of  a  system  without  which 


ROUMANIA  AND  THE  WAR  121 

the  safety  of  such  a  country  could  never  be  assured. 
It  was  the  existence  of  this  state  of  things,  together 
with  the  methods  of  recruitment  and  training  of  the 
oflScers,  who  are  separated  by  a  wide  social  gulf  from 
the  masses  of  the  country,  and  together  with  the 
fact  that,  during  the  neutrality  of  Roumania,  the  Gov- 
ernment did  not  take  and  could  not  take  the  measures 
necessary  to  secure  an  adequate  amount  of  war  ma- 
terial, which  affected  the  power  of  an  army  which 
was  nominally  much  stronger  than  that  of  either  Serbia 
or  Bulgaria. 

From  a  military  standpoint,  the  plan  of  campaign 
adopted  by  Roumania  was  undoubtedly  a  mistake. 
The  Government,  which  for  a  moment  appeared  to 
think  that  the  rupture  of  relations  with  Bulgaria  could 
be  avoided,  ought  to  have  known  that,  for  reasons 
already  given,  such  a  desirable  object  could  not  then 
be  achieved,  and  that  therefore  the  Roumanian  army 
would  be  compelled  to  fight  on  the  northern  and  north- 
western frontiers  as  well  as  on  the  line  of  the  Danube. 
Instead  of  taking  the  magnitude  of  her  task  into  ac- 
count, of  recognising  that  her  railway  system  leading 
up  to  the  Austro-Hungarian  frontier  was  much  less 
adequate  than  that  possessed  by  the  enemy,  and  there- 
fore of  contenting  herself  by  endeavouring  to  block 
the  passes  of  the  Carpathians  and  the  Transylvanian 
Alps  and  devoting  herself  more  closely  to  the  situation 
on  the  other  side  of  the  Danube,  Roumania  immedi- 
ately took  the  offensive  on  the  north  and  west  and 
pushed  forward  into  enemy  territory.  Even  the 
strategical  advantages  to  have  been  gained  by  a  suc- 
cessful advance  as  far  as  the  line  of  the  Middle  Maros 
did  not  justify  such  an  undertaking,  for  the  passive 


122  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE   WAR 

defence  of  the  Carpathians  and  the  Transylvanian 
Alps  would  certainly  have  been  all  that  could  have 
been  safely  undertaken,  bearing  always  in  mind  that 
the  Turks  were  in  a  position  to  send  forces  to  Bulgaria, 
that  the  Bulgarian  army  itself  was  in  no  way  immo- 
bilised at  Salonica,  and  that  once  Roumania  had  entered 
the  War,  Germany  would  spare  no  pains  to  insure  her 
annihilation. 

Nevertheless  in  this  connection,  it  is  always  neces- 
sary to  remember  certain  circumstances  which  miti- 
gate, if  they  do  not  altogether  remove,  the  blame  which 
would  otherwise  rest  upon  those  responsible  for  the 
inauguration  of  the  plan  adopted  by  Roumania.  To 
begin  with,  it  is  asserted,  on  good  authority,  that 
Russia  definitely  promised  to  attack  Bulgaria  and  to 
immobilise  her  army.  Moreover,  we  have  to  recog- 
nise that  the  Roumanian  Government  may  not  have 
been  able  to  render  political  motives  subservient  to 
military  necessities.  Indeed  as  the  people  favoured 
war  largely  with  the  object  of  bringing  about  the  liber- 
ation of  their  co-nationals  domiciled  in  enemy  territory, 
and  as  it  would  have  been  almost  impossible  for  any 
leader  to  persuade  them  that  this  aspiration  could  be 
realized  better  by  an  Allied  than  by  a  local  Roumanian 
victory,  the  King  and  his  advisers  were  at  once  placed 
in  the  position  of  being  obliged  either  to  adopt  measures 
in  total  discord  with  military  tenets,  or  to  risk  the 
dangers  of  a  policy  which  would  not  have  been  clearly 
understood  by  a  people  who  for  years  have  turned 
their  attention  towards  Transylvania. 

Turning  to  the  international  reasons  for  the  Rou- 
manian disaster,  if  we  dismiss,  as  we  certainly  must 
dismiss  the  suggestion  that  there  was  any  want  of 


ROUMANIA  AND  THE   WAR  123 

loyalty  on  the  part  of  the  Western  AIHes,  then  we  find 
that  the  first  and  primary  cause  of  the  defeat  of  that 
country  was  due  to  the  fact  that  she  entered  the  War 
at  the  wrong  time.  The  enemy  had  already  achieved 
far-reaching  successes  in  the  East ;  Bulgaria  had  been 
ranged  on  the  side  of  the  Central  Powers  for  nearly 
a  year ;  and  the  power  of  King  Constantine  had  so 
increased  that  the  attitude  of  the  Greek  Government 
was  a  continual  menace  to  the  safety  of  the  Salonica 
expedition  —  a  menace  which  prevented  the  objects  of 
Roumania  being  furthered  by  an  attack  which  might 
otherwise  have  been  made  from  the  direction  of  the 
Aegean.  But  what  was  far  more  important  was  that 
whether  or  not  Roumania  was  actually  forced  to  come 
into  the  War,  the  Government  of  the  ex-Tsar  certainly 
promised  her  strong  support  in  men  and  war  material, 
and,  as  I  have  just  said,  encouraged  her  to  think  that 
she  would  only  have  to  fight  on  her  northern  and  west- 
ern frontiers  against  Austria  and  Germany,  since  Russia 
intended  to  deal  with  Bulgaria  by  means  of  an  expedi- 
tion landed  on  the  Black  Sea  coast.  Not  only  were 
none  of  these  promises  fulfilled,  but  Russia  actually 
held  up  supplies  destined  by  the  other  Allies  for  Rou- 
mania and  did  nothing  whatever  even  to  threaten  the 
Bulgarians  from  the  direction  of  the  Black  Sea.  This 
bad  faith  was  largely  responsible  for  the  Roumanian 
defeat.  It  is  as  a  consequence  of  it,  and  of  the  way 
in  which  for  years  Roumania  has  been  treated  Ijy  Rus- 
sia, that  our  sympathy  must  go  out  to  a  people  whose 
treatment  by  the  enemy  is  an  example  of  what  Ger- 
many means  by  so-called  justice. 

At  the  moment  of  writing,  it  is  too  early  and  it  is 
unnecessary  to  discuss  in  detail  the  local  consequences 


124  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE   WAR 

of  the  peace  terms  brutally  Imposed  upon  Roumania, 
terms  which  it  would  have  been  worse  than  useless 
for  her  temporarily  to  refuse  to  accept.  To  begin 
with,  it  can  hardly  be  admitted  that  these  terms  are 
otherwise  than  temporary,  for  they  should  be  sub- 
jected to  revision  when  the  moment  for  peace  comes. 
Sufficient  therefore  be  it  to  say  that  the  worst  conse- 
quences of  the  new  situation  in  Southeastern  Europe, 
so  far  as  it  concerns  Roumania  herself,  are  bound  up 
with  the  facts  that  that  country  has  not  only  failed  to 
secure  any  part  of  Transylvania  but  that  she  has  lost 
the  Dobrudja  and  been  compelled  to  agree  to  an  actual 
rectification  of  Austro-Hungarian  frontier.  So  far  as  the 
Dobrudja  be  concerned,  whilst  that  area,  conquered  by 
Roumania  during  the  second  Balkan  war,  is  to  revert 
to  Bulgaria,  the  more  northerly  part  is  to  go  to  the 
enemy  under  conditions  which  are  not  plain,  Roumania 
merely  being  assured  of  a  trade  route  to  the  Black  Sea 
by  way  of  Czerna  Voda  and  Constanza. 

Such  a  settlement  carrying  with  it  the  moral  strangu- 
lation of  Roumania,  when  coupled  with  the  fact  that 
she  also  now  seems  practically  to  have  ceded  her  sov- 
ereignty, so  far  as  her  oil  fields  are  concerned,  are  such  as 
to  make  her  position  about  as  disastrous  a  one  as  it  is 
possible  to  imagine.  In  addition,  that  country  has  been 
forced  to  give  up  other  areas  which,  unless  they  be  re- 
stored when  the  time  of  peace  comes,  will  make  her 
future  position  almost  entirely  negligible  from  a  military 
standpoint.  On  the  Danube  the  Austro-Hungarian 
frontier  is  to  be  extended  in  a  southeasterly  direction 
so  as  to  include  the  Iron  Gates,  a  strip  of  territory 
and  a  wharf  is  to  be  compulsorily  leased  to  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  Dual  Monarchy  at  Turnu  Severin,  and 


ROUMANIA   AND   THE   WAR  125 

certain  Danubian  islands  are  to  be  acquired  by  that 
country.  On  the  north  and  west  of  Roumania  — 
that  is,  on  the  Hne  followed  by  the  Transylvanian  Alps 
and  by  the  Carpathians  —  and  at  all  the  passes  of 
importance  "the  new  Roumanian  frontier  has  been  so 
far  removed  to  Roumanian  ground  as  military  reasons 
require." 

In  exchange  for  these  losses,  if  exchange  it  may  be 
called,  Roumania  is  apparently  to  be  allowed  to  annex 
all  or  at  least  part  of  the  Russian  Province  of  Bes- 
sarabia. If  this  annexation  be  permitted  by  the  Cen- 
tral Powers,  it  will  certainly  carry  with  it  considerable 
satisfaction  in  Roumania.  But  from  the  international 
standpoint  it  will  constitute  proof  positive  of  the 
enemy's  confidence  in  his  power  to  establish  and  to 
maintain  control  over  the  whole  of  Central  Europe,  and 
of  his  consequent  preference  that  Bessarabia  should  be 
incorporated  in  Roumania  rather  than  that  it  should 
remain  part  of  Russia  where  he  must  know  that  the 
whole  future  is  uncertain.  Once  more,  therefore,  an 
apparent  concession,  actuated  for  purely  Pan-Germanic 
reasons,  seems  in  progress  of  employment  for  the  sole 
purpose  of  developing  and  consolidating  the  Kaiser's 
dream  for  domination  in  the  East. 

These  disasters,  and  they  are  local  disasters,  are 
such  as  in  many  ways  to  make  the  present  position 
of  Roumania  as  worthy  of  sympathy  as  is  that  of 
Serbia.  But  whereas,  in  spite  of  diplomatic  mistakes, 
the  latter  country  has  fought  for  the  Allies  since  the 
beginning  of  the  War,  it  is  impossible  to  forget  not 
only  that  Roumania  was  herself  largely  responsible 
for  her  bad  relations  with  Bulgaria,  but  that  she  post- 
poned her  entry  into  the  theatre  of  hostilities  until 


126  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE   WAR 

long  after  the  time  at  which  her  assistance  would 
have  been  of  special  value  to  the  Allies,  notably  the 
period  of  the  Bulgarian  mobilisation,  and  until  no  other 
alternative  was  open  to  her.  These  facts  must  some- 
what lessen  the  intense  feeling  which  would  otherwise 
be  forthcoming  for  her  as  a  victim  of  Germanism,  and 
make  that  which  remains  largely  dependent  upon  the 
exceedingly  difficult  position  in  which  Roumania  has 
been  placed  by  the  War,  and  upon  the  manner  in 
which  she  was  treated  by  Russia  before  and  after  her 
adhesion  to  the  cause  of  the  Allies. 


VI 

GREECE   AND   THE   WAR 

In  order  to  understand  the  Greek  attitude  towards 
and  role  in  the  War,  it  is  necessary  first  to  reahse  the 
meaning  of  some  of  the  events  which  have  occurred 
in  Athens  during  the  last  few  years  and  to  examine 
the  several  ways  in  which  the  position  of  that  country 
is  an  entirely  special  one.  After  many  years  of  mis- 
government  —  misgovernment  which  resulted  in  con- 
sequences which  were  temporarily  fatal  to  the  pros- 
perity of  Greece  —  a  peaceful  revolution  took  place 
in  August,  1909.  This  revolution  established  the 
power  of  the  Military  League  which  completely  and 
absolutely  controlled  the  affairs  of  the  country  until 
the  spring  of  1910.  Early  in  that  year  M.  Venezelos, 
having  been  summoned  to  Athens,  proposed  that  a 
National  Assembly  should  be  convoked  in  order  that 
the  League  should  be  able  to  retire  into  the  back- 
ground, whilst  at  the  same  time  avoiding  an  ordinary 
general  election,  which  could  not  take  place  at  that 
time  owing  to  the  then  state  of  the  Cretan  question 
and  particularly  to  the  fact  that  the  deputies  who  would 
have  been  elected  by  the  Cretans  to  represent  them  in 
the  Greek  Parliament  could  not  have  been  permitted 
to  take  their  seats  in  view  of  the  attitude  of  the  Pro- 


128  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE   WAR 

tecting  Powers  of  Crete  and  of  the  Ottoman  Gov- 
ernment. 

The  meeting  of  this  National  Assembly  in  September, 
1910,  practically  saved  Greece  from  complications, 
the  disastrous  nature  of  which  it  is  impossible  to  over- 
estimate. M.  Venezelos  —  already  the  saviour  of 
modern  Greece  —  actually  formed  his  Ministry  in 
October  of  that  year.  In  the  spring  of  1912,  when  an 
election  took  place,  he  was  returned  with  one  hun- 
dred and  forty-seven  supporters  in  a  Parliament  then 
composed  of  one  hundred  and  eighty-one  members. 
Since  that  time  this  patriotic,  far-seeing,  and  sagacious 
statesman  has  not  only  been  in  part  responsible  for 
the  creation  of  the  original  Balkan  League,  but  he 
has  steered  his  country  successfully  through  the  two 
Balkan  Wars  and  saved  her  from  utter  disaster  in  a 
manner  which  should  have  won  him  the  gratitude  and 
the  esteem  of  every  patriotic  Greek.  Indeed  suffi- 
cient be  it  here  to  say  that  as  a  result  of  the  Balkan 
Wars,  Greece,  which  made  the  smallest  sacrifices  ex- 
cept Roumania  and  Montenegro  in  those  campaigns, 
was  increased  by  about  one  third  of  its  size.  Instead 
of  being  made  up  of  just  over  25,000  square  miles  and 
containing  a  population  of  about  2,760,000  souls,  im- 
mediately before  the  War  she  had  an  area  of  about 
42,000  square  miles  and  a  population  of  over  4,821,000 
souls. 

The  outstanding  feature  in  the  earlier  part  of  M. 
Venezelos'  regime,  that  is  to  say,  during  the  period 
intervening  between  his  arrival  at  Athens  early  in  1910 
and  the  assassination  of  the  late  King  George  at  Salonica 
after  the  first  Balkan  War  and  in  March,  1913,  was  the 
striking  way  in  which  His  Majesty  and  the  new  Premier 


GREECE   AND   THE   WAR  129 

forgot  their  former  differences  and  worked  together 
for  the  regeneration  and  good  of  their  country.  In 
1910  the  King,  whose  tact,  wisdom,  and  moderation 
undoubtedly  saved  Greece  from  the  serious  conse- 
quences which  would  most  certainly  have  resulted 
from  an  aggressive  policy  towards  Turkey  during 
the  earlier  years  which  followed  the  re-establishment  of 
the  Ottoman  Constitution  in  1908,  faced  by  the  alterna- 
tive of  either  sanctioning  the  continued  rule  of  the 
Military  League  or  of  summoning  the  somewhat  un- 
constitutional National  x\ssembly  recommended  by  M. 
Venezelos,  finally  and  wisely  decided  to  adopt  the 
latter  course.  From  that  time  onwards  until  his 
death,  His  Majesty,  knowing  that  the  Cretan  leader 
was  the  one  man  in  whom  the  Greek  nation  then  placed 
its  confidence,  put  all  his  personal  feelings  on  one 
side  and  consistently  utilised  the  capacity  of  a  man 
without  whose  assistance  and  presence  one  of  the 
most  rapid  regenerations  in  modern  history  could 
never  have  been  effected. 

M.  Venezelos,  whose  relations  with  the  royal  family 
prior  to  1910  had  been  far  from  cordial,  owing  to  his 
consistent  opposition  to  the  policy  of  Prince  George 
whilst  His  Royal  Highness  was  High  Commissioner  of 
Crete  (1898-1906),  also  made  up  his  mind  to  forget 
the  past  and  to  devote  himself  untiringly  to  the  good 
of  the  Hellenic  cause.  Thus,  instead  of  advocating 
the  extreme  measures  suggested  by  the  ^Military  League 
and  instead  of  utilising  his  influence  against  the  royal 
princes  —  particularly  the  Crown  Prince,  afterwards 
King  Constantine  —  the  Prime  Minister  actually  fur- 
thered the  establishment  of  the  prestige  of  the  dynasty 
and    the    reappointment    of    Prince    Constantine    as 


130  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE  WAR 

Inspector  General  or  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  army 
—  a  reappointment  in  fact  largely  responsible  for  the 
great  popularity  which  the  future  King  gained  during 
the  Balkan  Wars.  In  short,  M.  Venezelos,  whose  down- 
fall as  an  Island  leader  had  been  one  of  the  primary 
objects  of  Prince  George  in  Crete,  obliterated  himself 
and  worked  loyally  with  a  ruler  who,  if  he  were  weak 
and  sometimes  shortsighted,  in  the  end  proved  that  he 
was  sufficiently  far-seeing  to  understand  that  the  pros- 
perity of  his  country  could  not  be  developed  without 
the  assistance  of  the  one  great  man  of  modern  Greece. 
In  order  to  realise  the  position  of  Greece  in  the  War, 
it  is  necessary  to  recognise  that  it  is  an  entirely  special 
one,  and  that  her  attitude  and  that  of  the  Allies  towards 
her  have  been  influenced  by  various  historical  events, 
by  the  mentality  of  the  people,  and  by  the  internal 
struggle  which  was  in  progress  at  Athens  from  the 
time  of  the  accession  until  the  abdication  of  King  Con- 
stantine.  In  the  first  place,  as  is  clearly  shown  by 
Thomas  Erskine  Holland  in  his  book  entitled  "The 
European  Concert  in  the  Eastern  Question ",  Greece 
owes  her  very  existence  to  the  good  will  and  to  the 
protection  of  England,  France,  and  Russia.  Thus, 
as  early  as  1826,  Great  Britain  and  Russia  signed  a 
protocol  by  which  they  were  to  negotiate  with  the 
Sublime  Porte  on  behalf  of  the  Greeks,  whose  indepen- 
dence from  Turkey  had  not  then  been  brought  about. 
In  the  following  year,  when  the  mediation  thus  offered 
had  been  refused  by  Turkey,  and  when  the  Govern- 
ments of  Austria  and  Prussia  had  declined  to  accede 
to  that  protocol,  the  three  Powers  (France  had  by  this 
time  joined  England  and  Russia)  entered  into  a  treaty 
for  the  object  of  re-establishing  peace  between  the  con- 


GREECE  AND  THE   WAR  131 

tending  parties  —  the  Greeks  and  the  Ottoman  Govern- 
ment. 

In  1830  the  Conference  of  London  decided  that 
Greece  should  be  entirely  independent  of  Turkey,  and 
two  years  later  agreed  to  offer  the  throne  of  that 
country  to  Prince  Otho  of  Bavaria,  and  by  a  convention 
then  signed  between  the  representatives  of  England, 
France,  and  Russia  on  the  one  side,  and  that  of  Bavaria 
on  the  other,  that  country  was  placed  "under  the 
guarantee"  of  the  above-mentioned  three  Powers. 
By  a  treaty  signed  by  the  representatives  of  the  said 
Protecting  Powers  with  Denmark  in  1863  —  that  is, 
the  year  following  the  expulsion  of  King  Otho  —  it 
was  further  arranged  that  "Greece  under  the  sover- 
eignty of  Prince  William  of  Denmark  and  the  guarantee 
of  the  three  Courts  forms  a  monarchical,  independent, 
and  constitutional  State."  Again,  when  it  was  agreed 
at  the  same  time,  that  the  Ionian  Islands  were  to 
be  united  with  the  Hellenic  Kingdom,  it  was  settled 
that  those  islands  were  also  to  be  comprised  in  the 
above-mentioned  guarantee.  Once  more,  in  1881, 
when  the  frontiers  of  Greece  were  greatly  extended 
by  a  convention  signed  between  the  Great  Powers 
and  Turkey,  it  was  expressly  stated  that  "they  (the 
inhabitants  of  the  then  new  Greek  territory)  will  enjoy 
exactly  the  same  civil  and  political  rights  as  subjects 
of  Hellenic  origin."  Ever  since  that  time  the  Protect- 
ing Powers  —  England,  France,  and  Russia  —  and 
particularly  England  who  ceded  the  Ionian  Islands, 
have  therefore  had  special  privileges  in  and  obligations 
towards  Greece,  and  they  have  had  the  right  to  inter- 
vene either  to  protect  that  country  from  her  foreign 
foes  or  to  defend  her  people  from  an  unconstitutional 


132  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE   WAR 

regime  against  which  they  (the  Powers)  are  the  guar- 
antors. 

The  second  direction  in  which  the  position  of  Greece 
is  a  special  one  is  bound  up  with  the  Graeco-Serbian 
relations  depending  upon  events  which  preceded  and 
immediately  followed  the  second  Balkan  war.  The 
treaty  between  the  two  countries,  which  followed 
other  less  formal  agreements,  was  actually  concluded 
on  June  1,  1913,  and  therefore  two  days  after  the  signa- 
ture of  the  document  which  formally  terminated  the 
first  Balkan  War.  Whilst  so  far  as  I  know  its  full 
text  has  never  been  published,  it  undoubtedly  bound 
the  parties  concerned  to  come  to  the  support  of  one 
another  and  to  provide  a  given  force  —  believed  to 
number  one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  men  —  should 
either  country  be  attacked  by  Bulgaria.  This  being 
the  case,  it  is  obvious,  directly  Bulgaria  entered  the 
War  on  the  side  of  the  enemy  and  attacked  Serbia, 
that  the  said  treaty  came  into  force.  It  was  argued 
at  the  time  and  subsequently  by  the  neutralists  in 
Greece  and  by  the  supporters  of  the  policy  of  King 
Constantine,  that  this  treaty  had  become  inoperative, 
because  Serbia  had  refused  to  support  Greece  during 
her  difficulties  with  Turkey  in  the  summer  of  1914, 
because  in  1915  she  (Serbia)  had  tardily  and  with 
reserves  agreed  to  cede  to  Bulgaria  territory  in  the 
ownership  of  which  she  (Greece)  held  herself  to  have 
an  interest,  and  lastly  because  Bulgaria  was  acting 
not  alone  in  a  purely  Balkan  war  but  in  conjunction 
with  the  Central  Powers.  The  answer  to  these  con- 
tentions is  that,  whilst  the  Graeco-Serbian  Treaty  may 
have  been  of  a  generally  defensive  nature,  it  was 
aimed  not  against  Turkey  but  against  Bulgaria,  and 


GREECE  AND   THE   WAR  133 

that  as  it  certainly  did  not  actually  specify  that  it  was 
intended  as  a  measure  in  case  of  a  purely  Balkan  war, 
it  must  have  been  valid  in  the  circumstances  which 
arose  in  1915.  Moreover,  whereas  an  attempt  was 
made  by  the  opposition,  after  the  return  to  power  of 
M,  Venezelos  in  the  summer  of  that  year,  to  qualify 
the  force  of  that  arrangement  in  such  a  way  that  it 
was  only  to  be  operative  in  case  of  a  Bulgarian  and 
not  in  the  eventuality  of  a  European  war,  no  sugges- 
tion to  this  effect  was  ever  made  prior  to  the  triumph 
of  The  Great  Man  of  modern  Greece,  who  clearly  secured 
a  mandate  for  his  war  and  pro-Serbian  policies  at  that 
election. 

Turning  to  questions  connected  with  the  mentality 
of  the  Greeks  and  with  the  internal  situation  in  Greece 
as  it  has  influenced  the  War,  it  must  be  remembered 
that  outstanding  among  the  Greek  national  character- 
istics are  the  exaggerated  patriotism,  which  amounts 
to  chauvinism,  the  love  of  political  strife,  and  the  in- 
dividualism of  the  people.  Every  Greek  is  a  politician, 
not  only  during  an  electoral  campaign,  but  on  each 
day  through  the  year.  He  loves  the  strife  involved 
in  politics  because  it  leads  to  opposition,  and  because 
it  therefore  carries  with  it  a  sort  of  excitement  or  pleas- 
ure corresponding  to  that  which  used  to  be  felt  in  the 
Olympic  Games  by  the  Greeks  of  old.  Patriotic 
though  he  be,  every  Greek,  therefore,  spends  all  his 
spare  time  in  his  accustomed  cafe,  discussing  in  vehe- 
ment language  topics  of  which  he  often  has  no  real 
knowledge.  Again  the  individualism  of  the  people, 
who  for  the  most  part  fail  to  recognise  the  value  of 
combination  and  of  co-operation,  means  that  in  Greece 
the  question  of  peace  or  war  is  largely  governed  by  the 


134  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE  WAR 

individual  views  of  the  majority.  Moreover,  whereas 
the  Bulgarian  army  fights  as  a  well-organised  machine, 
and  whereas  the  Turk  lives  his  life  as  fate  may  direct 
it,  the  Greek,  full  of  dash  as  he  is,  is  practically  useless 
as  a  fighter  if  he  be  engaged  in  an  unpopular  way. 

This  means  that  in  war  as  in  peace  the  policy  of 
every  Greek  Government  must  of  necessity  be  influ- 
enced by  the  individual  feelings  of  the  people,  and  that 
from  the  moment  of  the  outbreak  of  the  European  con- 
flagration the  whole  history  of  the  country  has  really 
been  bound  up  with  a  great  struggle  in  progress  between 
all  the  old  political  chiefs  on  the  one  side  and  a  new 
Liberal  Party  on  the  other.  Thus,  if  for  nearly  three 
years  this  struggle  happened  to  be  connected  with  the 
proper  foreign  policy  of  adoption  by  the  Hellenic  Gov- 
ernment, that  struggle  was  as  much  a  political  and  in- 
ternal one,  between  the  anti-Venezelists  supported 
and  voiced  by  the  ex-King,  and  the  Venezelists,  as  it 
was  an  international  and  external  tussle  between 
non-Interventionists  and  Interventionists. 

In  spite  of  the  fact  that,  when  Crown  Prince,  he 
was  practically  dismissed  from  his  position  of  Com- 
mander-in-Chief, owing  to  his  lack  of  prestige  with 
the  Military  League,  the  ex-King  was  immensely 
popular  during  his  four  years'  reign.  His  military 
reputation,  which  was  principally  due  to  the  credit 
given  to  him  for  the  Greek  successes  in  the  Balkan 
Wars,  became  increased  by  his  appointment  as  a 
Field  Marshal  in  the  German  army — an  appointment 
which,  together  with  the  blatant  efforts  made  by  the 
Kaiser  to  secure  his  good  will,  certainly  greatly  flattered 
His  Majesty.  Moreover,  the  democratic  ways  of  the 
sovereign,   and  the  fact  that  he  —  a   Constantine  — 


GREECE  AND  THE  WAR  135 

had  married  a  Sophia,  and  that  by  such  a  matrimonial 
union  he  had  thus  rendered  possible  the  realisation  of 
the  ancient  legend  that  when  this  happened  the  Byzan- 
tine Empire  would  be  re-established,  played  their  part 
in  securing  for  the  King  the  love  and  respect  of  his 
subjects.  Thus,  whilst  he  certainly  played  the  role 
of  a  "Roi  de  Grece"  —  the  title  conferred  by  the 
Powers  upon  Prince  Otho  in  1832  —  His  Majesty  still 
remained  truly  identified  with  the  sentiments  of  his 
people,  a  large  number  of  whom  did  not  wish  to  go  to 
war  on  either  side.  Moreover,  the  many  Greeks 
who  idolised  the  King,  but  who  also  sympathised  with 
the  Allies,  resented  the  suggestion  that  His  Majesty 
had  pledged  himself  and  his  country  to  Germany. 
Indeed,  whilst  the  King  certainly  furthered  Germanic 
objects,  there  seems  good  reason  to  suppose  that  his 
feelings  were  influenced,  not  so  much  by  the  identity 
of  his  royal  consort,  but  by  his  military  education  in 
the  German  army,  by  the  attitude  of  the  Kaiser  towards 
the  retention  of  Kavala  by  Greece  in  1913,  and  last  but 
not  least  by  his  firm  conviction  that  the  enemy  would 
be  the  victors  and  that  at  all  costs,  therefore,  he  must 
not  allow  his  country,  which  could  not  protect  itself, 
to  become  involved  in  war  with  Bulgaria  and  the 
Central  Powers. 

These  sentiments,  together  with  the  fact  that  King 
Constantine  never  attempted  to  follow  the  good  ex- 
ample set  by  his  father  and  to  forget  the  former  career 
of  M.  Venezelos,  prompted  the  Sovereign  to  do  all  in 
his  power  to  maintain  the  neutrality  of  Greece  with 
the  object  of  avoiding  what  he  may  perhaps  have 
believed  to  have  been  a  dangerous  undertaking  and 
still  more  of  opposing  the  policy  advocated  by  a  man 


136  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE  WAR 

whom  lie  detested.  In  other  words  the  King  failed  to 
realise  that  the  salvation  of  Greece  depended  upon 
the  union  of  qualities  which  were  interdependent,  and 
that  his  own  prestige,  reputation,  and  personality  could 
only  be  developed  to  the  full  advantage  when  acting 
as  the  constitutional  mouth-piece  of  his  people.  It  was 
probably  this  failure  and  this  inability  to  forget  his 
personal  feelings  as  much  as  his  actual  pro-Germanism 
which  made  possible  the  disastrous  regime  which  has 
constituted  and  will  constitute  a  great  setback  to  that 
new  spirit  of  Hellenism  which  began  to  develop  after 
1910  and  particularly  after  the  Balkan  Wars. 

M.  Venezelos,  who  is  much  more  stolid,  more  seri- 
ous, and  more  far-seeing  than  any  other  Greek  whom 
I  have  met,  stands  out  alone  among  public  men  in 
his  country,  because  he  is  primarily  a  statesman  rather 
than  a  politician.  Recognising  the  wider  interests  of 
Hellenism,  he  has  always  played  the  role  of  a  "Roi 
des  Hellenes",  the  title  especially  conferred  upon  the 
late  King  George  by  the  Protecting  Powers  at  the 
time  of  his  election  to  the  Greek  throne  in  the  year 
1863.  A  patriot  above  and  before  everything  else, 
His  Excellency,  who  has  constantly  demonstrated 
his  entire  loyalty  to  the  dynasty,  was  therefore  ready 
to  try  to  work  with  King  Constantine  as  he  had  done 
with  his  father.  It  was  with  this  object  in  view  that, 
until  the  time  of  his  first  dismissal  in  March,  1915, 
the  leader  of  the  Liberal  Party,  which  voiced  Imperial- 
ism rather  than  Parochialism,  always  disguised  his 
disagreements  with  the  King  and  furthered  the  increase 
of  the  royal  prestige  which  would  never  have  attained 
its  final  zenith  had  the  Premier  originally  played  for 
his  own  hand  instead  of  for  the  good  of  the  country. 


l'liul.>t'rai>li  fruiii  Untibh  I'ictoriul  burviCQ 

M.  Venezelos 


(On  his  left  is  the  Greek  Minister  in  Luiuloii) 


GREECE   AND   THE   WAR  137 

Thus,  if  the  popularity  and  power  of  M.  Venezelos 
greatly  declined  in  Greece  between  the  time  of  his 
re-election  of  June,  1915,  and  his  return  to  power  after 
the  abdication  of  the  King  in  1917,  this  decline  is  due 
to  the  fact  that  His  Excellency  was  subjected  to  attacks 
fostered  by  German  propaganda  and  carried  out  by 
his  political  and  lifelong  adversaries  —  the  leaders  of 
the  Old  Parties  in  Greece  —  that  he  was  believed  to 
have  sanctioned  a  foreign  landing  on  Greek  soil,  and 
that  he  favoured  war,  in  which  the  majority  of  Greeks 
did  not  want  to  engage  on  either  side,  rather  than 
that  he  advocated  a  programme  destined  to  further 
the  cause  of  the  Allies. 

Turning  to  the  attitude  of  Greece  towards  the  War, 
the  events  which  have  taken  place  since  1914  may 
conveniently  be  discussed  as  having  occurred  in  four 
more  or  less  distinct  stages,  the  first  of  which  lasted 
until  tlie  entry  of  Turkey  into  the  arena  of  hostilities. 
That  phase  began,  however,  not  in  August,  1914, 
but  from  the  termination  of  the  Balkan  Wars,  and  this 
largely  because  before  as  immediately  after  the  out- 
break of  the  European  conflagration  the  Aegean  Island 
question,  to  which  I  have  referred  elsewhere,  was  of 
all-preponderating  importance  to  Greece.  Indeed 
this  question,  together  with  the  scandalous  and  brutal 
way  in  which  the  Greeks  of  Turkey  were  treated  by 
the  Ottoman  Government  during  1914,  brought  the 
two  countries  to  the  verge  of  hostilities  upon  several 
different  occasions.  Thus  the  fact  that  the  Island 
question  is  one  of  those  to  be  settled  by  the  present  W^ar 
has  always  made  and  still  makes  it  impossible  for  Greece 
directly  or  indirectly  to  further  the  re-establishment 
of  Ottoman  power  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean  — 


138  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE  WAR 

power  which  would  mean  not  only  that  Greece  would 
lose  Chios,  Mitylene,  and  Samos,  but  that  many  other 
important  islands  would  immediately  be  wrested  from 
her. 

The  second  historical  war  stage  in  Greece  was  prin- 
cipally bound  up  with  the  first  struggle  which  took 
place  between  M.  Venezelos  and  the  King,  with  the 
question  of  Graeco-Serbian  concessions  to  Bulgaria, 
and  with  the  election  which  took  place  in  June,  1915. 
Here  it  must  be  recalled  to  mind  that  the  retirement 
of  M.  Venezelos  in  March,  1915,  was  due  to  the  fact 
that  His  Excellency  was  then  already  in  favour  of  the 
entry  of  Greece  into  the  War  after,  and  as  a  result 
of,  Macedonian  concessions  to  Bulgaria  —  conces- 
sions for  which  he  rightly  felt  that  his  country  would 
have  been  repaid  by  the  fact  that  the  cause  of  Hellen- 
ism would  have  been  furthered  elsewhere.  So  strong, 
indeed,  was  the  feeling  of  the  ex-Prime  Minister  upon 
these  subjects  that  after  his  retirement  from  office 
he  made  known  the  contents  of  a  memorandum  which 
he  had  addressed  to  his  Sovereign  in  the  previous 
January.  M.  Venezelos,  having  stated  that  the  King 
originally  approved  of  the  contents  of  this  memoran- 
dum, an  official  communique  was  subsequently  issued 
in  Athens  denying  that  His  Majesty  ever  authorized 
anybody  to  pursue  negotiations  destined  to  result  in 
the  cession  of  any  Hellenic  territory. 

M.  Zaimis  having  refused  office,  largely  because  he 
did  not  consider  that  an  election  ought  then  to  be  held 
in  Greece,  M.  Gounaris,  who  is  practically  the  leader 
of  the  relics  of  all  the  former  political  parties  in  Greece, 
assumed  the  reins  of  the  Government  and  occupied 
the  position  of  Prime  Minister  from  March  until  after 


GREECE  AND   THE  WAR  139 

the  election  in  June,  1915.  That  election,  at  wliich 
for  the  first  time  the  districts  annexed  by  Greece  as  a 
consequence  of  the  Balkan  Wars  sent  representatives 
to  Athens,  constituted  a  triumph  for  M,  Venezelos, 
for  he  secured  the  return  of  one  hundred  and  ninety 
deputies  out  of  a  total  of  three  hundred  and  sixteen, 
of  which  the  chamber  is  now  composed. 

The  result  was,  however,  a  disappointment  to  those 
who  expected  that  the  return  to  power  of  M.  Venezelos 
would  mean  the  entry  of  Greece  into  the  War  upon  the 
side  of  the  Allies.  In  any  case,  such  an  expectation 
was  unjustified,  but  in  view  of  the  modifications  which 
took  place  in  the  European  situation  between  the  orig- 
inal proposals  made  by  His  Excellency  in  January 
and  his  re-election  in  June,  it  was  perfectly  obvious 
that  no  change  in  the  foreign  policy  of  the  country 
could  then  be  anticipated.  During  this  period  it 
became  evident  that  the  Dardanelles  campaign,  which 
was  naturally  watched  with  breathless  excitement 
throughout  the  Near  East,  was  not  developing  in  a 
manner  favourable  to  the  Allies.  The  Greek  General 
Staff,  who  knew  the  strength  of  the  defences  of  the 
Narrows,  must  have  looked  with  apparent  astonishment 
at  the  attempts  which  were  made  to  force  the  Straits 
by  the  British  and  French  fleets  between  the  latter 
half  of  the  month  of  February  and  the  naval  setback 
of  March  eighteenth.  They  knew  that  these  attempts 
ought  never  to  have  been  made  without  the  assistance 
to  the  fleet  which  could  have  been  given  by  a  force 
disembarked  upon  the  northwestern  coast  of  the 
Peninsula  of  Gallipoli.  They  knew  the  advantage 
to  the  Turks  of  the  delay  which  occurred  between  the 
original  naval  bombardment  and  the  first  determined 


140  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE   WAR 

landing  in  April ;  and  last,  but  not  least,  they  realised, 
when  it  was  finally  collected,  that  the  expeditionary 
force  available  in  April  was  made  up  of  contingents, 
the  strength  of  which  was  insufficient.  The  King  and 
General  Staff  undoubtedly  knew  of  the  reasons  for 
the  inauguration  of  the  Dardanelles  Campaign  and  of 
the  Russian  attitude  towards  it  —  questions  explained 
elsewhere.  But  profiting  by  the  ignorance  of  the 
General  Public,  they  were  able  to  increase  their  power 
by  contending  that  they  were  always  right  in  condemn- 
ing the  manner  in  which  the  Dardanelles  campaign 
was  undertaken,  if  not  actually  in  opposing  the  inau- 
guration of  that  campaign  at  all. 

The  second  direction  in  which  the  European  situa- 
tion was  modified  before,  and  particularly  just  after, 
the  return  to  power  of  M.  Venezelos  is  connected  with 
the  Allied  proposals  made  with  the  object  of  securing 
the  co-operation  of  Bulgaria.  So  far  as  Greece  was 
concerned,  these  suggested  concessions,  which  were 
desirable,  took  the  form  that  her  Ally  —  Serbia  —  was 
asked  to  cede  to  Bulgaria  areas  to  the  reversion  of 
which  she  (Greece)  thought  that  she  was  entitled, 
particularly  the  Doiran-Ghevgeli  Enclave,  and  that 
the  Hellenic  Government  would  have  given  up  Kavala 
and  at  least  a  portion  of  the  territory  situated  between 
the  rivers  Vardar  and  Mesta.  Greece,  like  Serbia, 
could  and  would  have  been  fully  compensated  for 
these  proposed  concessions  by  the  acquisition  of  far 
more  than  a  corresponding  amount  of  territory  else- 
where. Wliatever  may  be  accepted  as  the  reason  of 
the  failure  of  these  negotiations,  their  initiation  and 
their  abortive  result  certainly  increased  the  prestige 
of  the  Court  and  of  the  neutralist  party  in  Greece, 


GREECE   AND  THE   WAR  141 

for  that  party  contended  that  futile  attempts  had 
been  made  at  the  expense  of  Greece  to  secure  the  sup- 
port of  Bulgaria  —  a  country  which  almost  every 
Hellene  considered  to  be  his  traditional  enemy. 

The  third  war  stage  in  Greece  begins  from  the  orig- 
inal Allied  landing  at  Salonica  on  October  1,  from 
the  resignation  of  M.  Venezelos  on  October  5,  and 
from  the  actual  entry  of  Bulgaria  into  the  War  during 
the  first  half  of  October,  1915.  It  therefore  covers 
the  period  during  which  the  Allies  endeavoured  to 
come  to  the  direct  assistance  of  Serbia,  and  in  which 
they  subsequently  retreated  to  the  more  or  less  imme- 
diate vicinity  of  Salonica.  It  is  connected  with  the 
later  negotiations  concerning  the  treaty  obligations  of 
Greece  towards  Serbia.  It  includes  the  further  develop- 
ment of  the  unconstitutional  rule,  which  had  already 
begun  in  Greece  during  the  second  historical  stage,  and 
the  measures  which  were  taken  by  the  Allies  to  prevent 
the  prolongation  of  that  rule.  In  short,  the  historical 
phase  which  intervened  between  the  beginning  of  Oc- 
tober, 1915,  and  the  abdication  of  King  Constantine 
in  June,  1917,  is  probably  destined  to  be  the  most  im- 
portant period  through  which  Greece  has  ever  passed. 

It  is  impossible  here  to  discuss  in  detail  all  the  events 
which  led  up  to  the  second  resignation  of  M.  Venezelos 
and  which  occurred  during  his  absence  from  power, 
or  even  to  touch  upon  all  the  negotiations  between  the 
Allies  and  the  various  Governments  which  held  the 
reins  of  power  during  this  third  historical  phase. 
SuflScient  therefore  be  it  to  say  that  whatever  may 
have  been  his  final  attitude  towards  the  question  of 
Serbian  concessions  to  Bulgaria  and  especially  towards 
the  cession  of   the  Doiran-Ghevgeli   Enclave  by  the 


142  THE  CRADLE   OF  THE  WAR 

former  country,  His  Excellency  was  in  favour  of  an 
honourable  interpretation  of  the  Graeco-Serbian  Treaty 
and  of  Greek  support  for  her  ally.  Whilst  the  exact 
trend  of  events  at  this  time  is  still  far  from  clear,  what 
seems  to  have  happened  is  that,  whether  or  not  the 
Premier  actually  invited  the  Allies  to  disembark  an 
expeditionary  force  upon  Greek  territory,  he  certainly 
made  suggestions  in  his  view  destined  to  enable  Greece 
to  keep  her  treaty  obligations,  should  the  necessity 
for  so  doing  arise.  That  contingency,  of  course,  oc- 
curred when  Bulgaria  actually  entered  the  War.  Conse- 
quently, as  M.  Venezelos  had  already  asked  the  Pro- 
tecting Powers  if,  in  case  of  need,  they  could  furnish 
a  force  in  substitution  of  that  which  would  have  been 
forthcoming  from  Serbia  had  that  country  not  been 
fully  occupied  on  her  northern  and  western  frontiers, 
the  Allies,  as  the  protectors  of  Greece,  were  certainly 
entitled  to  take  that  question  as  a  sanction  for  that 
campaign.  Subsequently,  although  he  issued  a  formal 
protest  against  a  military  passage  through  Hellenic 
territory  —  a  protest  which  there  is  reason  to  believe 
resulted  from  the  pre-intended  withdrawal  of  the 
King's  consent  —  the  fact  that  M.  Venezelos  refused 
to  take  any  active  steps  to  prevent  such  a  passage 
was  made  pretext  for  his  fall.  That  fall,  that  enforced 
retirement  on  October  5,  of  a  Prime  Minister  who, 
two  days  after  the  original  landing  at  Salonica  had 
secured  a  vote  of  confidence  in  the  historic  and  stormy 
meeting  of  the  Chamber,  which  took  place  on  October  3, 
in  connection  with  the  question  of  the  Allied  disembar- 
kation, constituted  a  breach  of  the  spirit,  if  not  of  the 
letter,  of  the  Hellenic  Constitution  —  a  breach  which 
would  have  entitled  the  Allies  then  and  there  to  step 


GREECE  AND   THE   WAR  143 

in  to  enforce  constitutionalism,  and  a  breach  which 
justified  not  only  the  perseverance  in  an  o})eration, 
which  in  effect  had  been  sanctioned  by  the  Legal  Pre- 
mier and  by  Parliament,  but  also  their  future  attitude 
towards  a  series  of  governments  which  in  reality  were 
all  unconstitutional. 

Thenceforward  the  relationship  between  the  Allies 
and  the  Hellenic  Government  was  influenced  by  the 
necessity  of  subjugating  political  to  military  consider- 
ations, and  the  history  of  internal  events  was  bound 
up  with  the  great  struggle  which  was  in  progress 
between  liberalism  and  imperialism  on  the  one  side 
and  reaction  and  parochialism  on  the  other.  The 
King,  who  undoubtedly  remained  truly  identified 
with  the  sentiments  of  a  large  section  of  his  people, 
but  who  certainly  had  leanings  towards  and  admired 
Germany,  believed  in  a  policy  of  neutrality  at  all  costs 
and  utilised  the  anti-Venezelists  for  the  purposes  of 
that  policy  and  in  order  to  keep  out  of  office  a  man 
whom  he  personally  hated.  The  result  was  that  the 
many  Greeks  who  idolised  His  Majesty,  but  who  wished 
to  support  the  Allies,  resented  the  suggestion  that 
he  had  pledged  himself  to  the  Central  Powers,  and 
therefore  refrained  from  throwing  in  their  lot  with  a 
man  who  was  not  in  royal  favour.  It  was  here  that 
the  position  and  task  of  the  Allies  were  so  complicated, 
for  whilst  no  adequate  measures  seem  to  have  been 
taken  to  distinguish  between  "  Constantinism "  and 
"Pro-Germanism",  it  was  extremely  difficult  for  them 
to  do  otherwise  than  to  embrace  the  policy  of  M. 
Venezelos,  who  had  left  no  stone  unturned  to  further 
the  defeat  of  the  Central  Powers.  In  short,  it  was  in 
part  the  inability  to  discover  a  formula,  not  necessi- 


144  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE   WAR 

tating  the  combination  of  "  Pro-Allyism "  with  "Vene- 
zelism",  which  at  the  same  time  increased  the  magni- 
tude of  our  task  and  added  to  the  strength  and  power 
of  the  King  —  a  strength  and  power  which  for  months 
paralysed  Alhed  diplomacy  at  Athens. 

It  is  unnecessary  here  to  enter  into  or  even  to  men- 
tion all  the  numerous  developments  which  occurred 
between  the  Allied  landing  at  Salonica  in  October, 
1915,  and  the  abdication  of  the  King  in  June,  1917. 
During  that  period,  the  reins  of  the  Greek  Government 
were  in  the  hands  of  various  statesmen,  who  openly 
supported  the  policy  of  neutrality  advocated  by  the 
King,  not  because  they  were  pro- Germans,  but  be- 
cause they  believed  they  were  acting  in  the  interests 
of  their  own  country,  and  because  they  were  opposed 
to  M.  Venezelos  and  to  everything  which  he  advocated. 
M.  Zaimis,  who  took  office  in  October,  1915,  and  whose 
government  existed  purely  as  a  result  of  the  patriot- 
ism of  M.  Venezelos  —  his  friend  from  Cretan  times  — 
remained  in  power  until  he  was  defeated  in  the  Cham- 
ber nominally  upon  a  purely  internal  question.  He 
was  succeeded  early  in  November  by  M.  Skouloudis 
—  a  very  far-seeing  man  —  who  played  the  pro- 
German  game,  not  because  he  wished  to  further  the 
interests  of  the  Kaiser,  but  rather  because  he  feared 
the  consequences  of  resistance  to  enemy  aggression 
and  therefore  of  intervention  in  the  War.  This  ex- 
banker  of  Constantinople,  who  is  one  of  the  best- 
informed  men  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula,  and  who  recog- 
nised the  terrible  fate  which  would  await  the  Ottoman 
Hellenes  were  Greece  to  throw  in  her  lot  against  Tur- 
key, held  office  until  June  21,  1916. 

During  that  time,  as  the  mouthpiece  of  the  Crown, 


GREECE   AND  THE   WAR  145 

he  was  responsible  for  the  election  of  December  — 
an  election  which,  though  it  resulted  in  a  very  large 
majority  for  the  policy  of  M.  Gounaris  and  for  the 
Government,  really  constituted  a  victory  for  Liberalism, 
and  this  because  M.  Venezelos  was  able  to  prevent 
nearly  two  thirds  of  the  voters  from  taking  any  part 
in  it.  This  attitude  of  abstention  by  M.  Venezelos 
may  or  may  not  have  been  in  the  ultimate  interests 
of  Greece,  but  in  its  result  there  lies  a  proof  that,  in 
spite  of  all  and  every  intrigue,  the  popular  Cretan 
leader  then  still  enjoyed  the  confidence  of  the  great 
proportion  of  his  people.  During  the  Skouloudis 
regime,  too,  we  know  that  while  the  Hellenic  Govern- 
ment placed  numerous  difficulties  in  the  way  of  the 
transport  of  the  Serbian  army  across  Greek  territory, 
it  countenanced  the  surrender  of  Fort  Rupel  in  the 
Struma  Valley  on  May  25,  1916  —  a  surrender  followed 
by  the  Allied  blockade  of  the  Greek  coast,  and  by  the 
delivery  of  a  Note  demanding  the  complete  demobilisa- 
tion of  the  Hellenic  army,  the  appointment  of  a  busi- 
ness and  nonparty  Government,  and  the  immediate 
dissolution  of  the  Chamber  which  had  been  illegally 
elected  in  the  previous  December.  This  Note  resulted 
in  the  retirement  of  M.  Skouloudis  and  the  return  to 
power  of  M.  Zaimis.  His  task  was  too  difficult  of  ac- 
complishment, for  owing  to  the  treacherous  surrender 
of  Kavala,  to  the  Bulgarian  advance  on  the  east  of 
the  Struma,  and  to  the  flagrant  support  given  by  the 
military  authorities  to  the  Reservists'  leagues,  it  was 
impossible  to  hold  the  suggested  elections,  and  His 
Excellency  once  more  retired  when  he  had  been  in 
office  about  two  months. 

Passing   over   the   disturbances   which   occurred   at 


146  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE   WAR 

Salonica  In  August,  1916,  between  the  Venezelist  and 
anti-Venezelist  troops,  and  the  attitude  taken  up  by 
the  King,  who  publicly  thanked  certain  officers  of 
the  latter  party  for  their  loyalty,  the  next  important 
event  was  the  departure  of  M,  Venezelos  from  Athens 
on  September  24  and  the  formation  by  him  of  an 
Independent  Cabinet  at  Salonica  about  a  fortnight 
later.  This  development  constituted  a  sort  of  divid- 
ing of  ways,  for  whilst  the  Allies  did  not  openly  embrace 
the  policy  of  M.  Venezelos,  it  at  once  became  evident 
that  their  only  alternative  was  either  to  repudiate 
the  step  taken  by  their  protege,  which  was  obviously 
impossible  under  the  circumstances,  or  to  work  for 
the  augmentation  of  his  power  and  for  the  increase  of 
the  size  of  the  sphere  of  country  which  acknowledged 
him. 

From  October  onwards  events  marched  apace. 
In  that  month  Admiral  de  Fournet  demanded  the 
cession  of  the  whole  of  the  Greek  fleet  except  three 
vessels  —  a  demand  which  was  agreed  to  by  the 
Lambros  Ministry.  The  demobilisation  of  the  Aj-my, 
however,  proceeded  very  slowly,  and  in  November, 
the  French  Commander-in-Chief  insisted  upon  the 
immediate  surrender  of  ten  Greek  mountain  batteries 
and  the  subsequent  handing  over  of  the  remaining 
war  material.  This  peremptory  request  was  not  com- 
plied with,  and  on  December  1,  Allied  troops  were 
landed  at  the  Piraeus.  The  exact  nature  of  the  assur- 
ances given  by  the  King  as  to  the  likelihood  of  the 
occurrence  of  disturbances  resulting  from  this  landing 
is  uncertain,  but  the  fact  remains,  as  a  result  of  some 
kind  of  undertaking  in  this  direction,  that  the  Allied 
contingents  disembarked  were  so  inadequate  in  size  that 


GREECE  AND   THE  WAR  147 

it  became  necessary  ignominioiisly  to  withdraw  them, 
on  the  understanding  that  six  batteries  instead  of  ten 
would  be  surrendered.  The  AHied  Legations  having 
been  insulted  and  the  Royahst  party  having  maltreated, 
imprisoned,  and  murdered  a  large  number  of  Veneze- 
lists,  a  renewed  blockade  was  declared,  —  a  blockade 
which  was  accompanied  by  a  demand  for  reparation 
for  the  events  of  December  1  and  2,  and  for  the  trans- 
ference of  a  large  proportion  of  the  Greek  army  to  the 
Peloponnesus. 

Although  the  King  subsequently  agreed  to  the  trans- 
fer of  his  forces  to  the  Peloponnesus,  and  although  a 
formal  apology  was  made  for  the  events  of  December, 
it  was  obvious  that  after  the  occurrence  of  these  events, 
it  was  impossible  for  the  Allies  to  look  with  favour  upon 
the  continuance  of  a  regime  which  was  responsible  for 
endangering  their  whole  position  in  the  Balkans.  The 
removal  of  the  Hellenic  forces  proceeded  unsatisfac- 
torily, the  reign  of  terror  instituted  against  Venezelists 
was  prolonged,  and  for  a  time  the  Allies  temporised 
in  the  hope  of  being  able  to  accomplish  their  objects 
without  finally  resorting  to  drastic  measures.  But 
on  June  7,  1917,  when  the  question  of  the  distribution 
of  the  Thessalian  harvest  had  become  a  matter  of  the 
utmost  urgency,  and  when  it  was  necessarj^  to  prevent 
its  being  handed  over  in  its  entirety  to  the  anti-Veneze- 
list  section  of  the  country,  M.  Jonnart  reached  Athens 
as  the  High  Commissioner  of  the  Protecting  Powers. 
Immediately  after  his  arrival,  he  claimed  from  M. 
Zaimis,  who  was  once  again  Prime  Minister,  more 
complete  guarantees  for  the  safety  of  the  Allied  army 
in  Macedonia,  the  restoration  of  the  unity  of  the 
kingdom,  and  the  working  of  the  constitution  in  its 


148  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE  WAR 

true  spirit.  Five  days  later,  when  Allied  troops  had 
been  landed  at  the  Piraeus,  and  when  various  places 
in  Thessaly  had  been  occupied,  the  King,  as  a  result 
of  the  demand  of  the  High  Commissioner,  abdicated, 
designating  as  his  successor  his  second  son,  Prince 
Alexander  —  a  young  man  of  twenty -four  years  of  age, 
who  had  previously  played  no  political  role  in  the 
affairs  of  his  country. 

The  policy  adopted  by  the  Allies  at  Athens  was 
pursued  under  such  difficulties  and  in  such  circum- 
stances that  unless  the  whole  situation  be  viewed  in 
its  broader  and  proper  light,  the  way  may  be  left 
open  for  some  critics  to  suggest  that  their  attitude 
towards  the  King  was  so  short-sighted  that  they  played 
directly  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  and  for  others 
to  say  that  Greece  was  bullied  and  that  in  the  end  the 
abdication  of  her  ruler  was  brought  about  for  causes 
which  were  not  reasonable. 

The  answer  to  such  suggestions  is  that  as  the  wish 
of  the  great  majority  of  Greeks  was  to  avoid  war  on 
either  side,  the  fact  that  England,  France,  and  Russia 
naturally  supported  M.  Venezelos,  who  advocated  the 
endorsement  of  the  Graeco-Serbian  Treaty,  which 
meant  war,  they  could  not  help  strengthening  the 
hands  of  his  royal  and  other  opponents  who  stood  for 
peace.  Moreover  whilst  they  (the  Allies)  may  have 
taken  the  necessary  measures  for  their  self-preserva- 
tion in  the  wrong  way  and  too  late,  there  can  rest 
in  the  mind  of  the  real  student  no  doubt  that  as  a 
result  of  their  special  duties  and  rights  of  protection, 
and  as  a  consequence  of  the  Graeco-Serbian  Treaty, 
they  were  entitled  to  undertake  the  measures  which 
they    actually    employed.     Thus    the    position    was 


GREECE  AND  THE   WAR  149 

entirely  unlike  that  of  Belgium,  for  whilst  Germany 
had  actually  guaranteed  the  neutrality  of  that  country, 
and  whilst  she  was  therefore  under  a  direct  obligation 
not  to  violate  that  neutrality,  the  Protecting  Powers 
of  Greece,  who  happened  to  be  three  of  the  Allies,  had 
a  well-defined  right  to  intervene,  either  to  defend  that 
country  against  her  foreign  foes  or  to  protect  her  people 
from  a  regime  against  which  they  (the  Protecting  Pow- 
ers) were  and  are  the  guarantors. 

The  developments  which  occurred  at  Athens  during 
the  period  immediately  preceding  the  resignation  of 
the  King  were  neither  the  only  nor  I  think  the  prin- 
cipal cause  justifying  the  Allies  in  bringing  about 
the  abdication  of  His  Majesty.  Their  attitude  was 
legitimatised  by  events  which  had  taken  place  much 
earlier  in  the  War  —  events  which  certainly  prove 
that  the  King  had  not  governed  in  accordance  with  the 
spirit  and  letter  of  the  constitution  by  which  he  was 
bound.  For  example,  even  if  we  ignore  the  reasons 
for  which  M.  Venezelos  was  compelled,  in  March,  1915, 
to  leave  office  when  he  had  nearly  one  hundred  and 
fifty  supporters  out  of  a  total  of  one  hundred  and 
eighty-four  deputies  —  reasons  which,  to  say  the  least 
of  it,  must  be  in  opposition  to  the  spirit  of  the  Greek 
constitution  —  we  find  that  various  events  took  place 
subsequently  which  were  contrary  to  the  actual  letter 
of  that  document.  The  elections  of  both  June  and 
December,  1915,  were  held  during  a  mobilisation,  and 
many  men  serving  with  the  colours  were  allowed  to 
vote,  which  is  illegal.  Moreover,  the  old  Chamber, 
having  been  dissolved  on  May  1,  1915,  according  to 
the  constitution,  the  new  Parliament  should  have  met 
within  three  months  and  not  on  August   16,   which 


150  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE   WAR 

was  actually  the  case.  Once  more,  as  M.  Venezelos 
secured  a  vote  of  confidence  at  the  time  of  the  AlHed 
disembarkation  at  Salonica,  it  is  impossible  to  justify 
the  attitude  of  the  King  in  refusing  to  agree  to  the 
policy  advocated  by  his  then  Prime  Minister  or  to  see 
by  what  right  His  Majesty  dissolved  the  Chamber  on 
November  11  and  therefore  on  a  second  occasion  in 
the  same  year.  There  seems  no  reason  to  doubt,  too, 
that  the  secrecy  of  letters,  which  is  guaranteed  by 
the  constitution,  did  not  remain  inviolable  during 
the  regime  of  King  Constantine.  These  are  some  of 
the  facts,  which  even  if  they  were  more  or  less  con- 
doned at  the  time,  subsequently  entitled  the  Allies  to 
make  the  demands  and  to  take  the  measures  neces- 
sary for  the  establishment  and  maintenance  of  their 
national  safety  —  demands  which,  though  more  or 
less  backed  up  by  force  of  arms,  were  none  the  less 
demands  really  made  in  support  of  M.  Venezelos, 
who,  constitutionally  speaking,  should  have  been 
and  had  been  the  constitutional  Premier  ever  since 
the  mandate  received  from  the  country  in  June, 
1915. 

The  fourth  stage  in  the  war  attitude  of  Greece 
begins  from  the  abdication  of  the  King  on  June  12, 
1917,  and  from  the  return  to  power  of  M.  Venezelos, 
who  succeeded  M.  Zaimis  and  arrived  in  Athens  towards 
the  end  of  that  month.  Even  now  it  is  too  early  to 
summarise  or  to  forecast  what  will  be  the  effects  of 
the  changes  from  the  local  Greek  or  from  the  larger 
European  standpoints.  Internally  speaking,  the  dis- 
appearance of  the  King  and  the  reappointment  of  the 
one  great  statesman  of  modern  Greece  as  her  Prime 
Minister   have   already   meant   at   least   the   nominal 


GREECE  AND  THE   WAR  151 

reunion  of  that  country  under  one  government,  the 
consequent  avoidance  or  at  any  rate  the  postponement 
of  an  outbreak  of  civil  war,  and  the  creation  of  a  new 
atmosphere  in  the  country.  Reorganisation  of  the 
Government  departments  and  of  the  army  are  in 
progress,  and  endeavours  are  being  made  to  obliterate 
the  effect  of  the  chaos  which  had  existed  for  nearly 
two  years.  But  although  M.  Venezelos  has  recalled 
the  last  legally  elected  Chamber,  in  which  he  was 
returned  to  power  in  June,  1915,  and  although  startling 
disclosures  have  been  made,  it  is  impossible  to  ignore 
the  difficulties  which  beset  a  premier  who  is  undoubtedly 
much  less  popular  with  the  people  than  he  was  prior 
to  his  resignation  early  in  1915. 

From  an  external  or  international  point  of  view  the 
above-mentioned  events  have  carried  with  them  the 
breaking  off  of  the  relations  between  the  Central 
Powers  and  Greece  and  a  consequent  demonstration 
by  the  Hellenic  Government  of  open  friendship  for 
the  Allies.  That  friendship  is  now  being  proved  by  the 
active  support  of  Greek  contingents  on  the  Salonica 
front.  These  results  are  so  far  satisfactory  in  that 
the  Allies  —  the  Protecting  Powers  —  have  been  the 
means  of  re-establishing  constitutionalism  in  Greece, 
whilst  at  the  same  time  they  have  created  a  situation 
which  has  removed  some  of  the  difficulties  and  compli- 
cations of  their  position  in  the  Balkans.  In  short,  the 
future  depends  not  so  much  upon  the  fighting  value  or 
importance  of  the  Greek  army,  as  upon  the  statesman- 
ship, the  moderation,  and  the  good  will  of  a  man  who 
has  already  saved  his  country  in  more  than  one  time  of 
crisis,  and  upon  the  capacity  and  ability  of  the  Allies 
to  help  and  to  allow  this  man  to  work  out  the  destiny 


152  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE  WAR 

of  his  country  in  such  a  way  as  to  regain  his  prestige 
at  home  and  to  further  the  interests  of  his  own  people 
and  also  those  of  a  group  of  countries  who  are  fighting 
for  the  protection  of  small  nationalities,  and  for  the 
overthrow  of  militarism. 


VII 

ALBANIA  AND  THE  ALBANIANS 

Although  her  people  have  obviously  not  been  able 
to  play  any  direct  part  in  the  War,  the  geographical 
and  political  importance  of  Albania  is  such  that  the 
history  of  and  conditions  prevailing  in  that  country 
are  worthy  of  serious  consideration  to-day.  Geo- 
graphically this  importance  is  due  to  the  fact  that  Al- 
bania occupies  a  position  which  makes  it  the  natural 
means  of  entry  into  and  exit  from  a  large  part  of  the 
Western  Balkans.  It  is  for  these  reasons  that  the 
northern  area  of  the  country,  together  with  the  ports 
of  San  Giovanni  di  Medua  and  Durazzo,  are  coveted 
by  the  Serbs,  who  desire,  by  securing  possession  of 
them,  to  obtain  free  access  to  the  sea.  Equally  well, 
situated  as  it  is  on  the  Lower  Adriatic,  Albania  practi- 
cally commands  the  Straits  of  Otranto,  and  the  govern- 
ment in  control  there  can  therefore  influence  the  whole 
position  in  the  Adriatic  Sea  to  which  they  lead.  It  is 
this  which  makes  Italy  particularly  interested  in  the 
future  of  Europe's  latest  principality  and  especially  in 
that  of  its  southern  port  Avlona,  for  that  Power  cannot 
afford  to  be  menaced  by  the  establishment  there  of  a 
regime  hostile  to  her  natural  development,  her  safety, 
and  her  very  existence. 


154  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE   WAR 

Closely  bound  up  with  these  conditions  are  the  facts 
that,  for  years,  Austria  has  been  working  untiringly  to 
bring  about  the  augmentation  of  her  influence  in  Al- 
bania, and  that  Greece  has  been  striving  to  denational- 
ise the  people  domiciled  across  her  frontier.  The  first 
country,  actuated  by  the  intense  rivalry  existing  be- 
tween her  and  Italy  upon  all  questions  connected  with 
the  Western  Balkans  and  the  Adriatic,  has  acted  as 
the  instrument  of  Germany  and  with  the  object  of 
preparing  the  way  for  the  realisation  of  the  Mittel- 
Europa  scheme.  The  Hellenic  Government,  on  the 
other  hand,  whilst  nominally  animated  by  religious 
objects,  has  really  directed  its  policy  for  nationalistic 
motives.  The  result  is  therefore  that  the  Albanian 
question,  which  was  nominally  settled  by  the  creation 
of  an  autonomous  principality  during  the  Balkan  Wars, 
still  remains  one  of  the  most  important  problems  for 
solution  at  the  end  of  the  present  conflagration.  It  is 
for  this  reason,  and  particularly  because  the  Allies 
and  the  United  States  of  America  are  pledged  to  the 
principle  of  "Government  with  the  consent  of  the 
Governed"  or  of  "nationality",  that  we  are  bound 
to  consider  how  this  principle  applies  to  Albania,  whose 
people  are  entitled  to  expect  the  same  consideration  of 
their  claims  as  are  those  belonging  to  any  other  smaller 
nationality. 

Prior  to  the  Balkan  Wars,  and  to  the  loss  of  terri- 
tory which  was  then  suffered  by  Turkey,  it  was  difficult 
accurately  to  describe  what  was  meant  by  the  geo- 
graphical term  "Albania."  Whilst  an  official  of  the 
Turkish  Government  always  refused  to  acknowledge 
the  existence  of  a  district  known  by  the  name,  an 
Albanian,  a  Greek,  a  Bulgarian,  and  a  Serbian  would 


ALBANIA  AND  THE  ALBANIANS  155 

each  define  the  boundaries  of  Albania  in  accordance 
with  his  own  national  aspirations.  Lord  Fitzmaurice 
(then  Lord  Edmond  Fitzmaurice)  in  a  despatch  ad- 
dressed to  Earl  Granville  in  the  year  1880  described  the 
district  covered  by  the  geographical  expression  Albania 
as  that  territory  "which  falls  mainly  within  the  two 
vilayets  of  Scutari  and  Janina,  but  extends  also  in  an 
easterly  direction  beyond  the  watershed  of  the  moun- 
tains dividing  the  streams  which  fall  into  the  Adriatic 
from  those  which  fall  into  the  Aegean  Sea,  and  includes 
portions  of  the  vilayets  of  Monastir  and  of  Kossovo." 
The  Principality  of  Albania,  if  principality  it  can 
still  be  called,  contains  more  or  less  the  area  which  is 
thus  indicated.  Situated  as  it  is  on  the  eastern  side 
of  the  Adriatic  and  wedged  in  between  Montenegro, 
Serbia,  Greece,  and  the  sea,  this  unhappy  country  is 
the  child  not  of  love  but  of  hatred,  for  its  creation  was 
brought  about  by  the  rivalry  which  existed  between 
the  Great  Powers,  and  particularly  between  Austria 
and  Italy,  rather  than  as  a  result  of  any  feelings  of 
friendship  for  the  Albanians.  Whilst  the  independence 
of  the  country  was  decided  upon  by  the  London  Am- 
bassadorial Conference  in  December,  1912,  the  frontiers 
have  never  been  definitely  fixed,  or,  more  correctly, 
they  have  never  .been  observed  by  the  neighbouring 
countries,  and  especially  Greece.  At  the  present 
time,  therefore,  it  is  impossible  to  say  whether,  in  dis- 
cussing Albania,  we  should  include  or  exclude  the  large 
southern  areas  which  are  in  dispute  with  Greece  and 
parts  of  which  have  been  in  Italian  hands  since  an 
earlier  period  of  the  War.  If  we  include  these  in  Al- 
bania and  consider  that  country  as  it  was  established 
by  the  Great  Powers,  then  it  has  an  area  of  about 


156  THE   CRADLE,  OF  THE   WAR 

11,000  square  miles  and  a  population  of  approximately 
800,000  souls.  Measured  from  north  to  south  it  has 
a  length  of  about  one  hundred  and  eighty  miles,  and 
from  west  to  east  an  approximate  width,  at  its 
broadest  part,  of  only  eighty-five  miles. 

The  greater  part  of  the  country  is  mountainous. 
In  the  neighbourhood  of  Scutari,  in  areas  of  Central 
Albania,  and  in  the  south,  there  are,  however,  fertile 
plains  watered  by  various  rivers  which  wend  their  way 
to  the  Adriatic.  The  people  devote  themselves  al- 
most entirely  to  agriculture,  which  is  carried  on  with 
primitive  implements,  such  as  wooden  ploughs,  and 
there  are  no  home  manufactures.  Goat  and  sheep 
skins,  which  are  exported,  are  dried  by  pegging  them 
down  upon  the  ground  with  wooden  pegs.  One  of 
the  most  important  of  the  exports  from  the  country  is 
the  bitumen  which  is  found  at  Selenitza  near  Avlona. 
The  mine  is  worked  by  a  French  company  or  syndi- 
cate, and  the  bitumen,  which  is  of  one  of  the  best 
qualities  known,  is  transported  from  the  pit's  mouth 
to  the  port  on  donkeys  and  pack  animals,  who  wend 
their  way  across  the  hills  for  a  distance  of  some  twelve 
miles. 

Towns  properly  so  called  are  few  and  far  between, 
for  Scutari,  with  a  population  of  about  thirty-two 
thousand  souls,  and  the  capital  of  the  north,  is  the  only 
city  which  boasts  of  more  than  fifteen  thousand  inhabit- 
ants. Durazzo,  the  so-called  capital  of  the  country, 
and  the  former  seat  of  the  Prince's  Government,  is 
built  upon  the  site  of  the  ancient  Dyrrachion.  It 
has  a  population  of  but  five  thousand.  The  city, 
which  is  located  on  the  northern  shore  of  a  commodious 
bay,  where  it  is  almost  always  safe  for  ships  to  lie,  is 


5    •« 
o    §• 


O    E 

^    i 


ALBANIA   AND   THE   ALBANIANS  157 

practically  surrounded  by  rocks  and  by  the  sea,  except 
upon  the  side  where  the  promontory  upon  which  it  is 
built  is  joined  to  the  mainland.  Avlona,  now  occupied 
by  the  Italians,  is  possessed  of  a  fine  bay.  Its  popula- 
tion is  about  six  thousand  souls.  Elbasan  (El  Bassan), 
situated  as  it  is  in  the  heart  of  the  country  and  in  the 
Scumbi  Valley,  is  the  proper  capital  of  the  country, 
not  only  on  account  of  its  central  position,  but  also 
because  its  inhabitants  are  known  to  be  those  who 
possess  the  most  moderate  political  ideas,  and  therefore 
those  who  voice  what  should  be  the  general  policy  of 
a  united  Albania. 

From  a  local  as  well  as  from  a  national  point  of 
view,  one  of  the  most  important  questions  connected 
with  Albania  to-day  is  that  which  concerns  the 
nationality  of  its  inhabitants.  In  order  to  understand 
this  aright  it  is  necessary  to  remember  that  in  Turkish 
times  these  people,  unlike  the  other  alien  races  which 
went  to  make  up  the  European  provinces  of  the  Otto- 
man Empire,  were  not  formed  into  a  "millet"  or  a 
religious  "community."  In  other  words,  whilst  the 
nationality  of  the  Bulgarians  and  the  Greeks  was  recog- 
nised, as  the  result  of  the  existence  of  the  Bulgarian 
and  Greek  Churches,  the  Albanians  had  no  such 
binding  link,  and  they  were  classed  in  the  making  of 
a  census  entirely  according  to  their  religion.  Thus,  if 
an  Albanian  belonged  to  the  Orthodox  Church  he  was 
called  a  Greek  ;  if  he  were  a  Moslem,  he  was  put  down 
as  a  Turk.  This  meant  not  only  that  the  gallant  Shky- 
pctars,  as  the  Albanians  call  themselves,  were  never 
supported  by  intrigue  adroitlj^  hatched  in  various 
capitals,  but  that  their  territory  has  been  and  is  sub- 
ject to  the  aspirations  of  their  neighbours.     This  is  a 


158  THE  CRADLE  OF  THE   WAR 

question  of  supreme  importance,  for  whilst  up  to  a 
point  Abdul  Hamid  encouraged  the  Greeks,  the  Bul- 
garians, and  the  Serbians  of  Turkey  in  their  national- 
istic and  religious  ideas,  with  the  express  purpose  of 
causing  strife  between  these  elements  of  the  popula- 
tion, the  Turks  —  Old  and  New  —  never  left  a  stone 
unturned  to  subdue  the  Albanians,  whose  sentiments 
of  nationalism  and  of  patriotism  are  probably  older, 
stronger,  and  deeper  than  those  of  any  of  the  Balkan 
race. 

The  Albanians  are  generally  and  probably  accu- 
rately identified  by  impartial  observers  as  the  de- 
scendants of  the  ancient  Illyrians,  who  were  simply  the 
inhabitants  of  Illyria,  and  who  in  their  turn  were  the 
offspring  of  the  Pelasgeans  —  the  first  people  to  come 
to  Europe.  It  was  therefore  to  their  forefathers  that 
the  Albanians  allege  St.  Paul  referred,  when  he  said 
"Round  about  into  Illyricum  I  have  fully  preached 
the  gospel  of  Christ."  But  little  is  known  about  these 
Illyrians  except  that  they  were  slow  to  accept  the 
civilisation  of  the  Greeks  and  Romans,  and  that  sub- 
sequently they  were  driven  westwards  towards  the 
shores  of  the  Adriatic  by  the  advancing  hordes  of 
Slavs.  From  the  time  of  the  Turkish  Conquest, 
which  may  be  said  finally  to  have  taken  place  about 
the  year  1478  and  soon  after  the  death  of  the  famous 
Albanian  hero  —  Scanderbeg  —  until  the  Balkan  Wars, 
Albania  formed  part  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  and  it 
was  nominally  ruled  from  Constantinople.  But  such 
were  the  strength  and  the  feelings  of  nationalism  of 
the  people,  that  throughout  this  period  they  really 
enjoyed  a  considerable  amount  of  independence,  being 
governed  largely  by  unwritten  laws  administered  by 


ALBANIA  AND   THE   ALBANIANS  159 

the  local  chieftains.  In  short,  for  centuries  the  Al- 
banians occupied  in  Europe  towards  the  Government 
the  same  kind  of  position  as  that  held  in  Asia  Minor 
by  the  Kurds.  Both  races  are  religiously  unorthodox  ; 
both  races  have  been  utilised  by  the  Turks  to  support 
them  in  times  of  need,  and  prior  to  the  re-establishment 
of  the  Ottoman  Constitution  in  1908,  the  attitudes  of 
both  races  towards  European  interference  in  the  Turk- 
ish Empire  were  made  use  of  by  the  Central  Govern- 
ment as  a  threat  to  the  Great  Powers  as  each  new  pro- 
gramme for  reform  was  suggested  at  Constantinople. 

The  Shkypetars  are  today  a  wild,  warlike,  lawless 
people,  but  nevertheless  they  have  their  own  —  a  very 
strict  —  code  of  honour,  and  they  are  faithful  even 
unto  death.  An  Arnaut  once  engaged  is  not  only  the 
most  trusty  servant  and  loyal  follower  in  the  Near 
East,  but  he  is  the  most  useful  protector  of  his  em- 
ployer in  whatever  difficulty  may  arise.  Indeed,  the 
honour  of  the  people  is  such  that  if  once  they  have  en- 
tertained you  in  their  houses,  or  if  once  they  have  given 
you  a  promise,  you  may  be  absolutely  sure  that  not  a 
sacrifice  will  be  too  great  for  them  to  make  in  order 
that  their  promise  may  be  fulfilled.  In  this  con- 
nection I  well  remember  that  on  one  occasion,  when 
I  was  travelling  in  Albania,  it  was  necessary  to  ac- 
complish an  extremely  long  journey  in  the  course  of 
one  day.  My  guides  and  horsemen  protested  against 
my  wish  to  do  what  they  said  was  almost  impossible. 
The  matter  was,  however,  finally  settled,  and  we 
started  out  on  the  morrow.  These  men  walked  hour 
after  hour  over  the  roughest  of  country^  and  we  even- 
tually accomplished  my  object  in  spite  of  almost  in- 
surmountable difficulties.     But  that  object  was  only 


160  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE   WAR 

realised  because  they  went  far  beyond  their  legal  bai'- 
gain,  even  carrying  me  across  rivers  in  the  dark  and 
protecting  me  against  wild  dogs,  in  order  that  we  should 
reach  the  house  of  friends  by  night.  Compensation 
they  got,  but  even  compensation  is  not  always  suf- 
ficient recompense  for  a  promise  which  is  more  than 
honourably  carried  out. 

The  Albanians  are  divided  into  two  main  groups  — 
the  Ghegs  and  the  Tosks.  The  River  Scumbi,  which 
enters  the  Adriatic  halfway  between  the  towns  of 
Durazzo  and  Avlona,  and  its  picturesque  valley,  may 
be  said  to  separate  the  country  inhabited  by  the 
former  from  that  populated  by  the  latter.  The 
Ghegs,  or  Northern  Albanians,  are,  in  their  turn,  made 
up  of  a  number  of  warlike  tribes,  many  of  whom  still 
live  a  feudal  life.  The  Tosks,  or  Southern  Albanians, 
are  more  civilised  and  perhaps  less  warlike  than  their 
northern  brothers.  Their  tribal  system  is  much  less 
well  defined,  but  they  owe  their  allegiance  to  local 
beys  or  chiefs,  to  whom  they  turn  for  guidance  in  all 
matters  of  importance. 

Whilst  foreign  propaganda  has  done  a  good  deal  to 
aggravate  the  religious  feelings  of  the  people,  the 
Albanians  are  not  for  the  most  part  fanatical  from  an 
actual  religious  standpoint.  At  the  present  time  about 
two  thirds  of  the  Albanian  population  is  Moslem. 
Of  the  remaining  one  third,  the  Christians  of  the  north 
are  believers  in  Roman  Catholicism,  whilst  those  of 
the  south  belong  to  the  Orthodox  Church.  This  re- 
ligious division  is  due  to  several  historical  facts. 
Originally  the  people  were  all  Christians,  many  of 
them  having  been  converted  as  early  as  the  first 
century.     In  earlier  times  the  Albanians  belonged  to 


ALBANIA  AND  THE   ALBANIANS  161 

the  Orthodox  faith,  but  about  the  middle  of  tlie  tliir- 
teenth  century  many  of  the  CathoHc  Ghegs  of  the 
north  abandoned  the  Eastern  for  the  Western  Church, 
and  at  the  time  of  Scanderbeg  there  was  a  further 
secession.  After  the  arrival  of  the  Turks,  when  the 
people  were  Christian  in  little  but  name,  large  num- 
bers embraced  Islam,  rather  from  secular  than  from 
spiritual  reasons,  that  is  to  say,  because  the  position 
of  a  Moslem  was  in  many  ways  a  more  privileged  one 
than  that  of  a  Christian.  There  was  a  further  seces- 
sion in  the  seventeenth  century  for  similar  causes. 
But  whilst  there  is  strife  between  the  different 
religious  elements,  owing  generally  to  misunderstand- 
ings, the  people  are  in  principle  and  at  bottom  Al- 
banians before  they  are  either  Moslems  or  Christians. 
Consequently,  when  disputes  take  place,  they  occur 
rather  as  a  result  of  some  political  or  local  squabble 
than  because  of  any  innate  religious  feeling.  There 
are  districts  where  the  inhabitants  are  entirely  Chris- 
tian, and  there  are  others  where  the  population  is  ex- 
clusively Moslem.  But  in  the  greater  part  of  the 
country  it  is  more  or  less  mixed.  In  the  south  there 
is  less  religious  strife  than  in  the  north.  This  has 
become  particularly  the  case  during  the  recent  years, 
for  as  the  Nationalistic  Movement  has  increased,  the 
Orthodox  Albanians  have  grown  to  understand  that 
their  religion  has  been  exploited  by  the  Greek  Church 
for  political  purposes,  and  therefore,  the  power  of  that 
Church  is  greatly  decreasing,  and  the  people  are  slowly 
getting  to  understand  that  they  need  not  fear  the 
attitude  of  their  Moslem  fellow  countrymen. 

The  Albanians  have  their  own  language.     It  is  lield 
by  most  authorities  to  be  of  Aryan  origin,  and  it  prob- 


162  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE   WAR 

ably  formed  the  original  speech  of  the  people  of  large 
parts,  if  not  the  whole,  of  the  Balkan  Peninsula.  Al- 
though the  groundwork  and  grammar  of  the  language 
are  supposed  to  be  Indo-European,  a  large  number  of 
words  have  been  taken  from  the  Turkish,  Latin,  Greek, 
Slav,  and  Italian  tongues,  which  means  that  there 
are  distinct  dialects  in  different  parts  of  the  country. 
The  people  of  the  various  regions  have  borrowed  words 
from  the  language  of  the  country  to  which  their  homes 
are  nearest.  Thus  the  ignorant  Tosk  of  the  south 
makes  use  of  many  more  Greek  words  than  a  Gheg 
of  the  north,  whom  he  would  only  understand  with 
a  certain  difficulty.  The  fact,  too,  that  Albanian  was 
only  reduced  to  writing  in  comparatively  modern 
times,  and  that  no  general  form  of  alphabet  was  de- 
cided upon  until  after  the  advent  of  the  Turkish  Con- 
stitution, is  largely  responsible  for  the  differences  of 
the  dialect  which  exist  to-day. 

Prior  to  the  seventeenth  century  there  is  no  trace 
of  the  Albanians  reading  or  writing  their  own  language, 
and  the  large  majority  of  the  people  cannot  read  or 
write  to-day.  The  earliest  books  which  contained 
printed  examples  of  Albanian  were  published  about 
three  hundred  years  ago.  These  volumes  consisted  of 
religious  works,  dictionaries,  and  textbooks.  Much 
later  the  Roman  Catholic  clergy  furthered  the  language 
movement  by  providing  the  people  with  books,  many 
of  which  were  published  in  Scutari  by  the  Jesuits, 
who  began  their  work  in  Albania  about  the  middle  of 
the  nineteenth  century.  But  it  is  largely  due  to  the 
religious  work  undertaken  by  the  British  and  Foreign 
Bible  Society  that  the  people  have  been  provided  with 
literature  printed  in  Albanian.    As  early  as  1824  the 


ALBANIA   AND   THE  ALBANIANS  163 

gospel  of  St.  Matthew  was  printed  in  Tosk-Albanian 
at  Corfu  by  the  Ionian  Bible  Society  —  a  Society 
promoted  and  subsidised  by  the  British  and  Foreign 
Bible  Society.  Three  years  later  the  whole  of  the  New 
Testament  was  published  under  the  same  auspices  in 
the  same  language,  but  on  this  occasion  the  modified 
Greek  alphabet,  used  in  the  printing,  was  included  in 
order  to  enable  the  illiterate  people  to  read  its  contents. 
Between  the  years  1860  and  1870  a  large  portion  of  the 
Bible  was  translated  by  an  Albanian,  and  as  a  result, 
a  volume  containing  the  four  Gospels,  the  Book  of 
The  Acts,  and  an  alphabet  was  published  for  the  Ghegs 
in  Latin  characters,  with  certain  minor  alterations, 
in  1866.  This  publication  was  followed  by  others 
printed  in  the  Greek  characters  for  the  people  of  the 
south  and  in  the  Latin  for  those  of  the  north  and  pub- 
lished in  Constantinople  between  the  years  1868  and 
1879. 

Ten  years  later,  under  the  direction  of  Gerasim 
Kyrias,  a  patriotic  Albanian  who  had  studied  in  the 
American  School  at  Samakov,  the  Book  of  Genesis 
and  the  Gospel  of  St.  Matthew  were  printed  in  the 
new  national  alphabet  (i.e.  Latin  alphabet  with  modi- 
fications), which  had  been  adopted  by  an  Albanian 
Committee  which  met  to  discuss  the  development  of 
literature  in  1879.  So  strong,  however,  was  the  Turkish 
opposition  to  the  introduction  of  these  characters  that 
various  publications  subsequently  made  were  not  al- 
lowed to  be  printed  in  them.  It  was  only,  therefore, 
after  the  re-establishment  of  the  Constitution  in  1908 
that  the  question  of  the  method  of  writing  the  language 
was  again  taken  up  seriously,  and  that  the  new  national 
characters  (namely,  Latin  characters  with  one  or  two 


164  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE   WAR 

modifications)  were  finally  adopted.  Their  employ- 
ment was  as  fervently  opposed  by  the  Young  Turks 
as  it  had  been  by  their  predecessors. 

The  present  political  conditions  prevailing  in  Al- 
bania are  largely  the  outcome  of  what  has  taken  place 
there  during  the  last  few  years.  Prior  to  the  advent 
to  power  of  the  Young  Turks,  every  endeavour  was 
made  to  hinder  the  Nationalistic  Movement.  At  the 
same  time,  during  the  reign  of  Abdul  Hamid,  the 
Albanians  were  treated  with  the  utmost  deference, 
and  His  Majesty  did  everything  in  his  power  to  make 
certain  of  their  support  in  time  of  need.  The  Albanian 
Imperial  Guard,  recruited  from  the  south,  was  always 
well  and  regularly  paid,  and  these  soldiers  were  allowed 
to  return  to  their  villages  as  soon  as  their  time  had 
expired,  instead  of  being  retained  with  the  colours  for 
months  or  years  in  excess  of  their  proper  period  of 
service.  During  the  days  of  the  Old  Regime,  too,  the 
Albanians,  especially  the  tribes  of  the  north,  were 
permitted  to  manage  their  own  internal  affairs,  prac- 
tically without  the  interference  of  the  Constantinople 
Government.  It  was  only  when  the  northeastern 
Ghegs  —  always  actuated  by  feelings  of  antagonism 
towards  their  Slav  brothers  —  seemed  inclined  to 
jeopardise  the  policy  of  their  spiritual  and  temporal 
master  at  Constantinople  that  troops  were  despatched 
to  Albania  to  quiet  the  country,  either  by  bombarding 
the  malefactors  with  shell,  or  by  bribing  their  leaders 
with  decorations  or  with  money. 

After  the  re-establishment  of  the  Ottoman  Constitu- 
tion the  Young  Turks,  instead  of  recognising  that  the 
Albanians  could  be  of  valuable  support  to  them,  im- 
mediately antagonised  them  by  endeavouring  to  abro- 


ALBANIA  AND  THE  ALBANIANS  105 

gate  many  of  the  privileges  which  they  had  previously 
enjoyed.  In  the  north  these  endeavours  took  I  lie 
form  of  striving  to  disarm  the  people,  of  attempting 
to  do  away  with  the  tribal  and  feudal  system  of  gov- 
ernment by  which  the  people  had  formerly  been  ruled, 
and  of  trying  to  introduce  compulsory  military  service 
which  had  previously  never  been  enforced.  Through- 
out the  country,  too,  and  particularly  in  the  south, 
another  grievance  common  to  the  Moslem  and  Chris- 
tian Albanians  was  the  attitude  of  the  Sublime  Porte 
towards  the  educational  question.  Not  only  did  the 
Government  fail  to  establish  Albanian  schools,  but  it 
actually  opposed  their  opening  and  even  insisted  upon 
the  closing  of  several  such  establishments  run  by  the 
Albanians  themselves.  The  result  of  this  policy  was 
that  from  the  summer  of  1909  right  up  to  the  time  of 
the  outbreak  of  the  Balkan  Wars,  large  areas  of  the 
country  were  in  an  almost  continuous  state  of  insur- 
rection —  a  state  of  insurrection  which  in  the  end  was 
indirectly  if  not  directly  responsible  for  hastening  the 
downfall  of  Turkey  as  a  European  Power. 

The  Albanians  took  no  active  part  in  the  Balkan 
Wars,  and  this  because  they  hated  both  the  Balkan 
Allies  and  the  Turks  with  an  equal  hatred.  On  the 
one  side  they  knew  that  the  Serbians,  Montenegrins, 
Greeks,  and  to  a  lesser  degree  the  Bulgarians,  all 
coveted  areas  of  territory  which  were  dear  to  them. 
On  the  other  hand  they  recognised  that  an  Ottoman 
victory  would  result  in  further  attempts  to  denational- 
ise and  to  subjugate  them.  The  consequence  was,  that 
as  the  Turkish  hold  over  Albania  existed  only  in  name, 
practically  the  whole  country  was  overrun  by  the 
Serbians,    Montenegrins,    and    Greeks,    many    of    the 


166  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE  WAR 

farms  and  houses  being  burned,  and  large  portions  of 
the  population  being  put  to  flight.  The  Balkan  Wars 
were,  however,  an  epoch-making  period  for  the  people, 
because  it  was  during  the  first  campaign  and  at  the 
end  of  November,  1912,  that  Ismail  Kemal  Bey  —  a 
former  member  of  the  Ottoman  Chamber  and  a  lead- 
ing Albanian  —  proclaimed  an  independent  Govern- 
ment at  Avlona  and  that,  some  three  weeks  later,  the 
London  Ambassadorial  Conference  decided  to  estab- 
lish an  autonomous  Albanian  State.  That  decision, 
which  was  followed  by  prolonged  negotiations  between 
the  Great  Powers  as  to  the  status  of  and  to  the  position 
of  the  frontiers  of  the  new  principality,  was  finally 
carried  out  in  a  manner  which  made  the  adopted 
boundaries  of  the  country  a  sort  of  compromise  between 
those  suggested  by  the  Balkan  Allies,  who  worked  for 
a  very  small  Albania,  and  those  advocated  by  Austria 
and  Italy,  who,  whilst  claiming  less  than  did  the  Al- 
banian Provisional  Government,  none  the  less  pro- 
posed a  settlement  too  much  in  accordance  with  the 
basis  of  nationality  to  be  acceptable  to  Serbia,  to 
Montenegro,  or  to  Greece.  In  short,  whilst  the  Al- 
banians finally  got  Scutari  in  the  north  and  Korcha  and 
Santi  Quaranta  in  the  south,  they  did  not  secure  Ipek, 
Jacova,  Prisrend,  and  Dibra  —  places  which  by  their 
allotment  to  Montenegro  and  to  Serbia  robbed  the 
people  of  Northern  Albania  of  market  towns  with 
which  they  had  always  been  wont  to  trade. 

In  addition  to  the  fact  that  it  did  something  to  make 
known  to  Europe  the  claims  of  the  Albanians,  the  pro- 
visional Government  of  Ismail  Kemal  Bey,  which  in  a 
way  was  the  father  of  the  State,  together  with  others 
afterwards  set  up  in  districts  not  occupied  by  or  from 


ALBANIA   AND   THE   ALBANIANS  167 

which  the  Balkan  armies  had  withdrawn,  maintained 
order  and  did  wonders  to  preserve  peace  from  the 
moment  of  their  estabhshment  until  long  after  the 
arrival  of  the  European  Commission  of  Control  (the 
appointment  of  which  was  decided  upon  by  the  Am- 
bassadorial Conference),  in  the  early  autumn  of  1913. 
Indeed,  when  I  was  in  Albania  immediately  after  this, 
although  I  found  the  international  forces  in  possession 
of  Scutari  and  three  or  four  entirely  independent 
governments  in  different  parts  of  the  country,  such  was 
the  state  of  things  that  I  travelled  with  perfect  safety 
through  the  greater  part  of  it  without  any  guard  other 
than  that  provided  by  a  native  policeman,  whose 
presence  was  necessary  to  enable  a  stranger  to  find 
the  way  in  areas  which  were  almost  nowhere  possessed 
of  better  means  of  communication  than  those  pro- 
vided by  the  most  primitive  bridle  paths. 

Prince  William  of  Wied,  a  Major  in  the  German 
Guards,  who  was  nominated  to  rule  Albania  by  the 
Great  Powers  in  November,  1913,  arrived  at  Durazzo, 
which  he  constituted  his  capital,  on  March  7  of  the 
following  year.  The  fact  that  his  regime  was  a  total 
failure  is  due  in  part  to  the  international  conditions 
then  prevailing  and  in  part  to  the  role  personally 
played  by  His  Royal  Highness.  From  an  international 
standpoint  the  basis  of  the  whole  question  was  that 
Albania  having  been  constituted  largely  in  order  to  re- 
lieve European  tension,  ever-recurring  difficulties  arose 
between  the  Great  Powers  really  responsible  for  its 
government.  Moreover,  whilst  Europe  had  nominally 
fixed  the  northern  and  southern  frontiers,  she  took  no 
effective  measures  to  hand  over  to  the  Prince  terri- 
tory which  was  his.     In  the  south,  the  Greeks  remained 


168  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE  WAR 

in  possession  of  large  areas  of  Albania  until  the  end  of 
March,  1914.  Most,  if  not  all,  of  these  districts  were 
then  officially  evacuated.  But,  instead  of  the  Greek 
regular  army,  there  came  the  Epirote  insurgents  and 
the  Epirote  Independent  Government,  who,  secretly 
supported  from  Athens,  maintained  a  reign  of  terror 
in  an  area  actually  allotted  to  Albania.  Thus  through- 
out the  stay  of  the  "Mpret",  as  the  Albanians  called 
their  ruler,  the  European  Concert,  if  Concert  it  can 
be  called,  ignored  the  necessity  for  taking  the  measures 
necessary  for  the  protection  of  the  country  and  looked 
on  pacifically  whilst  the  Greeks  infringed  the  frontiers 
already  delimited  in  the  south,  and  whilst  the  insur- 
gents threatened  and  practically  besieged  Durazzo  in  a 
manner  which  finally  confined  the  powers  of  the  Prince 
almost  to  the  very  precincts  of  his  palace. 

The  above  remarks  are  sufficient  to  prove  the  enor- 
mous difficulties  which  would  have  in  any  case  beset 
any  ruler  of  Albania.  His  Royal  Highness,  whose 
shortcomings  were  apparent  from  the  first,  made  little 
endeavour  to  overcome  them.  Ignoring  altogether  his 
attitude  towards  the  southern  frontier  question,  con- 
cerning which  he  should  have  made  some  stipulation 
with  the  Great  Powers  before  he  ever  entered  upon 
his  new  task,  the  Prince  made  at  least  two  fundamental 
mistakes.  By  arriving  at  Durazzo,  instead  of  enter- 
ing his  new  country  by  way  of  Scutari,  which  was  still 
in  the  hands  of  the  international  forces  which  occupied 
it  in  the  first  Balkan  war,  and  which  was  therefore 
more  or  less  neutral  country,  the  new  ruler  seemed  to 
show  his  partiality  towards  Essad  Pasha  and  thus 
offended  all  the  enemies  of  a  man  who,  if  then  power- 
ful in  the  centre  of  the  country,  was  certainly  not  be- 


ALBANIA  AND  THE   ALBANIANS  169 

loved  beyond  the  confines  of  his  own  particular  dis- 
trict. Subsequently,  and  before  it  was  too  late,  in 
place  of  trying  to  take  the  people  into  his  confidence 
and  of  endeavouring  to  travel  among  them,  the  Prince 
appeared  to  think  that  he  could  maintain  his  authority 
by  encouraging  one  section  of  the  community  to  sup- 
port him  against  the  other,  and  that  he  could  succeed 
in  Albania  without  any  display  of  courage.  Thus  on 
May  24,  a  few  days  after  the  banishment  of  Essad 
Pasha,  at  a  time  when  Durazzo  was  threatened  by  the 
insurgents,  the  Prince  and  his  family  took  refuge  on  an 
Italian  warship  —  an  action  which,  though  he  only 
remained  there  for  one  night,  was  sufficient  to  seal  his 
fate  in  a  country  where,  to  say  the  least  of  it,  cowardice 
is  not  one  of  the  faults  of  the  people.  As  time  wore  on, 
things  went  from  bad  to  worse  until  the  outbreak  of 
the  War,  immediately  before  which  the  international 
contingents  vacated  Scutari  and  immediately  after 
which  the  Prince  and  the  International  Commission  of 
Control  left  Durazzo. 

Prior  to  the  departure  of  the  Prince  on  September  1 1 , 
Turkish  insurgents,  having  occupied  Avlona,  advanced 
upon  Durazzo.  From  that  time  onwards,  therefore, 
the  country,  once  more  left  without  even  the  vestige  of 
a  central  Government,  was  ruled  by  various  self-con- 
stituted administrations,  all  practically  independent 
of  one  another.  At  first  Prince  Burhan  Eddin,  son  of 
the  ex-Sultan  Abdul  Hamid,  was  the  nominal  chief  of 
an  administration  which  owed  any  force  which  it 
possessed  to  the  local  power  of  Essad  Pasha.  After 
the  subjugation  of  Serbia  and  Montenegro,  in  the 
winter  of  1914-1915,  when  a  large  number  of  Serbians 
retreated  to  the  Adriatic  coast   through  Albania,  the 


170  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE   WAR 

northern  and  central  districts  of  the  country  were 
overrun  by  the  Austro-Germans,  who  finally  occupied 
and  still  hold  about  three  quarters  of  the  principality. 
Over  and  above  the  fact  that  a  proclamation  was  issued 
by  the  enemy  in  1917  to  the  effect  that  he  proposes  to 
create  of  Albania  some  kind  of  autonomous  province, 
closely  allied  to  if  not  constituting  an  integral  part  of 
Austria-Hungary,  we  therefore  have  no  reliable  in- 
formation concerning  the  conditions  prevailing  in  an 
area  which  is  entirely  cut  off  from  communication  with 
the  Allied  world. 

In  the  south,  where  the  Italians  occupied  Avlona  on 
December  25,  1914,  and  therefore  before  the  entry  of 
that  country  into  the  War,  events  have  been  bound 
up  with  the  attitude  of  the  Hellenic  Government 
towards  the  Epirus  question,  with  the  relations  exist- 
ing between  Greece  and  Italy  upon  that  subject,  and 
with  the  developments  in  the  zone  actually  held  by 
the  forces  of  King  Victor  Emanuel.  With  regard  to 
the  first  two  questions,  sufficient  be  it  to  say  that  in 
December,  1916,  shortly  after  the  capture  of  Monas- 
tir  by  the  Allies,  Colonel  Desco  n,  acting  on  behalf 
of  the  French  Government,  proclaimed  the  establish- 
ment of  a  small  autonomous  A  banian  State,  to  include 
Korcha  and  the  area  immediately  surrounding  that 
town.  Further  to  the  south,  where  the  Greeks  had 
evacuated  large  areas  previously  held  by  them,  the 
Italians  took  over  a  large  section  of  Epirus  and  oc- 
cupied Janina,  actually  in  Greek  territory,  during  the 
spring  of  1917.  After  the  abdication  of  King  Con- 
stantine  in  June,  1917,  and  the  return  to  office  of  M. 
Venezelos,  it  was  however  arranged  at  the  Paris  Con- 
ference of  the  following  month  that  the  Italians  should 


ALBANIA  AND   THE  ALBANIANS  171 

withdraw  from  all  but  the  triangular  area  of  Greek 
territory  through  which  the  road  from  Santi  Quaranta 
to  Korcha  runs.  This  arrangement,  together  with  the 
fact  that  M.  Venezelos  has  always  endeavoured  to 
adopt  a  moderate  attitude  upon  the  Southern  Al- 
banian frontier  question,  has,  it  must  be  hoped, 
created  a  new  atmosphere — an  atmosphere  in  which 
this  highly  complicated  problem  may  be  able  to  be 
solved  at  the  same  time  in  acccordance  with  the  prin- 
ciple of  nationalities  and  without  serious  detriment  to 
the  interests  of  the  two  countries  most  closely  affected 
by  this  ever-vexed  question. 

Whilst,  prior  to  her  adhesion  to  the  side  of  the  Allies, 
Italy  contented  herself  by  the  occupation  of  the  port  of 
Avlona,  later  she  extended  her  front  so  that  it  ran  along 
the  lower  reaches  of  the  River  Viosa,  which  constitutes 
the  natural  defensive  line  for  that  city.  Subsequently, 
too,  she  disembarked  another  force  at  Santi  Quaranta, 
which,  acting  with  the  army  already  at  Avlona,  ad- 
vanced into  the  interior  and  ultimately  established 
connection,  near  the  village  of  Cologna,  with  the 
Allied  forces  based  upon  Salonica.  Since  that  time 
Italy  has  been  in  occupation  of  approximately  a 
quarter  of  the  whole  country  —  a  quarter  in  which 
she  has  done  a  great  deal  to  improve  the  conditions 
previously  prevailing.  Considerable  lengths  of  road 
have  been  built,  thereby  not  only  facilitating  means  of 
communication,  but  also  providing  the  native  popu- 
lation with  work  for  which  a  fair  rate  of  pay  has  been 
given.  Agricultural  colleges  have  been  established, 
and  the  farmers,  now  able  to  obtain  machinery,  are 
being  encouraged  to  cultivate  their  ground  systemati- 
cally.    Numerous  schools  have  been  opened,  and  the 


172  THE  CRADLE  OF  THE  WAR 

children  are  thus  educated  in  a  manner  which  has 
never  previously  been  possible.  And,  last  but  not 
least,  the  Italians,  realising  that  the  way  to  win  the 
people  is  to  leave  the  direction  of  local  affairs  as  far 
as  possible  in  Albanian  hands,  have  established  Courts 
of  Justice,  some  of  which  are  presided  over  by  natives 
brought  over  from  the  large  Albanian  colony  in  Italy, 
and  have  formed  a  local  police  corps  under  the  super- 
vision of  Italian  officers. 

I  have  said  sufficient  briefly  to  explain  the  past  and 
present  situations  in  Albania.  With  regard  to  the 
future,  there  are  two  questions  of  outstanding  im- 
portance. The  first  is  the  problem  bound  up  with  the 
frontiers  of  the  country,  —  a  problem  with  which  I 
shall  deal  elsewhere.  The  second  concerns  the  future 
status  of  the  principality.  On  account  of  the  aspira- 
tions of  her  neighbours,  of  the  lack  of  development  of 
the  country,  and  of  the  inexperience  of  the  vast  majority 
of  the  people  in  all  matters  appertaining  to  Government, 
I  do  not  think  that,  for  the  present  at  least,  Albania 
can  exist  or  manage  her  affairs  entirely  alone.  Conse- 
quently, as  a  return  to  the  state  of  things  existing  after 
the  Balkan  Wars  is  impossible,  only  two  alternatives 
appear  possible.  The  first  is  some  form  of  autonomy 
under  all  or  perhaps  a  group  of  the  Allied  Great  Powers, 
an  arrangement  carrying  with  it  the  difficulties  always 
arising  from  combined  control.  The  second  is  the  pro- 
tection of  only  one  of  the  countries  who  are  now  fight- 
ing for  the  interests  of  smaller  nationalities.  If  this 
latter  alternative  be  adopted,  unless  the  United  States 
of  America  or  Great  Britain  were  willing  to  undertake 
the  task,  it  would  naturally  fall  to  Italy  who  has  already 
proclaimed  "the  unity  and  independence  of  all  Albania 


ALBANIA  AND  THE  ALBANIANS  173 

under  the  aegis  and  protection  of  the  Kingdom  of 
Italy ",  and  who  has,  as  I  have  said,  shown  her  good 
will  towards  the  Albanians.  Such  a  solution  might  not 
at  once  be  acceptable  to  many  of  the  inhabitants  who 
desire  to  be  entirely  independent  or  at  least  to  be  under 
the  protection  of  America  or  England  who  have  no 
direct  interests  in  Albania.  But  patriots  as  they  are, 
these  men  will  do  well  to  remember  that  in  addition 
to  helping  them  to  establish  good  government  and  to 
develop  their  country,  the  protection  of  Italy  would 
provide  them  with  a  powerful  friend  —  a  friend  without 
whom  they  might  be  helpless  not  only  to  enlarge,  but 
even  to  maintain  their  present  frontiers. 


VIII 
MILITARY  HIGHWAYS  OF  THE  BALKANS 

My  object  in  this  chapter  is  to  examine  a  few  of  the 
geographical  and  semi-geographical  problems  which 
have  influenced  and  do  influence  the  situation  in  the 
Balkan  Peninsula,  and  in  particular  to  enumerate 
some  of  the  military  highways  which  of  necessity  have 
governed  and  still  govern  the  operations  in  this  area 
—  highways  for  the  possession  of  which  a  great  deal 
of  fighting  has  been  done.  In  so  doing,  although  I 
have  walked,  ridden,  or  driven  through  most  of  the 
districts  about  which  I  am  now  writing,  I  cannot 
attempt  to  indicate  the  military  importance  or  the 
actual  role  played  by  many  of  the  railways,  rivers, 
or  roads  under  discussion.  To  do  so  or  to  consider 
the  highways  of  the  Balkans  otherwise  than  as  be- 
longing to  the  countries  to  which  they  belonged  prior 
to  the  outbreak  of  the  War  would  not  only  be  to  deal 
with  questions  discussed  elsewhere,  but  it  would  also 
necessitate  the  devotion  of  a  whole  volume  (such  as 
that  entitled  "Geographical  Aspects  of  Balkan  Prob- 
lems" by  Doctor  Marion  Newbigin)  instead  of  only 
one  chapter  to  this  all-important  aspect  of  the  Balkan 
question. 

From  a  geographical  standpoint,  the  contents  of 
the   peninsula    are    extremely    difficult    to    define.     I 


MILITARY  HIGHWAYS  OF  THE   BALKANS     175 

propose,  however,  to  consider  it  as  bounded  on  the 
north  by  a  line  roughly  drawn  from  the  Port  of  Con- 
stanza  on  the  Black  Sea  to  Pola  on  the  Adriatic,  or, 
practically  speaking,  by  the  line  of  45°  N.  Lat.  This 
being  so,  we  have  to  consider  the  highways  of  Serbia, 
Bulgaria,  Turkey,  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  Monte- 
negro, Albania,  and  Greece  —  countries  which  all  lie 
to  the  south  of  the  Danube  and  of  the  Save  which 
flows  into  that  river  at  Belgrade,  in  addition  to  those 
of  Roumania,  to  which  only  brief  reference  will  be 
made,  owing  to  the  fact  that,  geographically  speaking, 
most  of  that  country  lies  without  the  area  under 
discussion. 

The  greater  part  of  the  peninsula  is  mountainous, 
but  with  few  exceptions  the  mountains  form  chaotic 
masses  rather  than  regular  ranges.  The  two  great 
chains,  or  so-called  chains,  are  the  Balkan  Range  and 
the  Rhodope  Balkans.  The  Balkan  Range  extends 
from  Cape  Emine  on  the  Black  Sea  to  the  River 
Timok  on  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  frontier,  thus  dividing 
Bulgaria  into  two  main  sections,  northern  and  south- 
ern. In  places  these  mountains  attain  an  elevation 
of  about  eight  thousand  feet  above  the  sea  level. 
The  Rhodopes  used  approximately  to  form  a  good 
part  of  the  frontier  between  Bulgaria  and  Turkey, 
and  they  still  constitute  a  natural  barrier  between 
what  may  be  called'  Old  Bulgaria  and  that  area  which 
lies  between  this  range  and  the  Aegean  —  an  area  the 
eastern  part  of  which  was  annexed  by  the  Government 
of  King  Ferdinand  as  a  result  of  the  Balkan  Wars. 
The  elevations  attained  at  the  eastern  end  of  the  range 
are  considerably  less  than  those  upon  the  west.  Whilst 
in  the  former  district  we  have  nothing  higher  than  the 


17G  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE   WAR 

Katal  Dagli  which  rises  to  six  thousand  feet  above  the 
sea,  in  the  latter  there  is  the  Musa  Alia  peak,  which 
reaches  a  height  of  nine  thousand  feet.  The  Sredna 
Gora  —  an  offshoot  of  the  main  Balkan  Range  —  juts 
forward  towards  the  south  almost  to  meet  the  Rhodopes 
at  Trajan's  Gateway  between  Sofia  and  Philippopolis, 
and  the  two  ranges,  or  a  prolongation  of  the  two  ranges, 
are  more  or  less  united  at  their  western  end  by  a 
mountainous  area  through  which  the  Serbo-Bulgarian 
frontier  runs. 

Partly  as  a  result  of  a  generally  very  confused 
mountain  system,  the  rivers  run  from  various  points 
in  unexpected  directions.  Streams  which  one  would 
think  should  flow  east  turn  suddenly  north  or  west, 
or  vice  versa.  Thus  the  great  Maritza,  which  rises 
on  the  Musa  Alia  group  of  peaks,  after  flowing 
eastward  across  the  broad  plain  of  Eastern  Roumelia. 
instead  of  continuing  its  course  towards  the  Black 
Sea,  turns  suddenly  southwards  at  Adrianople  and 
empties  its  vast  volume  of  water  into  the  Aegean  near 
the  port  of  Dede  Agatch.  Again,  the  Vardar  and  the 
Morava,  the  former  emptying  itself  into  the  Gulf  of 
Salonica  and  the  latter  into  the  Danube,  respectively 
run  down  valleys  the  common  summit  of  which  may 
be  said  to  be  near  Uskub.  The  Drin  and  the  Scumbi 
—  the  two  most  important  rivers  of  Albania  —  wend 
their  ways  to  the  sea  by  valleys,  one  or  both  of  which 
may  sometime  constitute  the  route  to  be  followed  by 
a  great  railway  leading  down  to  the  shores  of  the 
Adriatic. 

The  Balkan  Peninsula  is  essentially  the  meeting- 
place  of  East  with  West.  Whilst  after  the  wars  of 
1912  and  1913  the  European  dominions  of  the  Sultan 


MILITARY  HIGHWAYS  OF  THE   BALKANS     177 

were  enormously  reduced,  so  large  a  part  of  the  entire 
peninsula  belonged  to  Turkey  until  comparatively 
recent  times  that  almost  the  whole  area  still  shows 
signs  of  Ottoman  misrule.  This  partly  accounts  for 
the  extraordinary  surprises  by  which  the  traveller  is 
met  in  various  parts  of  the  peninsula.  In  places 
the  whole  country  appears  to  be  perfectly  European. 
In  others  the  traveller  passes  for  miles  across  bare 
country,  the  soil  of  which  is  of  a  brown-red  colour  — 
country  which  almost  reminds  one  of  the  veldt  of  South 
Africa.  Again,  as  one  wends  one's  way  by  road  or  path 
through  the  Balkans,  and  particularly  through  Turkey, 
one  finds  that  places  which  from  the  map  would  appear 
to  be  centres  of  importance  are  made  up  of  only  a  few 
houses  located  in  the  valley  or  halfway  up  some  for- 
bidding hillside.  Thus  the  prevailing  impression  left 
upon  one's  mind  is  that  Turkish  misrule  has  been  re- 
sponsible for  the  creation  of  a  state  of  rack  and  ruin 
and  for  the  existence  of  conditions  which  can  only  be 
improved  when  a  long  period  of  peace  has  enabled  the 
Balkan  States  as  a  whole  to  introduce  those  reforms 
and  that  good  government  which  have  existed  in  Bul- 
garia since  her  liberation  in  the  year  1878. 

In  this  connection  it  has  always  been  interesting  to 
note  the  enormous  differences  which  become  markedly 
apparent  as  soon  as  one  leaves  Turkey  and  enters 
Bulgaria.  The  Bulgarian  road  is  not  only  well  laid 
out  but  it  is  maintained  in  a  good  state  of  repair. 
Carriages  may  roll  along  without  jolting  the  traveller 
much  more  than  would  be  the  case  on  an  English  coun- 
try road.  The  fields  are  well  cultivated.  The  ground, 
which  much  resembles  heavy  rich  English  soil,  is  made 
the  best  use  of.     Animals  of  all  kinds  are  contentedly 


178  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE   WAR 

grazing  in  the  pastures,  instead  of,  as  in  Turkey, 
being  allowed  to  wander  in  all  directions,  thereby 
tramping  down  the  standing  corn  or  crossing  the 
newly  ploughed  fallows.  Hay  and  corn  crops  are 
carefully  collected  in  small,  round,  thatched  ricks. 
The  forests  are  systematically  cut,  and  trees  are 
planted  in  place  of  those  removed  for  sale  or  everyday 
use. 

The  Near  East  is  therefore  a  land  of  contrasts. 
Although  we  have  some  of  the  monotonous  scenery 
to  which  I  have  already  referred,  one  also  comes  upon 
the  unexpected  in  the  opposite  direction.  For  in- 
stance, the  magnificent  land-locked  Bocche  di  Cattaro 
is  a  gem  of  beauty,  the  like  of  which  it  would  be  difficult, 
if  not  impossible,  to  surpass  in  Europe.  Again,  there 
are  places  such  as  Sofia  or  Serajevo  where  civilisation 
has  advanced  by  leaps  and  bounds.  The  capital  of 
Bulgaria,  in  1878  little  more  than  a  collection  of  mud 
huts,  is  now  a  prosperous  modern  city.  Equally, 
whilst  the  Austrians  may  not  have  given  political 
satisfaction  to  the  Slav  population  of  Bosnia,  they 
have  undoubtedly  made  of  its  capital  a  city  in  which 
picturesque  beauty  is  combined  with  modern  comfort. 
Composed  partly  of  modern  and  partly  of  Turkish 
houses  and  nestled  on  both  sides  of  the  narrow  valley 
of  the  river  Miljacka,  Serajevo  is  a  place  in  which 
East  certainly  meets  West. 

In  view  of  the  influence  of  climatic  conditions  upon 
communications  no  apology  is  needed  for  making  a 
brief  reference  to  the  question  of  the  weather  in  the 
Balkan  Peninsula.  In  the  north  and  northeast  of  the 
peninsula  the  climate  is  largely  governed  by  the  ex- 
tremely cold  winds  which  blow  from  those  directions, 


MILITARY  HIGHWAYS  OF  THE   BALKANS     179 

by  the  considerable  amount  of  snow  which  therefore 
falls  in  many  districts,  and  by  the  length  and  severity 
of  the  frosts.  In  the  south  and  southwest,  partly 
owing  to  the  protection  given  by  the  mountains  and 
high  table-lands,  the  climate  is  much  milder  and  the 
rain  comes  usually  with  a  south  or  southwest  wind. 
In  many  districts  there  are  very  sudden  changes  in 
the  weather,  and  there  is  a  great  contrast  between 
the  temperature  of  the  day  and  of  the  night.  For 
instance,  at  the  end  of  October  there  comes  an  almost 
annual  short  spell  of  very  cold  weather  at  Constan- 
tinople —  a  spell  in  which  there  are  always  biting 
cold  winds  and  sometimes  falls  of  snow  or  sleet.  From 
then,  often  until  the  end  of  December,  the  days  are 
generally  brilliantly  fine  and  warm.  Again,  even  in 
the  early  autumn  the  visitor  to  the  interior  will  find 
that  very  little  exercise  will  make  him  warm  by  day, 
whilst  at  night,  and  even  when  rough  shelter  is  avail- 
able, he  will  gladly  coil  up  in  all  the  fur  garments 
which  he  may  be  lucky  enough  to  possess.  Both  the 
heavy  downpours  of  rain  and  the  melting  of  the  snows 
create  conditions  which  the  traveller  and  the  engineer 
have  to  be  prepared  to  meet.  Thus  it  is  no  uncommon 
thing  for  routes  which  are  perfectly  passable  in  summer 
to  be  completely  impassable  during  times  of  rain  and 
flood.  It  is  this  factor  which  often  accounts  for  the 
existence  of  alternative  roads,  used  at  different  seasons 
of  the  year,  and  it  is  this  contingency  which  often 
leads  to  mistakes  in  information  as  to  the  utility  or 
inutility  of  various  communications  for  military  pur- 
poses. 

Although  Turkey  now  forms  but  a  very  small  part 
of  the  Balkan  Peninsula,  the  question  of  the  existing 


180  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE  WAR 

communications  in  the  whole  area  under  discussion 
has  been  largely  influenced  by  the  attitude  of  the  Otto- 
man Government.  For  years  much  of  the  politics 
of  the  Near  East  has  turned  upon  railroad  questions, 
and  therefore,  whilst  considerable  parts  of  the  penin- 
sula had  already  passed  out  of  Turkish  hands  before 
the  construction  of  railways  was  practicable  in  such 
an  area,  yet  up  to  the  time  of  the  Balkan  Wars  the 
geographical  distribution  of  the  European  dominions 
of  the  Sultan  was  such  as  to  give  the  Ottoman  Gov- 
ernment the  deciding  voice  as  to  the  construction  of 
numerous  lines  leading  through  Turkey  to  the  sea- 
coast.  The  building  of  roads  and  railways  would 
have  carried  with  it  economical  as  well  as  political 
advantages  to  the  State,  but  their  construction  was 
opposed  alike  by  Abdul  Hamid  and  by  the  Young 
Turks.  This  opposition  was  sometimes  due  to  in- 
ternal political  reasons,  and  sometimes  it  resulted 
from  the  existence  of  rival  schemes  supported  by 
different  Governments,  or  by  concession  hunters  who 
were  directly  or  indirectly  interested  in  them.  Again, 
as  large  numbers  of  railways  in  Turkey  were  built 
under  a  kilometric  guarantee  from  the  Government 
—  a  guarantee  which  assured  the  company  in  question 
a  fixed  gross  income  every  year  —  it  is  well  known 
that  the  Turkish  authorities  agreed  to  what  was 
often  a  most  extravagant  sum,  but  only  when  the 
line  in  question  was  required  for  some  strategical  pur- 
pose, or  when  its  construction  was  forced  upon  the 
Sublime  Porte  by  some  more  than  usually  active 
diplomatic  representative  at  Constantinople. 

One  result  of  this  inadequate  provision  of  railways 
is  that  the  Near  East  has  always  been  but  little  under- 


MILITARY  HIGHWAYS  OF  THE   BALKANS     181 

stood  by  those  who  have  only  been  able  to  pass  hurriedly 
through  it,  and  that  once  off  the  beaten  track,  many 
parts  of  the  Balkan  Peninsula  are  stranger  to  the 
ordinary  outsider  than  are  the  wilds  of  Central  Africa. 
Indeed  the  methods  of  travel  are  so  diverse  that 
whilst  in  peace  time  Constantinople  can  be  reached 
in  the  luxurious  Orient  Express,  once  off  the  great 
international  route,  one  might  almost  as  well  be  in  the 
heart  of  some  unexplored  continent.  Thus  to  approach 
the  Peninsula  of  Gallipoli  by  land,  or  to  get  into  the 
heart  of  Macedonia,  you  must  rely  upon  some  fourth- 
rate  carriage,  whilst  to  penetrate  the  rocky  valleys  of 
Albania  you  are  compelled  to  content  yourself  with  a 
pack  horse,  a  mule  or  even  a  donkey.  Again,  arrived 
in  the  interior,  accommodation,  which  is  distinctly 
primitive  even  in  many  of  the  larger  Balkan  towns, 
must  either  be  provided  by  the  transportation  of 
camping  arrangements  or  sought  in  buildings  so  dirty 
and  so  unpleasant  that  it  is  much  easier  to  pass  the 
night  than  actually  to  sleep. 

Before  approaching  a  discussion  of  the  actual  military 
routes  within  the  real  peninsula,  I  will  briefly  refer  to 
two  international  highways,  which  if  they  be  not  prop- 
erly in  the  Balkans  themselves  are  certainly  controlled 
by  one  or  more  of  the  rulers  in  this  "Danger  Zone"  of 
Europe.  Ignoring  here  the  numerous  interesting  facts 
connected  with  the  Dardanelles  and  the  Bosphorus  I 
will  refer  very  briefly  to  the  enormous  importance  of 
Europe's  second  largest  river.  Although  it  is  impos- 
sible without  entering  into  countless  details  to  discuss 
its  evervarying  breadth  and  depth,  it  may  be  interest- 
ing to  remember  that  at  Belgrade  the  Danube  is  nearly 
one  mile  wide,  and  that  with  certain  exceptions  its  gen- 


182  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE   WAR 

eral  width  between  Vienna  and  the  Iron  Gates  is  from 
six  hundred  and  fifty  to  two  thousand  yards  at  low  river. 
From  the  Iron  Gates,  where  the  channel  is  only  about 
eighty  yards  broad,  the  river  widens  out,  and  through- 
out its  course  to  Braila  its  average  breadth,  when  the 
water  is  low,  is  about  half  a  mile.  On  the  Upper 
Danube,  that  is,  on  the  part  above  the  Iron  Gates, 
traffic  is  maintained  by  barges  and  by  special  river 
steamers  drawing,  I  believe,  up  to  five  or  six  feet  of 
water.  So  far  as  one  is  able  to  ascertain,  such  vessels 
can  now  navigate  the  stretch  between  Vienna  and 
Turnu  Severin  at  practically  all  times  except  when 
the  river  is  stopped  by  the  presence  of  ice.  Below 
Turnu  Severin  and  between  there  and  Braila  there 
are  about  twelve  feet  of  water,  and  small  sea-going 
vessels  can  therefore  pass  up  and  down.  Between 
Braila  and  the  Black  Sea,  by  way  of  the  Sulina  branch, 
there  is  a  minimum  depth  of  about  eighteen  feet  of 
water.  This  last-named  section  of  the  river  is  under 
the  control  of  the  Danubian  Commission. 

The  above  details  are  sufficient  to  prove  the  enormous 
importance  of  the  Danube,  not  only  as  a  thoroughfare 
for  traffic  but  also  as  an  obstacle  to  through  communi- 
cation between  the  north  and  south.  No  bridges  span 
the  river  between  Peterwardein  —  a  Hungarian  town 
situated  about  forty  miles  to  the  northwest  of  Bel- 
grade —  and  Cerna  Voda  in  Roumania,  that  is,  for  a 
distance  of  nearly  six  hundred  miles.  This  means 
that  the  greater  part  of  Roumania  —  a  country  the 
communications  in  which  cannot  really  be  considered 
as  part  of  those  in  the  peninsula  —  is  separated  from 
the  Balkan  States  by  a  natural  barrier,  the  width  of 
which  is  in  many  places  much  greater  than  that  of 


MILITARY  HIGHWAYS  OF  THE   BALKANS     183 

either  the  Bosphorus  or  the  Dardanelles.  Thus  whilst, 
as  I  shall  show  below,  eight  more  or  less  independent 
Roumanian  railways  run  down  to  the  northern  bank 
of  the  Danube  at  seven  different  places,  and  whilst 
six  Bulgarian  lines  approach  its  southern  bank  near 
five  different  towns,  connection  between  the  Rou- 
manian and  Bulgarian  termini,  which  are  for  the  most 
part  situated  almost  opposite  to  each  other,  is  main- 
tained solely  by  ferry  boats  which  do  not  carry  trains. 
Indeed,  the  only  route  by  which  the  railway  systems 
of  the  two  countries  are  actually  connected  is  by  way 
of  a  new  line  through  the  Dobrudja,  a  line  which  I 
shall  discuss  later  on  in  this  chapter. 

Cerna  Voda  is  on  the  main  line  from  Bucharest  to 
Constanza,  and  therefore  upon  the  route  which  in 
peace  time  is  followed  by  the  Orient  Express  upon 
certain  days  in  the  week.  Here  a  great  viaduct,  or 
more  correctly,  a  series  of  viaducts,  cross  the  river  and 
the  lower  ground  and  marshes  which  border  upon  it. 
In  addition  to  the  supplementary  sections,  which 
have  a  length  of  nearly  two  miles,  the  bridge  over  the 
river  alone  is  not  only  more  than  eight  hundred  yards 
long  but  the  roadway  is  one  hundred  feet  above  the 
level  of  the  water.  Built  by  Roumanian  engineers  at 
a  cost  of  about  £1,400,000,  and  opened  in  September, 
1895,  it  constitutes  a  possession  of  which  the  Rou- 
manians may  be  justly  proud.  Indeed,  as  I  have  said 
elsewhere,  its  existence,  as  also  that  of  the  port  of 
Constanza,  which  is  now  one  of  the  most  important 
on  the  Black  Sea,  are  the  fundamental  causes  for 
which  the  Roumanians  desired  to  secure  a  properly 
defensible  frontier  on  the  south  of  the  Dobrudja,  and 
therefore  one  of  the  most  important  reasons  for  which 


184  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE  WAR 

they  insisted  upon  the  acquisition  of  the  areas  they 
obtained  during  and  as  a  result  of  the  two  Balkan 
wars. 

The  international  status  of  the  Danube  depends 
upon  various  treaties  and  arrangements  which  date 
back  as  far  as  1814  and  1815.  In  the  former  year,  and 
by  the  Treaty  of  Paris,  it  was  arranged  that  the  navi- 
gation of  the  Rhine  should  be  free  and  that  it  should 
not  be  prohibited  by  any  one.  In  1815  the  Congress 
of  Vienna  confirmed  this  arrangement.  In  1856,  and 
by  the  Treaty  of  Paris,  it  was  agreed  that  the  Danube, 
the  navigation  upon  which  up  till  that  time  had  been 
regulated  by  a  treaty  between  ^Austria  and  Russia, 
should  be  placed  under  the  same  rules  as  those  which 
had  already  been  made  for  international  water  high- 
ways which  traverse  more  than  one  State. 

This  brings  us  to  a  point  at  which  it  is  necessary  to 
consider  under  more  or  less  separate  headings  the 
work  which  has  been  carried  out  by  the  Danube 
Commission,  and  the  larger  political  position  of  the 
Danube.  This  international  Commission,  which  was 
instituted  by  the  Treaty  of  Paris  of  1856,  was  created 
with  the  special  object  of  executing  the  works  neces- 
sary to  put  the  lower  part  of  the  river  and  its  mouths 
into  the  best  possible  state  for  navigation.  Its  powers 
have  been  prolonged  by  various  periods,  and  in  1878, 
and  by  the  Treaty  of  Berlin,  a  Roumanian  delegate 
was  added.  At  the  same  time  the  work  of  the  Com- 
mission was  extended  as  far  west  as  Galatz.  Its  juris- 
diction having  been  again  prolonged  in  the  year  1883, 
as  far  as  Braila,  the  Commission  has  continued  to 
exist  since  1904  under  a  three  years'  agreement  made 
under  the  Treaty  of  London  signed  in  1883. 


MILITARY  HIGHWAYS  OF  THE   BALK.\NS     185 

The  Commission  is  possessed  of  extra-territorial 
powers,  and  it  is  not  in  any  way  under  the  control  of 
the  Roumanian  Government.  It  has  the  right  to 
levy  tolls,  to  carry  out  public  works,  and  to  institute 
regulations  for  the  navigation  on  the  part  of  the  river 
which  it  controls.  All  members  and  employees,  be- 
sides its  works  and  its  establishments,  and  particularly 
those  at  Sulina,  are  to  be  considered  neutral,  and  in 
case  of  war  they  are  to  be  equally  respected  by  all  the 
belligerents.  The  Commission  has  its  own  flag  and 
badge,  and  it  holds  general  meetings  and  committees 
in  order  to  carry  out  the  necessary  regulations  for 
river  traffic. 

It  is  only  possible  here  very  briefly  to  consider  the 
larger  political  status  of  the  Danube,  that  is,  the  status 
of  the  river  from  its  mouth  as  far  as  the  Iron  Gates. 
By  the  Treaty  of  Berlin,  it  was  determined  that  all 
the  fortifications  on  the  river  between  its  mouth  and 
the  Iron  Gates  should  be  razed,  and  that  no  new  ones 
should  be  created.  At  the  same  time  it  was  settled 
that  no  vessel  of  war,  with  the  exception  of  those  light 
ones  in  the  service  of  the  river  police  and  of  the  "Sta- 
tionnaires"  of  the  Powers,  which  were  to  be  allowed 
to  ascend  as  far  as  Galatz,  should  navigate  this  stretch 
of  the  river.  These  regulations,  and  especially  those 
connected  with  the  presence  of  war  vessels,  have  not 
been  carried  out  to  their  letter,  for  Roumania  cer- 
tainly possessed  river  monitors  which  could  hardly  be 
necessary  for  police  work 

Many  of  the  numerous  international  arrangements 
connected  with  the  Danube  have  been  "interpreted" 
by  the  various  enemy  belligerents  in  a  manner  which 
would  certainly  not  have  been  accepted  by  international 


186  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE   WAR 

lawyers.  Sufficient,  therefore,  be  it  to  say  here  that 
as  no  riverian  State  possesses  the  right  of  searching 
ships  which  do  not  stop  in  her  ports,  and  as  no  ships 
of  war  may  legally  navigate  the  river,  there  are  un- 
decided problems  connected  with  such  questions  as 
the  freedom  of  the  Danube  "in  respect  to  commerce", 
as  to  the  definition  of  the  term  "vessel  of  war",  and 
as  to  the  possible  difference  in  status  between  the 
once  entirely  Roumanian  and  the  joint  Roumanian 
and  Serbo-Bulgarian  (now  Austro-German  Bulgarian) 
sections.  In  war  these  questions  were  obviously 
destined  to  be  decided  only  according  to  the  circum- 
stances of  the  moment  and  to  the  power  which  any 
particular  party  possessed  to  support  its  own  point 
of  view. 

I  will  now  proceed  to  a  more  detailed  description  of 
the  actual  routes  which  exist  or  the  construction  of 
which  is  in  progress  or  proposed.  With  only  a  few 
exceptions  I  shall  say  but  little  in  regard  to  roads, 
because  for  the  most  part  they  follow  the  general 
lines  of,  or  act  as  feeders  to,  railways.  Moreover, 
in  modern  days  the  movements  of  large  armies  are  so 
influenced  by  the  necessity  for  the  transportation  of 
heavy  guns  and  of  vast  quantities  of  munitions  and 
of  supplies,  that  these  armies  are  usually  compelled  to 
take  the  lines  of  least  resistance  and  to  follow  railway 
routes.  In  order  to  make  my  remarks  as  brief  and  as 
clear  as  possible  I  have  divided  them  into  three  distinct 
sections. 

1.  An  account  of  what  may  be  called  the  main  lines 
of  railway  in  the  peninsula. 

2.  A  summary  of  the  more  important  secondary 
lines  —  a  summary  in  which  those  lines  are  grouped 


MILITARY  HIGHWAYS  OF  THE   BALKANS     187 

as  far  as  possible  in  accordance  with  the  countries 
through  which  they  run. 

3.  An  outhne  of  various  routes  which  are  not  followed 
by  railways  and  a  brief  explanation  of  some  of  the 
lines  the  construction  of  which  has  often  been  pro- 
posed. 

By  far  the  most  important  railway  in  the  Balkan 
Peninsula  is  that  which  connects  Belgrade  with  Con- 
stantinople and  which  follows  a  route  traversed  at 
various  historical  periods  by  Turks,  Crusaders,  and 
Slavs.  It  constitutes  the  Balkan  section  of  the  great 
trunk  route  from  west  to  east  and  therefore  its  domina- 
tion forms  a  prominent  feature  in  the  German  "  Drang 
nach  Osten  "  scheme.  Of  its  total  length  of  six  hundred 
and  fifty-nine  miles,  two  hundred  and  twelve  miles 
are  in  Serbia,  two  hundred  and  seventy-one  miles 
are  in  Bulgaria,  and  the  remaining  one  hundred  and 
seventy-six  miles  are  in  Turkey.  The  line,  which  has 
no  kilometric  guarantee,  was  built  during  the  period 
between  1869  and  1888,  when  it  was  opened  to 
through  trafSc.  In  the  former  year  Baron  Hirsch 
obtained  a  concession  to  construct  certain  railways 
in  Turkey.  Amongst  other  important  lines  con- 
tracted for  under  that  arrangement  was  one  to  pass 
through,  or  more  correctly  near  to,  Adrianople,  and 
to  connect  Constantinople  with  the  northwestern  fron- 
tier of  what  was  then  Eastern  Roumelia.  This  line 
was  opened  to  traffic  about  the  year  1872.  The 
original  Bulgarian  section,  that  is  the  stretch  extend- 
ing from  the  above-mentioned  frontier  to  Tsaribrod, 
and  the  Serbian  section,  namely  the  length  from 
Tsaribrod  to  Belgrade,  were  built  as  a  result  of  several 
conferences  which  were  held  under  Article  X.  of  the 


188  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE  WAR 

Treaty  of  Berlin.  Owing  to  various  political  delays 
these  sections  were  not  completed  until  1888.  The 
Turkish  section  is  still  worked  under  an  arrangement 
by  which  Baron  Hirsch  entered  into  a  formal  agree- 
ment with  the  Sublime  Porte,  and  under  which  he 
formed  a  company  or  syndicate,  now  called  the  Oriental 
Railway  Company,  to  exploit  the  line  on  behalf  of  the 
Ottoman  Government.  The  Bulgarian  part,  which 
now  includes  the  whole  section  between  Luleh  Burgas 
and  Tsaribrod,  and,  until  the  defeat  of  that  country, 
the  Serbian  part  extending  from  there  to  Belgrade, 
are  worked  by  the  State  railways  of  the  respective 
countries.  In  peace  time  this  route  is  followed  by 
the  Orient  Express,  and  through  communication  is 
maintained  by  at  least  one  daily  passenger  train  in 
each  direction  —  a  train  which  has  become  familiarly 
known  as  the  "Conventionnel",  probably  because  its 
existence  depends  upon  a  Convention  originally  signed 
by  Austria,  Serbia,  Bulgaria,  and  Turkey. 

After  crossing  the  Save  by  an  iron  bridge,  the  length 
of  which  is  over  four  hundred  yards  at  Belgrade,  which 
lies  at  the  junction  of  that  river  with  the  Danube,  the 
line  runs  through  hilly  country  to  Veliko  Plana.  On 
this  section,  and  near  a  place  called  Ripany,  situated 
about  fifteen  miles  to  the  south  of  Belgrade,  there  is  a 
tunnel  about  a  mile  and  a  quarter  long.  From  Veliko 
Plana,  where  it  enters  the  valley  of  the  Morava,  and 
for  a  distance  of  some  ninety -five  miles  the  line  follows 
the  banks  of  that  river  almost  to  Nish,  whence  it  turns 
in  a  more  easterly  direction  and  hugs  the  bank  of  the 
Nishava,  subsequently  crossing  the  Dragoman  Pass 
and  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  frontier.  After  crossing  the 
Sofia  plateau  the  line  enters  the  valley  of  the  great 


MILITARY  HIGHWAYS  OF  THE   BALKANS     189 

Maritza,  not  by  Trajan's  Gate,  through  which  the 
historical  road  to  the  East  ran,  but  by  a  pass  situated 
just  to  the  southwest  of  it.  Thence  it  traverses  the 
plain  of  Eastern  Roumelia,  flanked  on  the  north  by  the 
Balkan  Range  and  on  the  south  by  the  Rhodopes, 
until,  after  leaving  Bulgarian  territory  at  Luleh  Bur- 
gas, it  enters  the  valley  of  the  Erkene,  by  which  it 
continues  its  ever-winding  way  until  it  reaches  the 
northwestern  end  of  what  is  known  as  the  Peninsula  of 
Constantinople.  After  passing  through  the  Chatalja 
Lines  and  the  ancient  walls  of  the  Ottoman  capital  it 
finally  arrives  at  its  terminus  on  the  southwestern  side 
of  the  Golden  Horn. 

Second  only  in  significance  to  this  line  is  the  railway 
which  connects  Nish  with  Salonica.  The  length  of 
this  line  is  two  hundred  and  seventy-eight  miles.  The 
northern  section,  that  is,  the  section  from  Nish  to 
Ristovats,  was  built  by  the  Serbians  and  opened  in 
the  year  1888.  Its  length  is  seventy  miles.  The  re- 
maining two  hundred  and  eight  miles  were  built 
for  the  Ottoman  Government  by  Baron  Hirsch,  the 
greater  part  being  opened  in  1872.  The  Turkish  sec- 
tion, which  had  no  kilometric  guarantee,  was  worked 
by  the  Oriental  Railway  Company  until  the  Balkan 
Wars  of  1912-1913.  As  a  result  of  these  wars  the 
Serbians  secured,  and  subsequently  took  over  the 
working  of,  the  line  between  Ristovats  and  Ghevgeli 
—  a  section  which  has  a  length  of  just  over  one  hun- 
dred and  fifty  miles.  The  rest  of  this  line,  that  is, 
the  part  between  Ghevgeli  and  Salonica,  has  been  in 
Greek  territory  since  these  wars,  but  the  Hellenic 
section  continued  to  be  worked  by  the  Oriental  Rail- 
way Company  until  after  the  order  for  Greek  mobilisa- 


190  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE   WAR 

tion  issued  at  the  end  of  September,  1915,  when  it  was 
taken  over  by  the  Government,  and  more  or  less  since 
which  time  it  has  been  practically  in  the  hands  of  the 
Allies. 

Following  the  valleys  of  the  Morava  and  the  Vardar 
this  line  takes  the  great  highroad  from  north  to  south 
across  the  Balkan  Peninsula,  If  seriously  improved 
or  rebuilt,  and  if  better  harbour  facilities  were  available 
at  Salonica,  this  line  would  constitute  the  shortest 
and  the  most  direct  route  from  Europe  to  Egypt, 
India,  and  the  Far  East.  Since  the  outbreak  of  the 
War,  it  has  been  most  important  partly  because  t  was 
by  way  of  it  that  Serbia  was  at  first  able  to  communi- 
cate with  the  sea  and  partly  because  it  constitutes  the 
natural  line  of  advance  from  Salonica  into  the  interior. 
But  as  it  runs  more  or  less  parallel  to  the  Bulgarian 
frontier,  and  as  it  passes  through  one  or  more  narrow 
gorges,  it  was  easy  of  attack  by  the  army  of  that 
country,  which  secured  possession  of  considerable  sec- 
tions directly  after  the  Bulgarian  entry  into  the  arena 
of  the  War. 

There  remains  one  other  railway  of  very  considerable 
importance.  It  leaves  the  main  Belgrade-Constan- 
tinople route  at  Luleh  Burgas,  a  junction  situated  on 
the  right  bank  of  the  River  Maritza,  and  lying  at  a 
distance  of  about  eighteen  miles  to  the  south  of  Adrian- 
ople.  This  line  forms  the  connecting  link  between 
the  Constantinople-Adrianople  Railway  and  Salonica. 
The  first  section  —  that  part  between  Luleh  Burgas 
and  Dede  Agatch,  which  runs  down  the  valley  of  the 
ISIaritza  —  was  originally  constructed  and  worked 
with  and  by  the  Oriental  railways.  Its  length  is 
approximately  sixty  miles.     The  second  section,  that 


MILITARY  HIGHWAYS  OF  THE   BALKANS     191 

is,  the  part  between  Dede  Agatch  and  Salonica,  was 
built  and  exploited  up  to  the  time  of  the  Balkan  Wars 
by  a  French  company.  With  a  very  large  kilometric 
guarantee  —  the  highest  guarantee  ever  given  for  a 
railway  built  on  this  system  —  this  line,  including 
two  short  branches,  has  a  length  of  two  hundred  and 
sixty-five  miles.  Of  these  about  ninety  miles  are  now 
in  Bulgaria  and  the  remainder  nominally  in  Greece. 
The  main  line  from  Dede  Agatch  to  Salonica  runs 
practically  parallel  to  and  at  an  average  distance  of 
some  fifteen  miles  from  the  Aegean  coast,  and  it 
traverses  the  plain  which  lies  between  that  coast  and 
the  Rhodope  Balkans.  Passing  Gumuljina  in  Bul- 
garia and  Drama,  Seres,  and  Demir  Hissar  in  Greece, 
it  approaches  within  a  distance  of  about  twenty  miles 
of  Kavala,  but  it  touches  the  seacoast  only  at  Dede 
Agatch  and  near  Porto  Lagos.  As  the  geographical 
position  of  this  railway  is  one  of  extreme  importance 
it  is  advisable  to  remember  that  a  loop  or  branch  line 
connects  the  Maritza  Valley  Railway  with  the  line  to 
Salonica  without  passing  through  Dede  Agatch,  and 
that  big  ships  cannot  enter  the  arm  of  the  sea  which 
lies  to  the  north  of  Porto  Lagos.  The  loop  at  Dede 
Agatch  has  its  strategical  significance,  for  instead  of 
absolutely  approaching  the  coast,  it  follows  a  route 
which  lies  behind  the  hills  and  at  a  distance  of  nearly 
nine  miles  from  the  shore. 

As  a  result  of  the  Balkan  Wars  the  ownership  and 
the  working  of  the  Bulgarian  sections  of  these  railways 
—  parts  which  were  at  once  seized  by  the  Bulgarian 
Government  —  became  most  unsatisfactory.  This  was 
the  case  because  the  only  means  of  railway  communica- 
tion between  the  main  part  of  Bulgaria  and  the  Bui- 


192  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE  WxVR 

garian  port  of  Dede  Agatcli  was  by  way  of  a  line  con- 
siderable parts  of  which  were  in  Ottoman  territory. 
In  other  words,  as  the  Turks  owned  the  railway  be- 
tween a  point  situated  just  to  the  southeast  of  Mus- 
tapha  Pasha  and  Mandra,  lying  to  the  southwest  of 
Demotika,  this  line  could  only  be  used  by  the  Bul- 
garians on  the  strength  of  an  arrangement  made  by 
them  with  Turkey  after  the  second  Balkan  war. 
Whilst  in  peace  it  was  open  to  countless  disadvantages, 
in  war  it  was  possessed  of  complications,  the  nature  of 
which  it  is  impossible  to  exaggerate.  It  was  for  this 
reason  that  the  Germans,  as  I  have  explained  else- 
where, compelled  the  Turks  to  agree  to  the  Turco- 
Bulgarian  Convention,  by  which  the  formerly  Otto- 
man areas  situated  on  the  west,  or  right  banks,  of  the 
rivers  Tunja  and  Maritza  were  handed  over  to  Bul- 
garia. As  a  result  of  this  arrangement,  the  Bulgarians 
secured  possession  of  the  whole  line  from  Mustapha 
Pasha  to  Dede  Agatch,  and  they  therefore  became  the 
owners  of  the  railway  from  the  former  place  as  far  as 
Okjilar  on  the  Dede  Agatch-Salonica  line.^  The 
Greeks  on  their  part  are  the  nominal  owners  of  the 
section  from  Okjilar  to  Salonica.  As  in  the  cases  of 
other  railways  running  through  now  Hellenic  territory, 
this  line  was  worked  under  the  old  arrangements  until 
it  was  taken  over  by  the  Greek  Government  after  the 
promulgation  of  the  1915  order  for  mobilisation,  since 
which  time  a  considerable  area  of  the  country  through 
which  it  runs  has  been  occupied  by  the  Bulgarians. 

1  At  the  time  of  writing  it  is  reported  that  all  or  part  of  this  area,  includ- 
ing the  Station  of  Adrianople,  situated  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Maritza, 
and  known  as  Karagatch,  has  been  restored  to  Turkey  by  Bulgaria.  The 
accuracy  of  this  report  and  the  real  reason  for  a  second  transference  of  this 
area,  however,  still  remain  to  be  proved. 


MILITARY  HIGHWAYS  OF  THE   BALKANS     193 

Although  it  is  not  strictly  speaking  a  main  lino,  its 
geographical  position,  partly  in  Greece  and  partly  in 
Serbia,  makes  it  convenient  here  very  briefly  to  refer 
to  the  railway  which  connects  Salonica  with  Monastir. 
This  railway,  with  a  total  length  of  one  hundred  and 
thirty-six  miles,  was  opened  in  the  year  1890. 
With  a  kilometric  guarantee  of  £572  per  mile,  it  was 
worked  by  the  Oriental  Railway  Company  until  the 
Balkan  Wars.  After  that  the  Serbian,  or  northern 
section,  the  length  of  which  is  only  about  fifteen  miles, 
was  taken  over  by  the  Serbian  Government.  The 
remainder  of  the  line,  administered  more  or  less  under 
the  former  arrangements  until  the  1915  Greek  mobili- 
sation, was  then  taken  over  by  the  Hellenic  Govern- 
ment. The  railway  is  of  considerable  importance  be- 
cause it  serves  an  area  of  country  which  would  other- 
wise be  far  from  accessible  —  the  proposed  line  from 
Kuprulu  (Veles)  to  Monastir  running  entirely  through 
Serbian  territory  was  not  constructed  before  the  enemy 
occupation  of  this  area  ^  —  and  because  for  years  it 
has  been  part  of  the  programme  of  Balkan  railway 
construction  to  prolong  it  through  Albania  to  some 
point  on  the  Adriatic.  Moreover  as  it  runs  through 
Gidia,  Veria,  and  Fiorina,  it  provides  through  com- 
munication with  Athens  by  a  line  which  now  connects 
Larissa  with  Gidia  —  a  line  concerning  which  I  will 
give  further  particulars  below. 

Having  thus  briefly  outlined  the  positions  and  im- 
portance of  the  main  lines  of  railway  in  the  Balkan 
Peninsula,  I  will  now  proceed  to  a  summary  of  what 
may  be  called  the  secondary  and  for  the  most  part 

1  It  is  reported  that  the  Germans  or  the  Bulgarians  have  now  built  at 
least  a  considerable  section  of  this  line. 


194  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE   WAR 

internal  communications  —  that  is,  communications 
which,  important  as  they  are  in  themselves,  do  not 
with  certain  exceptions  (particularly  in  Roumania) 
maintain  any  connection  with  those  of  a  foreign 
country.  Let  us  begin  with  Roumania,  which  lying 
as  it  does  for  the  most  part  to  the  north  of  the  Danube, 
has  only  one  linking  railway  with  those  of  the  remainder 
of  the  peninsula. 

Ignoring  the  roads,  which  are  national  and  for  the 
most  part  good,  the  railways  of  Roumania,  which 
have  a  length  of  nearly  two  thousand  four  hundred 
miles  and  all  of  which  are  either  State  owned  or  worked, 
may  for  the  present  purposes  be  discussed  under 
two  headings  —  firstly  the  main  line  which  runs 
more  or  less  east  and  west  across  the  country  together 
with  its  feeders,  and  secondly  that  which  runs  approxi- 
mately in  a  northerly  and  southerly  direction  through 
the  northern  horn  of  the  kingdom  together  with 
its  tributaries.  The  great  east  and  west  line  starts 
from  Constanza,  on  the  Black  Sea,  crosses  the  Cerna 
Voda  bridge  and  passing  through  Bucharest,  goes  to 
Verciorova  on  the  frontier,  whence  it  turns  in  a  north- 
erly direction  and  continues  its  way  to  Budapest  and 
Vienna.  This  line  has  numerous  feeders  which  run 
up  to  it  from  the  south.  The  first,  which  joins  it  at 
Medgidiii  in  the  Dobrudja,  is  the  only  railwaj^  (except 
the  trunk  line  passing  through  Belgrade)  by  which 
through  communication  exists  between  the  Balkan 
Peninsula  and  the  remainder  of  Europe.  Meeting 
the  Bulgarian  system  at  Oborishte  on  the  Roumano- 
Bulgarian  frontier,  it  was  constructed  by  the  Rou- 
manians after  the  Balkan  Wars,  only  being  completed 
subsequent  to  the  outbreak  of  the  European  conflagra- 


MILITARY  HIGHWAYS   OF  THE   BALKANS     105 

tion.  With  a  length  of  about  seventy  miles  it  is  highly 
important  commercially  because  it  enables  goods  and 
passengers  to  be  conveyed  from  Bucharest  to  Sofia 
or  vice  versa  without  the  necessity  for  any  trans- 
shipment on  the  banks  of  the  Danube.  It  has  played 
a  significant  strategic  part  in  the  War,  for  it  greatly 
furthered  the  Bulgarian  advance  into  Roumania. 
Since  the  enemy  occupation  of  the  Dobrudja  this  line 
is  believed  to  have  been  prolonged  in  a  northerly 
direction  from  Medgidia  as  far  as  Babadagh  or  Tultcha 
or  some  other  point  on  the  south  of  the  Danube. 

Ignoring  the  great  international  routes  going  through 
Moldavia  and  running  up  to  the  Predeal  Pass,  which 
must  be  considered  separately,  this  East  and  West 
Line  is  approached  from  the  south  and  from  the  north 
by  several  railways  which  have  played  a  prominent 
part  in  the  War.  On  the  south  and  running  down 
to  the  Danube,  there  are  six  railways,  four  of  which 
approach  the  northern  bank  of  the  river  opposite 
or  nearly  opposite  to  Bulgarian  railway  termini. 

On  the  north,  ignoring  several  lines  of  more  or  less 
local  significance,  the  Constanza-Verciorova  Railway 
is  approached  by  two  important  highways.  The  first 
is  the  Fateshti-Buzeu  line,  which  constituted  the 
route  followed  by  the  Berlin-Breslau-Cracow-Lemberg- 
Constanza  Express,  run  prior  to  the  War  in  competition 
to  the  Orient  Express.  Passing  over  the  Chiulnitza- 
Slobodzie-Ployesti  branch,  and  the  two  lines  to  the 
west  of  Bucharest  which  run  up  towards  but  not 
across  the  Roumanian  frontier  from  Pitesti,  we  come 
to  the  Riatra-Cainen  Railway  which  passes  through 
the  Rotherturm  Pass  and  connects  with  the  Hungarian 
railway  system. 


196  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE  WAR 

What  I  have  described  as  the  south  and  north  rail- 
way system  of  Roumania  starts  from  Bucharest  and 
runs  by  way  of  Ployesti-Buzeu-Adjud  and  Pashkani 
to  Suczawa  on  the  frontier  of  the  Bukovina.  This 
raihvay,  which  traverses  Moldavia,  is  met  at  Ployesti, 
in  the  heart  of  the  oil  country,  by  the  international 
line  which  goes  to  Sinaia,  the  great  summer  resort  of 
fashionable  Roumanians,  and  subsequently  passes 
through  the  Predeal  Pass  into  Hungary.  The  Bu- 
charest-Suczawa  line  also  has  branches  respectively 
running  towards  the  west  and  east.  Whilst  the  most 
significant  leading  in  the  former  direction  is  that 
which  runs  from  Adjud  through  the  Gyimes  Pass 
and  into  Hungary,  the  most  important  running  to 
the  east  are  those  which  connect  Buzeu  with  Fateshti 
near  Cerna  Voda,  Buzeu  with  Brail  a,  Moresesti  with 
Tecuciu  (on  the  independent  Russian  frontier  line 
from  Galatz  to  Jassy)  and  Pashkani  with  Jassy  and  the 
Russian  frontier. 

The  above  remarks,  if  studied  in  conjunction  with 
a  map,  are  intended  to  prove  four  things.  Firstly, 
the  communications  existing  in  Roumania  are  of  vital 
importance  as  giving  access  to  the  Danube  from  the 
north  and  of  considerable  significance  as  providing 
the  shortest  routes  from  southeastern  Hungary  into 
Russia.  It  was  for  these  reasons,  as  I  have  already 
explained,  that  Germany  desired  the  entry  of  Rou- 
mania into  the  War  on  one  side  or  the  other.  Secondly, 
the  railways  of  Southern  Roumania  were  such  as  to 
facilitate  a  military  concentration  by  that  country 
on  the  northern  bank  of  the  Danube  and  therefore 
against  Bulgaria,  or  to  further  a  Bulgarian  advance 
into  Roumania  once  a  crossing  of  the  river  were  ef- 


MILITARY  HIGHWAYS  OF  THE   BALKANS     197 

fected,  as  it  was  effected  at  the  end  of  1916.  Thirdly, 
whilst  the  enemy  had  an  effective  system  of  railways 
running  more  or  less  parallel  to  his  Transylvanian 
frontier,  the  Roumanians  had  only  the  one  semi- 
circular line  from  Suczawa  by  way  of  Ployesti,  Bu- 
charest, and  Pitesti  to  Verciorova  —  a  line  which  was 
very  inadequately  connected  with  the  frontier.  And 
fourthly,  if,  and  so  far  as  the  Roumanian  railways 
had  been  constructed  for  strategical  purposes  at  all, 
this  had  been  done  with  a  view  to  war  against  Russia 
rather  than  as  a  preparation  for  hostilities  against 
Austria-Hungary. 

Turning  to  Serbia,  during  the  years  which  preceded 
the  outbreak  of  the  War,  and  particularly  since  the 
annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  in  1908,  the 
Government  had  been  devoting  large  sums  of  money 
to  railway  construction.  The  Serbian  lines  are  of 
two  distinct  categories  —  normal  and  narrow-gauge 
lines. 

All  the  railways  in  Serbia,  except  two,  really  con- 
stitute branches  of  or  feeders  to  the  main  trunk  line 
from  Belgrade  to  Constantinople.  I  will  deal  first 
with  those  which  run  from  the  main  line  in  a  more  or 
less  westerly  direction.  Of  these  there  are  three. 
The  first  and  last  —  both  narrow-gauge  lines  —  are 
important  because  they  jut  out  towards  the  Bosnian 
frontier  and  therefore  towards  the  railways  of  that 
province,  with  which  ere  now  they  may  well  have 
been  connected  by  the  enemy  and  with  which  they 
are  destined  to  be  united  should  Bosnia  go  to  Serbia, 
as  we  hope  that  it  will  as  a  result  of  the  present  War. 
On  the  east  or  northeast  of  the  main  trunk  route  there 
are  three  Serbian  railways  of  considerable  and  two  of 


198  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE  WAR 

only  local  significance.  The  first  important  one  runs 
from  Veliko  Plana  to  Semendria,  and  follows  the 
valley  of  the  Morava.  It  was  used  by  the  Austro- 
German  forces  when  they  advanced  into  Serbia  in 
the  autumn  of  1915.  The  second  connects  Nish  with 
Prahov  on  the  Danube.  The  whole  of  this  line  was 
not  open  to  passenger  traffic  before  Serbia  was  over- 
run by  the  enemy,  but  it  has  certainly  been  completed 
by  now.  Between  these  two  lines  there  is  an  im- 
portant narrow-gauge  railway,  which  unites  the  main 
trunk  route  with  the  one  from  Nish  to  Prahov.  These 
latter  lines  facilitated  the  Bulgarian  advance  and  occu- 
pation of  northeastern  Serbia. 

As  already  stated,  there  are  only  two  railways  in 
Serbia  which  have  no  connection  with  the  main  trunk 
route  from  Belgrade  to  Constantinople.  The  first  of 
these  unites  Shabatz  on  the  Save  with  Loznitza  on  the 
Drina.  The  second  is  that  which  runs  through  the 
district  best  known  as  the  Sanjak  of  Novibazar  — 
that  narrow  tongue  of  formerly  Turkish  territory 
which  up  to  the  time  of  the  Balkan  Wars  separated 
Serbia  from  Montenegro.  This  line  now  forms  a 
branch  of  the  main  route  from  Nish  to  Salonica. 
Leaving  that  railway  at  Uskub,  it  runs  in  a  north- 
westerly direction  to  Mitrovitza  and  has  a  length  of 
seventy-four  miles.  It  was  constructed  for  the  Otto- 
man Government  under  the  arrangements  made  with 
Baron  Hirsch,  and  it  actually  formed  part  of  the 
original  line  from  Salonica,  for  the  section  from  Uskub 
to  the  then  Serbian  frontier  was  not  built  until  after- 
wards. Of  the  famous  and  long-proposed  railway 
from  Mitrovitza  to  the  Austro-Hungarian  frontier  I 
will  sav  more  later  on. 


MILITARY  HIGHWAYS  OF  THE   BALKANS     199 

Turning  to  Bulgaria  we  have  the  Balkan  country 
in  which  by  far  the  greatest  amount  of  attention  has 
been  paid  to  the  construction  of  railways  and  roads. 
Whilst  in  the  year  1887  there  were  no  railways  in 
Bulgaria  proper,  only  some  two  hundred  miles,  con- 
structed under  the  auspices  of  the  Turkish  Govern- 
ment, were  open  to  traffic  in  Eastern  Roumelia,  After 
the  Balkan  Wars,  the  Bulgarian  State,  including  East- 
ern Roumelia,  had  over  fourteen  hundred  miles  of 
railway  open,  besides  several  lines  under  construc- 
tion. The  railways,  which  are  all  State  owned,  are 
well  equipped  and  efficiently  run  and  managed.  In- 
deed the  visitor  who  takes  the  principal  routes  is  so 
well  accommodated  in  sleeping  and  restaurant  cars 
that  it  is  difficult  for  him  to  believe  that  he  is  really 
travelling  on  a  Balkan  branch  line  at  all.  Moreover 
the  districts  which  are  not  yet  effectively  provided 
with  railways  are  well  served  with  roads  which  are 
maintained  in  a  state  of  repair  which  far  surpasses 
that  of  any  other  highways  existing  in  the  Balkans. 

Whilst  some  of  them  are  so  important  that  they  can 
hardly  be  considered  as  branches  of  the  main  line,  it  is 
convenient  for  the  present  purposes  to  consider  the 
railways  of  Bulgaria  as  feeders  of  the  great  trunk 
route  from  Belgrade  to  Constantinople.  A  line  runs 
from  Sofia  up  the  gorgelike  valley  of  the  Isker  and 
then  across  the  plains  of  Northern  Bulgaria  to  Varna 
on  the  Black  Sea.  In  its  turn  it  has  what  may  be 
called  six  distinct  branches  running  toward  the  North, 
five  of  which  approach  the  Danube  at  five  different 
places,  opposite  to  most  of  which,  as  I  have  already 
said,  there  are  Roumanian  railway  towTis  from  which 
connection  is  made  with  the  interior  of  that  coimtrv. 


200  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE  WAR 

All  these  lines  running  up  to  and  towards  the  Danube, 
together  with  the  trans-Balkan  line  described  below, 
have  been  most  important  since  1914.  During  the 
neutrality  of  Bulgaria,  as  since  the  entry  of  that 
country  into  the  War,  they  have  been  utilised  for 
the  transportation  of  men  and  goods  coming  from 
Central  Europe  across  or  by  way  of  the  Danube,  to 
Turkey.  This  has  relieved  the  traffic  pressure  on 
the  main  line  from  Belgrade  to  Constantinople,  More- 
over, after  the  adhesion  of  Bulgaria  to  the  cause  of  the 
enemy,  these  railways  and  especially  the  more  easterly 
lines  were  utilised  to  facilitate  the  Bulgarian  advance 
into  the  Dobrudja  and  Southern  Roumania. 

The  Sofia- Varna  line  is  connected  with  the  Philip- 
popolis-Burgas  railway,  to  which  I  will  refer  in  detail 
later,  by  one  which  traverses  the  Balkan  Range.  This 
line,  which  is  obviously  of  the  greatest  importance, 
was  only  opened  quite  recently.  Instead  of  following 
the  old  road  from  Turnovo  to  Kazanlik  by  way  of 
the  Shipka  Pass,  it  takes  a  more  easterly  route  and 
passes  through  the  Travna  Gap.  By  so  doing  a  climb 
of  nearly  1000  feet  is  saved,  for,  whilst  the  altitude  of 
the  Shipka  is  4378  feet,  that  of  the  Travna  is  only 
3359  feet.  The  use  of  this  line  enables  merchandise 
or  troops  to  be  rapidly  conveyed  by  railway  from 
Northern  to  Southern  Bulgaria,  or  vice  versa,  without 
being  compelled  as  formerly  to  pass  through  Sofia. 
As  a  matter  of  fact  it  played  a  considerable  role  even 
before  the  entry  of  Bulgaria  into  the  War,  for  it  was 
by  it  that  munitions  destined  for  Turkey  were  for  the 
most  part  forwarded  from  the  Danube  to  the  Ottoman 
frontier. 

At  Sofia  and  from  the  main  trunk  route  a  railway 


MILITARY  HIGHWAYS  OF  THE   BALKANS     201 

branches  off  in  a  southwesterly  direction,  and  runs 
to  Gyuveshevo  absolutely  on  the  Serbo-Bulgarian 
frontier.  It  is  important  because  of  the  facilities 
which  it  gives  for  a  military  concentration  in  this  part 
of  Bulgaria,  and  therefore  for  a  Bulgarian  advance 
upon  Uskub,  and  also  because  it  was  intended  as  the 
Bulgarian  section  of  line  finally  to  link  Sofia  with  that 
town  and  perhaps  to  form  part  of  a  great  line  from 
the  Danube  to  the  Adriatic,  Had  the  second  Balkan 
war  not  occurred,  the  Bulgarians  would  then  have 
constructed  another  line  from  Radomir,  by  way  of 
Dubnitza  and  the  Struma  Valley,  to  the  shores  of  the 
Aegean.  As  a  matter  of  fact  since  their  entry  into 
the  War  they  have  built  the  northern  section  of  this 
line,  which  is  believed  to  be  open  in  the  form  of  a  light 
railway  as  far  as  Lipnitza  just  to  the  north  of  the 
former  Graeco-Bulgarian  frontier. 

Between  Sofia  and  the  Turco-Bulgarian  frontier 
there  are  only  two  railways  which  branch  from  the 
main  line.  They  both  run  in  a  northeasterly  direction. 
The  first  is  by  far  the  most  important.  It  connects 
Philippopolis  with  Burgas.  The  second  branch  leaves 
the  main  line  at  Turnovo  Siemenli  (Sejmen).  It  runs 
in  an  almost  due  northerly  direction  to  Nova  Zagora, 
where  it  meets  the  above-described  Philippopolis- 
Burgas  railway.  Its  importance  has  been  consider- 
ably decreased  of  late,  for  since  the  construction  of 
the  section  Philippopolis-Cirpan  it  no  longer  forms  the 
only  line  connecting  Burgas  with  the  remainder  of 
Europe,  and  through  traflSc  from  Sofia  to  Burgas  goes 
now  by  Philippopolis  and  Cirpan  instead  of  by  Tur- 
novo Siemenli.  According  to  some  reports  a  line  has 
recently  been  constructed  from  Jamboli  on  the  Burgas 


202  THE   CRADLE   OF   THE   WAR 

Railway  to  Adrianople.  Others  deny  these,  and  hav- 
ing regard  to  all  the  circumstances  it  seems  very  likely 
that  they  are  not  authentic. 

In  Turkish  Thrace  the  means  of  communication  are 
still  extremely  indifferent,  and  this  not  only  because 
of  the  lack  of  railways,  but  also  on  account  of  the  bad 
state  of  repair  in  which  Turkish  roads  are  always  main- 
tained. Whilst  the  construction  of  several  railways 
has  been  under  discussion  for  years,  unless  the  Germans 
have  recently  constructed  others,  the  only  one  actually 
open  is  that  which  runs  in  a  northerly  direction  to 
Kirk  Kilissa.  It  is  important  because  it  facilitates 
the  means  of  communication  between  Turkey  and 
Southeastern  Bulgaria  by  shortening  the  distance  to 
be  covered  by  road. 

With  regard  to  the  roads,  if  we  ignore  all  minor 
routes,  there  are  at  least  three  which  lead  from  rail- 
ways in  a  northerly  or  northeasterly  direction.  The 
first  unites  Adrianople  in  Turkey  with  Jamboli  in 
Bulgaria,  and  follows  the  route  possibly  now  taken 
by  the  above-mentioned  railway.  The  second  runs 
in  a  northerly  direction  from  Kirk  Kilissa  towards 
the  frontier.  Both  these  were  used  by  the  Bulgarians 
in  their  advance  during  the  first  Balkan  war.  There 
is  also  a  road  from  near  Tchorlu  to  Midia  on  the  Black 
Sea. 

On  the  south  there  are  several  roads  connecting  the 
coast  of  the  Sea  of  Marmora  with  the  railway  from 
Constantinople  to  Adrianople.  Without  discussing 
those  located  in  the  more  or  less  immediate  neighbour- 
hood of  the  Ottoman  capital,  we  have  four  so-called 
thoroughfares  which  are  worthy  of  mention.  The 
first  two  connect  Rodosto  with  the  railway.     Their 


MILITARY  HIGHWAYS  OF  THE   BALKANS     203 

importance  is  that  they  enable  troops,  landed  from 
Asia  Minor  at  Rodosto,  to  be  marched  into  the  interior 
and  towards  Adrianople.  The  third  runs  from  Rodosto 
by  way  of  Malgara  to  Keshan  where  it  meets  the  main 
route  by  which  land  communication  is  maintained 
between  Uzun  Kupru  on  the  railway  and  the  Peninsula 
of  Gallipoli.  This  last-named  road,  which  was  prac- 
tically rebuilt  a  few  years  ago,  is  certainly  passable 
for  all  arms.  Even  before  its  completion  about  the 
year  1910  it  was  feasible  for  vehicles  to  travel  by  it 
without  any  danger  of  being  stuck  in  the  mud,  and 
without  any  serious  inconvenience  to  their  occupants. 

Having  thus  very  briefly  described  practically  all  the 
railways  existing  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula  except  those 
in  Bosnia,  Herzegovina,  Montenegro,  and  Greece,  I 
will  now  proceed  to  a  discussion  of  a  few  of  the  great 
international  routes  which  are  partly  or  entirely  de- 
void of  railways.  In  order  to  make  the  discussion 
the  more  clear  I  will  divide  it  into  three  main  sections. 
They  are  — 

(1)  Some  of  the  possible  means  of  advancing  into 
the  interior  from  the  Adriatic. 

(2)  The  routes  which  lead  from  what  may  be  called 
Old  Greece  into  the  area  united  to  that  country  after 
the  Balkan  Wars. 

(3)  The  roads  or  communications  by  which  it  is 
possible  to  enter  the  main  part  of  Bulgaria  from  the 
Aegean,  from  Greece,  and  from  Serbia. 

Although  at  the  present  time,  and  when  the  future 
ownership  of  large  areas  of  the  Balkan  Peninsula  is 
uncertain,  it  is  useless  to  enter  into  a  long  and  detailed 
account  of  the  railways  whose  construction  has  been 
proposed  at  various  times,  that  question  is  so  closely 


204  THE   CRADLE   OF   THE   WAR 

bound  up  with  the  various  existing  lines  of  communi- 
cation that  a  brief  reference  to  it  may  not  be  out  of 
place.  In  order  to  understand  it  aright,  and  particu- 
larly to  grasp  what  has  been  done  or  what  may  be 
done  in  the  western  part  of  the  peninsula,  it  is  neces- 
sary first  to  give  a  brief  description  of  the  lines  leading 
to  and  already  existing  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina. 

Since  the  occupation  of  those  provinces  in  1878,  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Government  has  adopted  a  policy 
of  peaceful  penetration  —  a  policy  furthered  and  sup- 
ported by  the  construction  of  hotels,  of  public  build- 
ings, of  roads,  and  of  railways.  A  line  of  great 
importance  extends  from  India  on  the  main  Belgrade- 
Vienna  Railway  to  Fiume  on  the  Adriatic.  That 
railway  and  others  coming  from  Vienna  and  Buda- 
pest give  access  to  a  main-line  (narrow  gauge)  railway, 
which  runs  from  north  to  south  of  the  annexed  prov- 
inces and  connects  Bosnish  Brod  on  the  southern 
bank  of  the  Save  with  Zelenika  on  tlie  northern  shore 
of  the  Bocche  di  Cattaro.  On  the  west  tliis  line  is  fed 
by  branches  which  connect  it  with  Jajce  in  Central 
Bosnia  and  with  Gravosa  on  the  Dalmatian  coast. 
On  the  east,  in  addition  to  several  short  and  therefore 
comparatively  unimportant  lines,  there  are  branches 
which  run  towards  the  Serbian  and  Montenegrin 
frontiers. 

The  natural  routes  by  which  two  of  these  railways 
could  be  connected  with  those  of  Serbia  would  be  by 
the  construction  of  lines  from  Siminhan  to  Valievo, 
and  from  Vardishte  to  Ujitse.  The  advantage  of  the 
adoption  of  one  or  both  of  these  plans  would  be  that 
as  the  Bosnian  railways  are  of  the  same  gauge  as  those 
of    Western    Serbia    no    alteration    or    reconstruction 


MILITARY  HIGHWAYS  OF   THE   BALKANS     '■205 

would  be  required  on  any  of  the  existing  lines.  Further 
to  the  south  it  will  be  remembered  that  prior  to  the 
Balkan  Wars  the  Austrians  had  for  years  been  desirous 
of  constructing  a  line  through  the  Sanjak  of  Novi- 
bazar  from  Uvats  on  their  frontier  to  Mitrovitza 
—  the  terminus  of  the  railway  from  Uskub.  Shortly 
before  the  re-establishment  of  the  Turkish  Constitu- 
tion and  when  the  route  still  lay  across  Ottoman  terri- 
tory, Abdul  Hamid  actually  signed  an  Irade  granting 
permission  for  the  making  of  the  preliminary  surveys 
for  its  construction.  With  a  length  of  about  one 
hundred  and  forty  miles  it  would  provide  an  alternative 
route  to  Salonica.  But  as  there  could  be  no  through 
communication  on  railways  of  different  gauges,  it 
is  clear  that  the  sole  object  of  this  scheme  was  a 
strategical  one  —  an  object  which  formed  part  of 
Austria's  attempt  to  push  her  way  down  to  the  Aegean. 
The  narrow-gauge  lines  of  Bosnia  might  be  relaid  —  a 
work  entailing  enormous  expense  owing  to  the  moun- 
tainous nature  of  the  country  —  or  the  present  exist- 
ing line  to  Banjaluka  —  a  line  which  is  of  the  normal 
gauge  —  might  be  prolonged  by  way  of  Jajce  and 
Serajevo  to  the  Bosnian  frontier,  but  as  things  stand 
at  present  it  is  difficult  to  foresee  the  existence  of  a 
political  situation  in  which  such  an  undertaking  is 
likely  to  become  one  of  practical  politics. 

For  many  years  there  have  been  two  more  or  less 
rival  schemes  for  uniting  the  Danube  with  the  Adriatic. 
First,  a  great  Slav  railway  to  run  through  Serbia  and 
either  Montenegro  or  Albania ;  and,  second,  a  line 
through  Bulgaria  and  thence  to  the  seacoast.  In  view 
of  the  present  political  and  military  situations,  it  is 
impossible  to  forecast  the  considerations  which  may 


206  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE   WAR 

influence  the  ultimate  construction  of  one  or  both  of 
these  Hnes.  Sufficient,  therefore,  be  it  to  say  that 
the  Serbian  scheme  is  by  no  means  a  new  one.  It 
would  provide  connection  with  Roumania  by  a  bridge 
across  the  Danube  somewhere  near  Prahov,  and  it 
would  run,  via  Nish  and  Mitrovitza,  probably  to  San 
Giovanni  di  Medua  or  to  Antivari.  The  Bulgarian 
plan  has  always  been  to  establish  through  communi- 
cation from  Roumania  to  Salonica  or  to  the  Adriatic 
by  way  of  Sofia.  The  construction  of  a  bridge  across 
the  Danube  has  been  proposed  at  Vidin,  Sistova,  or 
Rustchuk.  The  missing  links  are  therefore  the  section 
from  Gyuveshevo  to  Komanovo,  and  from  Uskub  or 
Monastir  to  the  Adriatic. 

In  approaching  a  discussion  of  the  communications 
between  the  lower  part  of  the  Adriatic  coast,  it  will  be 
convenient  to  classify  the  routes  existing  prior  to  the 
enemy  advance  of  1915-1916  into  sections  devoted 
respectively  to  descriptions  of  the  roads  then  running 
through  Montenegro  alone,  through  Albania  and 
Montenegro,  and  through  Albania  alone.  Since  that 
time  it  is  probable  that  the  Austro-Germans  have 
done  a  great  deal  to  improve  the  communications  in 
these  two  countries. 

The  only  line  of  advance  through  Montenegro  alone 
runs  from  the  port  of  Antivari  and  by  way  of  the 
Antivari-Virbazar  railway  —  a  short  stretch  of  narrow- 
gauge  line  which,  with  the  port  of  Antivari,  was  con- 
structed by  an  Italian  company.  In  Montenegro  an 
excellent  road  connects  the  Austrian  port  of  Cattaro 
with  Cettinje,  Podgoritza,  and  Niksics.  As  branches 
of  this  main  route  there  are  roads  from  Riyeka  to  Vir- 
bazar  and  thence  to  Antivari,  and  from  Podgoritza 


MILITARY  HIGHWAYS  OF  THE   BALK\NS     207 

to  Plavnitza,  a  port  on  Lake  Scutari.  For  some  time 
prior  to  the  war  the  Montenegrins  had  phmned  to 
build  a  road  from  Podgoritza  to  Andriyevitza  and 
to  prolong  it  by  two  routes  running  ■  to  the  frontier. 
It  has  also  been  suggested  that  these  roads  should 
be  extended  across  the  frontier  to  Novibazar  and 
to  Mitrovitza  respectively.  Political  conditions  and, 
above  all,  the  jealousy  existing  between  Serbia  and 
Montenegro  had,  however,  prevented  the  realisation 
of  this  latter  idea.  As  things  stood  at  the  time  of 
the  Montenegrin  defeat,  a  road  actually  existed  from 
Podgoritza  to  Andriyevitza.  The  most  direct  and 
easy  route  to  be  followed  by  a  possible  future  rail- 
way is  that  by  way  of  Andriyevitza,  Berane,  and 
thence  to  Novibazar  and  up  the  valley  of  the  River 
Ibar  to  the  railway  town  of  Kralievo  in  Serbia. 

In  order  to  use  routes  for  passing  through  Albania 
and  Montenegro  one  would  land  at  San  Giovanni  di 
Medua,  and  go  from  there  to  Scutari  by  road,  or  else 
go  up  the  River  Boyana  to  the  capital  of  Northern 
Albania.  The  port  of  San  Giovanni  di  Medua  con- 
sists of  a  few  houses  located  on  the  northern  side  of 
a  small  bay.  That  bay  is  more  or  less  sheltered,  but 
no  facilities  exist  for  the  disembarkation  or  embarka- 
tion of  men  or  war  material.  The  road  to  Scutari 
was  made  passable  for  wheeled  traffic  and  for  motors 
during  the  summer  of  the  year  1914  when  the  new 
bridge  over  the  River  Drinitza  and  near  Scutari  was 
opened.  To  use  the  Boyana,  men  and  goods  would  have 
to  be  trans-shipped  to  small  steamers  at  San  Giovanni 
di  Medua  or  at  the  mouth  of  the  river  and  again  at 
Oboti.  From  Scutari,  lake  boats  would  be  used  as  far 
as  Virbazar,  Riyeka,  or  Plavnitza  in  Montenegro. 


208  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE  WAR 

Through  Albania  alone  there  are  three  possible 
general  lines  of  communication  between  the  coast 
and  the  interior.  The  first  follows  the  above-men- 
tioned route  to  Scutari  and  from  there,  after  running 
up  the  Drin  Valley  for  some  miles,  crosses  the  moun- 
tains to  Prisrend  —  a  town  allotted  to  Serbia  by  the 
London  Ambassadorial  Conference.  This  route,  which 
dates  from  Roman  times,  continues  to  Ferisovitch  on 
the  Uskub-Mitrovitza  railway,  and  was  used  by  the 
Serbian  Government  and  by  the  French  Aeroplane 
Mission  when  they  retreated  to  Scutari  at  the  end  of 
1915. 

The  second  route,  which  runs  from  Durazzo  into 
the  interior,  follows  the  line  of  the  celebrated  Via 
Egnatia  for  about  one  hundred  and  twenty  miles, 
reaching  the  head  of  the  Salonica-Monastir  railway 
at  the  last-named  place.  Of  these  one  hundred  and 
twenty-five  miles  not  more  than  the  section  from 
Monastir  to  Struga  —  which  is  about  forty-five  miles 
—  was  passable  for  wheeled  traffic,  prior  to  the  enemy 
occupation  of  Northern  Albania.  The  remainder  of 
the  road  consisted  of  nothing  better  than  an  extremely 
bad  and  ill-kept  path,  and  unless  it  has  been  improved 
it  could  not  be  utilised  by  a  European  force  made  up 
of  all  arms  and  accompanied  by  the  big  guns  and  by 
the  transport  required  in  modern  warfare. 

As  a  northern  alternative  to  this  route,  there  is  a 
road  which  connects  Durazzo  with  Tirana  and  a  path 
leading  from  the  latter  place  to  Dibra,  In  the  south 
there  is  a  road  from  Avlona  to  Berat  and  to  Elbasan, 
but  owing  to  its  greater  length  and  to  the  fact  that 
the  plains  are  practically  impassable  in  bad  weather 
it  possesses  little  claim  to  be"  considered  as  of  equal 


MILITARY  HIGHWAYS  OF  THE  BALKANS     209 

importance  to  that  which  follows  the  Scumbi  Valley. 
Since  their  occupation  of  Southern  Albania,  the  Italians, 
as  I  have  said  elsewhere,  have  constructed  several 
lengths  of  road  in  the  area  which  they  hold. 

The  third  and  most  southerly  route  through  Albania 
is  by  far  the  best  road  in  that  country.  Throughout 
its  length  it  is  passable  for  wheeled  traflSc,  and  it  must 
now  have  been  greatly  improved  by  the  Italians  who 
are  in  occupation  of  the  greater  part  of  it.  Starting 
from  Santi  Quaranta,  a  port  situated  almost  immedi- 
ately opposite  to  the  northern  end  of  the  Island  of 
Corfu,  it  connects  that  place  with  Korcha  and  with 
Monastir.  The  first  section  of  the  road  is  part  of  that 
originally  built  by  the  Turks  to  connect  Janina  with 
the  coast.  A  part  of  this  route  (roughly  twenty  miles) 
runs  through  territory  which  officially  belongs  to 
Greece.  This  is  the  case,  because  when  Santi  Qua- 
ranta and  Korcha  were  given  by  Europe  to  Albania, 
the  natural  and  existing  means  of  communication 
between  these  two  most  important  places  was  inter- 
rupted by  a  frontier  delimitation  in  the  neighbourhood 
of  Doliani,  a  delimitation  in  which  the  practical  condi- 
tions of  life  were  completely  and  unfairly  ignored  at 
the  expense  of  Albania,  and  in  order  to  put  off  inter- 
national dangers  which  were  then  looming  in  the 
distance. 

Before  discussing  the  communications  which  are 
available  between  Old  Greece,  that  is,  the  area  which 
formed  part  of  the  Hellenic  monarchy  before  the 
Balkan  Wars,  and  the  remainder  of  the  peninsula,  it 
may  be  well  to  remind  my  readers  that  whilst  that 
country  possessed  a  fairly  effective  railway  system, 
that  system  was  not  until  after  those  Wars  connected 


210  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE  WAR 

with  the  railways  of  the  remainder  of  Europe.  For 
years  two  more  or  less  rival  schemes,  each  destined  to 
accomplish  this  object,  had  been  under  consideration. 
The  Turkish  proposal  was  for  the  construction  of  a 
line  to  join  Larissa  in  Greece  with  Veria  on  the  Salonica- 
Monastir  line.  This  line  would  have  run  parallel  to 
but  well  away  from  the  coast.  The  Greeks,  on  the 
other  hand,  favoured  the  provision  of  a  line  extending 
almost  along  the  shore  of  the  Gulf  of  Salonica  from 
Karate  Derven,  their  terminus,  to  Gidia  on  the  above- 
mentioned  line.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  in  January,  1914, 
a  contract  was  signed  between  the  Hellenic  Govern- 
ment and  a  French  company  for  the  building  of  a  line 
to  follow  this  the  original  Greek  route,  and  the  line 
is  now  available  for  traffic. 

With  regard  to  roads,  there  are  three  principal 
routes  by  which  Greece  maintains  communication 
with  her  new  provinces.  To  begin  with  there  is  a 
good  road  from  Prevesa,  at  the  entrance  to  the  Gulf 
of  Arta,  to  Janina.  Further  to  the  northeast  there 
is  a  route  which  connects  Kalabaka  —  a  Greek  rail- 
way terminus  —  with  Janina  by  way  of  Metsovo. 
Again,  from  Larissa  it  is  possible  to  travel  by  way  of 
Elasona  to  Kozani  and  thence  to  the  Salonica-Monastir 
railway  by  several  different  roads. 

In  approaching  a  discussion  of  the  last  question  to 
be  dealt  with  here,  namely,  the  routes  leading  into  the 
heart  of  Bulgaria  from  the  south  and  southwest,  it 
may  be  said  that  there  are  three  principal  lines,  none 
of  which  is  followed  by  a  completed  railway,  and  all 
of  which  are  practicable  for  wheeled  traffic.  Two  of 
these  traverse  or  practically  traverse  the  Rhodope 
Balkans  and  the  third  runs  from  Northern  Macedonia 


MILITARY  HIGHWAYS  OF  THE   BALKANS     211 

up  to  the  Serbo-Biilgarian  frontier.  Of  the  first  pair 
the  most  easterly  route  is  tliat  which  connects  Gu- 
niuljina  on  the  Dede  Agatch  Kne  with  Haskovo  in 
Old  Bulgaria.  The  greater  part  of  the  road,  which 
now  lies  wholly  in  Bulgaria,  was  constructed  by  the 
Turks  for  military  purposes  during  the  closing  years 
of  the  reign  of  Abdul  Ilamid.  After  the  Balkan  Wars 
it  was  greatly  improved  by  the  Bulgarians,  who  fore- 
saw its  enormous  importance  as  a  means  of  communi- 
cation with  the  coast.  Always  well  engineered  and 
laid  out,  this  road  is  certainly  now  practicable  for 
motor  traffic,  for  before  the  entry  of  Bulgaria  into 
the  War  it  was  easy  to  make  the  whole  journey  in  a 
day,  and  by  the  use  of  motor  cars  for  hire  in  Haskovo 
or  even  in  a  motor  diligence  which  maintained  a  daily 
service. 

At  the  end  of  1913  when  it  became  necessary  for  the 
Bulgarians  to  turn  their  attention  to  the  provision 
of  some  satisfactory  port  upon  the  Aegean,  and  to 
connect  that  port  with  the  interior  by  a  line  not  pass- 
ing through  Turkish  territory,  the  preliminary  surveys 
for  a  railway  to  follow  more  or  less  the  above  route 
were  undertaken.  Owing  to  the  engineering  difficulties 
and  to  the  necessity  for  two  important  tunnels,  the 
construction  of  this  line  would  have  taken  three  or 
four  years,  and  nothing  further  was  done  to  realise 
the  project  before  the  entry  of  Bulgaria  into  the 
present  War. 

If  we  ignore  the  road  which  leads  into  but,  unless 
it  has  just  been  prolonged,  not  right  across  the  Rho- 
dopes  from  Drama,  and  which  runs  up  the  Mesta 
Valley,  the  next  route  by  which  it  is  possible  to  advance 
right  into  the  interior  is  that  which  takes  the  valley 


212  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE  WAR 

of  the  Struma,  and  therefore  hugs  the  banks  of  the 
river  of  that  name.  This  Hne  constitutes  the  natural 
outlet  for  Bulgaria  towards  the  Aegean,  and  particularly 
by  way  of  the  port  of  Kavala.  It  is  for  this  reason 
that  the  Government  of  Sofia  was  particularly  anxious 
to  obtain  possession  of  that  port,  and  to  secure  a 
frontier  which  gave  to  Bulgaria  the  whole  Struma 
Valley. 

A  good  and  thoroughly  passable  Struma  Valley 
road,  which  has  now  been  supplemented  by  a  light 
railway  for  the  greater  part  of  its  length,  connects 
Demir  Hissar  w^ith  Radomir.  For  some  years  prior  to 
the  Balkan  Wars  the  construction  of  a  railway  by  way 
of  this  route  was  under  discussion.  That  the  scheme 
was  not  executed  was  due  to  military  and  political 
rather  than  to  economic  considerations.  For  obvious 
reasons  the  Turks  were  anxious  for  its  construction 
as  an  alternative  to  the  proposed  Bulgarian  line  from 
Gyuveshevo  to  Komanovo,  and  this  because  it  would 
have  been  easj^  of  attack  from  the  west  and  from  the 
east,  and  because  it  would  not  have  given  to  Bulgaria 
those  political  advantages  possessed  by  a  line  leading 
direct  from  Sofia  into  Bulgarian  Macedonia.  The 
idea  was  also  favoured  by  the  French  Salonica-Dede. 
Agatch  Railway  Company  because  the  line  in  question 
would  have  constituted  an  important  feeder  to  their 
system.  But  the  Bulgarians  were  willing  to  build 
their  section  only  on  the  condition  that  the  Turks 
agreed  to  construct  the  Gyuveshevo-Komanovo  line. 
The  permanent  realisation  of  this  idea,  as  of  many 
others  connected  with  the  Balkan  Peninsula,  will  now 
entirely  depend  upon  the  territorial  changes  brought 
about  by  the  war. 


MILITARY  HIGHWAYS  OF  THE   BALKANS     213 

As  the  means  of  communication  between  the  valleys 
of  the  Vardar  and  the  Struma  are  bad,  the  only  other 
route  into  Bulgaria  which  is  worthy  of  consideration 
here  is  that  from  Northern  Macedonia  and  that  which 
connects  Komanovo  on  the  TJskub-Nish  railway  with 
Gyuveshevo,  the  Bulgarian  frontier  terminus.  The 
road  is  certainly  passable  for  wheeled  traffic,  and  it  is 
probable  that  ere  now  it  has  been  rendered  practicable 
for  motors.  For  some  years  it  has  always  been  con- 
sidered that  this  route  might  be  the  one  to  be  followed 
by  the  first  line  to  establish  through  connection  be- 
tween the  Danube  and  the  Adriatic.  No  serious 
engineering  difficulties  exist,  and  the  only  portion  of 
the  line  that  would  be  costly  to  construct  is  the  tunnel 
piercing  the  Deve  Bair  Mountain.  It  is  therefore 
probable  that  since  their  occupation  of  this  part  of 
the  country  the  Bulgarians  have  built  or  are  build- 
ing at  least  the  section  of  this  line  where  no  tunnels 
are  required. 

Partly  owing  to  the  great  difference  between/  the 
amount  of  water  in  most  of  the  rivers  after  the  melting 
of  the  snows  and  after  the  dry  season,  and  partly  owing 
to  the  lack  of  public  works,  the  rivers  of  the  Balkan 
Peninsula,  except  the  Danube,  the  Save,  and  the 
Boyana,  are  not  systematically  navigated.  I  have 
already  referred  to  the  importance  of  the  Danube. 
The  Save,  which  more  or  less  forms  the  western  section 
of  the  northern  frontier  of  the  peninsula,  has  a  length 
of  about  four  hundred  and  forty  miles,  but  of  these 
only  about  three  hundred  and  fifty  are  navigable. 
The  Boyana,  which  constitutes  an  outlet  for  Lake 
Scutari,  flows  into  the  Adriatic  between  the  towns  of 
Dulcigno  and  San  Giovanni  di  Medua.     In  its  lower 


214  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE  WAR 

course  it  forms  the  boundary  of  Montenegro  and 
Albania.  When  the  river  is  full,  and  when  there  is 
enough  water  to  get  over  the  bar  at  its  mouth,  it  is 
navigable  for  small  vessels  as  far  as  Oboti.  Thence 
to  the  port  of  Scutari  there  is  only  sufficient  water 
for  small  stern-wheeled  vessels  or  for  boats  whose 
owners  make  their  livelihoods  by  conveying  passengers 
from  lake  and  river  vessels  to  the  quay.  Small  barges 
or  flat-bottomed  boats  may  be  seen  drifting  down  the 
lower  reaches  of  the  Maritza,  and  the  rivers  of  the 
Rhodope  Balkans  are  utilised  for  floating  logs  and  trees 
to  the  plain  which  skirts  the  Aegean  Sea ;  but  the  rivers 
have  not  really  been  used  for  the  furtherance  of  trade. 
In  the  foregoing  pages  I  have  endeavoured  to  give 
some  idea  of  the  military  highways  of  the  Balkans. 
In  so  doing  I  have  not  attempted  fully  to  discuss 
the  various  parts  played  by  these  communications  in 
the  present  war,  and  I  have  purposely  considered  the 
position  of  the  frontiers  and  the  ownership  of  the 
railways  to  be  as  they  were  before  the  War.  To  have 
done  otherwise  would  have  meant  that  I  must  still 
further  have  burdened  my  readers  with  countless 
details,  and  that  I  must  either  have  gone  into  par- 
ticulars which  it  were  better  should  not  be  published, 
or  else  that  I  should  have  been  compelled  to  treat 
the  whole  question  so  superficially  that  my  remarks 
would  have  been  worthy  of  no  serious  attention. 
Consequently,  if  I  have  only  dealt  indirectly  with  mili- 
tary questions,  which  are  now  of  vital  interest  to  all, 
I  trust  that  I  may  have  been  able  to  do  something  to 
make  clearer  various  geographical  and  other  questions 
possessed  of  far-reaching  strategical  influence  upon  a 
situation  which  is  rapidly  changing  from  day  to  day. 


IX 

THE  DARDANELLES   CAMPAIGN 

In  the  previous  chapter,  I  have  endeavoured  to  show 
that  for  years  the  situation  in  the  East  has  been  closely 
bound  up  with  the  fact  that  the  Balkan  Peninsula  — 
the  Balkan  States  and  Turkey  in  Europe  —  constituted 
and  constitute  not  the  Germanic  goal  but  the  corridor 
towards  a  goal,  and  that  Germany  has  been  and  is 
determined,  by  means  of  the  "Drang  nach  Osten", 
to  strike  a  deadly  blow  at  the  very  vitals  of  the  British 
Empire  and  to  prevent  Russia  from  pushing  forward 
actually  or  morally  towards  warm  water.  Thus, 
whilst  by  a  temporary  military  penetration  across  the 
Balkans  and  right  into  Asiatic  Turkey,  the  Central 
Powers  have  greatly  increased  the  strength  of  their 
strategic  position,  still  more  by  the  driving  of  a  per- 
manent wedge  through  the  same  areas  would  they  have 
triumphed  by  endangering  the  Allied  position  through- 
out the  East.  By  the  same  means  they  would  have 
postponed  indefinitely  a  change  in  the  status  of  the 
Straits,  — the  Dardanelles  and  the  Bosphorus.  On  the 
other  hand,  were  good  relations  to  be  established  be- 
tween the  Balkan  States,  and  were  Allied  influence 
to  increase  there,  at  Constantinople  and  in  Asia  Minor, 
then  an  Allied  wedge  would  prevent  Germanic  expan- 
sion towards  the  East.     From  the  moment  of  the  out- 


216  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE  WAR 

break  of  the  War,  therefore,  and  particularly  from  Octo- 
ber 31,  1914,  when  Turkey  threw  in  her  lot  upon  the 
side  of  the  Central  Powers,  it  was  the  question  of  this 
Germanic  wedge,  or  rather  of  the  preventing  of  it, 
which  constituted  the  real  raison  d'etre  and  the  cause 
of  the  Allied  operations  both  at  the  Dardanelles  and 
at  Salonica. 

For  centuries  Constantinople,  covering  as  it  does 
the  great  land  route  from  Europe  to  Asia  as  well  as 
the  water  highway  between  the  Black  Sea  and  the 
Mediterranean,  has  been  the  object  of  many  aspira- 
tions. From  earliest  times  the  reigning  monarch  in 
this  city  has  been  able  to  control  these  two  great  thor- 
oughfares as  a  result  of  the  fortifications  constructed 
to  protect  his  capital  from  attack  by  land  and  sea. 
In  the  past  the  defences  of  the  Dardanelles  and  the 
Bosphorus  have  not  only  safeguarded  the  position  of 
the  Turkish  capital,  but  they  have  also  protected  the 
Sea  of  Marmora.  Thus  so  long  as  these  two  channels 
remain  impregnable  the  Ottoman  Government  can 
not  only  bring  troops  from  Asia  Minor  and  land  them  in 
Europe,  but  the  Sultan  and  his  Allies  can  pour  armies 
into  Asia  Minor,  thence  to  send  them  by  railway  and 
by  road  to  areas  from  which  they  can  threaten  the 
Egyptian  frontier  and  the  British  positions  in  the  Per- 
sian Gulf  and  even  in  India. 

Without  entering  into  details,  and  ignoring  a  ques- 
tion of  all-preponderating  importance  to  which  I  will 
proceed  below,  it  must  therefore  be  apparent  that  a 
successful  campaign  against  the  forts  defending  the 
Dardanelles  and  the  Bosphorus  would  have  been  pos- 
sessed of  consequences  the  far-reaching  results  of  which 
it  is  impossible  to   exaggerate.     To  begin   with,   the 


THE  DARDANELLES  CAMPAIGN  217 

presence  of  an  Allied  fleet  in  the  Sea  of  Marmora 
would  have  placed  Constantinople  —  the  key  of  the 
Ottoman  Empire  —  at  our  mercy.  Knowing  the  Turks 
and  their  leaders  as  I  do,  I  think  that  this  would  have 
meant  immediate  overtures  for  peace  on  their  part. 
But,  had  this  not  been  the  case,  there  seems  every 
reason  to  believe  that  the  arrival  of  an  Allied  fleet  off 
Constantinople  would  have  strengthened  the  hands  of 
the  peace  party  and  consequently  that  it  would  have 
brought  about  a  revolution.  This  belief  is  supported 
by  the  opinions  of  such  men  as  Lord  Kitchener  and 
Lord  Grey,  who,  according  to  the  report  of  the  Darda- 
nelles Commissioners,  "confidently  looked  forward 
to  a  revolution  taking  place  in  Constantinople  if  once 
the  British  Fleet  appeared  in  the  Sea  of  Marmora." 
In  addition,  had  these  highly  desirable  objects  been 
achieved,  their  immediate  effect  would  have  been  the 
entry  into  the  Wai-  then  and  there  upon  our  side  of  the 
at  that  time  neutral  Balkan  States,  —  Bulgaria,  Greece, 
and  Roumania,  —  thereby  creating  a  situation  the 
meaning  of  which  must  be  obvious  to  the  least  well- 
informed  student  of  the  War. 

Provided  adequate  preparations  had  been  made,  and 
provided  the  operations  had  been  inaugurated  as  a 
combined  naval  and  military  campaign,  instead  of 
being  begun  by  the  fleet  alone,  these  objectives  might 
in  themselves  have  been  well  worth  the  risks  and  the 
cost  of  an  undertaking,  which,  however  it  were  carried 
out,  would  certainly  have  been  costly.  This  being 
the  case,  the  question  of  a  possible  attack  upon  the 
Dardanelles  was  naturally  discussed  by  the  British 
Cabinet  directly  after  the  entry  of  Turkey  into  the 
War.     Nevertheless   nothinfj   definite   was   done   until 


218  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE   WAR 

early  in  January,  1915,  when  the  attitude  of  the  AlHed 
Governments  was  of  necessity  suddenly  changed  by 
the  receipt,  on  January  2,  of  a  very  important  telegram 
from  the  British  Ambassador  at  Petrograd,  expressing 
a  hope,  on  behalf  of  the  Russian  Government,  that  a 
demonstration  against  the  Turks  would  be  made.^ 
Whilst  we  do  not  know  the  exact  contents  of  this 
telegram  —  contents  which  were  probably  far  more 
pressing  and  far  more  dictatorial  than  one  is  sometimes 
allowed  to  believe  —  we  are  told  in  the  Dardanelles 
Report  that  they  "materially  affected  the  situation" 
and  that  "The  British  Government  considered  that 
something  must  be  done  in  response  to  it."  In  other 
words,  an  operation  which  might  or  might  not  have 
been  a  justifiable  "gamble"  was  suddenly  forced 
forward  into  a  position  in  which  it  had  to  be  considered 
not  only  in  reference  to  its  direct  military  importance 
but  also  in  proportion  to  its  indirect  political  and 
military  consequences  —  consequences  which  might 
have  ensued  had  the  Western  Allies  taken  up  an  atti- 
tude based  solely  upon  their  own  strategical  and  mili- 
tary positions  at  that  time.  Under  these  circumstances 
I  propose  therefore  to  ask  my  readers  to  accept  the 
opinion  that  the  undertaking  itself  was  rendered  practi- 
cally unavoidable  by  the  above-mentioned  Russian 
demand  and  that  its  failure  was  the  result  not  merely 
of  shortcomings  in  the  conduct  of  the  campaign,  but 
that  it  was  due  largely  on  the  one  hand  to  the  necessity 
of  doing  something  to  relieve  the  pressure  upon  Russia, 

1  That  telegram  and  many  other  details  connected  with  the  inauguration 
of  the  Dardanelles  campaign  are  referred  to  in  the  "  Dardanelles  Commis- 
sion —  First  Report "  which  was  presented  to  Parliament  by  command  of  His 
Majesty  and  published  in  1917  as  an  official  document  numbered  Cd  8490. 


THE   DARDANELLES  CAMPAIGN  219 

when  England  and  France  were  already  fully  occupied 
elsewhere,  and  on  the  other  to  the  enormous  geographi- 
cal difficulties  which  I  will  now  endeavour  to  describe. 

Before  doing  this,  I  must,  however,  explain  that  as 
various  journeys  in  Turkey  in  Europe  and  in  Asia 
Minor  have  led  me,  under  different  pretexts,  to  wander 
over  most  of  the  ground  about  which  I  am  writing, 
my  task  is  a  particularly  difficult  one.  Not  only  am 
I  obliged  to  consider  how  much  or  how  little  of  my 
knowledge  I  am  justified  in  imparting  to  the  public, 
but  I  am  also  compelled  for  obvious  reasons  to  with- 
hold the  dates  and  the  methods  by  which  I  obtained 
my  information.  To  do  otherwise  might  be  not 
only  to  endanger  the  property  but  perhaps  even  the 
lives  of  some  of  those  who  may  still  be  in,  or  who  after 
the  War  may  be  returning  to  Turkey. 

Picnics  and  shooting  expeditions  may  not  have  ex- 
cited the  suspicions  of  certain  local  officials,  but  even 
so  it  would  be  impossible  to  disclose  the  localities  in 
which  these  pleasurable  excursions  took  place,  or  to 
reveal  the  identities  of  the  different  kinds  of  people 
with  whom  they  were  organised.  Consequently,  if 
any  of  my  descriptions  seem  somewhat  disjointed 
and  confused,  and  if  I  leave  out  altogether  any  refer- 
ences to  the  routes  and  methods  by  which  I  reached 
the  Peninsula  of  Gallipoli,  I  hope  that  my  readers  will 
bear  with  me  and  believe  that  I  am  endeavouring  so 
far  as  is  possible  under  the  circumstances  and  in  the 
available  space  to  give  them  an  outline  of  the  nature 
of  the  defences  of  Constantinople  and  to  bring  my 
knowledge  of  the  country  to  bear  in  describing  a  cam- 
paign which  was  probably  more  difficult  than  any 
which  has  ever  been  inauiJjurated  in  modern  times. 


220  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE   WAR 

Owing  to  its  geographical  position,  Constantinople 
is  easy  to  defend  by  land  and  sea.  The  city  is  situated 
at  the  southeastern  extremity  of  a  sort  of  peninsula, 
which  is  bounded  on  the  north  by  the  Black  Sea,  on 
the  east  by  the  Bosphorus,  and  on  the  south  by  the 
Sea  of  Marmora.  Thus  by  land  the  capital  has  only 
to  be  protected  on  one,  its  western  front.  On  the  sea 
side  Constantinople  is  also  extremely  strong,  because 
the  Marmora  can  only  be  approached  by  way  of  the 
Bosphorus  on  the  north  and  through  the  Dardanelles 
on  the  southwest.  In  order  to  make  my  account  of 
these  three  series  of  defences  the  more  clear,  I  will 
divide  it  into  three  sections  devoted  respectively  to 
descriptions  of :  — 

(1)  The  land  defences  including  the  Chatalja  Lines, 

(2)  The  Bosphorus  forts, 

(3)  The  Dardanelles  forts. 

(1)  The  land  defences  of  the  city  are  divided  into 
two  sections :  the  Constantinople  and  the  Chatalja 
Lines.  The  Constantinople  Lines  are  made  up  of  an 
outer  and  an  inner  ring  of  earthen  forts,  which  extend 
from  the  village  of  Makri  Keuie  on  the  Sea  of  Marmora, 
and  about  two  and  a  half  miles  west  of  the  ancient  city 
walls,  to  Buyukdere,  on  the  Bosphorus,  and  at  a  dis- 
tance of  about  twelve  miles  from  Constantinople. 
For  some  years  these  forts  have  been  said  to  be  out  of 
repair  and  unarmed,  and  their  power  of  resistance  is 
but  very  small  when  compared  to  that  of  the  Chatalja 
Lines. 

(2)  The  Chatalja  Lines,  which  constitute  the  real 
land  defences  of  the  capital,  extend  across  the  Constan- 
tinople Peninsula,  at  a  distance  of  about  twenty -five 
miles  to  the  west  of  the  city.     Designed  by  Von  Bluhm 


THE  DARDANELLES   CAMPAIGN  221 

Pasha,  when  the  Russian  army  was  advancing  on  Con- 
stantinople in  1878,  they  cover  a  front  of  about  sixteen 
miles,  a  front  which  is  flanked  on  the  south  by  Lake 
Buyuk  Chekmedche  —  an  inlet  of  the  Sea  of  Marmora, 
and  on  the  north  by  Derkos  Gol.  The  forts,  which 
number  about  thirty,  are  constructed  on  a  ridge  of 
hills  about  five  hundred  feet  above  the  level  of  the  sea, 
A  small  stream  runs  across  practically  their  entire 
front.  The  position  is  therefore  extremely  strong,  for 
its  flanks  rest  upon  the  sea  and  upon  these  impassable 
lakes  and  therefore  they  cannot  be  turned.  The  forts 
had  always  been  maintained  in  an  effective  state,  but 
during  and  since  the  Balkan  Wars  no  stone  had  been 
left  unturned  to  render  up-to-date  land  defences  which 
rank  only  second  in  importance  to  the  forts  situated 
on  the  Bosphorus  and  the  Dardanelles.  It  is  therefore 
argued,  even  in  well-informed  circles,  that  had  the 
Peninsula  of  Gallipoli  once  been  conquered  by  the 
Allies,  or  had  an  Allied  fleet  made  its  way  into  the 
Marmora,  it  might  still  have  remained  necessary  to 
undertake  land  operations  on  a  large  scale  in  order  to 
penetrate  the  Chatalja  Lines,  and  therefore  actually 
to  advance  upon  Constantinople.  Militarily  speak- 
ing, there  may  be  something  in  this  point  of  view, 
but  I  am  convinced  that,  had  a  fleet  once  arrived  off 
the  Golden  Horn,  the  Turks  would  either  have  volun- 
tarily surrendered  the  city,  or  a  revolution  would  have 
taken  place  which  would  have  rendered  it  unnecessary 
for  that  fleet  either  to  shell  the  town  or  for  the  city  to 
be  attacked  from  the  land  as  well  as  from  the  sea  side. 
Turning  to  the  Bosphorus,  which  is  important  in 
connection  with  the  Dardanelles  campaign  because  it 
was  possible  that  Russian  assistance  might  be  forth- 


THE   CRADLE   OF  THE   WAR 

coming  from  that  direction,  assistance  which  it  would 
seem  that  the  Western  Allies  were  entitled  to  expect, 
the  length  of  that  channel,  measured  from  the  Seraglio 
Point  at  Constantinople  to  the  mouth  of  the  Black 
Sea,  is  about  nineteen  miles.  The  breadth  varies 
from  about  seven  hundred  and  fifty  yards,  just  above 
Rumeli  Hissar,  to  a  little  over  two  miles  in  Buyukdere 
Bay.  Except  when  the  wind  is  exceedingly  strong 
from  the  south  and  southwest,  the  current  runs  from 
the  Black  Sea  to  the  Sea  of  Marmora  with  an  average 
speed  of  two  and  a  half  miles  per  hour,  but  opposite 
Rumeli  Hissar  a  speed  of  five  miles  per  hour  is  occa- 
sionally obtained.  The  winds  are  changeable,  at  times 
blowing  from  one  direction  at  one  end  of  the  Bosphorus 
and  from  another  direction  at  the  opposite  end.  Unlike 
the  Dardanelles,  the  Bosphorus,  which  resembles  a 
winding  river,  is  bordered  by  picturesque  wooden 
houses  and  by  fine  and  stately  palaces.  Indeed,  both 
sides  of  this  miraculous,  wonderful  water  highway 
are  so  thickly  populated  that  two  continuous  towns, 
or  more  correctly  two  long  series  of  villages,  run  prac- 
tically all  the  way  from  Galata  to  Buyukdere  on  the 
European  side,  and  from  Scutari  to  Beikos  on  the  Asiatic 
Coast.  Almost  throughout  the  length  of  the  Bosphorus 
both  shores  rise  immediately  from  the  water's  edge, 
in  some  places  the  coasts  ascend  to  a  height  of  a  little 
more  than  low  hills,  but  in  others  their  elevation  reaches 
that  of  hundreds  of  feet,  the  highest  levels  being  at- 
tained on  the  borders  of  the  northern  end.  Many 
small  valleys  intersect  these  hills,  and  countless  bays 
add  picturesqueness  to  the  scene. 

The  most  important  forts   which  defend  the  Bos- 
phorus nearly   all   lie  between  Buyukdere  in  Europe 


THE  DARDANELLES  CAMPAIGN  223 

and  Beikos  in  Asia  and  the  Black  Sea  entrance  to  the 
channel  —  thus  leaving  the  southern  and  thickly  popu- 
lated parts  of  the  coast  almost  entirely  undefended. 
The  forts  are  extremely  well  hidden,  many  of  them 
being  so  carefully  placed  that  it  is  easy  to  pass  up  or 
down  the  channel  without  becoming  aware  of  their 
existence.  Some  are  placed  close  to  the  water's  edge, 
and  some  are  on  the  slopes  of  the  hills.  Moreover, 
the  defences  are  so  arranged  as  to  cover  the  various 
more  or  less  straight  lengths,  in  such  a  way  as  to  be 
able  to  fire  upon  ships  alike  before  they  reach,  as  they 
pass,  and  after  they  have  passed  them.  But  although 
during  recent  years  much  work  has  been  done  on  the 
Bosphorus,  there  is  no  doubt,  even  if  they  had  to  be 
attacked  only  from  the  north,  that  the  defences  of  this 
area  are  much  less  strong  and  far  less  numerous  than 
are  those  situated  on  the  Dardanelles. 

As  in  the  case  of  the  Dardanelles,  the  passage  of  a 
hostile  fleet  through  the  Bosphorus  could  be  furthered 
by  the  landing  of  a  force  on  one  or  both  of  its  shores. 
Owing,  however,  to  the  existence  of  the  Chatalja 
Lines,  it  would  be  difficult  to  take  the  forts  on  the 
European  coast  in  the  rear,  or  more  correctly  it  would 
be  necessary  for  a  landing  party  to  be  disembarked 
somewhere  within,  that  is,  to  the  east  of,  these  lines. 
The  places  suitable  for  such  a  landing  arc  naturally 
strictly  limited,  but  the  best  is  Kelia  Bay,  which,  I 
believe,  is  provided  with  a  fort  to  guard  the  main 
defences  from  any  attack  in  rear,  or  at  least  to  form  a 
lookout  station.  On  the  Asiatic  coast,  on  the  other 
hand,  a  landing  from  the  Black  Sea  was  always  more 
feasible.  Troops,  disembarked  at  or  near  Riva  on 
the  Black  Sea,  would  only  have  had  to  advance  for 


224  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE   WAR 

a  very  few  miles  in  order  to  occupy  the  high  ground 
lying  at  the  back  of  and  commanding  the  Asiatic  forts 
of  the  Bosphorus,  forts  which  are  practically  at  no 
point  situated  on  the  summit  of  the  hills.  The  exist- 
ence of  a  road  from  Riva  to  Beikos  would  have  assisted 
a  force  moving  from  this  direction,  and  such  a  force 
might  have  been  able  to  get  guns  on  to  the  above- 
mentioned  high  ground  had  a  landing  been  effected, 
either  as  a  surprise  or  when  the  Turks  were  not  in  a 
position  adequately  to  defend  this  area.  More  or 
less  the  same  difficulties  would  have  occurred  as  in 
the  attack  on  the  Peninsula  of  Gallipoli,  but,  knowing 
the  ground  in  both  areas,  I  consider  that  that  situated 
at  the  back  of  the  Bosphorus  forts  is  the  easier,  and 
that  even  a  threatened  attack  in  this  direction  would 
have  greatly  minimised  the  magnitude  of  our  task  at 
the  Darda^nelles. 

The  northeastern  end  of  the  Dardanelles  is  distant 
from  Constantinople  one  hundred  and  thirty  miles. 
The  length  of  the  Straits,  which  are  winding  and 
extremely  difficult  to  navigate,  is  some  thirty-three 
miles.  The  breadth  varies  from  about  thirteen  hun- 
dred yards  when  measured  between  the  towns  of 
Chanak,  on  the  Asiatic  coast,  and  Kilid  Bahr,  on 
the  European  shore,  to  four  miles  or  five  miles  shortly 
after  the  entrance  to  the  Straits  from  the  Aegean  Sea. 
A  strong  current  runs  from  the  Marmora  towards  the 
Mediterranean.  When  the  wind  blows  from  the  north- 
east, that  is,  more  or  less  straight  down  the  channel, 
the  difficulties  of  navigation  and  the  speed  of  the 
current  are  considerably  increased. 

The  Peninsula  of  Gallipoli,  which  bounds  the  Dar- 
danelles on  the  northwest,  is  a  long,  narrow  tongue  of 


THE   DARDANELLES   CAMPAIGN  225 

land,  some  thirty -five  miles  in  length.  Its  width  is 
only  three  miles,  when  measured  across  the  Isthmus 
of  Bulair,  lying  as  it  does  to  the  northeast  of  the  town 
of  Gallipoli.  More  to  the  southwest  it  widens  out, 
only  to  narrow  again  to  a  breadth  of  about  four  miles 
in  rear  of  the  town  of  Maidos.  The  northwestern  and 
western  shores  of  the  peninsula  are  washed  by  the 
waters  of  the  Gulf  of  Saros  and  of  the  Aegean  Sea. 
The  coast  rises  in  many  places  precipitously  from  the 
water's  edge.  Nearly  the  whole  of  the  country  in 
rear  of  Maidos  and  of  Kilid  Bahr  consists  of  hills 
which,  in  many  places,  attain  a  height  of  six  or  seven 
hundred  feet  above  the  level  of  the  sea.  These  hills 
are  intersected  by  small  rocky  valleys,  with  steep, 
almost  precipitous  sides,  up  which  I  have  climbed 
often  on  my  hands  and  knees.  Much  of  the  country, 
and  especially  these  valleys,  which  run  for  the  most 
part  across,  and  not  up  and  down,  the  peninsula,  are 
covered  with  scrubby  bushes  about  two  or  three  feet 
high.  These  bushes  tear  one's  boots  and  clothes 
and  person,  and  thus,  even  in  peace  time,  make  walk- 
ing through  them  a  highly  difficult  and  disagreeable 
experience.  The  hills  immediately  to  the  west  and 
southwest  of  Kilid  Bahr  are  prettily  wooded,  the  trees 
extending  almost  to  the  seashore.  Except  where  the 
Turks  and  the  Germans  had  recently  improved  them, 
the  roads  along  and  across  the  peninsula  were  very 
bad,  for  before  the  War  communication  had  usually 
been  maintained  by  sea.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  one  of 
the  most  unpleasant  tasks  imposed  upon  the  Allied 
troops  on  the  peninsula  was  that  of  making  and  improv- 
ing roads,  a  task  of  necessity  performed  under  the 
shell-  if  not  the  rifle-fire  of  the  enemy. 


226  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE  WAR 

The  most  important  town  on  the  peninsula  is  GalH- 
poH,  at  the  northeastern  entrance  to  the  Dardanelles. 
Its  population  is  about  fourteen  thousand  souls.  The 
place  is  essentially  Turkish,  and  was  the  first  to  fall 
into  the  hands  of  the  Osmanlis,  soon  after  Sulieman 
Pasha  crossed  the  Dardanelles  and  planted  the  standard 
of  the  Crescent  in  Europe  in  the  year  1356.  The  only 
other  towns  of  any  importance  are  Maidos  and  Kilid 
Bahr,  lying  much  lower  down  the  peninsula.  Like 
the  remainder  of  the  peninsula,  which  is  but  sparsely 
populated,  both  these  places  would  be  practically 
unknown  were  it  not  for  the  strategic  value  of  the 
country  which  surrounds  them.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
they  are  hardly  ever  visited  by  a  foreigner,  for,  in 
addition  to  the  actual  diflSculties  of  communication, 
obstacles  are  placed  in  the  way  of  every  stranger  both 
before  and  during  his  visit  to  this  all-important  area. 

The  modern  defences  of  the  Peninsula  of  Gallipoli 
may  practically  be  divided  into  four  groups  : 

(1)  The  two  forts  built  to  protect  the  outer  entrance 
to  the  channel  and  lying  in  the  immediate  neighbour- 
hood of  Cape  Helles  and  of  Sedd-el-Bahr.  Whilst 
these  forts  were  armed  with  fairly  big  guns,  their 
importance  and  power  of  resistance  have  always  been 
insignificant  when  compared  with  those  guarding  the 
Narrows.  In  this  first  group,  too,  there  should  be 
included  two  forts,  or  batteries,  which  are  situated 
respectively  about  seven  and  a  half  miles  and  about 
nine  and  a  half  miles  from  the  southwestern  extremity 
of  the  Dardanelles.  They  are  both  placed  close  to  the 
water's  edge. 

(2)  The  forts  in  rear  of,  and  near,  Kilid  Bahr,  and 
therefore  on,  or  immediately  below  or  above,  the  nar- 


n\/C  Forts  and  Baller.es 

SVWXY    Beaches  where  British  I: 
Dagh-Moontain    TepeHill    Height 


nded 
;  .n  (eet 


Southern-  Paut  (jf  thk  (>allipoli  Peninsula 

From  "Mai.  K"ok  of  tlic  WnrlJ-WKk.  War."  Thos.  Nelson  A:  Sons.  Limited,  London  and  Kdinlmr:;li 


THE  DARDANELLES   CAMPAIGN  227 

rowest  part  of  the  Straits.  These  forts,  which  are 
at  least  eleven  in  number,  constitute  by  far  the  strong- 
est portion  of  the  defences  of  the  Straits.  Here  the 
shore  hterally  bristles  with  redoubts,  some  being  hidden 
amongst  the  trees  which  cover  the  hills,  whilst  others 
are  dotted  about  right  down  to  the  water's  edge. 
Yildiz,  or  Tekeh  Fort,  which  has  always  been  consid- 
ered one  of  the  most  important  of  these  defences, 
lies  at  the  extreme  outer  end  of  the  group,  and  a  little 
to  the  southwest  of  Kilid  Bahr.  It  owes  its  strength 
to  its  height  above  the  water,  to  its  field  of  fire,  and 
to  the  consequent  diflSculty  of  damaging  it  from  the 
sea. 

(3)  The  forts  built  to  the  north  and  northeast  of 
Maidos  —  forts  which,  therefore,  lie  within  or  above  the 
narrowest  part  of  the  channel.  These  defences,  of 
which  there  are  six,  are  built  upon  the  summits  of  the 
various  hills  which  border  this  part  of  the  Straits. 
They  are  so  constructed  as  to  be  able  to  fire  across 
the  channel  towards  Nagara  Point,  up  the  Dardanelles 
in  the  direction  of  Gallipoli,  and  down  the  Straits 
towards  Chanak. 

(4)  The  Bulair  Lines.  These  defences  run  across 
the  Isthmus  of  Bulair,  and  thus  defend  the  Peninsula 
of  Gallipoli  from  an  attack  by  a  force  endeavouring 
to  advance  from  the  land  side.  They  consist  of  three 
or  four  redoubts,  connected  by  trenches  constructed 
to  cover  the  only  road  running  into  the  peninsula 
from  the  remainder  of  European  Turkey. 

There  is  a  great  contrast  between  the  two  shores  of 
the  Dardanelles.  The  Asiatic  coast  is  for  the  most 
part  lower,  and  the  appearance  of  the  country  is  greener 
and  more  fertile  than  that  of  the  Peninsula  of  Gallipoli. 


228  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE   WAR 

Communication  by  land  is  also  bad,  but  a  passable 
road  connects  Lamsaki  (just  opposite  Gallipoli)  with 
Chanak,  and  thence  runs  on  down  the  coast  towards 
the  entrance  of  the  Straits.  The  only  centre  of  any 
importance  is  Chanak  or  Dardanelles,  situated  oppo- 
site Kilid  Bahr,  and  united  with  that  place  by  a  sub- 
marine cable,  which  was  reported  destroyed  early  in 
the  campaign.  The  town,  which  possesses  a  popu- 
lation of  some  ten  thousand  people,  is  prettily  located 
on  the  water's  edge.  There  is  an  anchorage  for  ships, 
both  below  and  above  it,  and  prior  to  the  War  the  little 
bay  immediately  to  the  north  of  the  village  was  usually 
occupied  by  some  of  the  ships  which  go  to  make  up 
the  Turkish  fleet.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  it  was  here 
that  Messudiyeh  —  which  was  the  flagship  of  Admiral 
Limpus  until  he  left  Constantinople  prior  to  the  out- 
break of  war  —  was  torpedoed  by  the  British  submarine 
B  11  in  December,  1914.  In  connection  with  this 
event,  there  are  two  interesting  stories,  so  interesting 
indeed  that  they  would  be  unbelievable  had  I  not 
received  them  from  entirely  reliable  sources.  Ac- 
cording to  the  first,  when  the  vessel  was  struck,  there 
was  a  dull  boom,  and  a  high  cloud  of  smoke  and  water 
rose  from  the  surface  of  the  sea.  Within  five*  minutes 
she  turned  turtle,  but  as  the  water  was  shallow,  a 
section  of  the  hull  rested  on  the  bottom  whilst  the 
remainder  projected  above  the  sea.  Nearly  all  the 
crew  were  drowned,  the  only  exceptions,  as  it  was 
thought  at  the  time,  being  a  few  men  who  were  picked 
up.  However,  when  the  ship  had  settled  down,  bottom 
upwards,  knocks  were  heard  on  a  part  of  the  vessel 
which  was  not  under  water.  Men  were  set  to  work 
to  cut  a  hole,  and  after  the  rescuers  had  been  engaged 


THE   DARDANELLES   CAMPAIGN  229 

for  three  days  and  nights,  twenty-three  men  were 
got  out  ahve.  The  second  anecdote  gives  an  insight 
into  the  mentahty  of  the  Turks.  Anxious  to  prove 
that  although  Messudiyeh  had  been  lost  they  had 
secured  a  prize  of  no  mean  importance :  they  rigged 
up  a  motor  boat  to  look  like  a  submarine,  and  towed  it 
past  the  town  of  Chanak  and  up  to  Nagara  Point  in 
order  to  make  the  inhabitants  believe  that  the  British 
submarine,  which  in  fact  had  made  good  its  escape, 
had  been  downed  as  a  result  of  the  vigilance  of  the 
Ottoman  defence. 

Partly  owing  to  their  positions,  situated  generally 
more  or  less  upon  the  level  of  the  sea,  the  defences  of 
the  Asiatic  coast  are,  from  a  natural  point  of  view, 
decidedly  less  strong  than  are  those  built  upon  the 
Peninsula  of  Gallipoli.  The  Asiatic  forts  may,  how- 
ever, also  be  divided  into  three  main  or  principal  groups  : 

(1)  The  two  forts  built  to  protect  the  outer  entrance 
of  the  channel,  which  lie  in  the  more  or  less  immedi- 
ate vicinity  of  Kum  Kale.  These  forts  were  armed 
with  guns  of  a  considerable  size,  but  they  have  always 
been  considered,  like  those  corresponding  to  them  upon 
the  European  shore,  as  a  sort  of  advanced  guard  to 
the  main  defences  of  the  Straits.  In  this  outer  group, 
too,  there  are  three  other  forts,  namely,  those  located 
at  and  just  to  the  southwest  of  Kephez  Point. 

(2)  The  forts  at  and  near  the  town  of  Chanak,  and 
therefore  on  or  near  the  narrowest  part  of  the  channel. 
One  of  these,  Hamidieh  I  Tabia,  is  placed  rather  under 
a  mile  to  the  south  of  the  town  ;  another,  Hamidieh  III 
Tabia,  lies  at  Chanak,  and  two  more  are  located  above 
but  within  a  distance  of  about  one  mile  from  the  Nar- 
rows themselves. 


230  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE   WAR 

(3)  The  three  forts  built  on  or  in  the  neighbourhood 
of  Nagara  Point,  and  therefore  at  a  distance  of  about 
three  and  a  half  miles  above  the  Narrows.  These 
forts  occupy  a  very  strong  position,  owing  to  the  way 
in  which  this  cape  and  also  Cape  Abydos  run  out  into- 
the  channel,  thus  giving  two  of  them  good  fields  of  fire 
in  more  than  one  direction. 

The  above  details  are  sufficient  to  prove  the  great- 
ness of  the  task  undertaken  by  the  Allies  at  the  Dar- 
danelles. Throughout  the  last  few  years,  especially 
since  the  Turco-Italian  and  the  Balkan  wars,  and 
particularly  since  the  entry  of  Turkey  into  this  War, 
the  Turks  and  the  Germans  had  made  preparations 
to  defend  an  area  which  is  of  vital  importance  to  them. 
Moreover,  the  whole  situation  is  such  as  to  react  al- 
most entirely  against  belligerents  who  are  compelled 
to  depend  on  the  fire  of  ships  and  in  favour  of  those 
in  occupation  of  the  shores.  The  Dardanelles  are  so 
narrow  that  throughout  their  greater  part  the  power 
of  real  manoeuvring  is  denied  to  all  ships  except  those 
of  a  very  small  size.  For  the  same  reasons  —  that  is, 
owing  to  the  narrowness  and  to  the  winding  nature 
of  the  channel  —  the  great  guns  on  ships,  the  range 
of  which  is  many  miles,  cannot  be  utilised  to  the  fullest 
advantage.  Again,  the  Turks  were  able  to  employ 
all  kinds  of  weapons  which  would  have  been  valueless 
had  the  range  been  greater.  Mobile  batteries  of  guns 
and  howitzers  were  placed  in  countless  and  secluded 
valleys,  in  which  it  was  difficult  to  discover  their  posi- 
tion and  to  rain  lead  upon  them  from  the  sea.  These 
guns,  having  made  their  presence  unpleasantly  felt, 
were  moved  by  road  or  on  railway  lines  to  places  of 
safety  even  before  our  fire  could  be  brought  to  bear 


THE  DARDANELLES   CAMPAIGN  231 

upon  them.  The  existence  of  these  conditions  was 
extremely  detrimental  and  dangerous,  not  only  for 
the  smaller  vessels  endeavouring  to  penetrate  the 
Dardanelles,  but  also  for  the  Allied  troops  on  the  Penin- 
sula of  Gallipoli,  whose  lines  and  positions  could  be 
completely  raked  and  enfiladed  by  fire  from  Asia 
Minor. 

The  enemy  was  also  able  to  make  the  fullest  use  of 
mines,  and  to  fire  land  torpedoes  in  the  Dardanelles. 
These  latter  weapons  could  either  be  sent  on  their  way 
from  proper  torpedo  tubes,  or  by  other  methods  of  a 
more  impromptu  nature.  From  the  time  of  the  arrival 
of  enemy  submarines  in  the  Aegean  our  difficulties 
were  enormously  increased,  for  ships  which  might 
otherwise  have  been  employed-  to  protect  the  flank 
of  our  armies  were  open  to  the  continuous  danger  of 
being  torpedoed.  Again,  the  presence  of  these  under- 
water craft  made  it  impracticable  to  utilise  transports 
and  larger  ships  for  the  purpose  of  the  conveyance  of 
troops  to  and  from  the  peninsula.  Reliance  had 
therefore  to  be  placed  upon  all  manner  of  smaller  craft, 
and  the  position  of  each  and  every  new  landing  was 
influenced  by  the  difficulties  and  dangers  of  utilising 
these  smaller  craft  for  a  passage  of  more  than  a  few  brief 
hours  in  length. 

The  extremely  unfavourable  position  of  a  fleet  de- 
sirous of  entering  the  Sea*of  Marmora  thus  rendered 
it  highly  desirable  that  a  land  attack  upon  the  forts 
should  have  been  inaugurated  at  the  very  beginning 
of  the  operations.  Such  an  attack,  made  by  a  force 
landed  on  the  northwestern  coast  of  the  Peninsula 
of  Gallipoli,  where  in  places  the  shore  is  low  and  sandy, 
would  probably  have  been  destined  greatly  to  further 


232  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE  WAR 

the  task  of  the  fleet.  Indeed,  an  army  once  having 
gained  possession  of  the  hills  which  lie  in  rear  of  Maidos 
and  Kilid  Bahr  and  which  command  the  forts,  would 
have  been  in  control  of  the  whole  situation,  for,  from 
various  points  on  these  hills,  it  is  possible,  as  I  have 
done,  to  look  down  upon  and  into  some  of  the  European 
redoubts  of  which  we  all  heard  so  much  during  the 
campaign. 

The  disembarkment  of  such  a  force,  even  quite  at 
the  beginning  of  the  operations  and  before  the  enemy 
was  fully  prepared,  would  have  been  a  matter  of 
considerable  difficulty,  especially  as  some  years  ago, 
I  believe  in  1905  or  in  1906,  the  Turks,  in  an  endeavour 
to  guard  against  a  surprise  of  this  nature,  built  a  small 
lookout  station  on  Gaba  Tepe  —  a  little  promontory 
situated  on  the  western  shore  of  the  Peninsula  of 
Gallipoli  and  lying  at  a  distance  of  about  seven  miles 
to  the  northwest  of  Kilid  Bahr.  But  having  regard 
to  the  fact  that  most  of  the  forts  were  constructed 
to  fire  only  towards  the  Straits  and  to  the  enormous 
importance  of  striking  immediately  from  the  land  as 
well  as  from  the  sea,  that  this  was  not  attempted  or, 
more  correctly,  that  it  could  not  be  attempted  consti- 
tutes the  fatal  and  most  far-reaching  mistake  made 
at  the  Dardanelles.  It  meant,  when  land  operations 
were  finally  undertaken,  that  instead  of  these  opera- 
tions being  of  a  subsidiary  nature  and  instead  of  land- 
ing parties  threatening  the  rear  of  the  forts  whilst  the 
fleet  was  endeavouring  to  force  a  passage,  a  land 
campaign  of  great  magnitude  had  to  be  undertaken. 
In  other  words,  after  April  25,  1915,  the  ever-increas- 
ing interest  in  the  Dardanelles  operations  was  trans- 
ferred from  events  on  the  sea  to  those  on  the  land, 


THE   DARDANELLES  CAMPAIGN  233 

where  the  Allied  armies  were  called  upon  to  fight  a 
scries  of  great  battles  with  the  object  of  taking  the 
forts  by  means  of  siege  operations  instead  of  more  or 
less  by  surprise  as  might  have  been  the  case  earlier  in 
the  War. 

Turning  to  the  actual  operations,  into  which  I  will 
not  go  in  detail,  as  whole  books  have  been  written  upon 
the  subject,  it  may  be  said  that  the  campaign  was  di- 
vided into  three  stages  : 

(1)  The  original  naval  attack  upon  the  Straits,  which 
began  on  February  nineteenth.  From  that  time  on- 
wards until  the  sinking  of  Bouvet,  Irresistible,  and 
Ocean  and  the  damaging  of  Inflexible  and  Gaulois  on 
March  18,  a  series  of  attacks  were  made  upon  the 
forts  by  ships  which  entered  the  Dardanelles  and  by 
others  stationed  in  the  Gulf  of  Saros.  Queen  Eliza- 
beth and  other  vessels  made  use  of  indirect  fire  and 
threw  shells  right  over  the  Peninsula  of  Gallipoli. 
Mine-sweeping  operations  were  carried  out,  and  certain 
of  the  forts  which  defended  the  extreme  southwestern 
end  of  the  Straits  were  practically,  if  not  absolutely, 
destroyed.  The  net  results  of  these  operations  were 
that  indirect  fire,  even  when  employed  with  the  assist- 
ance of  air  observation,  proved  to  be  little  more  than 
a  waste  of  ammunition ;  that  the  Dardanelles  forts 
were  much  stronger  than  seems  to  have  been  supposed  ; 
and  that  the  Turks,  by  the  use  of  mines,  possessed  a 
deadly  advantage,  the  magnitude  of  which  it  is  im- 
possible to  exaggerate. 

The  second  stage  is  that  connected  with  the  landing 
operations  which  began  on  Sunday,  April  25,  and  with 
the  terrible  fighting  of  the  three  months  which  followed 
them.     On  that  day  landings  were  made  at  numerous 


234  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE  WAR 

points  at  and  near  the  extreme  southwestern  end  of 
the  peninsula,  and  on  the  beach  immediately  to  the 
north  of  Gaba  Tepe,  afterwards  known  as  Anzac 
Beach.  The  general  plan  was  that  these  two  more  or 
less  distinct  forces,  the  one  composed  of  a  British  Divi- 
sion and  the  other  made  up  of  the  Australian  and  New 
Zealand  contingents,  were  to  work  respectively  up 
and  across  the  peninsula  with  the  object  of  joining 
hands  and  of  sweeping  right  up  and  across  the  penin- 
sula to  the  Narrows.  During  the  whole  of  these  three 
months  the  forces  landed  at  the  southwestern  end  of 
the  peninsula  were  fighting  for  the  possession  of  Achi 
Baba,  a  height  which  attains  an  elevation  of  about 
seven  hundred  feet  above  the  sea  level.  This  all- 
important  position,  which  extends  practically  from 
sea  to  sea,  not  only  dominates  the  whole  area  of  country 
lying  to  the  southwest  of  it,  but  also  forms  the  south- 
western extremity  of  the  line  of  hills  which  traverse 
practically  the  whole  length  of  the  peninsula.  Further 
north  the  operations  based  on  Anzac  were  practically 
all  undertaken  with  the  object  of  endeavouring  to  cap- 
ture the  crests  of  Sari  Bair  and  of  Khoja  Chemen  Dagh, 
both  of  which  command  this  part  of  the  peninsula, 
and  the  latter  of  which  attains  an  elevation  of  nine 
hundred  and  fifty  feet  above  the  level  of  the  sea. 

The  third  stage  in  the  campaign  is  that  connected 
with  the  Suvla  Bay  fighting,  which  began  in  August. 
On  the  sixth  of  that  month  a  large  force  was  disem- 
barked at  Suvla  Bay,  located  about  five  miles  to  the 
north  of  the  Anzac  Beach.  The  plan  of  operations 
was  that  this  force  should  advance  in  an  easterly 
and  southeasterly,  whilst  the  Australasians  pushed  for- 
ward in  a  northeasterly,  direction  towards  Sari  Bair  and 


THE  DARDANELLES  CAMPAIGN  235 

Chimuk  Bair  Ridges.  Our  overseas  troops  actually 
seized  the  summits,  hut  the  new  attack  from  the  north 
did  not  make  the  progress  whicli  was  counted  upon,  and 
it  was  not  developed  quickly  enough.  The  result  was 
that  it  came  to  a  standstill  after  an  advance  of  some 
two  and  one  half  miles,  and  that  the  Australasians 
were  compelled  to  withdraw  from  the  positions  which 
they  had  actually  seized.  After  the  arrival  of  rein- 
forcements on  August  21  further  attempts  were  made 
to  push  forward  in  an  easterly  direction  from  the  Anzac 
and  Suvla  areas.  Certain  tactical  features  were 
captured,  but  these  last  operations  left  things  very 
much  as  they  were  before  August  21,  and  the  net  result 
of  the  Suvla  Bay  landings  was  that  we  consolidated  our 
position  and  secured  possession  of  a  connected  line 
extending  along  a  front  of  about  twelve  miles. 

Before  making  a  few  general  remarks  upon  the 
Dardanelles  campaign  there  are  three  questions  worthy 
of  brief  explanation.  The  first  concerns  the  theory, 
entertained  in  some  quarters,  that  had  the  British 
been  prepared  to  make  the  necessary  naval  sacrifices 
in  February,  they  could  have  pushed  through  the  Dar- 
danelles then  without  even  attempting  to  occupy  and 
to  subjugate  the  Peninsula  of  Gallipoli.  Militarily 
unsound  as  this  might  have  been,  considering  the  fact 
that  the  door  could  have  been  slammed  behind  such 
ships  and  that  their  means  of  supply  might  therefore 
have  been  cut  off,  there  would  have  been  at  least  a 
good  argument  in  favour  of  such  an  attempt  had  it 
not  been  for  the  existence  of  Goehen  in  the  Sea  of 
Marmora.  The  presence  of  that  ship  and  of  Breslau, 
however,  rendered  the  idea  of  such  a  raid  —  for  it 
only  would  have  been  a  raid  upon  a  large  scale  —  worse 


236  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE   \NAU 

than  useless,  for  in  view  of  the  then  strength  of  the 
AlHed  fleets,  that  undertaking  could  have  been  haz- 
arded only  with  at  best  second-class  ships  —  ships 
the  power  of  which,  had  they  even  once  entered  the 
Sea  of  Marmora,  might  well  have  been  outmatched 
by  the  Ottoman  fleet,  then  augmented  by  a  German 
dreadnought  and  a  fast  cruiser. 

The  second  criticism  sometimes  made  by  those  who 
are  not  au  courani  with  the  situation  concerns  the  sug- 
gestion that  if  the  Peninsula  of  Gallipoli  were  so  difficult 
of  occupation,  it  would  have  been  better  to  undertake 
land  operations  on  the  Asiatic  instead  of  upon  the 
European  side  of  the  Straits.  This  suggestion  is  not 
worthy  of  the  attention  which  it  would  seem  to  merit 
at  first  sight.  To  begin  with,  whilst  the  disembarka- 
tion of  troops  and  their  advance  across  the  northwestern 
corner  of  Asia  Minor  would  have  been  nearly  as  diffi- 
cult as  were  the  operations  on  the  peninsula,  the  dis- 
tance to  be  covered,  as  the  crow  flies,  instead  of  only 
amounting  to  six  or  seven  miles  from  Anzac  and  to 
about  twelve  from  Cape  Helles,  would  have  been  about 
twenty-five  miles.  Moreover,  owing  to  the  topography 
of  the  ground  —  the  Gallipoli  coast  is  much  higher 
than  the  Asiatic  shore  —  and  to  the  greater  strength 
of  the  European  forts,  once  in  possession  of  Chanak 
and  the  neighbourhood,  even  then  we  should  not 
have  been  in  a  position  safely  and  surely  to  dominate 
the  Straits  and  their  surroundings. 

We  now  come  to  the  third  and  constantly  repeated 
suggestion  that  a  landing  at  or  near  Bulair  would  have 
been  an  enormous  advantage  to  the  Allies,  because  it 
would  have  cut  the  Turkish  communications  and  be- 
cause the  distance  to  be  covered  by  an  army  landed  at 


The  Rock-like  Coast  of  the  Gallipoli  Temnslla 

The  buildings  are  in  the  outskirts  of  the  town  of  Gallipoli,  and  the 

Light  House,  on  the  right  of  the  picture,  may  be  said  to  mark  the 

northeastern  end  of  the  Dardanelles. 


The  \'illage  of  Bulair 

Fn.in  Fhntofraiilis  tiy  the  Author 


THE   DARDANELLES   CAMPAIGN  237 

that  point  would  have  been  less  than  elsewhere.  Both 
these  suggestions  are  largely  erroneous.  In  regard 
to  the  first  this  is  the  case  because,  whilst  communi- 
cation with  the  Peninsula  of  Gallipoli  is  maintained  to 
some  extent  by  land,  it  is  principally  carried  on  by  sea. 
It  is  true,  however,  as  I  have  explained  elsewhere, 
that  a  good  road  runs  from  Uzun  Kupru  on  the  Con- 
stantinople-Adrianople  railway  to  Gallipoli.  This  road 
traverses  the  Isthmus  of  Bulair,  following  a  line  which 
runs  on  its  eastern  or  Dardanelles  side.  The  road 
was  well  within  the  range  of  the  guns  of  ships  lying 
in  the  Gulf  of  Saros,  but  even  so  it  could  be  utilised 
with  comparative  safety  at  night.  An  Allied  landing 
might,  therefore,  have  resulted  in  the  occupation  of 
this  road,  but,  if  so,  it  would  have  had  to  be  undertaken 
by  a  very  large  force,  for  not  only  would  the  initial 
disembarkation  have  had  to  be  carried  out  in  the 
teeth  of  the  fire  of  the  big  guns  in  the  Bulair  Lines, 
but,  once  in  occupation  of  the  isthmus,  such  a  force 
would  have  been  compelled  to  be  prepared  to  meet 
an  attack  delivered  both  by  the  Turkish  army  on  the 
peninsula  and  by  troops  endeavouring  to  come  to  its 
assistance  from  the  remainder  of  Turkey  in  Europe. 
Moreover,  even  had  we  cut  this  line  of  communication 
by  an  occupation  of  the  territory  in  question,  the 
Turks  would  still  have  been  able  to  send  reinforce- 
ments across  the  Straits  from  Chanak  or  elsewhere  — 
a  route  which  they  in  fact  did  employ  in  order  to  sub- 
stitute for  the  long  and  dangerous  passage  by  way  of 
the  Sea  of  Marmora,  where  British  submarines  were 
operating,  a  passage  of  only  thirteen  or  fourteen  hun- 
dred yards  which  could  be  covered  in  vessels  so  small 
that  they  constituted   a  most  difficult  target  for  in- 


238  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE   WAR 

direct  fire,  for  bombardment  from  the  air,  or  for  sub- 
marines. So  far  as  the  second  point,  that  is  to  say, 
the  argument  in  regard  to  the  desirabihty  of  attack- 
ing the  forts  from  the  direction  of  Bulair  be  con- 
cerned, sufficient  be  it  to  say  that  although  that  village 
lies  practically  at  the  narrowest  part  of  the  peninsula, 
the  area  in  question  is  located  about  thirty  miles  to 
the  northeast  of  the  Narrows  and  therefore  of  the 
district  the  possession  of  which  was  vital  to  the  Allied 
cause. 

After  what  may  be  described  as  the  final  failure  of 
the  Suvla  Bay  attack  at  the  end  of  August,  1915,  the 
Dardanelles  campaign  entered  upon  a  new  phase. 
From  that  moment  it  became  obvious  that  the  Allies 
would  be  compelled  to  give  up  the  undertaking  alto- 
gether, to  endeavour  simply  to  maintain  their  posi- 
tions upon  the  Peninsula  of  Gallipoli  or  to  make  the 
preparations  necessary  for  the  despatch  to  and  main- 
tenance of  a  vast  army  in  the  northeastern  corner  of 
the  Mediterranean.  Even  now  we  do  not  know  all 
the  various  considerations  which  governed  Allied  policy 
at  that  time.  But  it  is  certain  that  the  entry  of  Bul- 
garia into  the  War  upon  the  side  of  the  enemy  in  Octo- 
ber, the  continued  neutrality  of  Roumania,  and  the 
then  attitude  of  Greece  created  an  entirely  new  situa- 
tion —  a  situation  which  in  addition  to  other  difficulties 
led  to  our  withdrawal  from  the  Dardanelles  in  Decem- 
ber, 1915,  and  January,  1916. 

It  would  be  useless  to  conceal  the  fact  that  that 
withdrawal,  which  constituted  an  admission  of  failure, 
must  have  resulted  in  a  loss  of  Allied  prestige  through- 
out the  East,  and  particularly  the  Moslem  East,  where 
even  a  necessary  cutting  of  losses  is  not  realised  some- 


THE   DARDANELLES   CAMPAIGN  230 

times  to  be  the  strongest  policy.  But  having  regard 
to  all  the  circumstances,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that 
Sir  Charles  Monro,  who  had  already  then  shown  him- 
self worthy  of  the  highest  confidence  of  the  British 
people,  was  correct  when  he  said,  soon  after  after  he 
took  over  the  command,  that  the  evacuation  of  Gallipoli 
should  be  taken  in  hand  at  once.  The  position  there 
was  unique  in  history.  We  held  merely  a  fringe  of 
coast  line,  dominated  from  the  hills  occupied  by  the 
Turks.  Communications  were  insecure  and  difficult, 
owing  to  the  weather  and  to  the  fact  that  landing  places 
could  be  raked  by  the  enemy's  fire.  Officers  and  men, 
who  could  not,  as  in  other  theatres  of  war,  be  with- 
drawn from  the  shell-swept  area,  had  suffered  seriously 
from  the  consequent  nerve  strain  and  from  diseases 
which  are  so  common  in  that  part  of  the  world.  More- 
over, had  we  merely  held  on  to  the  ground  already  occu- 
pied, or  had  we  even  endeavoured  to  push  forward, 
the  number  of  Turks  in  future  to  be  immobilised  would 
have  been  comparatively  small,  and  the  large  pro- 
portion of  the  Ottoman  army  would  soon  have  been 
left  free  for  undertakings  in  Mesopotamia  and  against 
Egypt.  Consequently,  as  there  was  no  longer  any 
hope  of  achieving  a  useful  purpose  by  remaining  on  the 
peninsula,  it  would  have  been  worse  than  foolish  to 
continue  to  involve  the  British  Empire  in  the  appalling 
cost  resulting  from  an  expedition  possessed  of  every 
military  defect  —  an  expedition  from  which  no  pos- 
sible strategic  or  tactical  advantages  could  at  that 
time  be  anticipated. 

To  summarise  and  to  recapitulate,  I  think  that  in 
order  to  review  the  Dardanelles  operations  in  their 
proper  light,  we  must  realise  not  only  the  mistakes 


240  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE  WAR 

which  were  made  but  also  the  enormous  difficulties 
which  existed.  True  it  is  and  true  it  will  ever  remain 
that  there  was  no  military  justification  for  the  way 
in  which  the  campaign  was  conducted.  It  is  now  per- 
fectly clear  that  those  responsible  did  not  recognise 
the  real  strength  of  the  defences ;  for  had  they  done  so 
they  would  have  known  that  an  attempt  to  force  the 
Straits  without  the  assistance  of  an  army  landed  upon 
the  Peninsula  of  Gallipoli  was  almost  doomed  to  failure. 
The  net  result  of  this  mistake  was  that  the  original 
attack  upon  the  Dardanelles  —  an  attack  lasting  on 
and  off  for  a  month  —  so  put  the  enemy  upon  his 
guard  and  showed  him  the  weak  spots  in  his  own  de- 
fence, that  during  a  further  five  weeks  he  had  ample 
opportunity  to  turn  the  whole  peninsula  into  a  veritable 
entrenched  camp.  Again  it  is  apparent  that  at  the 
time  of  and  after  the  landings  on  April  25,  the  military 
contingents  available  and  the  reinforcements  sent  out 
were  entirely  inadequate.  For  example,  the  Twenty- 
ninth  Division,  depleted  by  casualties  suffered  during 
the  original  landing  at  the  southwestern  end  of  the 
peninsula,  was  entirely  unable  to  maintain  the  suc- 
cesses which  it  originally  achieved.  The  result  was 
that  the  Turks,  who  even  then  were  not  really  pre- 
pared, and  who  probably  did  not  number  more  than 
thirty  thousand  men  on  the  peninsula  itself,  brought 
up  their  reinforcements,  large  numbers  of  whom  ar- 
rived about  a  week  later,  and  the  Germans,  who  were 
not  at  first  present  in  great  strength,  had  plenty  of 
time  to  put  in  an  appearance  and  to  take  over  the 
complete  direction  of  affairs  in  Gallipoli.  Even  subse- 
quently, when  large  numbers  of  men  were  despatched  to 
the  Mediterranean,  with  the  exception  of  the  August 


THE  DARDANELLES   CAMPAIGN  ^11 

landings,  the  forces  available  were  entirely  insufficient 
to  insure  success  in  an  area  which  is  more  difficult 
than  any  which  I  have  visited  during  my  travels  in  the 
Near  East. 

To  set  against  all  this,  if  we  are  to  do  justice  to  those 
responsible  for  this  great  effort,  and  it  was  a  great 
effort,  we  must  visualise  what  was  the  then  position  in 
Europe.  The  newly  formed  British  army  was  not 
ready,  and  the  larger  number  of  units  then  available 
were  urgently  required  in  France.  It  was  this  state 
of  things  which  made  Lord  Kitchener  demur  and  delay 
in  sending  an  expeditionary  force  to  the  Eastern  Medi- 
terranean. Under  ordinary  circumstances,  therefore, 
there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  War  Cabinet  should 
have  definitely  abandoned  the  idea  of  an  attack  upon 
the  Dardanelles  until  their  military  member  and  ad- 
viser —  The  Minister  of  War  —  was  in  a  position  to 
provide  a  force  and  its  reinforcements  sufficient  at 
least  to  further  the  task  of  a  fleet  endeavouring  to  force 
its  way  into  the  Sea  of  Marmora.  But  when  the  ques- 
tion was  already  under  discussion  in  January,  1915, 
there  came  the  communication  from  the  Russian  Gov- 
ernment to  which  I  have  already  referred.  That 
communication  introduced  a  new  element  into  the 
position  —  an  element  which,  though  its  importance 
is  often  minimised,  must,  I  consider,  be  held  as  having 
been  the  deciding  factor  in  the  situation.  The  Rus- 
sians, who  had  mobilised  their  forces  much  more 
rapidly  than  was  anticipated,  and  who  had  greatly 
influenced  the  situation  in  Western  Europe  by  their 
advance  into  East  Prussia  early  in  the  autumn  of  1914, 
appealed  for  our  assistance.  The  British  Govern- 
ment had  then  two  alternatives  before  it.     It  could. 


242  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE   WAR 

and  perhaps  it  should,  have  declared  that  it  was  not 
and  would  not  be  in  a  position  to  make  a  demonstra- 
tion against  Turkey  in  the  immediate  future.  Or  it 
could,  as  it  did,  consider  that  something  must  be 
done  in  response  to  an  appeal  from  an  Ally  who  then 
certainly  seemed  to  be  playing  a  prominent  part  in 
the  War.  The  adoption  of  the  latter  course  may  have 
been  ill  advised,  but  as  loyalty  to  Allies  comes  only 
second  to  the  necessity  for  the  defeat  of  the  enemy, 
whatever  our  personal  opinions  may  be,  it  would  appear 
that  the  Dardanelles  campaign  became  a  practical 
if  not  an  actual  necessity. 

So  far  as  the  main  objective  was  concerned,  that 
campaign,  in  which  British  soldiers  and  sailors  accom- 
plished tasks  the  magnitude  of  which  it  is  impossible 
to  realise  unless  one  has  been  to  Gallipoli,  proved  a 
failure.  But  even  so,  looking  at  things  in  their  true 
perspective,  and  to  some  extent  we  are  now  able  to 
do  this,  as  the  operations  were  originally  undertaken 
in  order  to  create  a  diversion  in  Turkey,  it  may  be 
said,  without  fear  of  contradiction,  that  a  good  deal 
was  accomplished.  Thus  a  large  Ottoman  force 
which  would  otherwise  have  been  employed  in  the 
Caucasus,  against  Egypt,  or  in  Mesopotamia,  was 
certainly  innnobilised  at  Gallipoli.  Moreover,  it  is 
stated,  though  no  evidence  has  been  produced  in  support 
of  the  theory,  that  the  expedition  had  considerable  in- 
fluence upon  the  attitude  of  the  Balkan  States.  This 
latter  contention  may  or  may  not  be  true,  and  the 
question  as  to  whether  these  supposed  advantages 
were  or  were  not  commensurate  with  the  loss  of  valu- 
able lives  and  treasure  incurred  must  remain  a  matter 
of  opinion.     In  conclusion  therefore  let  me  say  that 


THE   DARDANELLES   CAMPAIGN  243 

the  more  one  knows  of  the  AlHed  difficulties  existing 
at  tliat  time  and  the  more  one  has  seen  of  the  areas 
in  question,  the  less  one  is  inclined  to  criticise,  and 
that  vvliere  criticism  is  due,  it  is  justified  not  so  much 
in  regard  to  the  actual  undertaking  of  the  campaign, 
but  rather  as  a  result  of  the  numner  in  which  almost 
insurmountable  difficulties  were  underestimated  by 
those  at  home  and  on  the  spot. 


X 

THE  RIDDLE  OF  SALONICA 

Although  the  original  Allied  landing  at  Salonica 
took  place  during  the  early  days  of  October,  1915, 
the  expedition  which  since  then  has  been  based  upon 
that  port  may  really  be  considered  as  having  followed 
and  to  some  extent  resulted  from  the  British  lack  of 
success  at  the  Dardanelles  —  a  lack  of  success  which 
became  evident  directly  after  the  failure  of  the  Suvla 
Bay  operations.  At  about  that  time,  too,  the  whole 
position  in  Southeastern  Europe  obviously  became 
modified  by  the  practical  certainty  that  the  enemy 
would  ere  long  undertake  a  great  drive  across  Serbia, 
by  the  probabihty  that,  unless  she  secured  concessions 
at  the  hands  of  the  Alhes,  Bulgaria  would  throw  in 
her  lot  with  the  Central  Powers,  and  by  the  new  situa- 
tion created  in  Greece  resulting  from  the  necessity 
of  that  country  either  standing  by  or  repudiating  her 
treaty  obligations  with  Serbia. 

To  consider  in  somewhat  fuller  detail  the  reasons 
of  the  Salonica  expedition,  it  may  be  said  that  whilst 
a  successful  Dardanelles  campaign  would  incidentally 
have  had  the  effect  of  counteracting  and  forestalling 
the  dangers  of  a  German  drive  towards  the  East,  the 
Salonica  operations  were  inaugurated  with  the  definite 
object  of  either  preventing  the  establishment  of  through 

244 


THE   RIDDLE   OF  SALONICA  245 

connection  between  Central  Europe  and  the  Bosphorus, 
or  at  least  of  threatening  the  enemy's  lines  of  communi- 
cation were  they  once  established.  Thus,  whereas  the 
occupation  of  Constantinople  earlier  in  the  War  would 
have  definitely  frustrated  Germanic  designs  in  the 
East,  an  Anglo-French  advance  from  Salonica  to  Nish 
or  even  to  Uskub  would  either  have  prevented  a 
successful  penetration  along  the  whole  length  of  the 
Belgrade-Constantinople  railway  or  at  least  have  so 
threatened  that  railway  that  communication  by  way 
of  it  would  have  continued  insecure. 

These  were  obviously  the  fundamental  objects  of 
the  Salonica  expedition.  But  closely  bound  up  and 
connected  with  them  were  other  objects,  some  of  which, 
if  they  were  less  directly  military,  are  still  almost  if 
not  equally  important.  To  begin  with,  if  and  when 
Bulgaria  entered  the  War  upon  the  German  side,  it 
was  obvious  that  the  Serbians,  even  had  they  been 
supported  by  Greece,  at  once  became  powerless  to 
defend  any  large  section  of  their  country,  and  that 
Bulgaria,  acting  in  conjunction  with  the  Central 
Powers,  would  be  in  a  position  to  overrun  the  whole 
of  the  Western  Balkans.  Consequently,  although  the 
Serbs,  during  the  summer  of  1915  had  turned  a  deaf 
ear  to  the  advice  of  the  Allies  —  advice  which,  had  it 
been  taken  at  once,  would  probably  have  secured  at 
least  the  neutrality  and  perhaps  even  the  support  of 
Bulgaria  —  it  was  almost  impossible  for  sentimental 
as  well  as  for  military  reasons  to  leave  to  her  fate  a 
little  country  whose  army  had  fought  most  gallantly 
during  the  opening  months  of  the  War.  In  addition, 
as  Greece  claimed  that  Serbia  was  not  then  able  to 
provide  the  contingent  (150,000  men)  promised  by  her 


24G  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE   WAR 

under  the  Graeco-Serbian  Treaty,  she  (Greece)  would 
have  been  more  or  less  justified  in  refusing  to  come  to 
the  assistance  of  her  ally  had  England  and  France  not 
undertaken  to  do  their  best  to  furnish  contingents  to 
take  the  place  of  that  which  was  not  available  at  the 
hands  of  the  Government  of  King  Peter.  And  lastly, 
once  it  was  evident  that  the  Austro-Bulgaro-Germanic 
armies  would  be  in  a  position  to  act  as  one  force  and 
that  the  future  policy  of  Greece  was  to  hang  in  the 
balance,  it  became  advisable  for  the  Allies  to  establish 
and  to  maintain  a  picd-d-terre  in  the  Balkans  —  a 
pied-d-terre  without  which  the  whole  peninsula  would 
have  fallen  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  and  failing 
which  the  then  neutrals,  Greece  and  Roumania,  would 
almost  undoubtedly  have  thrown  in  their  lot  with  the 
Central  Powers. 

The  unjustifiable  optimists,  who  contended  that  we 
should  reach  Nish  or  even  Uskub  before  our  enemies, 
who  believed  that  our  arrival  at  Salonica  would  im- 
mediately bring  Greece  into  war  on  the  Allied  side, 
and  who  thought  that  the  Bulgarians  would  be  easy 
of  defeat,  were  doomed  to  meet  with  disappointment. 
But  this  does  not  justify  their  whole-hearted  criticism 
of  our  policy  in  the  Balkans  —  a  policy  the  framing 
of  which  has  been  beset  by  difficulties  on  every  side. 
Faults,  grievous  faults  there  have  been,  but  these 
faults  are  not  bound  up  with  what  is  stated  in  some 
quarters  to  have  been  Allied  influence  in  restraining 
Serbia  from  attacking  Bulgaria  before  the  latter  coun- 
try's overt  adhesion  to  the  enemy  cause,  or  with  what 
is  sometimes  argued  to  have  been  unjustifiable  delay 
in  going  to  the  Western  Balkans.  As  I  have  already 
said,  even  had  we  so  advised  Serbia,  who  in  suggesting 


THE  RIDDLE   OF  SALONICA  247 

an  immediate  attack  by  her  against  Bulgaria  also  in- 
sisted upon  the  earher  sending  of  an  alhed  force  to 
Salonica,  such  would  have  been  good  advice,  for  the 
Serbian  position  could  not  thus  have  been  ameliorated. 
In  other  words,  as  it  was  not  feasible  for  the  Allies  to 
undertake  a  Balkan  expedition  during  the  complicated 
negotiations  which  were  in  progress  in  the  summer  of 
1915,  or  to  disembark  in  Greece  without  her  consent 
or  without  then  infringing  the  neutrality  of  that  coun- 
try, the  failure  to  save  Serbia  was  not  due  to  Allied 
fault  but  to  the  strategic  position  of  our  enemies,  to 
their  overwhelming  strength,  to  the  enormous  geo- 
graphical difficulties,  and  to  the  continued  situation 
in  Greece  —  a  situation  the  complications  and  the 
effect  of  which  it  was  impossible  to  foresee. 

In  the  short  space  which  is  here  available,  it  would 
not  be  possible  and  I  do  not  propose  to  try  to  go  into 
the  details  of  all  that  has  taken  place  in  connection 
with  the  Salonica  operations  since  their  original  in- 
auguration in  October,  1915.  My  sole  object,  there- 
fore, is  to  provide  my  readers  with  a  description  of  the 
country  connected  with  these  operations,  to  indicate 
the  enormous  geographical  difficulties  which  beset  a 
force  based  upon  that  port,  and  to  outline  very  briefly 
the  three  stages  into  which  that  campaign  may  be 
said  to  have  been  divided.  On  account  of  the  very 
different  nature  of  the  country  which  has  grown  to 
be  called  Macedonia  and  of  its  diverse  peoples,  nobody 
who  has  ever  travelled  in  that  unhai)py  district  is 
able  to  consider  it  as  a  concrete  whole.  He  thinks  of 
it  as  an  area  which  is  divided  [)olitically  and  geographi- 
cally into  water-tight  compartments ;  as  a  place  in- 
habited   by    diverse   populations,    and    as    a    locality 


248  THE   CRADLE   OF   THE   WAR 

possessed  of  well-defined  routes,  which  constitute 
natural  if  not  adequately  developed  lines  of  communi- 
cation. Consequently,  if  I  seem  to  be  disjointed  in 
my  description,  this  is  due  not  to  any  want  of  fore- 
thought, but  because  I  feel  constrained  to  write  of 
what  I  have  seen  rather  than  to  try  to  produce  a 
concise  description  of  something  which  really  does  not 
exist. 

Bulgaria,  against  which  the  Allied  expedition  was  to 
operate,  and  especially  Southwestern  Bulgaria,  is  shut 
off  from  the  Aegean  by  a  strip  of  Hellenic  territory 
annexed  by  Greece  after  the  Balkan  Wars.  Measured 
from  the  Vardar  Valley  on  the  west  to  the  Graeco- 
Bulgarian  frontier  on  the  east,  it  has  a  length  of 
about  one  hundred  and  fifteen  miles.  With  an  average 
depth,  from  the  Aegean  on  the  south  to  the  Rhodope 
Balkans  on  the  north,  of  about  fifty  miles,  this  district 
contains  the  port  of  Kavala,  the  towns  of  Drama  and 
Demir  Hissar  and  some  of  the  best  tobacco-growing 
areas  in  the  whole  Balkan  Peninsula.  For  these 
reasons  it  is  not  onlj^  rich  but  also  strategically  im- 
portant to  both  Greece  and  Bulgaria.  On  the  west 
of  the  Vardar,  the  territory  added  to  Greece  after  the 
Balkan  Wars  extends  in  the  north  up  to  the  Moglena 
Mountains  and  the  Serbian  frontier  and  on  the  west 
to  the  Albanian  boundary  and  the  Adriatic.  That 
these  two  areas  are  part  of  Greece  meant  that,  until 
the  attitude  of  the  Hellenic  Government  became  cer- 
tain, the  Allied  position  not  only  at  Salonica  and  in 
the  immediate  neighbourhood,  but  also  in  both  the 
above-mentioned  districts  was  extremely  complicated 
and  difficult. 

The  position  of  Salonica  is  favourable  as  a  port  be- 


THE   RIDDLE   OF  SALONICA  249 

cause  it  is  located  about  halfway  along  the  European 
coast  of  the  Aegean,  and  because  it  occupies  a  fine 
site  at  the  head  of  a  bay,  measuring  approximately 
twelve  and  one  half  miles  from  northeast  to  southwest 
—  a  bay  connected  with  the  sea  by  the  Gulf  of  Salonica, 
which  has  a  length  of  nearly  ninety  miles.  Both 
shores  of  the  gulf  are  mountainous.  Mount  Olympus 
on  the  west  attaining  an  elevation  of  nearly  ten  thou- 
sand feet  above  the  level  of  the  sea.  On  the  east  the 
bay  is  also  flanked  by  hills  which  extend  to  the  im- 
mediate neighbourhood  of  the  town,  but  on  the  west 
the  country  is  low  and  swampy.  Throughout  the 
gulf  there  is  deep  water,  but  parts  of  the  bay,  through 
which  there  is  an  adequate  channel,  are  blocked  by 
mud  brought  down  b}^  the  Galiko  and  Vardar.  The 
presence  of  this  mud,  which  is  constantly  increasing 
and  moving,  has  for  a  result  that  the  depth  of  the 
water  is  always  changing  and  that  sections  of  the  bay, 
especially  the  northwestern  corner,  which  within  the 
memory  of  living  man  were  navigable  for  small  boats, 
are  now  almost  entirely  silted  up. 

Salonica  harbour  is  of  modern  construction.  It 
consists  of  a  quay  measuring  about  four  hundred  and 
forty  yards  long  with  moles  of  just  over  two  hundred 
yards  long  at  each  end.  An  island  breakwater  pro- 
tects it,  and  ships  enter  by  the  southeastern  opening. 
Served  by  a  railway  and  built  to  have  twenty-four 
feet  of  water,  before  the  War  it  was  impossible  for 
ships  drawing  more  than  at  most  twenty-two  feet  of 
water  to  get  alongside  the  quays.  Further  deepening 
beyond  twenty-four  feet  was  difficult,  owing  to  the 
fact  that  the  foundations  were  upon  mud.  Enlarge- 
ment of  this  basin,  which  in  ordinary  times  only  pro- 


250  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE   WAR 

vides  accommodation  for  at  most  eight  ships  of  any 
size,  has  often  been  under  discussion,  but  prior  to  the 
War  it  was  never  attempted;  for,  whilst  the  expense 
of  dredging  and  digging  on  the  northwest  was  pro- 
liibitive,  an  extension  to  the  southeast  was  thought 
to  be  detrimental  to  the  sites  occupied  by  the  best 
buildings  in  the  city.  The  result  of  the  inadequacy 
of  the  accommodation  and  of  the  high  dock  dues  was 
that,  before  the  War,  many  ships  never  entered  the 
harbour  and  discharged  their  passengers  whilst  lying 
out  in  the  bay.  The  quays  running  from  the  harbour 
to  the  White  Tower  are  available  for  small  craft  and 
barges,  but  owing  to  the  south  wind,  which  always 
springs  up  in  the  afternoon,  and  to  the  then  choppy 
state  of  the  water,  their  utility  is  considerably  minimised. 
The  town  of  Salonica  occupies  a  magnificent  position 
at  the  head  of  the  bay.  Rising  from  the  water's  edge 
and  built  in  a  horseshoe  shape  on  the  slopes  of  the 
hills,  prior  to  the  recent  fire  it  was  extremely  pictur- 
esque. But  with  the  exception  of  the  comparatively 
new  street,  which  runs  along  the  quay  from  the  har- 
bour on  the  northwest  to  the  residential  quarter  on 
the  southeast,  the  city  was  dirty  and  squalid,  and  its 
thoroughfares  were  narrow  and  winding.  Indeed,  the 
outstanding  impression  left  upon  one's  mind  was  that 
the  town  constituted  something  isolated,  something 
different  from  that  which  exists  elsewhere  in  Europe. 
In  one  sense  it  seemed  to  be  completely  modern, 
materialistic,  and  vulgar,  whilst  in  another  it  had 
the  appearance  of  being  a  sort  of  relic  of  the  past. 
This  may  be  accounted  for  partly  by  the  fact  that 
the  nature  of  the  population  of  Salonica  is  something 
quite  unique.     Out  of  a  total  of  about  one  hundred 


THE   RIDDLE   OF  SALONICA  251 

and  twenty-five  thousand  souls  rou^ldy  seventy-five 
thousantl  are  Jews.  These  Jews,  who  are  tlie  de- 
scendants of  those  expelled  from  Spain  by  Ferdinand 
and  Isabella,  control  the  business  of  the  city  and 
surpass  the  Greeks  in  their  commercial  ability  and 
also  in  society.  Besides  these  Hebrews  there  arc 
about  fifteen  thousand  Dounmes  —  a  sect  the  real 
beliefs  of  whom  are  not  properly  known  to  the  outer 
world.  Distrusted  by  both  Jews  and  Mohammedans, 
they  five  a  life  apart  and  never  marry  with  the  outer 
world.  It  is  from  among  their  number  that  the 
Young  Turks  recruited  some  of  the  ablest  members 
of  the  Committee  of  Union  and  Progress.  The  re- 
mainder of  the  population  is  made  up  of  about  twenty- 
five  thousand  Greeks,  five  thousand  Turks,  four 
thousand  Bulgars,  and  of  a  European  colony,  all  of 
whom,  so  to  speak,  exist  as  a  result  of  the  sufferance 
of  the  Jews,  who  dominate  everything  from  the  most 
menial  work  to  that  of  banking.  It  was  partly  owing 
to  the  Oriental  plan  of  the  city  and  partly  as  a  conse- 
quence of  the  houses  being  built  largely  of  wood  and 
mud  and  of  there  having  been  no  rain  for  three  months, 
that  the  fire  of  August,  1917,  which  was  probably  due 
to  incendiary  causes,  did  such  terrible  damage.  In- 
deed, such  was  that  damage,  that  half  the  area  inside 
the  ancient  walls,  which  still  encompass  a  great  part 
of  the  business  area  of  the  town,  including  all  the 
more  important  stores,  hotels,  and  banks,  was  de- 
stroyed, thereby  leaving  approximately  sixty  thou- 
sand of  the  inhabitants  homeless  and  destitute,  and 
therefore  dependent  upon  the  Allies  either  for  subsist- 
ence in  Salonica  or  for  means  of  transportation  to  areas 
where  they  could  start  life  at  least  temporarily  anew. 


252  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE  WAR 

Before  discussing  the  geography  of  this  part  of  the 
Balkans,  a  few  words  should  be  said  about  the  climate 
of  this  area  of  Europe.  Partly  owing  to  its  enclosed 
position,  the  heat  in  Salonica  itself  is  intense  during 
June,  July,  August,  and  the  first  part  of  September, 
after  which  the  atmosphere  is  cooled  by  the  heavy 
rain  which  invariably  falls  between  the  tenth  and 
fifteenth  of  that  month.  The  heat,  which  is  mitigated 
by  the  fresh  sea  breeze  which  always  blows  in  the 
afternoon,  is  particularly  trying  at  night,  and  mos- 
quitoes are  so  numerous  that,  in  many  parts  of  the 
town,  it  is  advisable  to  sleep  under  nets  almost  through- 
out the  year.  In  spite  of  this,  unlike  Constantinople 
and  Athens,  there  is  no  summer  resort,  and  the  inhabit- 
ants therefore  remain  in  the  city  throughout  the  year. 
The  first  winter  spent  by  the  Allies  at  Salonica  was  an 
unusually  severe  one ;  for,  whilst  it  is  generally  wet  in 
January  and  February,  there  is  seldom  a  heavy  fall 
of  snow  in  the  city  itself.  In  the  interior  where  the 
heat  in  the  valleys  is  very  intense,  the  climate,  and 
particularly  the  temperature  at  night,  naturally  de- 
pends upon  the  elevation  of  the  district  in  question. 
In  winter  snow  is  prevalent  in  the  hills,  and  traffic 
on  many  of  the  roads  is  often  entirely  stopped  by 
it  and  by  the  immense  amount  of  water  brought 
down  from  the  mountains  at  the  time  of  the  spring 
thaw. 

The  geographical  relations  of  Salonica  with  the  in- 
terior and  the  whole  of  the  military  operations  which 
are  based  upon  that  port  are  governed  largely  by  the 
presence  of  the  Vardar  Valley  and  River  which  flows 
into  the  sea  at  a  distance  of  about  twelve  miles  to  the 
southwest  of  the  town.     It  divides  East  from  West 


THE   RIDDLE  OF  SALONICA  253 

and  forms  with  the  valley  of  the  Morava  the  great 
highroad  from  north  to  south  across  the  peninsula, 
and  makes  Salonica  the  natural  point  of  entry  into 
and  exit  from  a  large  area  of  the  Western  Balkans. 
Indeed  the  importance  of  the  valley  and  of  the  port 
are  interdependent,  and  it  is  for  this  reason  that 
Salonica  and  its  surroundings  ought  either  to  belong 
to  the  owners  of  the  hinterland,  or  that  the  hinter- 
land ought  to  be  annexed  by  the  owners  of  the  port. 
It  is  this,  together  with  the  fact  that  Salonica  is  a 
good  starting  point  for  various  routes  and  roads  into 
the  interior,  which  have  always  made  its  collecting 
and  distributing  radii  very  wide.  Thus  so  long  ago 
as  the  Great  War,  when  Napoleon  closed  the  accus- 
tomed routes  into  Germany,  the  port  of  Salonica 
formed  one  of  the  new  channels  of  commerce  —  com- 
merce carried  into  the  heart  of  the  interior  by  three 
more  or  less  independent  routes.  The  first  of  these 
ran  up  the  Vardar  Valley  and  through  Bosnia.  The 
second  went  by  Seres,  the  Struma  Valley,  Sofia,  and 
Vidin  and  thus  through  Hungary  and  Budapest  to 
Vienna.  The  third  deviated  from  the  second  at  Sofia, 
turning  in  a  northwesterly  direction  and  continuing 
its  course  into  the  heart  of  Europe  by  way  of  Nisli 
and  Belgrade  and  along  the  present  great  trunk  route 
from  east  to  west. 

In  order  to  make  my  description  of  the  geography 
of  the  country  and  of  the  military  operations  more 
clear,  I  am  going  to  base  it  almost  entirely  upon  this 
division  of  country  formed  by  the  Vardar.  Thus, 
although  the  actual  valley  of  that  river  can  hardly 
be  said  to  extend  much  to  the  south  of  the  Serbo- 
Greek  frontier,  it  is  convenient  to  consider  even  the 


254  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE   WAR 

area  closely  surrounding  Salonica  in  its  bearing  to 
that  river.  On  the  west  bank,  and  on  both  banks  in 
the  immediate  vicinity  of  its  mouths  and  of  the  mouth 
of  the  torrential  Galiko,  the  country  is  marshy,  inter- 
sected by  small  streams  and  dikes,  and  covered  largely 
by  reeds.  This  area  is  therefore  practically  impassable 
especially  in  wet  weather,  and  after  the  melting  of  the 
snows  when  the  volume  of  every  important  Balkan 
river  is  so  enormously  increased.  The  same  kind  of 
country,  growing  gradually  drier  and  less  marshy  as 
one  gets  away  from  the  river  and  its  mouths,  extends 
as  far  as  Yenidje  Vardar  —  a  village  situated  on  the 
road  to  Vodena,  and  at  the  foot  of  the  Pajak  Planina. 
To  the  north  and  northeast  of  that  place  as  far  as 
Karasulu,  and  particularly  between  there  and  the 
frontier,  there  are  hills  the  slopes  of  which  approach 
nearer  and  nearer  to  the  right  bank  of  the  Vardar. 

On  the  east  or  left  bank  of  the  river  the  whole 
character  of  the  country  is  different,  for  in  general 
it  is  hilly  if  not  mountainous.  Even  between  the 
railways,  to  which  I  will  refer  in  greater  detail  below, 
there  are  summits  which  attain  elevations  of  well 
over  one  thousand  feet  above  the  level  of  the  sea. 
On  the  east  of  the  Salonica-Doiran  line,  and  par- 
ticularly on  the  east  and  southeast  of  the  River  Galiko, 
the  whole  area  is  mountainous  as  far  as  the  Valley  of 
the  Struma  on  the  east  and  right  down  into  the  Chalkis 
Peninsula  on  the  south.  Here  are  detached  mountains 
and  groups  of  mountains,  such  as  the  Krusha  Balkan 
and  the  Beshik  Dagh  which  respectively  attain  eleva- 
tions of  about  three  thousand  feet  and  of  nearly 
three  thousand  five  hundred  feet  above  the  sea. 
Large  parts  of  this  area,  which  has  always  been  very 


THE  RIDDLE   OF  SALONICA  255 

inaccessible  from  the  outer  world,  arc  covered  with 
oak  scriih.  The  population  is  mixed,  but  with  the 
exception  of  the  Chalkis  Peninsula,  where  the  Greeks 
predominate,  it  is  largely  made  up  of  Turks. 

A  line  of  hills  and  positions,  immediately  defending 
Salonica  on  the  northeast,  east,  and  southeast,  runs 
from  the  Galiko  River  along  the  Duad  Baba  and 
Derbend  Hills  to  the  Hortach  Dagh,  located  at  a 
distance  of  about  nine  miles  to  the  east  of  the  port. 
From  this  mountain  group  the  obvious  line  of  defence 
for  Salonica  turns  in  an  easterly  direction  and  runs 
across  the  Chalkis  Peninsula  in  rear  of  Lakes  Langaza 
and  Beshik.  This  position,  which  in  certain  ways 
resembles  that  occupied  by  the  Chatalja  Lines  out- 
side Constantinople,  is  one  of  very  considerable  natural 
strength,  for  its  front  is  almost  entirely  protected  by 
the  above-mentioned  lakes  and  by  the  swamps  which 
lie  between  and  to  the  east  of  them.  Moreover,  the 
Hortach  Dagh,  with  an  elevation  of  over  three  thou- 
sand five  hundred  feet  above  the  sea,  and  the  Kolo- 
nionda  Dagh,  which  is  nearly  as  high,  conunand  and 
dominate  the  whole  of  the  country  which  lies  to  the 
north  and  northeast  of  them. 

In  regard  to  the  communications  available  in  these 
areas,  for  obvious  reasons  it  is  impossible  to  do  more 
than  to  indicate  those  which  existed  prior  to  the 
arrival  of  the  Allies.  On  the  west  of  the  Vardar 
sufficient  therefore  be  it  to  say  that  over  and  above 
the  road  and  railway  to  Monastir,  the  country  is  so 
marshy  and  difficult  that  there  are  few,  if  any,  routes 
which  are  worthy  of  our  attention  here.  The  centre 
of  the  position  is  well  served,  for  it  is  possessed  of  the 
Vardar  Valley  line  and  of  the  Salonica  Junction  Rail- 


256  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE   WAR 

way,  which  are  entirely  independent  of  one  another 
throughout  their  length.  To  make  matters  better, 
these  two  lines  are  joined  by  a  branch  which  runs 
from  Karasulu  on  the  former  to  Kilindir  on  the  latter 
railway.  Before  the  War  these  were  all  single  lines, 
but  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  since  the  Allied  occu- 
pation they  have  been  doubled  at  least  for  part  of 
their  length  and  that  they  have  been  supplemented 
by  other  railways  leading  to  various  parts  of  the 
Allied  front. 

Prior  to  the  international  occupation  of  Salonica 
only  two  so-called  roads  united  that  place  with  the 
hinterland  situated  to  the  northeast  and  southeast. 
The  first  ran  from  Salonica  to  Seres  and  thence  north- 
wards to  Demir  Hissar  and  into  the  Struma  Valley. 
This  road  crosses  the  northern  end  of  the  Beshik  Dagh 
by  a  pass,  the  highest  point  of  which  is  just  over 
two  thousand  feet  above  the  level  of  the  sea,  and  the 
River  Struma  by  a  bridge  at  Hadrie.  This  route  was 
nominally  passable  for  wheeled  traffic,  but  long  iafter 
the  Greek  annexation  its  condition  was  such  as  to 
render  it  quite  unfit  for  ordinary  motors.  The  second 
road  ran  in  a  southeasterly  direction  from  Salonica 
towards  and  into  the  Chalkis  Peninsula.  Its  condi- 
tion was  extremely  bad,  and  it  was  not  passable  for 
vehicles  for  more  than  a  few  miles  beyond  the  borders 
of  the  city.  As  in  the  case  of  the  railways  since  the 
international  occupation,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that 
the  Allies  have  greatly  improved  these  two  roads, 
especially  the  latter,  and  that  they  have  constructed 
numerous  routes  leading  towards  and  up  to  the  posi- 
tions which  they  have  occupied. 

Turning  to  a  discussion  of  the  more  distant  hinter- 


THE  RIDDLE  OF  SALONICA  257 

land  of  Salonica,  the  country  is  made  up  of  three 
distinct  areas  —  the  Vardar  Valley  district  and  the 
districts  respectively  situated  to  the  east  and  west 
of  it.  The  Vardar  Valley  is  the  most  important 
existing  line  of  communication  in  all  Macedonia, 
With  an  approximate  length  of  one  hundred  and 
fifty  miles,  if  measured  from  Salonica  to  Uskub,  large 
parts  of  it  are  so  gorge-like  that  for  some  miles,  in 
the  neighbourhood  and  to  the  north  of  the  Graeco- 
Serbian  frontier,  it  is  not  followed  by  a  road,  and 
only  by  a  railway  upon  which  traffic  is  therefore 
entirely  dependent.  That  railway  may  be  said  to 
enter  the  actual  valley  near  Karasulu  Junction.  From 
there  as  far  as  Kuprulu,  and  therefore  for  a  distance  of 
about  seventy -seven  miles,  the  valley  is  so  narrow, 
except  at  one  point,  that  the  line  crosses  and  re-crosses 
the  river  three  times.  Leaving  the  Vardar  at  Uskub 
it  passes  through  Komanovo  and  crosses  an  area  made 
up  of  bare  uncultivated  hills  subsequently  to  enter 
the  Valley  of  the  Morava  near  the  old  Serbo-Turkish 
frontier. 

During  recent  years  this  line  has  become  of  great 
commercial  and  military  importance.  Prior  and  sub- 
sequent to  the  Balkan  Wars,  it  was  used  by  Serbia 
(under  an  arrangement  first  with  Turkey  and  then 
with  Greece)  as  her  principal  route  to  the  coast,  and 
special  quays,  warehouses,  etc.,  were  allotted  to  her 
at  Salonica  —  quays  and  warehouses  which  were 
practically  ex-territorial  —  for  her  merchandise  and 
live  stock.  Between  August,  1914,  and  October, 
1915,  the  significance  of  the  Vardar  line  became  enor- 
mous because  it  was  by  way  of  it  alone  that  Serbia  was 
able  effectively  to  communicate  with  the  sea.     After 


258  THE   CRADLE   OF   THE   WAR 

our  arrival  at  Salonica,  it  was  by  this  route  that  we 
endeavoured  to  go  to  the  assistance  of  Serbia  and  to 
force  our  way  into  the  heart  of  that  country.  The 
valley  and  the  line  were,  however,  easy  of  attack, 
and  are  easy  of  defence  by  Bulgaria  because  of  the 
numerous  gorges,  and  because  they  run  more  or  less 
parallel  to  and  at  no  great  distance  from  the  frontier 
of  that  country  —  a  frontier  which  approaches  to 
within  about  five  miles  of  it  on  the  northeast  of  the 
station  of  Strumnitza. 

To  the  east  of  the  Vardar  Valley  the  principal 
feature  affecting  the  relations  of  Salonica  to  the  in- 
terior and  governing  the  direction  of  an  advance  from 
the  Aegean  coast  into  the  heart  of  old  Bulgaria  are 
the  Rhodope  Balkans.  That  range  is,  however,  so 
to  speak,  skirted  and  partially  avoided  by  one  or  two 
routes  extending  from  the  Vardar  Valley  towards 
and  across  the  Bulgarian  frontier  —  lines  which  though 
influenced  by  the  Rhodopes  and  their  off-shoots  do 
not  actually  penetrate  that  range.  Between  the 
Graeco-Serbian  frontier  and  Uskub  two  roads  run 
toward  the  Struma  Valley.  Though  prior  to  the  out- 
break of  the  War  they  were  in  bad  condition,  both 
have  undoubtedly  been  improved  by  the  Bulgarians 
since  their  advance  into  Macedonia.  But  the  most 
important  road,  running  in  an  easterly  direction  from 
the  Vardar  Valley,  is  that  which  connects  Komanovo, 
situated  a  few  miles  to  the  north  of  Uskub,  with 
Gyuveshevo  —  a  road  already  fully  described  elsewhere. 

Turn  to  the  Rhodopes  themselves,  the  western 
and  centra]  sections  of  which,  known  respectively  as 
the  Dospat  Dagh  and  the  Kara  Balkan,  form  one 
more  or  less  continuous  line.     But  to  the  east  of  the 


THE   RIDDLE  OF  SALONICA  259 

Kara  Balkan  this  line  practically  divides  into  two 
long  off-shoots  which  enclose  the  valley  of  the  Arda, 
the  northern  branch  following  the  old  Bulgarian 
frontier  and  the  southern  arm  skirting  the  plain  ad- 
jacent to  the  sea.  Practically  no  important  rivers 
drain  the  range  towards  the  south,  for  ignoring  the 
Struma,  the  principal  is  the  Mesta,  which  enters  the 
Aegean  about  thirty  miles  to  the  east  of  Kavala. 
Leaving  on  one  side  the  INIaritza,  the  largest  rivers 
which  flow  towards  the  north  and  east  are  the  Ki'ishim 
and  the  Arda,  the  waters  of  which  latter  are  augmented 
by  those  of  the  Seugudlu  River  and  the  Burgas  Chai. 

In  order  to  penetrate  the  Rhodopes  from  the  south 
it  w^ould  be  necessary  either  to  approach  and  to  occupy 
the  plain  which  borders  the  Aegean  from  the  west, 
and  therefore  from  the  direction  of  Salonica,  or  to 
effect  fresh  landings  somewhere  along  the  coast,  be- 
tween that  port  and  Dede  Agatch,  which  is  located 
just  to  the  west  of  the  mouth  of  the  Maritza.  The 
former  operation  would  be  dangerous  and  require  a 
large  force,  for  it  would  entail  an  advance  by  way  of 
the  Salonica-Dede  Agatch  Railway  which  runs  prac- 
tically parallel  to  the  real  front  of  the  enemy  —  a 
front  which  in  case  of  such  an  Allied  attempt  he  would 
undoubtedly  establish  more  or  less  along  the  line  of 
the  Rhodopes.  Fresh  landings  on  the  other  hand 
would  not  only  be  beset  by  the  heavy  losses  and  the 
enormous  difficulties  which  always  go  with  such  under- 
takings in  hostile  country,  but  they  would  also  be 
accompanied  bj^  dangers  due  to  the  fact  that,  except 
at  Kavala,  which  has  now  no  doubt  been  strongly 
fortified  by  the  enemy,  good  lauding  places  are  not 
available. 


260  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE  WAR 

We  now  come  to  the  section  of  country  located  on 
the  west  of  the  Vardar  Valley,  and  lying  more  or  less 
between  Salonica  and  Monastir  or  between  the  former 
town  and  the  southern  part  of  the  Albanian  frontier. 
The  geographical  and  other  conditions  prevailing  here 
were  and  are  in  some  ways  more  and  in  some  ways 
less  favourable  to  the  Allies  than  are  those  existing 
on  the  other  side  of  the  Vardar.  On  the  one  hand, 
whilst  there  are  the  IMoglena  and  other  mountains 
on  the  Graeco-Serbian  frontier  and  whilst  the  country 
to  the  north  and  northeast  of  Monastir  is  very  difficult, 
there  are  no  barriers  lying  to  the  south  and  southeast 
of  that  town  which  compare  in  their  strength  to  the 
Rhodopes.  Moreover,  Salonica  is  connected  with 
Monastir  by  a  road  and  a  railway.  The  road,  Vvhich 
is  passable  for  motors,  approximately  follows  the 
railway,  but  it  avoids  two  great  detours  made  by  the 
line.  The  railway  crosses  the  plain  to  Veria,  where, 
at  the  southern  point  of  its  first  bend,  it  begins  to 
enter  the  hills.  No  serious  gradients  are,  however, 
encountered  until  it  reaches  Vodena.  This  railway  is 
of  very  great  importance,  not  only  because  it  gives 
access  to  Monastir,  but  because  it  runs  more  or  less 
parallel  to  and  therefore  serves  the  Allied  front. 

So  much  for  the  favourable  conditions  in  this  area. 
From  the  opposite  point  of  view  it  was  here,  during 
the  period  of  her  uncertainty,  that  the  attitude  of 
Greece  so  greatly  complicated  the  Allied  plan  of  cam- 
paign. On  the  east  of  the  Vardar  and  in  the  Greek 
district  enclosed  by  that  river,  the  Rhodopes,  the 
Bulgarian  frontier,  and  the  Aegean,  there  was  the 
danger  that  the  Greek  forces  stationed  there  would, 
as  they  did,  make  no  effort  to  resist  an  enemy  advance. 


THE   RIDDLE   OF  SALONICA  261 

But  their  strength  was  known,  and  the  sacrifice  of 
that  territory  was  not  vital  to  the  whole  Allied  posi- 
tion. Not  so,  however,  with  the  area  to  the  south 
of  Monastir  and  to  the  west  of  Salonica.  There  the 
distribution  of  the  Hellenic  Kingdom  is  such  that, 
had  King  Constantine  thrown  in  his  lot  with  the 
enemy,  he  was  in  a  position  so  favourable  as  to  enable 
him  to  jeopardize  the  entire  British  and  French  plan. 
During  the  earlier  stages  of  the  campaign,  in  addition 
to  the  facts  that  the  Allies  could  not  know  when  and 
how  far  the  Greeks  would  allow  the  enemy  to  advance 
into  Hellenic  territory,  that  their  position  was  always 
endangered  by  the  presence  of  spies,  whose  movements 
and  actions  they  could  not  control,  they  were  also 
face  to  face  with  the  ever-present  danger  of  an  attack 
upon  their  left  rear  delivered  from  the  Greek  army, 
the  fighting  value  of  which  was  uncertain,  by  routes 
particularly  suitable  for  that  purpose.  The  railway 
from  Larissa  meets  the  Salonica-Monastir  Line  at 
Gidia,  roads  run  up  from  the  south  to  Veria,  to  Lake 
Ostrovo,  and  to  Fiorina.  It  was  these  dangers  and 
particularly  that  connected  with  the  left  rear  of  the 
Allied  front  at  Salonica  —  dangers  to  meet  which  no 
adequate  or  open  precautions  could  at  first  be  taken 
—  which  made  political  events,  or  more  correctly  the 
Allied  handling  of  political  events  in  the  Greek  capital, 
matters  possessed  of  such  immense  influence  upon  the 
Salonica  campaign. 

To  consider  very  briefly  the  three  stages  into  which 
the  actual  military  operations  have  been  divided  it 
may  be  said  that  the  first  was  connected  with  the 
original  Anglo-French  attempts  to  force  their  way 
into  the  interior  and  to  reach  Nish  or  Uskub  or  at 


THE   CRADLE  OF  THE  WAR 

least  to  prevent  the  complete  conquest  of  Serbia. 
These  endeavours  began  as  soon  as  sufficient  Allied 
troops  had  been  disembarked  to  render  possible  an 
advance  into  the  interior.  The  French,  on  the  left, 
pushed  forward  up  the  Vardar  Valley  and  to  the 
west  of  it  and  towards  the  Babuna  Pass.  The  British 
on  the  right  moved  forward  to  the  north  of  Lake 
Doiran.  The  Serbian  retreat  on  the  one  hand  and 
the  Bulgarian  advance  on  the  other  were,  however, 
so  rapid  that  the  Allies,  unable  to  effect  a  junction 
with  the  Serbs,  were  compelled  to  withdraw  to  Greek 
territory  and  to  the  immediate  vicinity  of  Salonica, 
where  for  months  they  occupied  more  or  less  the 
positions  which  I  have  already  indicated  as  constituting 
the  natural  defensive  line  of  the  port. 

The  second  stage  in  the  campaign  lasted  from  De- 
cember, 1915,  until  the  following  September.  During 
it  the  Allies  remained  practically  entirely  on  the  de- 
fensive, occupying  themselves  with  the  improvement 
of  their  communications  and  with  the  political  situa- 
tion in  Greece.  It  was  during  this  stage,  however, 
that  the  western  part  of  the  district  lying  between 
the  Rhodope  Balkans  and  the  sea,  and  particularly 
the  area  in  the  vicinity  of  both  banks  of  the  Struma, 
figured  prominently  in  the  campaign.  In  January, 
the  Allies  destroyed  the  Great  Bridge  across  the 
Struma  near  Demir  Hissar,  later  demolishing  others 
located  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Seres.  Subsequently 
and  in  May,  the  Greeks  handed  over  to  the  enemy 
Fort  Rupel  —  a  position  which  so  to  speak  constitutes 
the  key  to  the  entrance  of  the  Struma  Valley.  As  a 
consequence  of  this,  the  Bulgarians  were  able,  during 
the  summer,  to  advance  towards  the  sea,  finally  occupy- 


THE   RIDDLE  OF  SALONICA  263 

ing  Kavala,  the  bulk  of  the  garrison  of  which  place 
surrendered  without  any  resistance  in  September. 
The  then  Greek  Government  repudiated  the  conduct 
of  its  commander  at  Kavala,  but  the  greater  part  of 
the  Army  Corps  in  question  was  transported  to  Ger- 
many as  the  "guests"  of  the  German  Government. 
It  was  therefore  evident  that  even  if  the  then  Greek 
Premier  —  INIr.  Zaimis  —  was  not  himself  responsible, 
there  were  influences  at  work  which  proved  that  the 
attitude  of  the  Hellenic  Government  was  far  from 
reliable.  About  the  same  time  General  Milne  —  the 
British  commander  —  pushed  forward  across  the 
Struma,  thereby  making  an  effective  demonstration 
in  force  with  the  object  of  attracting  and  immobilising 
Bulgarian  forces  which  would  otherwise  have  been 
available  for  the  defence  of  the  area  on  the  west  of 
the  Vardar.  Subsequently,  however,  owing  to  the 
difficulty  of  the  ground,  to  the  floods  of  the  Struma, 
and  to  the  strength  of  the  enemy,  the  British  were 
unable  to  undertake  any  extended  operations  in  this 
area,  and  they  withdrew  to  the  west  of  the  Struma 
and  to  areas  which  are  more  easily  defensible  and  in 
which  the  climate  is  better  than  that  of  the  swamps 
which  border  upon  the  river. 

The  third  stage  in  the  campaign  began  with  the 
AlHed  push  in  the  direction  of  Monastir  in  the  late 
summer  of  1916.  I  have  said  sufficient  already  to 
prove  that  that  city  is  so  situated  and  that  the  com- 
munications passing  through  it  are  such  that  the  place 
is  of  considerable  military  importance.  But  its  political 
significance  and  meaning  are  even  more  far-reaching. 
For  years  the  possession  of  the  city  has  been  coveted 
by  the  Bulgarians,  the  Greeks,  and  the  Serbians,  and 


264  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE  WAR 

for  years  it  has  been  a  centre  in  which  Bulgarian,  Greek, 
and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  Serbian  propaganda  has  been 
in  full  swing.  The  fact  that  prior  to  the  Balkan  Wars 
the  largest  element  of  the  population  was  either  Bul- 
garian or  Greek  partly  accounted  for  the  Serbian  desire 
to  capture  the  city  during  the  first  Balkan  campaign. 
The  same  fact  was  in  part  responsible  for  the  second 
war  —  a  war  which  left  in  the  heart  of  every  Bul- 
garian an  outstanding  longing  to  recapture  the  city 
at  the  earliest  possible  opportunity.  It  was  really 
this  longing  which  brought  Bulgaria  into  the  War 
against  Serbia  —  a  longing  which  was  temporarily 
gratified  when  it  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy  soon 
after  Bulgaria  threw  in  her  lot  with  the  Central  Powers. 

Wlien  it  became  obvious,  during  the  early  autumn 
of  1916,  that  we  could  not  advance  either  across  the 
Rhodope  Balkans  or  by  way  of  the  Vardar  Valley, 
over  and  above  the  fact  that  except  for  the  Greek 
danger,  a  campaign  in  the  direction  of  Monastir  was 
by  way  of  the  line  of  least  resistance,  there  was  there- 
fore the  additional  object  of  recapturing  from  Bulgaria 
her  most  coveted  and  cherished  war  gain,  and  of  restor- 
ing to  Serbia  a  city,  for  the  possession  of  which  she  had 
already  fought  two  wars.  Consequently  it  was  these 
factors  which  led  to  the  developments  which  began 
at  the  end  of  August,  1916. 

Up  to  that  time  the  Bulgarians,  who  had  been 
gradually  advancing  from  Monastir,  had  reached  the 
northern  shores  of  Lake  Ostrovo,  where  there  was 
severe  fighting.  The  Allied  advance  was  inaugurated 
early  in  September,  the  French  and  Russians  on  the 
left  moving  on  Fiorina,  the  Serbians  under  General 
Mishitch  advancing  from  the  line  Vodena-Lake  Ostrovo 


THE   RIDDLE   OF  SALONICA  265 

against  the  Moglena  Ridge,  topped  as  it  is  by  Mount 
Kaimakchalan  which  rises  to  an  elevation  of  nearly 
eight  thousand  feet  above  the  level  of  the  sea.  After 
approximately  a  fortnight's  fighting,  the  Franco- 
Russian  forces  took  Fiorina  and  reached  the  southern 
entrance  to  the  Monastir  Plain,  whilst  the  Serbs 
stormed  Kaimakchalan,  thereby  reconquering  a  corner 
of  their  former  territory.  Thenceforth  the  plan  was 
that  the  left  of  the  Allied  line  was  to  demonstrate  and 
to  hold  the  enemy  first  on  his  defensive  line,  running 
north  of  Fiorina  and  south  of  the  frontier,  and  then 
on  the  Kenali  front,  whilst  the  Serbs  outflanked  these 
positions  by  advancing  across  the  River  Tcherna  and 
took  the  hills  in  the  Tcherna  Bend.  Mishitch's  first 
big  attack  failed,  but  a  few  days  later  he  pushed  his 
way  well  into  this  most  difficult  country.  For  the 
ensuing  month  (October  21  till  November  19)  the 
weather  was  extremely  bad,  but  the  Serbian  Com- 
mander-in-Chief held  his  ground  against  repeated 
counter  attacks,  and  by  the  middle  of  November 
had  advanced  to  positions  from  which  the  Kenali 
line  was  so  hopelessly  outflanked  that  the  Bulgarians 
retired  from  it  to  the  River  Bistritza,  which  runs 
east  and  west  at  a  distance  of  only  some  four  miles 
from  Monastir.  A  few  days  afterwards,  and  early 
in  the  morning  of  Sunday,  the  nineteenth,  the  Franco- 
Russian  forces  entered  Monastir,  followed  a  few  hours 
later  by  the  Serbians,  who  crossed  the  Tcherna.  Thus, 
largely  due  to  the  skill  of  General  Mishitch  and  to  the 
intense  bravery  of  the  Serbians,  who  had  to  advance 
over  by  far  the  most  difficult  area  of  country,  and 
who  were  responsible  for  the  taking  of  Kaimakchalan 
and  the  Tcherna  Bend,  Monastir  fell  into  the  hands 


266  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE   WAR 

of  the  Allies  on  the  fourth  anniversary  of  its  conquest 
by  the  Serbians  during  the  first  Balkan  war. 

The  capture  of  what  may  almost  be  described  as 
the  capital  of  Macedonia  was  important  both  politically 
and  militarily.  Over  and  above  the  reasons  alreadj^ 
given,  this  is  the  case  because  the  city  would  be  a  good 
jumping-off  ground  were  it  decided  to  increase  the 
forces  at  Salonica  in  such  a  way  as  to  enable  them  to 
deliver  a  determined  blow  in  the  Balkans.  Thus  from 
Monastir  there  run  routes  into  Albania  and  into 
Western  Serbia  and  also  a  road  —  if  not  now  a  rail- 
way —  through  Prilep  and  the  Babuna  Pass  to  Ku- 
prulu.  Moreover  the  Allied  advance  in  Western  Mace- 
donia was  responsible  for  bringing  about  the  junction 
of  the  Salonica  forces  with  those  of  Italy  based  upon 
the  Adriatic,  and  therefore  for  enabling  that  country 
to  further  the  Allied  cause  in  this  area.  The  Italians, 
having  occupied  Avlona  in  December,  1914,  subse- 
quently extended  their  sphere  of  control  roughly  as 
far  as  the  River  Viosa,  and  later  on,  as  I  have  shown 
elsewhere,  established  connection  with  the  Salonica 
army.  No  full  details  are  available  concerning  the 
work  and  difficulties  of  this  Italian  force,  but  its  original 
presence  and  particularly  the  fact  that  it  now  prolongs 
the  Allied  line  from  the  neighbourhood  of  Cologna 
near  which  place  the  French  left  rests,  to  the  Adriatic 
has  been  and  is  of  great  importance.  Had  it  not  been 
for  this  expedition  on  the  east  of  the  Adriatic,  during 
the  regime  of  King  Constantine,  the  dangers  of  the 
enemy's  pushing  forward  through  Albania  and  Greece 
and  therefore  of  his  out-flanking  the  Allies,  and  of 
the  junction  of  Bulgaro-Germanic  forces  with  regular 
and  irregular  Hellenic   contingents   would   have  been 


THE   RIDDLE   OF  SALONICA  267 

even  greater  than  they  were.  Equally  well,  the  fact 
that  Italy  now  holds  Southern  Albania  does  a  good  deal 
to  strengthen  our  strategic  position  in  the  Near  East 
—  a  strategic  position  which  has  its  direct  as  well 
as  its  indirect  influence  upon  the  War. 

Since  the  late  autumn  of  1916,  whilst  there  has  been 
occasional  and  intermittent  fighting,  there  have  been 
no  far-reaching  changes  in  the  Salonica  battle  front. 
Starting  from  a  point  on  the  Adriatic  situated  a  few 
miles  to  the  north  of  Avlona,  our  line  now  extends 
roughly  across  Albania  in  such  a  way  as  to  leave  Berat 
to  the  enemy  and  Korcha  to  the  Allies.  After  passing 
round  the  north  of  Monastir,  it  runs  in  an  almost  due 
easterly  direction  to  Lake  Doiran  where  it  soon  turns 
southeast,  approaching  the  Aegean  near  and  pre- 
sumably on  the  west  of  the  mouth  of  the  Struma. 
This  means  that  the  Allies  now  hold  approximately 
one  quarter  of  Albania,  that  they  are  in  possession 
of  the  extreme  southern  corner  of  Serbia,  and  that 
only  the  northeastern  section  of  New  Greece  is  in 
the  hands  of  the  enemy. 

The  foregoing  remarks  will  be  sufficient  to  prove 
that  the  Salonica  campaign  is  quite  unlike,  and  that 
the  country  is  far  more  difficult  than  anything  else  in 
Europe,  except  perhaps  that  on  the  Italian  front. 
With  the  exception  of  the  plain  lying  to  the  west  of 
the  town  and  of  the  one  which  borders  upon  the  Aegean, 
almost  the  whole  of  Macedonia  is  made  up  of  moun- 
tains or  disjointed  rocky  hills.  The  winding  valleys 
which  often  narrow  down  to  mere  gorges  are  shut  in 
by  sloping  hills  so  forbidding  that  advance  across 
them  seems  to  be  well-nigh  impossible.  In  other 
districts,    which   are   somewhat   more   open,    there   is 


268  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE   WAR 

hardly  a  single  locality  where  a  forward  movement  is 
not  rendered  extremely  arduous  by  the  existence  of 
defensive  positions,  the  merits  of  which  it  is  impossi- 
ble to  exaggerate.  When  the  Allies  went  to  Salonica, 
the  whole  of  the  railways  were  single  lines,  built  not 
for  the  purpose  of  heavy  and  numerous  trains,  but 
simply  to  meet  the  requirements  of  the  very  meagre 
traffic  of  peace  time.  The  gradients  are  steep,  the 
curves  are  sharp,  and  the  passing  places  were  few  and 
far  between.  Many  of  the  railways  and  especially 
the  Vardar  and  the  Salonica  Junction  lines  pass 
through  defiles  and  over  numerous  bridges  which  are 
easily  defensible  by  an  enemy  in  possession  of  the  hills 
which  command  the  valleys  of  the  Vardar  and  of  the 
Mesta.  With  the  exception  of  very  few  roads,  the 
paths  consisted  of  the  merest  tracks  strewn  with  rocky 
stones  so  numerous  that  one  had  to  ride,  to  stumble,  or 
to  clamber  along  them  as  best  one  might.  The  native 
bridges  were  so  narrow,  so  shaky,  and  so  steep,  that 
one  crossed  them  only  at  the  greatest  risk.  Moreover 
the  winter  rains  and  snows,  which  in  the  mountains 
are  very  heavy,  make  the  roads  —  where  roads  exist 
—  and  the  fords  well-nigh,  if  not  quite,  impossible. 

This  all  means,  except  where  the  country  has  been 
occupied  for  some  time  and  where  the  methods  of 
communication  have  been  improved,  that  the  utility 
of  motor  vehicles,  transport  waggons,  and  big  guns 
upon  which  a  modern  army  depends,  is  greatly  mini- 
mised, and  that  special  transport  and  mountain  guns 
must  be  provided  for  service  upon  the  numerous 
tracks  which  are  not  passable  for  wheeled  traffic. 
The  drought  of  the  summer,  which  makes  .water, 
except  in  the  actual  valleys,  a  difficulty  for  travellers, 


THE  RIDDLE  OF  SALONICA  269 

places  upon  the  supply  sections  of  the  army  a  burden 
the  magnitude  of  which  it  is  difficult  to  exaggerate. 
And  lastly  the  climatic  and  other  conditions  are  such 
that  it  was  and  is  impossible  to  expect  that  the  health 
of  the  troops  engaged  would  or  will  be  comparable 
to  that  of  those  fighting  in  more  healthy  theatres  of 
war  —  theatres  in  which,  when  contingents  are  with- 
drawn for  rest,  measures  can  be  taken,  in  a  way  im- 
possible at  Salonica,  to  insure  the  counteraction  of 
what  must  always  be  hard  and  arduous  fighting  at  the 
actual  front. 

These  are  some  of  the  factors  which  make  it  im- 
possible to  exaggerate  the  military  difficulties  sur- 
rounding the  conduct  of  a  campaign  in  this  part  of 
the  Balkan  Peninsula —  difficulties  which  when  coupled 
with  the  central  and  therefore  strategically  strong 
position  of  Bulgaria  and  with  the  effects  of  the  earlier 
attitude  of  Greece  are  responsible  for  the  original 
Allied  failure  to  advance  into  the  interior  of  Serbia 
and  for  our  subsequent  inability  in  any  way  seriously 
to  defeat  the  army  of  King  Ferdinand  or  to  threaten 
the  enemy's  line  of  communications  by  way  of  the 
Belgrade-Constantinople  Railway.  But  if  we  admit, 
as  we  must  admit,  that  the  Salonica  campaign,  like 
the  operations  at  the  Dardanelles,  has  not  accom- 
plished its  primary  objects,  the  undertaking  has  served 
and  is  serving  certain  purposes  in  the  War.  It  has 
demonstrated  the  Anglo-French  desire  to  come  to  the 
support  of  Serbia.  Moreover,  what  is  much  more 
important,  the  existence  of  the  Salonica  expedition 
was  probably  at  least  partially  responsible  for  pre- 
venting Greece  from  entering  the  War  upon  the  side 
of  the  enemy,   and   its  presence  certainly  prevented 


270  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE  WAR 

the  still  further  success  of  the  secret  intrigues  and 
propaganda  carried  out  in  that  country  by  German 
agents  during  the  regime  of  King  Constantine.  These 
results,  when  coupled  with  the  fact  that  England  and 
France,  two  of  the  Protecting  Powers  of  Greece,  have 
been  able  to  defend  the  greater  part  of  that  country 
from  invasion  and  thus  to  carry  out  their  treaty  obli- 
gations, are  of  significance;  for,  whilst  the  fighting 
value  of  the  Hellenic  army  is  not  of  any  great  im- 
portance to  either  group  of  belligerents,  the  unhindered 
and  unhampered  use  of  all  the  Greek  ports,  harbours, 
and  bays,  by  enemy  submarines,  would  have  carried 
with  it  danger  to  the  whole  Allied  position  in  the  East 
—  danger  so  great  that  it  cannot  be  estimated  here. 
For  these  reasons  and  for  many  others,  among  them 
the  fact  that  the  Allies  have  maintained  a  foothold 
in  the  Balkans,  the  Salonica  campaign  will  be  possessed 
of  a  historical  interest  and  importance  the  true  mean- 
ing of  which  may  not  become  apparent  before  or  even 
immediately  after  the  final  termination  of  hostilities. 


o [Qo       200         joo  Miles 

Railways  open»-c^— >   ProjectQd^^^a^iix^.^   Proposed'**' 

The  Bagdad  Railway  and  its  Tributaries 


XI 
THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY  AND  THE  WAR 

My  object  in  this  chapter  is  to  examine  the  impor- 
tance of  the  Bagdad  Railway  and  its  tributaries  in  the 
War  and  to  give  a  brief  outhne  of  the  political  and 
geographical  conditions  which  have  influenced  the 
construction  of  these  lines.  So  far  as  the  first  of  these 
points  be  concerned,  it  must  be  obvious  to  any  reader 
who  makes  the  most  superficial  study  of  the  subject, 
that  this  railway,  together  with  the  main  route  across 
the  Balkans,  constitute  the  great  line  of  Germanic 
communication  from  west  to  east,  and  that  the  Bag- 
dad Railway  alone  is,  so  to  speak,  the  backbone  of 
Turkish  utility  and  power  in  the  War.  Thus  were  it 
not  for  its  existence,  the  Ottoman  resistance  in  Mesopo- 
tamia and  in  Syria  could  have  been  discounted  as  a 
practical  consideration  in  the  War,  and  the  sending  of 
Turkish  reinforcements  to  the  Caucasus  would  have 
been  even  more  materially  delayed  than  has  in  fact 
been  the  case. 

That  these  facilities  were  intended  by  Germany  to 
be  the  war  conditions  in  case  of  an  outbreak  of  hostili- 
ties with  England  was  natural  and  obvious,  in  fact  so 
natural  and  so  obvious  that  had  the  enemy  ignored 
the  precaution  of  preparation  in  Turkey,  it  would 
have  meant  the  pursuit  of  a  policy  which  certainly 


^JAN 


!.»^s 


HRAN 


25 


XI 

THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY  AND  THE  WAR 

My  object  in  this  chapter  is  to  examine  the  impor- 
tance of  the  Bagdad  Railway  and  its  tributaries  in  the 
War  and  to  give  a  brief  outline  of  the  political  and 
geographical  conditions  which  have  influenced  the 
construction  of  these  lines.  So  far  as  the  first  of  these 
points  be  concerned,  it  must  be  obvious  to  any  reader 
who  makes  the  most  superficial  study  of  the  subject, 
that  this  railway,  together  with  the  main  route  across 
the  Balkans,  constitute  the  great  line  of  Germanic 
communication  from  west  to  east,  and  that  the  Bag- 
dad Railway  alone  is,  so  to  speak,  the  backbone  of 
Turkish  utility  and  power  in  the  War.  Thus  were  it 
not  for  its  existence,  the  Ottoman  resistance  in  Mesopo- 
tamia and  in  Syria  could  have  been  discounted  as  a 
practical  consideration  in  the  War,  and  the  sending  of 
Turkish  reinforcements  to  the  Caucasus  would  have 
been  even  more  materially  delayed  than  has  in  fact 
been  the  case. 

That  these  facilities  were  intended  by  Germany  to 
be  the  war  conditions  in  case  of  an  outbreak  of  hostili- 
ties with  England  was  natural  and  obvious,  in  fact  so 
natm-al  and  so  obvious  that  had  the  enemy  ignored 
the  precaution  of  preparation  in  Turkey,  it  would 
have  meant  the  pursuit  of  a  policy  which  certainly 


272  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE   WAR 

was  not  adopted  by  him  elsewhere.  Indeed  to  those 
who  have  travelled  in  the  East,  and  who  have  watched 
the  gradual  development  of  the  Pan-German  scheme 
there,  it  was  always  markedly  apparent  that  the 
objects  of  the  Bagdad  Railway  were  military  rather 
than  commercial.  Were  any  proof  of  this  required 
it  is  provided,  as  I  shall  endeavour  to  show  below,  by 
the  facts  that  the  Government  of  the  Kaiser  insisted 
upon  a  railway  from  the  Bosphorus  and  not  from  the 
Mediterranean  to  the  Persian  Gulf,  and  that  it  objected, 
when  a  modification  of  the  original  route  was  proposed, 
to  the  suggestion  that  the  line  should  pass  through 
Alexandretta  and  therefore  absolutely  along  the  sea- 
shore, at  the  northeastern  corner  of  the  Mediterranean, 
instead  of,  as  it  now  does,  never  coming  within  a  dis- 
tance of  about  ten  miles  of  the  coast. 

The  present  Bagdad  line  is  by  no  means  the  first 
that  has  been  under  consideration.  The  idea  of 
connecting  the  Mediterranean  with  the  Persian  Gulf 
by  an  overland  route,  and  therefore  of  shortening  the 
journey  round  the  Cape  or  across  the  Isthmus  of  Suez, 
was  first  suggested  about  the  year  1835.  Under  dis- 
cussion for  many  years,  the  original  plan  —  a  plan 
largely  based  upon  the  detailed  survey  made  by  Colonel 
Chesney  in  1835-1837  —  was  to  avoid  Asia  Minor 
altogether,  and  to  start  the  proposed  railway  not  from 
the  Bosphorus  but  from  some  point  on  the  Eastern 
Mediterranean.  One  proposal  was  for  a  railway  from 
Alexandretta  via  Aleppo  to  the  Euphrates  and  thence 
down  the  right  bank  of  that  river  to  Koweit ;  or,  for 
a  line  starting  from  the  same  point,  but  crossing  the 
Euphrates  near  Belis  and  subsequently  following 
either  the  left  bank  of  that  river  or  the  right  bank  of 


THE   BAGDAD  RAILWAY  AND  THE   WAR     273 

the  Tigris  to  Bagdad  and  thence  to  the  Gulf.  Another 
idea  was  a  hne  from  TripoH  or  Beirut  through  the 
desert  via  Pahnyra  to  the  Euphrates,  and  thence 
down  the  valley  of  that  river  to  the  sea.  A  third 
suggestion,  about  which  but  little  is  known,  was  to 
connect  Ismailia  with  Koweit  by  a  line  which  would 
have  run  practically  due  east  and  west. 

Negotiations  and  pourparlers  on  the  merits  of  these 
various  lines  were  in  progress  for  manj'^  years,  a  com- 
pany being  formed  for  the  purpose  of  realising  Colonel 
Chesney's  plan  in  the  early  fifties.  This  company  being 
unable  to  raise  the  necessary  funds,  and  the  British 
Government  having  refused  its  support  to  the  scheme 
in  1857,  the  question  lapsed  until  1872,  when  it  was 
referred  to  a  Parliamentary  Commission,  which  ap- 
proved of  the  construction  of  a  line  by  the  route  advo- 
cated by  Colonel  Chesney.  Subsequently,  however, 
the  idea  was  dropped  in  favour  of  one  by  which  early 
in  1876  England  purchased  shares  to  the  value  of 
£4,000,000  in  the  Suez  Canal,  which  had  been  open 
to  traffic  since  1869. 

From  this  time  onwards  two  reasons  gradually  led 
up  to  the  idea  of  connecting  not  the  Mediterranean 
but  the  Bosphorus  with  the  Persian  Gulf.  The  first 
of  these  was  that,  whilst  in  earlier  times  there  was  no 
railway  nearer  than  Brindisi  on  the  overland  route 
to  India,  from  the  opening  of  the  through  line  to  Con- 
stantinople in  1888  it  was  natural,  if  there  was  to  be 
an  overland  route  to  the  Persian  Gulf  at  all,  that  such 
a  route  would  follow  a  line  which  would  necessitate 
the  shortest  sea  passage.  The  other  and  from  political 
and  military  points  of  view  far  more  important  reason 
for  the  change  of  plan  was  that  German  influence, 


274  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE  WAR 

gradually  developed  in  Turkey  since  the  accession  of 
the  present  Emperor  to  the  throne,  has  been  entirely 
directed  towards  the  construction  of  railways  which 
would  not  be  easy  of  attack  and  communications  which 
could  not  be  cut  by  a  group  of  Powers  with  the  com- 
mand of  the  sea.  Thus,  whilst  a  line  starting  from  the 
Mediterranean  would  have  been  quite  useless  to  Turkey 
or  Germany  as  a  means  of  through  connection  between 
the  East  and  West,  a  railway  broken  only  at  the  south- 
ern end  of  the  Bosphorus  gives  to  the  enemy  an  iron 
road  the  importance  of  which  it  is  impossible  to  over- 
estimate. Indeed,  so  long  as  the  forts  of  the  Darda- 
nelles and  of  the  Bosphorus  remain  intact,  the  Sultan 
and  his  allies  enjoy  the  advantages  of  naval  power  in 
a  limited  area  —  the  Bosphorus,  the  Sea  of  Marmora, 
and  the  Dardanelles  —  without  the  possession  of  a 
fleet. 

Before  entering  into  a  discussion  of  the  history, 
geography,  and  construction  of  the  great  trunk  line, 
I  will  endeavour  to  show  in  a  general  way  the  ac- 
tual meaning  and  the  military  and  political  impor- 
tance of  the  railways  of  Asiatic  Turkey  as  they  exist 
to-day.  Starting  from  Haidar  Pasha,  opposite  to 
Constantinople,  it  is  now  possible  to  travel  by  train 
or  by  water  across  the  greater  part  of  the  areas  which 
lie  between  the  Ottoman  capital  and  Bagdad  on  the 
one  hand  and  the  Egyptian  frontier  on  the  other. 
The  Taurus  tunnels  were  pierced  in  November,  1916, 
and  they  are  now  open  to  traffic  maintained  at  least 
by  a  narrow-gauge  railway.  More  or  less  through 
communication  has  therefore  been  established  right 
across  the  Anatolian  Plateau,  along  the  Plain  of  Cilicia, 
and  through  the  Amanus  Range  to  a  junction  about 


THE  BAGDAD   RAILWAY  AND  THE  WAR    275 

ten  miles  to  the  north  of  Aleppo.  From  here  the 
northern  prong,  or  Bagdad  Railway  proper,  continues 
its  way  in  an  easterly  direction  as  far  as  Helif  and 
probably  to  Nisibin,  At  the  other  or  Bagdad  end 
the  railway  has  been  completed  in  a  northerly  direc- 
tion up  to  Samarra.  If  we  take  it  that  the  respec- 
tive termini  are  at  Helif  and  at  Samarra,  this  means 
that  out  of  the  total  distance  of  approximately  fifteen 
hundred  miles  from  Constantinople  to  Bagdad,  about 
twelve  hundred  miles  can  be  accomplished  by  train. 

The  portion  of  the  journey  which  cannot  be  per- 
formed by  train  is  made  up  of  two  parts,  the  first 
of  about  one  hundred  and  thirty  miles  across  the 
desert  from  Helif  to  Mosul.  From  here  the  stage  to 
Samarra,  about  one  hundred  and  seventy  miles,  can 
be  accomplished  in  boats  and  rafts  floated  or  sailed 
down  the  Tigris.  In  addition,  what  is  almost  equally 
important  is  that,  since  the  completion  of  the  Taurus 
and  Amanus  tunnels,  the  railway  thus  constructed 
approaches  and  crosses  the  Euphrates  at  Jerablus. 
From  that  place  there  is  an  alternative  means  of 
communication  with  Mesopotamia  by  way  of  the 
Euphrates  as  far  as  Feluja,  now  connected  by  a  light 
railway  with  Bagdad  only  about  thirty-five  miles  to 
the  east.  The  progress  of  the  construction  of  the 
Bagdad  line  has  therefore  had  its  direct  military  advan- 
tages to  Turkey  in  tlie  Mesopotamian  campaign.  It 
also  provides  an  easier  and  quicker  means  of  commu- 
nication between  Constantinople  and  Eastern  Asia 
Minor  than  would  otherwise  have  existed  so  long  as 
the  Black  Sea  route  was  closed  to  traffic.  For  instance, 
the  distances  to  be  covered  by  road  between  Helif 
and  the  Bitlis  district,  or  between  the  head  of  the  rail- 


276  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE  WAR 

way  and  Kharput  —  a  centre  of  the  utmost  impor- 
tance—  are  considerably  less  than  those  which  would 
otherwise  have  had  to  be  traversed  by  road  from  An- 
gora —  formerly  the  nearest  point  in  railway  connec- 
tion with  Constantinople.  These  facilities  are  of  the 
greatest  importance  to-day  because  they  must  further 
the  Turco-Germanic  objects  of  reconquering  North- 
eastern Asia  Minor  and  of  overcoming  Armenian 
resistance  there  and  in  the  areas  of  the  Russian  Cau- 
casus now  ceded  to  Turkey  by  Russia  under  her  terms 
of  peace  with  the  Central  Powers. 

Up  to  Aleppo,  about  eight  hundred  and  forty  miles 
from  Constantinople,  the  Anatolian  and  Bagdad 
railways  serve  as  a  means  of  communication  with 
the  south  as  well  as  with  the  east.  From  Aleppo  the 
southern  prong,  before  the  War  owned  partly  by  French 
companies  and  partly  by  the  Turks  themselves  (I 
must  obviously  speak  here  of  the  pre- War  ownership 
of  the  railways,  for  the  Turks  are  believed  to  have 
seized  all  those  which  properly  belong  to  companies 
of  Allied  nationality),  runs  by  way  of  Damascus  to 
Deraia.  From  this  point  there  are  two  routes.  The 
first  is  by  the  Hedjaz  line,  which  continues  its  way 
in  a  southerly  direction  as  far  as  Medina.  The  second 
bends  from  Deraia  in  a  westerly  direction  towards 
Haifa,  but  before  reaching  that  port  turns  south  near 
Nazareth,  ultimately  extending  as  far  as  Bir  Auja, 
about  thirty-five  miles  to  the  southwest  of  Beersheba.^ 
Although  there  is  at  least  one  break  of  gauge  at  Rayak, 
not  at  Aleppo  as  is  sometimes  stated,  the  strategical 

1  Presumably  ere  now  the  Egyptian  railway  system  has  been  united  with 
that  of  Palestine,  but  no  detailed  reference  can  be  made  here  or  in  the 
accompanying  maps  to  lines  constructed  by  the  British  for  war  purposes. 


THE   BAGDAD   RAILWAY  AND  THE   WAR     277 

importance  of  these  southern  prongs  is  enormous. 
They  have  rendered  possible  the  threatened  attack 
upon  Egypt,  an  attack  which,  although  it  never  ma- 
teriahsed,  at  one  time  had  a  certain  effect  upon  the 
general  plan  of  the  Allied  operations. 

The  story  of  the  numerous  and  various  arrange- 
ments which  have  led  up  to  the  existing  extension  of 
railways  in  Asia  Minor  is  closely  connected  with  the 
gradual  development  of  Germanic  influence  in  the 
Near  East.  In  1888,  the  only  railways  existing  in 
Asia  Minor  were  the  Smyrna-Aidin,  the  Smyrna-Cas- 
saba,  the  Mersina-Adana,  and  the  Haidar  Pasha 
(Scutari) -Ismid  lines.  All  these  railways  were  com- 
pletely, or  at  least  practically,  in  the  hands  of  English 
capitalists.  The  Scutari-Ismid  line,  which  now  con- 
stitutes the  first  section  of  the  Anatolian  Railway  and 
which  has  a  length  of  about  fifty-six  miles,  was  built 
by  the  Turkish  Government  in  1871.  In  1880  it  was 
leased  to  a  British  company  for  a  period  of  twenty 
years.  In  1888,  however,  the  Turks,  influenced  by 
the  Germans,  dispossessed  the  British  Company  and 
handed  the  line  over  to  a  German  syndicate  financed 
by  the  Deutsche  Bank  of  Berlin,  which  then  became 
the  moving  spirit  in  all  the  schemes  of  Germanic  rail- 
way construction  in  the  Asiatic  dominions  of  the 
Sultan.  Moreover,  the  Germans  secured  two  Imperial 
Irades,  the  one  giving  them  the  control  of  this  line  for 
a  period  of  ninety-nine  years,  and  the  other  granting 
them  the  right  of  extending  it  to  Angora,  and  therefore 
for  a  further  three  hundred  and  one  miles. 

At  the  same  time,  the  Turks  first  accepted  the  idea 
of  providing  kilometric  guarantees  for  railways,  the 
principle   of   those   guarantees    being   that   the    Gov- 


278  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE   WAR 

ernmcnt  promises  to  the  company  a  fixed  sum  as  the 
gross  annual  receipts  per  kilometre  of  line  open  to 
traffic.  This  sum  is  handed  over  to  the  railway  by 
the  Ottoman  Public  Debt  before  that  organisation 
passes  on  its  surplus  to  the  Government.  In  the  case 
of  the  Haidar  Pasha-Ismid  section  the  kilometric 
guarantee  is  10,300  francs  per  kilometre,  and  in  that 
of  the  Ismid-Angora  section  15,000  francs  per  kilo- 
metre. The  Anatolian  Railway  Company,  which 
came  into  being  in  1889,  completed  the  railway  to 
Angora,  which  was  opened  to  traffic  in  1892. 

In  the  following  year,  which  constitutes  a  very  im- 
portant epoch,  the  Germans  were  granted  two  further 
concessions.  The  first  gave  them  the  right  of  prolong- 
ing the  railway  from  Angora  to  Kaisariya  and  thence 
through  Sivas  and  Diarbekr  and  down  the  Tigris  to 
Bagdad.  This  proposal  was  not  carried  out,  ostensibly 
on  account  of  the  engineering  difficulties,  but  really 
because  of  the  hostility  which  it  created  in  Russia. 
The  idea  of  this  line  has,  however,  never  been  completely 
given  up,  and,  if  we  are  to  believe  various  authoritative 
publications  in  Germany,  the  existence  of  a  concession 
for  the  construction  of  lines  from  Adabazar  to  Bolu, 
and  from  Angora  by  way  of  Kaisariya  to  Sivas  on  the 
north,  and  to  Nigde  and  UIu  Kushlar  on  the  south,  is 
still  held  to  be  valid.  Indeed,  according  to  Mehr- 
mann's  "  Diplomatischer  Krieg  in  Vorder  Asien", 
published  in  1916,  some  fifty  miles  of  a  railway  from 
Angora  towards  Sivas  and  Erzerum  had  actually  been 
completed  in  November  of  that  year.  There  is  also 
good  reason  to  suppose  that  part  of  the  line  from  Ada- 
bazar  to  Bolu,  following  a  route  fully  described  in 
my  book,  "Washed  by  Four  Seas",  and  for  which  a 


THE   BAGDAD   RAILWAY  AND   THE   WAR     279 

concession  exists,  has  been  completed  since  the  begin- 
ning of  the  War. 

The  second  and  all-important  concession  granted 
to  the  Germans  in  1893  provided  for  the  construction 
of  what  was  then  considered  to  be  a  branch  line  from 
Eskishchr  to  Konia.  This  line,  which  has  a  length  of 
two  hundred  and  sixty-nine  miles  and  a  kilometric 
guarantee  (I  believe  amounting  to  about  1'3,500  francs 
per  kilometre),  was  opened  to  traffic  in  1896.  Its  com- 
pletion was  most  important,  not  only  because  it  laid 
the  foundation  for  the  construction  of  the  Bagdad 
railway  by  its  present  route,  but  because  one  hundred 
miles  to  the  south  of  Eskishehr  it  passes  through  Afiun 
Karahissar  and  thus  establishes  railway  connection 
between  Smyrna  and  Constantinople  by  what  is  still 
known  as  the  Smyrna-Cassaba  Railway. 

That  line  owes  its  existence  to  an  English  company, 
which  obtained  a  concession  for  its  construction  in 
1863.  Thirty  years  later,  having  no  kilometric  guar- 
antee, the  main  line  extended  for  a  distance  of  one 
hundred  and  five  miles  to  Alashehr,  and  its  northern 
arm  went  only  to  Soma.  In  1893  the  Turks  handed 
over  these  lines  to  a  French  company,  which  undertook 
to  work  them  under  a  special  arrangement  with  the 
Government  (its  details,  as  also  a  great  deal  of  other 
useful  information  concerning  railways  in  Asiatic 
Turkey,  are  to  be  found  in  "Corps  de  Droit  Ottoman", 
by  George  Young)  and  to  prolong  the  main  line  as 
far  as  Afiun  Karahissar,  this  latter  stretch  having  a 
kilometric  guarantee  amounting  to  nearly  19,000  francs 
per  kilometre.  For  some  years  the  rivalry  which 
existed  between  the  French  and  the  German  companies 
prevented  the  actual  junction  of  the  two  lines,  and 


280  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE   WAR 

when  I  was  at  Afiun  Karahissar  in  1905  I  found  the 
two  railway  systems  separated  by  a  distance  of  a  few 
hundred  yards  and  running  their  trains  in  such  a  way 
that  the  passenger  was  doomed  to  miss  his  connection. 
Subsequently,  and  I  believe  after  the  re-establishment 
of  the  Turkish  Constitution  in  1908,  the  two  companies 
arrived  at  a  working  arrangement,  and  the  trains  of 
the  French  company  started  from  the  German  station. 
After  that  time,  too,  the  French  company  secured  the 
concession  to  prolong,  as  far  as  Pandemia  on  the  Sea 
of  Marmora,  the  branch  which  ran  from  Magnesia  to 
Soma,  and  thus  to  open  a  subsidiary  line,  the  total 
length  of  which  is  one  hundred  and  thirteen  miles. 
This  prolongation,  which  has  no  kilometric  guarantee, 
has  played  a  most  important  part  in  the  War,  for  it  was 
on  account  of  its  existence  that  the  Turks  were  able  to 
convey  troops  to  districts  which  lie  in  the  immediate 
vicinity  of  the  Asiatic  coast  of  the  Dardanelles. 

Although  they  form  no  part  of  the  Bagdad  system, 
and  have  no  connection  with  it,  in  order  to  make  this 
chapter  as  complete  an  account  as  possible  of  the 
railways  of  Asiatic  Turkey  I  will  refer  here  very  briefly 
to  the  Mudania-Brusa  Line  and  to  what  is  known  as 
the  Smyrna-Aidin  Railway.  The  first  of  these,  which 
unites  the  ancient  capital  of  the  Turkish  Empire  with 
its  port  upon  the  Sea  of  Marmora,  has  a  length  of  about 
twenty-six  miles.  There  is  no  kilometric  guarantee, 
and  its  gauge  is  three  feet  three  and  four-tenths  inches 
(one  metre),  instead  of  the  normal  Continental  gauge 
of  four  feet  eight  and  one  half  inches.  By  a  firman  of 
1891  the  company  has  the  right  to  prolong  its  line  to 
meet  the  Anatolian  railway  system,  but  the  schemes 
for   the   establishment   of   connection   either   between 


THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY  AND   THE   WAR     281 

Brusa  and  the  Germanic  system  near  Eskislielir  or 
between  Brusa  and  the  Smyrna-Panderma  h'ne  never 
having  been  reahzed,  this  short  section  has  httle  poht- 
ical  or  mihtary  importance. 

The  concession  for  the  Smyrna-Aidin  Line  was  given 
to  a  group  of  British  capitahsts  in  1856  without  the 
provision  of  a  kilometric  guarantee.  Since  the  year 
18G6,  when  these  first  eighty  miles  of  railway  were 
opened  to  trafiic,  the  system  has  been  gradually  ex- 
tended to  Egerdir,  which  lies  at  a  distance  of 
two  hundred  and  ninety-four  miles  to  the  east  of 
Smyrna.  Possessed  of  four  short  branches,  this  line 
has  always  managed  to  prosper  without  a  kilometric 
guarantee.  But  unless  the  War  reverses  the  whole 
position  of  railways  in  Asia  Minor,  it  is  obvious  that 
the  dream  once  entertained  by  its  promoters  —  that 
it  should  be  prolonged  to  Konia  and  thus  form  the 
first  section  of  the  route  to  Bagdad  —  is  doomed  to 
meet  with  disappointment. 

From  the  moment  of  the  opening  of  the  railway  to 
Konia  the  German  plans  for  the  prolongation  of  that 
line  to  the  Persian  Gulf  became  more  definite  and  pre- 
cise. The  Kaiser,  who  had  paid  his  first  visit  to  Con- 
stantinople in  1889  —  a  visit  more  or  less  connected 
with  the  then  recent  grabbing  of  the  Haidar  Pasha- 
Ismid  Railway  by  the  Germans  and  with  its  prolonga- 
tion to  Angora,  to  which  I  have  already  referred  — 
went  to  Turkey  again  in  the  year  1898.  It  was  this, 
his  second  visit,  and  the  appointment  of  Baron  Marshal 
von  Bieberstein  as  German  Ambassador  in  Constan- 
tinople in  1897,  that  led  to  the  promise  of  a  concession 
for  the  present  railway  —  a  promise  which  I  believe 
was  made  verbally  in  1898. 


282  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE  WAR 

There  is  no  reason  here  to  enter  into  the  details 
of  the  negotiations  which  intervened  between  that 
time  and  the  signature  of  the  final  agreement  five 
years  later.  These  negotiations  have  been  admirably 
reviewed,  among  others,  by  Sir  Valentine  Chirol  in 
his  "Middle  Eastern  Question",  and  by  M.  Andre 
Cheradame  in  various  works  and  papers  which  he  has 
published  on  the  subject.  Suffice  it,  therefore,  to  say 
that  in  1899  a  preliminary  Convention  was  signed 
between  Doctor  Siemens  —  then  Director  of  the  Deut- 
sche Bank  —  and  the  Porte.  That  Convention  gave 
to  the  Anatolian  Railway  Company,  in  principle,  the 
right  of  constructing  a  line  from  Konia  to  the  Persian 
Gulf.  In  1902  a  formal  Convention  was  approved 
by  the  Sultan  —  a  Convention  which  in  its  turn  served 
as  the  basis  of  the  final  agreement  of  March  5,  1903. 
This  agreement,  which  constitutes  the  real  charter  of 
the  Bagdad  Railway,  was  actually  signed  between 
representatives  of  the  Ottoman  Government  on  the 
one  hand  and  those  of  the  Anatolian  Railway  Company 
on  the  other.  But  as  the  Anatolian  Railway  Com- 
pany was  so  blatantly  German,  and  as  the  Deutsche 
Bank,  at  that  time,  wished  to  cater  for  international 
financial  support,  it  was  carefully  arranged  before  the 
signature  of  the  Convention  that  a  new  company,  to 
be  known  as  the  "Imperial  Ottoman  Bagdad  Rail- 
way Company",  should  take  over  the  concession 
actually  given  to  men  who  acted  as  nominees  of  the 
Deutsche  Bank  and  of  the  Anatolian  Company  when 
they  signed  the  agreement.  The  new  company,  with  a 
capital  of  £600,000,  was  formed  on  the  very  day  on 
which  the  concession  was  signed. 

Although  my  primary  object  here  is  to  discuss  the 


TTTE   BAGDAD   RAILWAY   AND   THE   WAR     283 

military  and  geographical  aspects  of  the  Bagdad  Rail- 
way, the  financial  and  political  details  of  the  Conven- 
tion of  1903  (published  in  England  as  a  Parliamentary 
Paper  on  the  Bagdad  Railway  in  1911)  are  such  that 
it  seems  advisable  very  briefly  to  refer  to  some  of 
their  principal  features.  That  Convention  ensured 
to  the  company  not  only  the  power  of  building  a  line 
from  Konia  to  Basra,  more  or  less,  though  not  exactly, 
by  the  route  which  it  so  far  follows,  but  it  also  gave 
the  right  to  construct  branches,  the  most  important 
of  which  were  those  from  Sadijeh  to  Khanikin,  and 
from  Basra  to  a  point  on  the  Persian  Gulf  to  be  sub- 
sequently agreed  upon,  thus  totalling  nearly  two 
thousand  miles.  The  duration  of  the  arrangement 
was  to  be  for  ninety-nine  years,  the  existing  concessions 
for  the  lines  to  Angora  and  Konia  being  prolonged  for 
a  like  period.  The  first  section  had  to  be  begun  at 
once  and  completed  in  two  years.  All  sorts  of  facilities 
and  rights  were  guaranteed  and  given  to  the  company, 
including  the  power  of  constructing  ports  at  Bagdad, 
Basra,  and  on  the  Persian  Gulf.  It  was  also  to  have 
the  use  of  the  rivers,  Shatt-el-Arab,  Tigris,  and  Eu- 
phrates for  the  conveyance  of  material  and  workmen 
required  for  constructional  purposes.  In  addition 
the  concession  outlined  almost  unlimited  directions 
in  which  the  power  of  the  company  could  be  increased 
from  time  to  time. 

The  financial  arrangements  between  the  Govern- 
ment and  the  company  depend  partly  upon  the  Con- 
vention and  partly  upon  the  subsidiary  documents 
which  it  was  thereby  agreed  should  be  signed  before 
the  commencement  of  each  section  or  group  of  sec- 
tions.    Thus  whilst  the  original  concession  constitutes 


284  THE   CRADLE   OF   THE   WAR 

the  promise  of  the  Government  to  pay  the  company 
and  defines  the  amount  of  the  kilometric  guarantee, 
the  subsequent  loan  contracts,  the  first  three  series 
o'  which  are  pubHshed  in  the  above-mentioned  Blue 
Book,  actually  provide  the  money  for  the  payment  of 
the  guarantee,  which  in  fact  totals  15,500  francs  per 
year  per  kilometre  when  each  section  begins  to  work. 
That  sum  is  made  up  of  two  parts,  the  first  being 
11,000  francs  per  kilometre  for  construction  provided 
by  the  Government,  and  the  second  being  4500  francs 
per  year  per  kilometre  for  working  expenses.  If  the 
gross  kilometric  receipts  of  the  line  exceed  4500  francs 
per  annum,  provision  is  made  as  to  the  distribution  of 
the  surplus,  and  further  sums  were  guaranteed  for  the 
improvement  of  the  line  between  Haidar  Pasha  and 
Konia  and  for  the  subsequent  running  of  express  trains. 
The  Bagdad  Railway  Four  Per  Cent.  Loan  Con- 
tract, First  Series,  to  cover  the  expense  of  the  construc- 
tion of  the  first  section  of  the  line  from  Konia  to  Bul- 
gurlu,  was  signed  at  the  same  time  as  the  original 
Convention.  It  put  into  force,  so  far  as  that  section 
was  concerned,  the  arrangements  made  by  the  con- 
cession itself.  The  company  sold  bonds,  issued  by  the 
Government,  on  the  market,  and  secured  a  sum 
amounting  to  about  £1,800,000,  which  was  ample  for 
the  construction  of  a  stretch  of  line  on  which  there 
were  no  engineering  difficulties.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
after  the  opening  of  that  section,  which  took  place  in 
1904,  the  company  was  left  with  a  considerable  surplus 
(sometimes  estimated  at  over  £1,000,000),  to  be 
placed  towards  the  expense  of  building  the  much 
more  costly  sections  which  were  to  traverse  the  Taurus 
and  Amanus  ranges. 


THE   BAGDAD   RAILWAY   AND   THE   WAR     285 

From  Konia  to  Eregli  the  railway  wanders  over  a 
sparsely  populated  plain.  For  the  whole  distance, 
and  particularly  between  Karaman  and  Eregli,  one 
sees  nothing  but  miles  upon  miles  of  country,  only 
very  small  parts  of  which  are  cultivated.  The  first 
section  does  not,  however,  end  at  Eregli,  vdiich  would 
have  been  its  natural  terminus.  In  order  to  comply 
with  the  terms  of  the  concession,  which  states  that 
sections  must  be  one  hundred  and  twenty-five  miles 
in  length,  the  railway  was  prolonged  to  a  point 
a  few  hundred  yards  beyond  Bulgurlu.  Here,  for 
years,  a  pair  of  rails  laid  upon  a  low  embankment  were 
left  to  jut  out  into  space,  and  to  demonstrate  that 
things  in  Turkey  are  not  conducted  in  a  normal  manner. 

Although  strictly  speaking  it  does  not  form  part 
of  the  Bagdad  Railway,  I  will  briefly  refer  here  to  the 
scheme  for  the  irrigation  of  the  plain  of  Konia,  which 
is  in  the  hands  of  a  German  company,  formed  in  1907, 
as  an  offshoot  of  the  Anatolian  and  Bagdad  railway 
companies  and  which  I  have  described  in  detail  in  my 
book,  "The  Danger  Zone  of  Europe."  The  task  of 
that  company  is  to  bring  the  waters  of  Lakes  Beyshehr 
and  Karaviran  through  the  gorges  of  the  Charshembe 
River  in  order  to  irrigate  a  large  district  which  surrounds 
Chumla  station.  If  this  has  been  or  can  be  success- 
fully done  —  a  great  deal  of  work  had  actually  been 
carried  out  in  the  year  1909  —  some  one  hundred  and 
thirty  thousand  acres  of  arid  plain  will  have  been  effec- 
tively watered.  To  accomplish  this  object  more  than 
two  hundred  million  cubic  yards  of  water  will  be  re- 
quired every  year.  The  Turks  hope  to  be  able  to 
recover  the  money  spent  in  building  the  necessary 
canals,   etc.  —  money   advanced   by   the   Germans  — 


286  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE   WAR 

by  selling  portions  of  the  land  irrigated,  by  raising  the 
rents  upon  the  tenants,  and  by  decreasing  if  not  by 
doing  away  altogether  with  the  balance  to  be  paid  on 
the  kilometric  guarantees  of  at  least  this  section  of  the 
Bagdad  Railway. 

The  completion  of  the  first  section  of  the  line  was 
followed  by  a  prolonged  delay.  This  was  due  partly 
to  geographical  and  partly  to  political  and  international 
conditions.  From  the  first  of  these  standpoints  the 
difficulty  lay  in  the  fact  that  the  second  section,  which 
enters  the  Taurus  area  directly  it  leaves  Bulgurlu, 
was  the  most  costly  of  construction  upon  the  whole 
line.  This  meant  that  as  the  company  would  be 
compelled  to  disburse  the  handsome  surplus  left  over 
from  the  first  section,  it  refused  to  agree  to  build  the 
Taurus  length  unless  it  were  given,  at  the  same  time, 
the  money  for  at  least  two  sections  located  to  the  east 
of  that  range.  From  a  political  point  of  view  the  ques- 
tion was  complicated,  for,  whilst  the  Turks  had  diffi- 
culty in  providing  and  guaranteeing  the  interest  on 
the  necessary  funds,  there  arose  once  more  the  problem 
as  to  whether  international  consent  could  be  secured 
for  the  raising  of  these  funds,  and  whether  there  was 
or  was  not  to  be  international  co-operation  in  the 
scheme. 

After  a  great  deal  of  difficulty,  in  June,  1908  —  that 
is,  two  months  before  the  re-establishment  of  the  Otto- 
man Constitution  —  an  additional  Convention  and 
an  agreement  for  the  second  and  third  series  of  the 
Bagdad  Loan  Contract  (published  in  the  above-men- 
tioned Parliamentary  Paper)  were  signed  between  the 
company  and  the  Government.  The  first  of  these 
documents  slightly  modified  the  original  Convention, 


THE  BAGDAD   RAILWAY  AND   THE   WAR    287 

and  arranged  for  the  construction  of  four  sections 
to  measure  not  eight  hundred  but  eight  hundred  and 
forty  kilometres  and  to  extend  as  far  as  Hehf.  The 
second  provided  for  the  money  necessary  for  con- 
structional purposes.  The  signature  of  these  docu- 
ments was  in  its  turn  followed  by  a  further  delay,  this 
time  caused  by  the  temporarily  changed  conditions 
in  Turkey  itself.  The  revolution  of  July,  1908,  so 
shook  the  position  of  the  Germans  that  for  a  time  they 
did  not  know  where  they  were.  Moreover,  for  a  limited 
period  the  power  of  the  Ottoman  Parliament  became 
stronger  and  stronger,  and  the  influence  of  the  true 
Liberals,  who  desired  to  avoid  the  heavy  financial 
burdens  placed  upon  Turkey  by  the  railway  con- 
tract, became  greater  and  greater.  The  results  of 
this  were  that  there  intervened  a  great  struggle  loe- 
tween  the  opponents  of  the  scheme  and  those  who 
desired  to  modify  the  railway  route  on  the  one 
hand,  and  the  Germans  together  with  the  corrupt 
elements  of  the  Ottoman  population  on  the  other, 
and  that  the  line  was  only  open  as  far  as  Karapunar 
(about  ninety  miles  by  railway  to  the  southeast  of 
Eregli)  at  the  time  of  the  outbreak  of  the  War. 

On  leaving  Bulgurlu,  at  an  elevation  of  about  three 
thousand  seven  hundred  feet  above  the  sea,  the 
railway  immediately  begins  to  wind  its  way  up  the 
northern  slopes  of  the  Taurus.  Following  more  or 
less  the  line  of  the  old  post-road  the  gradients  are 
steep,  but  as  the  country  is  open  and  rolling,  engineers 
have  been  able  to  choose  their  own  route,  thus  avoid- 
ing any  serious  constructional  difficulties.  Arrived  at 
the  watershed,  known  as  the  Karndash  Bel  (height 
5070  feet),  the  railway  continues  its  way  for  two  or 


288  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE  WAR 

three  miles  and  as  far  as  Ulu  Kushlar  —  the  highest 
station  on  the  whole  line  at  an  altitude  of  four  thousand 
nine  hundred  feet.  Near  Ulu  Kushlar  the  traveller 
who  follows  this  route  by  road  or  train  enters  a  valley 
at  first  followed  by  the  Tabaz  and  subsequently  by 
the  Bozanti  Su.  That  valley,  the  sides  of  which  are 
bedecked  with  scattered  trees,  grows  narrower  and 
narrower  until  it  becomes  a  mere  gorge,  in  places  so 
narrow  that  the  river  flows  through  a  deep  rocky 
crevice,  where  before  the  construction  of  the  railway 
there  was  barely  room  for  the  road.  On  the  south 
and  west  one  has  distant  views  of  the  snow-covered 
Bulghar  Dagh,  whilst  on  the  north  and  east  one  has 
occasional  glimpses  up  side  valleys  which  reveal  distant 
mountain-tops  in  winter  covered  in  snow.  The  result 
of  the  limitations  due  to  the  existence  of  this  gorge  is 
that  the  construction  of  this  stretch  of  line,  about  thirty- 
five  miles  in  length,  was  very  costly,  for  it  entailed  the 
provision  of  numerous  bridges  and  lengthy  embank- 
ments and  a  great  deal  of  rock  hewing  to  render  it 
secure  against  floods  and  washouts. 

At  Ak  Kupru  (altitude  298,5  feet)  this  gorge  suddenly 
debouches  upon  the  Vale  of  Bozanti  (Podandus)  — 
a  fertile  district  about  four  miles  long  by  one  mile 
wide,  in  the  midst  of  the  Taurus  Mountains.  In  this 
valley  the  railway  and  the  new  road  constructed  by 
the  company  diverge  from  the  ancient  trade  route, 
which  takes  a  more  westerly  line  and  passes  through 
the  Cilician  Gates.  Bearing  off  in  a  southeasterly 
direction,  the  railway  and  new  road  follow  the  valley 
of  the  Chakra  Su,  which  flows  to  the  east  of  the  Cili- 
cian Gates.  This  river  runs  from  the  Vale  of  Bozanti 
into  the  heart  of  the  mountains  and  finally  dives  into 


THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY  AND  THE   WAR     289 

a  dark,  cavelike  opening,  to  emerge  again  on  the  south- 
ern slopes  of  the  range  after  a  subterranean  course 
of  some  three  hundred  yards.  Prior  to  the  construc- 
tion of  the  railway  the  approaches  to  the  places  where 
this  curious  river  enters  and  emerges  from  its  sub- 
terranean course  were,  I  believe,  almost  entirely  un- 
explored. 

The  line  was  opened  as  far  as  Karapunar  in  Decem- 
ber, 1913.  About  a  year  and  a  half  earlier  (April, 
1912)  it  had  been  completed  from  the  south  to  Dorak, 
on  the  southern  slopes  of  the  range.  It  was  therefore 
the  short  section  (roughly  about  thirty  miles  in  length) 
lying  between  these  two  places  which  blocked  through 
traffic  from  December,  1913,  until  that  section  was 
actually  opened  at  the  end  of  1916  or  early  in  1917.^ 
But  the  construction  of  this  piece  of  line  constituted 
by  far  the  most  difficult  engineering  task  on  the  whole 
railway.  In  addition  to  four  tunnels,  which  have  a  total 
length  of  about  eleven  miles,  there  was  an  immense 
amount  of  earthwork,  cutting,  and  bridge  building  to 
be  done.  Some  of  the  bridges  over  mountain  streams 
have  piers  fifty  to  one  hundred  feet  high,  and  in  one 
place  alone  there  is  a  cutting  for  a  distance  of  some  two 
miles.  The  new  road  itself,  which  was  constructed 
entirely  for  railway  purposes,  is  a  very  fine  piece  of 
work,  for  it  required  an  immense  amount  of  under- 
cutting in  the  cliffs  which  rise  sheer  above  and  fall 
vertically  below  it  in  such  a  way  that  wooden  balus- 
trades had  to  be  provided  to  ensure  against  accident. 
From  Dorak  the  line  sweeps  down  the  southern  slopes 

'  For  some  time  after  the  opening  of  this  section  it  was  run  as  a  narrow 
gauge  line.  Ere  now,  however,  it  may  possibly  have  been  finished  on  the 
normal  system. 


290  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE   WAR 

of  the  range,  and  after  about  fifteen  miles  meets  the 
old  Mersina-Adana  Railway  at  Yenije,  about  half- 
way between  Tarsus  and  Adana. 

After  leaving  the  Bozanti  Vale  the  old  post  road 
winds  its  way  up  to  the  Tekir  Plateau  or  summit 
(altitude  about  4500  feet).  Thence,  passing  through 
scenery  of  the  most  magnificent  beauty,  it  approaches 
the  Cilician  Gates.  Here  at  tliree  thousand  six  hundred 
feet  the  gorge  is  so  narrow  that  the  road  is  supported 
by  a  revetted  embankment  over  the  stream.  After 
leaving  this  historic  gateway  one  continues  down  the 
valley  of  one  of  the  tributaries  of  the  Tarsus  Chai 
(Cydnus),  and  after  passing  over  the  low  foothills  of 
the  Taurus  finally  reaches  the  Mersina-Adana  Railway 
at  Gulek  Boghaz  —  a  station  three  or  four  miles  to  the 
east  of  Tarsus.  It  is  this  road,  for  years  passable  for 
strong  vehicles,  and  recently,  I  believe,  considerably 
improved,  which  was  used  by  the  Turks  as  a  means  of 
communication  before  the  opening  of  the  Karapunar- 
Dorak  section  of  the  railway.  If  we  take  it  that  troops 
coming  from  the  north  would  have  been  detrained  at 
Bozanti  Han,  and  that  they  would  have  joined  the  rail- 
way again  at  Gulek  Boghaz,  the  distance  to  be  covered 
on  foot  would  be  about  forty  miles  —  a  distance  which 
took  me  about  fourteen  hours  in  a  carriage. 

Once  at  Gulek  Boghaz  by  road,  or  at  Yenije  by  train, 
the  traveller  has  reached  the  Cilician  Plain  —  a  very 
fertile  district  which  is  practically  cut  off  from  the 
remainder  of  Asia  Minor  by  mountains.  The  scene 
of  the  terrible  massacres  which  took  place  in  the  year 
1909,  when  some  twenty-five  thousand  Armenians 
were  brutally  murdered  without  any  adequate  protest 
by  the  Young  Turks,  it  is  watered  by  the  rivers  Tarsus 


THE  BAGDAD   RAILWAY  AND  THE  WAR     291 

Chai,  Seihiin,  and  Djehun.  These  rivers,  which  were 
once  navigable  in  their  lower  reaches,  are  now  only 
muddy  channels  which  serve  to  conduct  vast  volumes 
of  water  from  the  mountains,  in  which  they  rise,  to 
the  seacoast.  This  plain,  which  is  cultivated  for 
cotton,  wheat,  and  barley,  is  traversed  by  the  Mersina- 
Adana  and  the  Bagdad  railways.  The  former  line, 
which  was  originally  built  with  English  capital,  was 
taken  over  by  the  Germans  in  1908.  Forming  a 
branch  of  the  Bagdad  Railway,  between  that  time  and 
the  outbreak  of  the  War,  it  was  utilised  for  the  trans- 
port of  railway  material  and  rolling  stock  for  the  new 
line.  Though  INIersina  could  not  in  any  case  have 
competed  with  Alexandretta  as  a  port,  the  acquisition 
of  this  short  section  removed  the  possibility  of  any 
competition  with  the  Bagdad  Railway  in  this  area. 

Although  the  concession  for  their  construction  was 
not  granted  until  the  signature  of  the  agreement 
made  between  the  Government  and  the  company  on 
March  19,  1911  —  an  agreement  the  main  details  of 
which,  so  far  as  they  concerned  Alexandretta,  were 
published  in  the  Stamboul,  a  French  newspaper  issued 
in  Constantinople,  and  also  by  the  late  Mr.  H.  F.  B. 
Lynch  in  The  Fortnightly  Revieio  for  May,  1911  —  it  is 
convenient  to  refer  to  the  significance  of  the  branch 
built  to  and  of  the  port  at  Alexandretta  before  leaving 
the  Cilician  Plain.  That  concession  constitutes  the 
most  important  arrangement  made  with  the  company 
since  its  foundation  in  1903.  In  the  first  place  it 
finally  disposed  of  the  idea  of  a  modification  in  the 
original  route  —  a  highly  desirable  modification  which 
would  have  taken  the  main  line  by  way  of  Alex- 
andretta to  Aleppo  instead  of  by  the  present  more 


292  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE   WAR 

northerly  route.  These  negotiations  were  partially 
responsible  for  the  delay  which  occurred  before  the 
commencement  of  the  construction  of  the  second  and 
third  sections  of  the  line.  The  fact  that  this  modi- 
fication was  not  accepted  and  that  the  line  now  follows 
(with  certain  changes  to  which  I  will  refer  below)  the 
route  originally  defined  by  the  concession,  means  th-at 
in  place  of  running  absolutely  along  the  seacoast 
for  a  good  many  miles,  the  railway  now  approaches 
the  coast  nowhere  within  a  distance  of  less  than  ten 
miles.  Under  German  influence  the  Turks  have 
thereby  avoided  what  would  have  been  a  continual 
menace  to  their  communications  from  the  sea;  for, 
whilst  the  section  of  the  railway  in  the  neighbourhood 
of  the  Gulf  of  Alexandretta  is  still  the  one  most  easy 
of  attack,  that  attack  would  now  constitute  a  far 
larger  undertaking  than  were  the  line  to  have  run  close 
to  the  water's  edge. 

Politically  and  commercially  the  right  given  to  the 
company  to  construct  the  branch  to  and  the  port  at 
Alexandretta  went  far  beyond  anything  foreseen  in 
the  original  concession.  The  Turks  were  already  com- 
mitted by  that  arrangement  not  to  grant  concessions 
for  railways  running  to  the  coast  between  Mersina 
and  Tripoli  to  any  group  except  the  Bagdad  company. 
But  this  did  not  anticipate  the  giving  to  it  rights  to 
be  enjoyed  for  a  period  of  ninety-nine  years  from  the 
time  of  the  completion  of  the  railway  to  Helif,  rights 
which  really  amounted  to  a  lease,  and  facilities  which 
might  almost  be  compared  to  those  formerly  enjoyed 
by  the  Germans  at  Kiao-Chao.  The  concessionaires 
obtained  the  power  to  build  quays,  docks,  and  ware- 
houses, and  to  police  a  port  which,  unlike  Haidar  Pasha 


THE   BAGDAD   RAILWAY  AND   THE  WAR     293 

within  closed  Turkish  waters,  is  situated  in  an  area 
over  which  the  Turks  couhl  have  no  direct  control  so 
long  as  thej'  did  not  possess  the  command  of  the  sea. 
Commercially  speaking,  too,  the  acquisition  of  such  a 
prize  was  of  supreme  value  to  Germany,  for  the  pos- 
session of  Alexandretta  once  and  for  all  removed  any 
danger  of  competition  for  the  Bagdad  Railway. 

The  branch  to  Alexandretta  which  leaves  the  main 
route  at  Toprak  Kale  on  the  Cilician  Plain  and  for 
which  there  is  no  kilometric  guarantee  has  a  length 
of  about  thirty -seven  miles.  After  passing  through 
the  Amanian  Gates,  which  are  only  about  three  hun- 
dred yards  wide,  the  railway  enters  the  Plain  of  Issus, 
subsequently  following  the  seacoast  for  the  remainder 
of  its  length.  Had  this  section  formed  part  of  the 
main  line,  the  Bagdad  Railway  would  probably  have 
proceeded  from  Alexandretta  by  way  of  the  Beilan 
Pass  to  Antioch,  running  thence  in  an  easterly  direc- 
tion to  Aleppo.  As  things  stand  at  present,  it  is 
obvious  that  the  Alexandretta  line  can  have  no  signifi- 
cance, for  it  traverses  an  area  which  can  be  directly 
commanded  from  the  sea.  It  is  for  this  reason  that 
it  seems  highly  probable  that  the  enemy  may  have 
actually  taken  up  the  rails  in  order  to  utilise  them  for 
railway  construction  somewhere  upon  the  tl trough 
route. 

The  Cilician  Plain  practically  ends  at  Osmaniya, 
to  the  east  of  which  place  the  railway  plunges  into  the 
mountains  in  order  to  force  its  way  through  the  Amanus 
Range.  The  passage  of  this  range  entails  a  rise  from 
about  five  hundred  to  seventeen  hundred  and  fifty  feet 
above  the  sea.  After  passing  over  several  steel  bridges, 
and  through  a  number  of  small  tunnels,  the  railway 


294  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE  WAR 

enters  the  great  Bagche  tunnel,  five  thousand  tliree 
hundred  yards  in  length,  which  is  still,  I  believe,  the 
longest  in  Turkey.  Thus,  whilst  the  passage  of  the 
Amanus  Range  is  much  shorter  than  that  of  the  Taurus, 
the  engineering  difficulties  were  such  that  there  is  no 
wonder  that  the  completion,  which  took  place  during 
the  late  summer  of  1915,  delayed  the  opening  of  the 
section  which  lies  between  Mamoure  and  Raj  an  for  a 
period  of  nearly  three  years  from  the  time  when  it  was 
possible  to  reach  these  temporary  termini  by  train. 

In  and  immediately  to  the  east  of  the  Amanus 
Range  the  line  follows  a  trace  which  is  somewhat 
difl^erent  to  that  foreseen  in  the  original  concession. 
In  place  of  running  from  Bagche  to  Kazanali,  thence 
across  the  Kurd  Dagh  and  through  Killis  and  Tel 
Habesch  to  the  Euphrates,  the  line  now  turns  in  a 
southerly  direction  near  Bagche.  Passing  through 
Islahiya  it  subsequently  follows  the  valley  of  the  Kara 
Su  and  runs  round  the  southwestern  end  of  the  Kurd 
Dagh.  Instead  of  making  Killis,  or  more  correctly 
Tel  Habesch,  the  junction  for  Aleppo,  and  of  construct- 
ing a  branch,  as  foreseen  in  the  original  concession  from 
Tel  Habesch  to  Aleppo,  this  means  that  the  main 
line  passes  close  to  Aleppo  itself.  The  result,  for 
such  as  it  is  worth,  is  that  in  place  of  an  Aleppo  branch, 
about  forty  miles  in  length,  the  actual  junction  is 
made  at  Muslimiya  —  a  place  located  only  ten  miles 
to  the  north  of  Aleppo. 

To  the  northeast  of  Aleppo  the  next  important  land- 
mark on  the  railway  is  the  Jerablus  bridge  which  spans 
the  Euphrates.  With  a  length  of  eight  hundred  and 
fifty  yards  its  non-completion  delayed  effective  through 
communication  from  December,  1913  (when  the  sec- 


THE  BAGDAD   RAILWAY  AND   THE   WAR     295 

tion  to  the  west  of  the  Euphrates  was  opened) ;  for 
aUhough  a  temporary  wooden  structure  was'  ready  in 
1913,  the  steel  bridge,  made  up  of  many  spans,  was  not 
reported  finished  until  1915,  To  the  east  of  the  Eu- 
phrates the  railway  now  continues  its  way  at  least  as 
far  as  Helif  and  probably  to  Nisibin  or  beyond.  If 
Helif  be  the  point,  it  means  that  all  the  work  on  the 
main  line  arranged  for  in  the  agreements  of  1908  has 
actually  been  completed,  and  that  it  is  now  possible 
to  travel  by  train,  perhaps  still  with  a  break  of  gauge 
in  the  Taurus,  for  a  distance  of  over  eleven  hundred 
miles  from  Constantinople.  According  to  recent  re- 
ports too,  as  a  result  of  orders  given  by  the  German 
General  Staff,  a  branch  is  now  being  built  from  Ras-el- 
Ain  to  Diabekr,  the  rails  on  the  French  line  from 
Homs  to  Tripoli  having  been  taken  up  for  that  purpose. 
We  come  now  to  the  new  Conventions  signed  be- 
tween the  Ottoman  Government  and  the  company 
on  March  19,  1911,  and  to  the  sections  of  the  railway 
which  have  or  have  not  been  constructed  since  the 
arrival  of  these  agreements.  Over  and  above  the 
rights  given  to  the  Germans  for  the  construction  of  the 
Alexandretta  branch  and  of  the  port  of  Alexandretta 
(Conventions  2  and  3)  to  which  I  have  referred  above, 
we  have  in  these  arrangements  firstly  the  provision 
for  the  building  of  the  line  from  Helif  to  Bagdad,  and 
secondly  some  sort  of  German  undertaking  in  regard 
to  the  ownership  and  control  of  the  section  to  be 
built  from  Bagdad  to  the  Persian  Gulf.  The  ar- 
rangements made  for  the  prolongation  of  the  line  to 
Bagdad  are  given  in  the  Stamboul  for  March  20,  1911, 
but  no  reference  is  made  there  to  the  agreements  about 
the  last  section,  concerning  the  general  sense  of  which 


296  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE   WAR 

we  have  certain  information,  but  the  definite  details  of 
which,  so  far  as  I  am  aware,  have  never  been  pubHshed. 
With  regard  to  the  first  of  these  questions,  sufficient 
be  it  to  say  that  the  railway  has  been  planned  to  take 
the  original  trace  by  way  of  Nisibin  to  Mosul.  Between 
the  last  two  places  it  follows,  not  the  usual  route 
by  way  of  Jezire,  but  strikes  southeast,  first  across 
a  plain  on  which  there  are  a  few  villages,  and  then  into 
the  desert,  which  is  almost  entirely  unpopulated  and 
where  there  is  but  little  water.  From  Helif  to  Mosul, 
a  journey  reckoned  to  take  at  least  thirty  hours  by 
road,  the  distance  is  approximately  one  hundred 
and  fifty  miles.  There  is  no  reason  to  know  that  any 
part  of  this  section  or  of  the  proposed  branch  from 
Mosul  to  Erbil  (length  sixty-two  miles)  has  yet  been 
constructed.  From  Mosul,  from  which  point  river 
transport  can  be  utilised,  the  railway  is  planned  to 
cover  the  length  of  two  hundred  and  forty  miles  to  Bag- 
dad by  way  of  the  regular  trade  route,  which  fol- 
lows the  right  bank  of  the  Tigris  and  passes  through 
Hammam  Ali,  Tekrit,  and  Samarra.  So  far  as  we 
know,  no  work  has  been  done  from  the  northern  end 
of  this  section  or  upon  the  branch  from  Sadijeh  to 
Khanikin ;  but  the  piece  from  Bagdad  to  Samarra, 
built  from  the  southern  end  and  having  a  length  of 
about  seventy-five  miles,  has  been  open  to  trafiic 
since  October,  1914.  That  the  Turks  were  unable 
to  extend  the  line  to  Tekrit  or  beyond  is  largely  due 
to  the  fact  that  when  the  British  occupied  Basra  on 
November  21,  1914,  they  seized  a  considerable  amount 
of  railway  material  and  rolling  stock  —  material  which 
would  have  been  of  great  value  to  the  enemy  had  he 
been  left  the  opportunity  of  utilising  it  either  for  con- 


THE  BAGDAD   RAILWAY  AND  THE   WAR     297 

striictional  purposes  on  the  main  line  or  for  the  building 
of  the  intended  branch  from  Sadijeh  to  Khanikin. 

In  addition,  by  the  agreements  of  1911,  the  company- 
is  believed  more  or  less  to  have  renounced  its  right 
to  the  construction  of  the  section  from  Bagdad  to  the 
Persian  Gulf.  From  a  geographical  standpoint  all 
that  need  therefore  be  said  upon  this  question  is  that 
the  line,  as  originally  proposed,  was  to  leave  the  Tigris 
near  Bagdad,  and  after  crossing  the  Euphrates,  to  rim 
through  Kerbela  and  Nedjef  to  Zobeir  and  Basra. 
There  was  to  be  a  branch  from  Zobeir  "to  a  point  on 
the  Persian  Gulf  to  be  agreed  upon  between  the  Im- 
perial Ottoman  Government  and  the  Concession- 
aires." It  is  unnecessary  to  say  here  that  the  locality 
of  that  point  constitutes  one  of  the  most  important 
factors  in  the  whole  scheme,  and  that  no  decision 
upon  the  subject  has  ever  been  published.  As  things 
stand  at  present  it  seems  open  to  doubt  whether  the 
route  suggested  for  this  last  section  will  be  adopted 
or  whether  the  permanent  line  will  consist  of  an  im- 
provement of  the  military  railway  which  we  believe 
has  been  constructed  by  the  British  from  the  Persian 
Gulf  up  to  or  almost  up  to  Bagdad. 

Were  it  not  that  the  War,  and  particularly  the  Brit- 
ish advance  in  Mesopotamia,  cannot  fail  to  obliterate 
many  of  the  more  important  results  of  the  events 
which  preceded  and  followed  the  signing  of  the  new 
agreements  between  the  Turkish  Government  and  the 
company  in  March,  1911,  those  events  might  be  of 
political  consequence,  the  far-reaching  significance 
of  which  it  would  be  impossible  to  exaggerate.  The 
signature  of  this  agreement  almost  immediately  fol- 
lowed the  meeting  of  the  Tsar  with  the  Emperor  at 


THE   CRADLE   OF  THE   WAR 

Potsdam  in  November,  1910,  a  meeting  during  which 
the  relations  existing  between  Russia  and  Germany 
were  temporarily  adjusted.  Though  the  exact  nature 
of  that  arrangement  was  not  known  until  afterwards 
it  is  now  certain  that  Russia  agreed  no  longer  to  oppose 
the  construction  of  the  Bagdad  Railway,  and  either 
herself  to  build  or  allow  the  Germans  to  build  a  line 
from  Klianikin  —  the  terminus  of  a  branch  already 
agreed  upon  between  Turkey  and  the  Bagdad  Com- 
pany —  to  Tehran.  As  compensation  for  this,  the 
Russian  position  in  Northern  Persia  was  recognised 
by  Germany.  It  remained  then  for  Berlin  to  treat  with 
England  and  France  for  agreements  concerning  future 
developments  in  their  respective  spheres.  The  Tripoli 
War  of  1911  and  the  Balkan  War  of  1912  were  not, 
however,  favourable  periods  for  negotiation,  and  it 
was  thus  only  in  1913  that  Turkey,  in  agreement  with 
Germany,  despatched  to  London  the  ex-Grand  Vizier 
—  Hakki  Pasha  —  to  try  to  bring  about  agreements 
to  be  drawn  up  between  the  Foreign  Office,  the  Ger- 
man Embassy,  and  the  Ottoman  Embassy  —  agree- 
ments to  settle  the  outstanding  differences  as  regards 
the  Bagdad-Persian  Gulf  section  and  other  cognate 
matters  of  river  transport  in  these  regions.  These 
agreements  presumably  presupposed  a  continuance 
of  friendly  and  peaceful  relations  between  Turkey, 
Germany,  and  Great  Britain,  and  it  is  believed  that 
they  were  practically  already  concluded  when,  in 
August,  1914,  Great  Britain  found  herself  compelled 
to  declare  war  on  Germany,  Turkey  subsequently 
throwing  in  her  lot  with  our  enemies.^ 

1  These  are  the  Agreements  to  which  Prince  Lichnowsky  refers  in  his 
famous  memorandum. 


THE   BAGDAD   RAILWAY  AND  THE   WAR     290 

Before  passing  to  a  brief  description  of  the  Syrian 
railways  there  are  still  two  questions  which  must  be 
mentioned  in  connection  with  the  Bagdad  line.  The 
first  concerns  the  facilities  which  it  provides,  or  which 
it  might  provide,  for  travel.  The  agreement  for  the 
railway  stipulates  for  the  provision  of  a  fortnightly 
express  between  Constantinople  and  the  Persian  Gulf 
and  vice  versa.  This  train  was  to  run  at  an  average 
speed  of  about  twenty-eight  miles  per  hour,  including 
stops,  for  the  first  five  years  from  the  opening  to  traffic 
of  the  whole  of  the  main  line,  that  speed  subsequently 
to  be  increased  to  thirty-seven  miles  per  hour,  includ- 
ing stops.  This  means,  were  the  said  express  train 
to  run  at  its  lower  speed,  that  the  journey  from  Con- 
stantinople to  Bagdad  would  be  accomplished  in  about 
fifty-four  hours,  and  from  the  Turkish  capital  to  Basra 
in  about  sixty-six  hours.  Taking  the  pre- War  time 
necessary  for  the  journey  from  London  to  Constan- 
tinople by  Orient  Express,  and  allowing  for  a  very  short 
delay  at  the  latter  place,  theoretically  it  would  be 
possible  to  travel  from  London  to  Basra  in  one  hundred 
and  forty-four  hours,  that  is,  in  six  days.  From  Basra 
to  Bombay  the  distance  is  just  over  nineteen  hundred 
miles  —  a  distance  which  at,  say,  twenty  knots  per  hour 
could  be  accomplished  in  about  eighty-four  hours. 
Thus,  taking  all  the  conditions  at  their  most  favour- 
able value,  and  allowing  a  margin  of  only  five  hours 
at  Basra,  travellers  and  mails  could  be  conveyed  from 
London  to  Bombay  by  that  route  in  about  nine  days 
seventeen  hours,  instead  of,  as  before  the  War,  in  be- 
tween thirteen  and  fourteen  days. 

This,  of  course,  shows  a  considerable  nominal  sav- 
ing in  time  —  a  saving  which  might  even  be  increased 


300  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE  WAR 

by  running  fast  ships  from  Basra  to  Karachi  and  by 
improving  the  train  service  between  the  latter  place 
and  Bombay.  But  against  the  advantages  of  that 
nominal  saving  must  be  set  the  facts  that  the  jour- 
ney by  way  of  Brindisi  and  the  Suez  Canal  could 
be  speeded  up,  and  that  on  the  great  cross-country 
journey,  from  Constantinople  to  the  Gulf,  there  would 
be  bound  to  be  considerable  delays  and  irregularities 
in  the  running  of  the  trains,  delays  due  among  other 
things  to  the  conditions  prevailing  in  the  areas  through 
which  the  line  would  pass. 

Prior  to  the  outbreak  of  the  War,  the  tourist  desirous 
of  travelling  by  the  Anatolian  and  Bagdad  railways 
was  certainly  not  provided  with  the  comforts  which 
would  have  led  him  to  choose  such  a  route  in  prefer- 
ence to  one  followed  by  a  first-class  ocean  steamer. 
Leaving  the  Bridge  at  Constantinople  at  an  early  hour 
in  the  morning,  one  traversed  the  Bosphorus  in  a 
steamer  run  in  connection  with  the  train.  From  Haidar 
Pasha  to  Eskishehr  the  first  stage  of  the  journey  took 
ten  and  one-half  hours.  As  there  were  no  night  trains, 
one  was  compelled  to  sleep  at  the  latter  place,  starting 
at  5  A.M.  on  the  morrow  for  Konia,  which  is  reached 
after  a  journey  of  fifteen  hours.  At  Konia  the  com- 
pany has  built  a  new  hotel  which,  though  much  cleaner 
and  better  than  those  which  ordinarily  exist  in  the  in- 
terior of  Turkey,  is  still  less  comfortable  than  one  would 
suppose  from  its  pretentious  appearance.  Starting 
again  at  6.30  a.m.  one  could  go  on  for  the  subsequent 
one  hundred  and  ninety  miles  to  Karapunar  —  a  place 
which  in  its  turn  was  reached  after  eleven  hours. 
The  speed  on  all  these  sections  only  averaged  about 
eighteen  miles  per  hour.     The  first  time  I  went   to 


THE   BAGDAD  RAILWAY  AND   THE   WAR     301 

Eregli,  soon  after  the  opening  of  the  railway,  one 
travelled  in  old-fashioned,  non-corridor  carriages  which 
were  neither  heated  nor  provided  with  the  ordinary 
comforts  available  on  long  journeys.  On  a  subse- 
quent occasion  I  found  first-class  rolling  stock  which 
compared  quite  favourably  with  that  run  on  express 
lines  in  Europe.  Practically  nobody  except  Ambas- 
sadors, high  officials  of  the  State,  and  those  provided 
with  passes,  travel  first  class,  and,  as  the  majority 
of  the  passengers  are  natives,  who  cannot  afford  any- 
thing better  than  third,  the  second-class  passenger 
when  he  gets  well  into  the  interior  is  generally  the  sole 
occupant  of  a  carriage.  The  trains  are  mixed  (of 
passenger  coaches  and  baggage  cars),  and  therefore  at 
all  the  larger  stations  one  stops  for  a  sufficient  time  to 
allow  for  the  loading  and  unloading  of  goods. 

As  to  the  actual  financial  cost  to  Turkey  of  a  line 
like  the  Bagdad  Railway  it  is  difficult  to  form  any 
reliable  estimate.  In  addition  to  the  fact  that  only 
short  disconnected  lengths  were  open  before  the  War, 
those  lengths  had  not  been  completed  for  a  sufiicient 
time  to  render  possible  a  consequent  development  of 
trade.  The  distance  from  Konia  to  Bagdad  being  six- 
teen hundred  and  fifty  kilometres,  the  maximum  pos- 
sible cost  per  annum  to  the  Government,  if  the 
railway  had  no  receipts  whatever,  would  be  about 
25,575,000  francs  per  annum.  But  against  this  sura 
must  be  set  not  only  the  actual  receipts  of  the  line, 
receipts  which  for  the  first  section  between  Konia 
and  Eregli  amounted  to  about  514,350  francs  in  the 
year  1910,  but  also  other  and  more  indirect  advantages 
accruing  to  the  Government.  Connnercially  speak- 
ing these  advantages   are  primarily   due  to   the  fact 


302  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE   WAR 

that  in  railway  districts  the  peasants,  instead  of  only 
cultivating  what  they  require  for  their  own  use  and 
for  the  local  markets,  develop  their  land  to  much  fuller 
advantage  as  soon  as  they  are  able  easily  to  send 
away  their  goods.  This  results  not  only  in  the  in- 
creased prosperity  of  the  people,  but  also  in  a  great 
augmentation  in  the  traffic  and  in  the  tithes  to  be 
collected  by  the  Government.  The  change  is  shown 
by  the  fact  that,  whilst  the  receipts  of  the  Anatolian 
Company  amounted  in  1907  to  10,428,475  francs,  in 
1913  they  had  risen  to  20,549,875  francs,  thereby 
of  course  bringing  an  enormous  reduction  in  the  sum 
due  from  the  Government  for  kilometric  guarantees. 
This  change  is  also  shown  by  the  fact  that  the  peasants 
began  to  trade  in  gold  instead  of  in  silver,  with  the 
result  that  a  vast  quantity  of  gold  coin  has  disappeared 
into  the  interior  during  the  last  few  years. 

From  a  military  point  of  view,  over  and  above  the 
advantages  of  railway  communication  to  which  I 
have  already  referred  the  opening  up  of  the  country 
has  enabled  the  Ottoman  Government  to  quell  more 
than  one  insurrection  in  distant  parts  of  the  empire. 
In  recent  years  this  facility  has  been  particularly 
valuable  in  the  case  of  the  Hedjaz,  where  there  have 
been  several  rebellions.  Moreover,  the  existence  of 
railways  renders  possible  a  comparatively  rapid  mobili- 
sation of  at  least  parts  of  the  army.  But  this  in  its 
turn  has  rather  a  curious  effect,  for  it  means  that 
military  service  is  not  only  much  more  strictly  enforced 
among  the  sections  of  the  population  domiciled  near 
to  railways,  but  that  the  reserves  furnished  from  these 
districts  are  often  called  out  long  before  much  younger 
men,  recruited  from  more  remote  districts,  have  per- 


THE   BAGDAD   RAILWAY  AND   THE   WAR     303 

formed  their  military  obligations.  During  the  last 
six  years  of  almost  continuous  war  the  consequences 
of  this  are  that  a  very  unfair  burden,  which  is  greatly 
resented  by  those  who  have  had  to  bear  it,  has  been 
I^laced  upon  the  men  who  come  from  easily  accessible 
areas,  and  that  the  Ottoman  first-line  army,  instead  of 
being  composed  of  all  the  younger  men  of  the  country, 
often  contains  units  made  up  of  those  who  ought  to 
be  utilised  only  in  the  second  line  of  the  Turkish  fight- 
ing machine. 

Turning  to  the  Syrian  railways,  which  geographi- 
cally speaking  form  a  sort  of  southern  prong  of  the 
Bagdad  Railway,  I  will  discuss  those  lines  in  their 
relation  to  the  German  sj^stem,  and  therefore  from 
north  to  south  rather  than  in  the  order  in  which  they 
were  constructed.  To  begin  with,  since  the  end  of 
190G,  when  the  section  between  Aleppo  and  Hama 
was  opened  to  traffic,  a  French  line,  owned  by  a  com- 
pany known  as  the  "Damas  Hama  et  Prolongements  ", 
has  united  the  former  town  with  Rayak  on  the  line 
from  Beirut  to  Damascus.  With  a  total  length  of 
two  hundred  and  six  miles,  the  railway,  built  on  the 
normal  continental  gauge,  has  a  kilometric  guarantee 
amounting,  I  think,  to  13,600  francs  per  kilometre. 
Its  existence  depends  upon  various  arrangements  nuide 
between  the  Government  and  the  company  in  and  sub- 
sequent to  the  year  1893  —  arrangements  the  details 
of  which  are  very  fully  set  out  by  Mr.  George  Young 
in  his  "Corps  de  Droit  Ottoman."  The  whole  line  was 
of  easy  construction,  for  it  follows  the  plain  and  passes 
through  fine  cornlnnd,  which  is  not  liable  to  floods,  as 
the  rivers  run  in  deep  trenches.  There  is  one  big  bridge 
over  the  Orontes  at  Hama,  but  elsewhere  no  other  struc- 


304  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE  WAR 

turcs  of  any  engineering  significance.  The  normal- 
gauge  branch  from  Homs  to  Tripoh,  with  its  length  of 
about  sixty-five  miles,  which  belongs  to  the  same  com- 
pany and  which  was  built  without  a  kilometric  guar- 
antee after  the  re-establishment  of  the  Turkish  Consti- 
tution, is  believed  to  have  been  taken  up  in  order  that 
the  material  might  be  utilised  for  construction  else- 
where. 

Unless  it  has  been  widened  since  the  beginning  of 
the  War,  which  is  very  unlikely  owing  to  the  great 
length  of  line  which  would  have  had  to  be  altered, 
there  is  a  break  at  Rayak,  all  the  railways  to  the 
south  of  which  point  being  of  a  narrow  gauge.  Here 
we  meet  the  French  system,  known  as  the  company 
of  the  "Chemin  de  Fer  Beyrouth-Damas-Hauran ", 
which  owns  the  line  (one  hundred  and  fifty-five  miles 
in  length)  connecting  Beirut  with  Damascus  and 
Mezerib,  the  latter  about  six  miles  to  the  west  of  Deraia. 
This  railway,  which  has  been  open  to  through  traffic 
since  1895,  and  which  has  no  kilometric  guarantee, 
is  built  upon  the  somewhat  exceptional  gauge  of  3 
feet  5.34  inches  (1.05  metres). 

Starting  from  Beirut  harbour  the  railway,  which  is 
on  the  Abt  system  (an  engine  that  can  work  either 
by  adhesion  or  by  cogwheels  and  central  rail),  climbs 
up  the  Lebanon  for  about  five  thousand  feet  to  a  point 
just  above  Ain  Safar.  Thence  it  winds  down  to  the 
valley  of  the  Bekaa,  in  which  is  Rayak  Junction. 
The  gradients  are  very  steep,  and  therefore  even  with 
the  rack  and  pinion  system  short  trains  are  obliged  to 
go  very  slowly.  To  the  east  of  Rayak  the  railway 
continues  over  the  plain,  until  it  is  compelled  to  cross 
the  Anti-Lebanon,  where  the  gradients,  heavy  enough 


Jfilirruetti-fs 
Railways  open  t^-. 


3« 


The  Railways  of  Syria  and  Palestine 

From  a  map  prepared  by  The  Royal  (iengraphii-al  Soeiety  * 


THE   BAGDAD   RAILWAY  AND  THE   WAR     305 

to  limit  the  load  very  closely,  are  not  sufficient  to  neces- 
sitate at  any  point  the  use  of  the  cogwheel  system. 
To  the  south  of  Damascus  the  French  line,  which  is 
believed  to  have  been  taken  up  since  the  War  in  order 
that  the  material  might  be  utilised  for  construction 
elsewhere,  ran  practically  parallel  to  and  on  the  west 
of  the  Hedjaz  line. 

We  now  come  to  the  Hedjaz  Railway,  which  is  of  the 
1.05-metre  gauge  (adopted  in  order  to  correspond  with 
that  of  the  Beirut-Damascus  line,  by  which  rolling 
stock,  etc.,  had  to  be  imported).  Built  by  the  Turks 
themselves  with  the  assistance  of  foreign  engineers, 
and  particularly  with  that  of  Meissner  Pasha  —  a 
very  able  German  —  the  railway,  which  starts  from 
Damascus  and  which  is  eight  hundred  and  twenty 
miles  long,  was  jBrst  opened  as  far  as  Medina  towards 
the  end  of  the  year  1908.  Though  it  was  often 
broken  by  raiding  parties,  from  that  time  until  the 
outbreak  of  the  War  it  was  available  for  military 
transport  purposes  to  and  from  the  Hedjaz,  and  for 
the  pilgrims  for  whose  use  it  was  largely  constructed. 
Never  completed  to  Mecca  or  prolonged  to  the  coast 
of  the  Red  Sea  as  proposed,  the  railway  runs  through 
districts  in  which  for  years  the  Turkish  position  has 
been  so  far  from  stable  that  since  the  beginning  of 
the  War  it  could  probably  not  be  safely  used  beyond 
even  if  as  far  as  Maan.  In  addition  to  the  line  to 
Haifa,  to  which  I  will  refer  in  greater  detail  below, 
the  Hedjaz  Railway  has  a  branch  (twenty-two  miles 
in  length)  which  connects  Bosra  with  Deraia.  Ac- 
cording to  Petermanns  Miiteilnngcn,  July,  1915,  it 
also  has  a  French  feeder  (twenty-five  miles  in  length) 
running  from  Amman  to  Es  Salt,  a  feeder  which  it 


306  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE   WAR 

was  no  doubt  intended  should  be  prolonged  across  the 
Jordan  Valley  to  Jerusalem.  It  is  in  this  last  men- 
tioned neighbourhood  that  the  British,  based  upon 
Jerusalem,  have  attached  the  Hedjaz  line  in  order 
subsequently  to  be  able  to  utilise  it  for  their  further 
advance  towards  Damascus  and  the  north. 

There  now  remain  only  two  Syrian  lines  which  were 
open  to  traffic  before  the  outbreak  of  the  War.  The 
concession  for  the  first  of  these  —  the  Haifa  Railway 
—  having  been  given  in  1890,  that  line  was  partly 
built  by  a  British  company.  The  then  existing  works 
were  purchased  by  the  Government  in  1902,  and  the 
railway,  which  now  has  an  extension  from  Haifa  to 
Acre,  and  which  is  built  on  the  1.05-metre  gauge,  was 
finally  opened  to  traffic  in  May,  1906,  as  a  branch  of 
the  Hedjaz  line.  The  second,  to  which  no  special 
reference  is  necessary,  is  the  Jafi^a -Jerusalem  line,  the 
concession  for  which  was  acquired  by  a  French  com- 
pany in  1889.  Built  on  the  one-metre  gauge,  with  a 
length  of  fifty -four  miles,  the  line  was  opened  to  traffic 
in  1892.1 

Such  was  the  condition  of  things  in  Syria  on  the 
outbreak  of  the  War.  Before  that  time,  however,  it 
had  been  often  proposed  that  a  normal-gauge  railway 
should  be  constructed  on  the  west  of  the  Jordan  in 
order  to  prolong  the  line  from  Rayak  at  least  as  far 
as  Jerusalem.  I  believe  that  a  concession  had  been 
actually  granted  to  the  French  for  a  line  from  the 
former  place  to  Ramie  on  the  route  already  open  from 
Jaffa  to  Jerusalem.  Needless  to  say  work  upon  this 
section  was  never  begun,  and  its  place  was  taken  by 

^  The  north-western  part  of  this  line  was  taken  up  by  the  Turks  early 
in  the  war,  but  doubtless  it  has  now  been  relaid  by  the  British. 


THE   BAGDAD   RAILWAY  AND   THE   WAR    307 

a  line  built  by  the  Turks  themselves.  That  line 
(presumably  constructed  upon  the  1.05-metro  gauge, 
in  order  to  corresj)ond  with  the  Ilculjaz  and  Damascus- 
Beirut  systems)  starts  at  El  Fule  on  the  Dcraia-Haifa 
branch.  Keeping  well  inland,  it  runs  in  a  southerly 
direction  (there  is  a  considerable  detour  near  Nablus) 
to  Lydda  on  the  Jaffa-Jerusalem  Railway.  From  this 
point  the  new  line  follows  the  old  route  (the  gauge  has 
probably  been  changed)  to  Lydda,  where  it  leaves 
the  branch  to  Jerusalem  and  continues  its  way  via 
Beersheba  at  least  to  Bir  Auja.  No  details  are 
available  concerning  this  section,  the  length  of  which 
must  be  about  one  hundred  and  sixty  miles.  But  it  is 
obvious  that  its  completion  rendered  possible  the 
threatened  attacks  upon  Egypt  during  tlie  earlier 
stages  of  the  War,  and  that  its  existence  played  a  con- 
siderable role  in  enabling  the  Turks  to  bring  up  the 
reinforcements  with  which  they  so  determinately 
resisted  the  British  advance  upon  Jerusalem. 

Although  in  passing  I  have  mentioned  the  improve- 
ments and  extensions  made  upon  the  Bagdad  and 
Syrian  railways  since  the  entry  of  Turkey  into  the 
War,  the  knowledge  of  these  coming  improvements 
must  have  played  such  a  prominent  part  in  the  Allied 
plan  of  operations,  that  it  may  be  advisable  here  to 
draw  the  attention  of  my  readers  to  their  meaning  and 
effect.  In  November,  1914,  when  the  Ottoman  Gov- 
ernment threw  in  its  lot  with  the  Central  Powers,  so 
far  as  the  Bagdad  Railway  was  concerned,  there  was 
a  gap  of  thirty  miles  in  the  Taurus,  the  Amanus  tun- 
nels were  not  completed,  the  permanent  bridge  across 
the  Euphrates  was  not  in  position,  and  the  terminus 
was  at  Tel-el-Abiad,   only   about  sixty  miles  to   the 


308  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE  WAR 

east  of  that  river.  This  meant  not  only  that  Turkish 
reinforcements  and  material  destined  to  perform  as 
much  as  possible  of  the  eastern  journey  by  train,  were 
compelled  to  be  detrained  at  least  twice  (in  the  Taurus 
and  Amanus  sections)  but  that  the  enemy  was  unable 
to  derive  the  full  benefits  provided  by  the  Euphrates 
route  for  water  transport. 

Under  the  above  circumstances,  it  is  obvious  that 
the  constantly  increasing  Turkish  facilities  of  trans- 
port must  have  influenced  those  responsible  for  orig- 
inally pushing  forward  in  Mesopotamia  for  a  dis- 
tance and  in  a  manner  otherwise  entirely  unjustified 
considering  the  forces  available,  the  inadequate  prep- 
arations, and  the  difficulty  of  the  country.  Thus, 
the  necessity  for  forestalling  the  Turks  before  they 
could  effectively  improve  the  Bagdad  line  must  be 
considered  as  one  reason  for  the  inauguration  of  the 
Mesopotamian  campaign  directly  after  the  entry  of 
Turkey  into  the  War.  Moreover,  had  the  Turks  been 
left  a  free  hand  and  had  the  finished  parts  of  the  line 
therefore  been  available  for  the  transportation  of 
railway  material  instead  of  being  required  for  mili- 
tary purposes,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  much  further 
progress  could  have  been  made  both  on  the  main  route 
and  with  its  several  branches.  Equally  well,  in  regard 
to  the  Syrian  campaign,  had  we  waited  to  establish 
a  line  of  adequate  defences  in  an  area  situated  at  a 
safe  distance  to  the  east  of  the  Canal,  until  the  open- 
ing of  the  Taurus  and  Amanus  tunnels  and  until  the 
completion  of  the  new  railway  on  the  west  of  the  Jor- 
dan, it  is  obvious  that  the  magnitude  of  our  task  and 
the  dangers  of  the  situation  would  have  been  enor- 
mously increased.     As  in  the  case    of    Mesopotamia, 


THE   BAGDAD   RAILWAY   AND   THE   WAR     309 

it  is  these  conditions  which  make  it  safe  to  assert  that 
the  taking  of  measures  required  for  the  protection  of 
a  vital  section  of  the  British  Empire  were  necessary 
from  the  outset,  and  that  having  regard  to  what  may 
be  the  intended  future  of  this  part  of  the  world  these 
measures  may  well  have  entailed  a  bigger  campaign 
than  was  at  first  intended. 

The  present  is  a  moment  at  which  it  is  difficult,  if 
not  undesirable,  to  make  a  detailed  forecast  as  to  the 
future  of  the  Bagdad  Railway,  and  of  the  other  lines 
in  Asiatic  Turkey.  The  only  alternative  is  therefore 
to  say  that  two  things  seem  certain  —  firstly,  that 
sooner  or  later  the  Bagdad  or  some  other  line  from  the 
Bosphorus  to  the  Persian  Gulf  will  be  completed ; 
and  secondly,  that  its  ownership  and  control  must 
depend  not  so  much  upon  any  agreements  already 
made  as  upon  the  results  of  the  War  and  particularly 
upon  the  fate  of  Turkey.  In  regard  to  this  latter, 
the  Allies  must  leave  no  stone  unturned  to  prevent 
the  conclusion  of  a  peace  which  would  leave  the  enemy 
still  possessed  of  the  predominating  control  in  an  under- 
taking which,  once  it  is  robbed  of  its  political  signifi- 
cance, can  easily  be  established  upon  an  international 
basis  and  controlled  as  a  result  of  the  adoption  of  some 
scheme  of  internationalisation.  That  scheme  must 
depend  upon  the  future  status  of  the  now  Asiatic 
dominions  of  the  Sultan. 


XII 
MITTEL  EUROPA 

To  a  Britisher  who  has  followed  the  trend  of  evenis 
in  the  Near  East,  and  who  has  witnessed  the  gradual 
development  of  German  intrigues  in  that  area,  there 
has  never  been  published  a  document  so  important 
and  so  condemnatory  of  Germany  as  the  disclosures 
of  Prince  Lichnowsky.  On  the  one  hand  the  memo- 
randum of  the  Kaiser's  ex-Ambassador  in  London, 
coming  from  an  authoritative  enemy  pen,  proves  that 
practically  ever  since  the  Russo-Turkish  War  and  par- 
ticularly from  the  time  of  the  accession  of  the  present 
Emperor  to  the  throne,  the  Germans  have  carefully 
prepared  the  way  for  the  present  War,  and  for  the 
development  of  the  Mittel  Europa  scheme.  And 
on  the  other  side  it  indicates,  if  indeed  any  indication 
were  still  required,  that  the  so-called  rivalry  existing 
between  England  and  Germany  prior  to  the  War  arose 
not  from  any  desire  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain  to 
stand  in  the  way  of  the  development  of  legitimate 
German  interests  in  the  Balkans  and  in  Asia  Minor, 
but  from  the  unwillingness  of  the  Government  of  Ber- 
lin to  agree  to  any  reasonable  settlement  of  the  many 
all-important  questions  connected  with  those  regions. 

Although  for  years  the  Germans  had  been  intrigu- 
ing against  the  Triple  Entente,  Prince  Lichnowsky, 

310 


Baron  ^Marshal  von  Bieuerstein 

The  late  Baron  Marslu.l  von  Bicberstein  was  German  Ambassador  in  Con- 
stantinople from  1,S97  untilliis  transference  to  London  in  the  spring  of  IKll.'. 
It  was  largely  to  him  that  the  earlier  development  of  Germanic  influence  in 
Turkey  was  due,  and  he  was  one  of  the  Kaiser's  most  important  instruments 
in  furthering  the  growth  of  the  Mittel  Buropa  scheme. 


MITTEL  EUROPA  311 

a  man  possessed  of  personally  friendly  feelings  for 
England,  was  sent  to  London  in  order  to  camouflage 
the  real  designs  of  the  enemy  and  to  secure  repre- 
sentation by  a  diplomatist  who  was  intended  to  make 
good,  and  who,  in  fact,  did  make  a  high  position  for 
himself  in  British  official  and  social  circles.  The 
appointment  itself  therefore  raises  two  interesting 
questions.  In  the  first  place,  while  this  is  not  stated 
in  the  memorandum,  it  is  clear  that,  whereas  Baron 
Marshal  von  Bieberstein,  who  had  been  recalled  from 
Constantinople  partly  as  a  consequence  of  the  Turco- 
Italian  War,  was  definitely  instructed  to  endeavour 
to  make  friends  with  England  and  to  detach  her  from 
France  and  Russia,  or,  if  this  were  impossible,  to  bring 
about  war  at  a  convenient  time  for  Germany,  Prince 
Lichnowsky's  task  was  somewhat  different.  Kept 
at  least  more  or  less  in  the  dark  as  to  German  objects, 
the  Ambassador,  who  arrived  in  London  when  the 
Morocco  crisis  was  considered  at  an  end,  instead  of 
being  intrusted  with  the  dual  objects  of  his  predecessor, 
was  clearly  told  to  do,  and  did  in  fact  do,  his  utmost 
to  establish  friendly  relations  with  England,  The 
Berlin  Government,  on  the  other  hand,  this  time  main- 
tained in  its  own  hands  the  larger  question  of  the  mak- 
ing of  war  at  what  it  believed,  happily  wrongly,  to  be 
a  convenient  time  for  the  Central  Empires.  In  the 
second  place,  although  this  too  is  not  explained,  vari- 
ous references  made  by  Prince  Lichnowsky  leave  little 
doubt  in  the  mind  of  the  reader,  who  knows  the  situa- 
tion existing  at  the  German  Embassy  prior  to  the  out- 
break of  war,  that  the  Ambassador  himself  was  aware 
that  von  Kiihlmann  —  the  Counsellor  of  Embassy  — 
was,  in  fact,  the  representative  of  Pan-Germanism  in 


312  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE   WAR 

England,  and  that  to  this  very  able  and  expert  intriguer 
was  left  the  work  of  trying  to  develop  a  situation  which, 
in  peace  or  in  war,  would  be  favourable  to  the  ruler  and 
to  the  class  whose  views  he  voiced. 

I  have  already  dealt  so  fully  with  the  question  of 
German  intrigues  in  the  East  prior  to  the  outbreak  of 
the  War,  that  I  propose  here  only  briefly  to  refer  to 
one  or  two  points  raised  in  the  "Revelations  of  Prince 
Lichnowsky  ",  published  in  pamphlet  form  by  The  New 
York  Times.  To  begin  with,  no  doubt  whatever  is 
left  upon  the  mind  of  the  reader  that  Germany,  and 
not  Austria,  made  this  War,  largely  with  the  object 
of  improving  her  position  in  the  East.  Indeed  from 
the  time  of  the  Congress  of  Berlin  of  1878,  when  Prince 
Lichnowsky  says  his  country  began  the  Triple  Alliance 
Policy,  "The  goal  of  our  [German]  political  ambition 
was  to  dominate  in  the  Bosphorus",  and  "instead  of 
encouraging  a  powerful  development  in  the  Balkan 
States,  we  [Germany]  placed  ourselves  on  the  side  of 
the  Turkish  and  Magyar  oppressors." 

These  words  contain  in  essence  and  in  tabulated 
form  an  explanation  of  the  Pan-German  policy  in 
progress  during  the  period  covered  by  this  book  — - 
a  policy  the  existence  of  which  has  often  been  refuted 
and  denied  by  those  who  refused  to  see  that,  from  the 
first,  the  Kaiser  was  obsessed  by  a  desire  for  domina- 
tion from  Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf.  What  is 
even  more  striking,  too,  is  the  fact  that,  in  speaking 
of  the  Balkan  War  period.  Prince  Lichnowsky  says, 
that  "two  possibilities  for  settling  the  question  re- 
mained." Either  Germany  left  the  Near-Eastern 
problem  to  the  peoples  themselves  or  she  supported 
her  allies   "and  carried  out  a  Triple  Alliance  policy 


MITTEL  EUROPA  313 

in  the  East,  thereby  giving  up  the  role  of  mediator." 
Once  more,  in  the  words  of  the  Prince  himself,  "The 
German  Foreign  Office  very  much  preferred  the  latter," 
and  as  a  result  supported  Austria  on  the  one  hand  in 
her  desire  for  the  estabhshment  of  an  independent 
Albania,  and  on  the  other  in  her  successful  attempts 
to  draw  .Bulgaria  into  the  second  war  and  to  prevent 
that  country  from  providing  the  concessions  which 
at  that  time  would  have  satisfied  Roumania.  So  far 
as  the  first  of  these  questions  is  concerned,  while  the 
ex-Ambassador  admits  the  policy  of  Austria  was  actu- 
ated by  the  fact  that  she  "would  not  allow  Serbia 
to  reach  the  Adriatic",  the  actual  creation  of  Albania 
was  justified  by  the  existence  of  the  Albanians  as  a 
nationality  and  by  their  desire  for  independent  govern- 
ment. 

The  second  direction  in  which  the  enemy  devoted 
his  energy  was  an  even  larger,  more  German  and  more 
far-reaching  one.  "The  first  Balkan  w^ar  led  to  the 
collapse  of  Turkey  and  with  it  the  defeat  of  our  policy, 
which  has  been  identified  with  Turkey  for  many  years," 
says  the  memorandum.  This,  as  I  have  already 
explained,  at  one  time  seemed  destined  to  carry  with 
it  results  entirely  disadvantageous  to  Germany.  The 
Central  Powers  realized  the  situation,  and  having  en- 
couraged the  Balkan  rivalry  leading  to  the  second 
war,  which  brought  about  not  a  settlement  but  simply 
a  holding  in  suspense  of  the  numerous  Near-Eastern 
questions  of  which  a  settlement  was  so  necessary, 
turned  their  attention  toward  the  improvement  of 
their  relations  with  Turkey  more  definitely  and  more 
determinately  than  had  ever  been  the  case  })efore. 
Their  policy  was  carried  out  by  two  distinct  methods. 


314  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE   WAR 

The  first,  which  is  mentioned  by  Prince  Lichnowsky, 
was  the  appointment  of  General  Liman  von  Sanders 
as  practical  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  Turkish  Army 
—  an  appointment  which,  when  coupled  with  the  fact 
that  Enver  Pasha  —  an  out  and  out  pro-German  — 
became  Minister  of  War  about  the  same  time,  resulted 
in  enormous  improvement  in  the  eflBciency  of  the 
Ottoman  army  and  in  a  far-reaching  increase  of  Pan- 
German  influence  at  Constantinople.  The  second 
lever  employed  by  the  enemy  was  connected  with  the 
Aegean  Islands  question.  Germany,  having  first  util- 
ized her  diplomatic  influence  in  favour  of  Turkey, 
later  on  inspired  the  Government  of  that  country  in 
its  continued  protests  against  the  decision  upon  that 
question  arrived  at  by  the  Great  Powers.  Not  con- 
tent, however,  with  this,  the  Kaiser,  who  has  now 
adopted  the  policy  of  deportations  in  Belgium,  in  Po- 
land, and  in  Serbia,  definitely  encouraged  the  Turks  in 
a  like  measure  in  regard  to  the  Greeks  of  Asia  Minor, 
in  order  thereby  to  be  rid  themselves  of  a  hostile  and 
Christian  population  when  the  time  for  action  arrived. 
That  this  encouragement  was  given  was  always  appar- 
ent to  those  who  followed  the  course  of  events  in  1914, 
but  that  it  was  subsequently  admitted  by  the  German 
Admiral  Uzidon,  to  Mr.  Morgenthau,  constitutes  a 
condemnation  the  damning  nature  of  which  it  is  diffi- 
cult to  exaggerate. 

Turning  to  the  larger  aspects  of  the  European  situa- 
tion as  it  existed  immediately  prior  to  the  outbreak 
of  the  War,  there  are  two  questions  discussed  by  Prince 
Lichnowsky  which  are  worthy  of  brief  comment  here. 
The  first  concerns  the  ambassadorial  admissions  as 
to  the  conciliatory   attitude  adopted   by   the  British 


MITTEL  EUROPA  315 

Government  and  by  the  then  Secretary  of  State  for 
Foreign  Affairs  who  sought  "to  achieve  a  more  friendly 
rapprochement  with  Germany  and  to  bring  the  two 
groups  nearer  together",  and  whose  sincerity  in  its 
efforts  to  respect  German  rights  was  proved  by  the 
fact  that  Sir  Edward  Grey,  before  the  Bagdad  Rail- 
way Treaty  was  even  completed,  called  German  atten- 
tion to  English  men  of  business  who  were  seeking  oppor- 
tunities to  invest  capital  in  territories  to  be  included 
in  the  German  sphere  of  interest.  These  admissions 
prove  the  absolute  falseness  of  all  such  statements 
as  those  sometimes  made  to  the  effect  that  Russia 
and  France  have  consistently  co-operated  with  England 
in  preventing  the  completion  of  the  Bagdad  Railway. 

The  terms  of  this  practically  concluded  Bagdad 
Railway  arrangement,  to  which  I  have  referred  else- 
where, were  such  that,  whilst,  had  they  been  known, 
they  might  have  aroused  criticism  in  England,  they 
certainly  left  no  cause  for  complaint  by  Germany. 
For  instance,  among  other  things,  that  agreement, 
the  details  of  which  so  far  as  I  know  are  now  published 
for  the  first  time,  sanctioned  the  continuation  of  the 
Bagdad  line  to  Basra,  which  right  had  been  foregone 
by  Germany  in  order  to  secure  Alexandretta,  and  also 
recognized  the  whole  of  Mesopotamia  up  to  Basra, 
that  is  to  say,  to  the  north  of  Basra,  as  a  German  zone 
of  influence.  In  exchange  for  this  British,  French, 
and  Russian  economic  interests  were  acknowledged 
respectively  on  the  coasts  of  the  Persian  Gulf  and  in 
the  Smyrna-Aidin  Railway,  in  Syria,  and  in  Armenia. 
That  such  an  arrangement  wjis  virtually  concluded 
clearly  proves  that  the  Allies  never  stood  in  the  way 
of  the  realization  of   German  economic  penetration 


316  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE  WAR 

in  the  Near  East  and  that  no  concessions,  however 
favourable,  would  have  been  sufficient  to  give  satis- 
faction to  a  country  determined  to  establish  not  its 
economic  but  its  military  domination. 

Turning  to  the  events  connected  with  the  crisis 
arising  out  of  the  murder  of  the  Archduke  Franz  Ferdi- 
nand and  his  Consort  on  June  28,  absolute  proofs 
are  provided  from  two  German  pens  —  those  of  Prince 
Lichnowsky  and  of  Doctor  Miihlon,  a  former  member 
of  the  Krupp  Directorate  —  that  Berlin,  no  longer 
acting  through  the  mouthpiece  of  Vienna,  promoted 
the  War,  merely  utilizing  these  murders  as  an  excuse 
for  what  was  hoped  would  be  the  successful  develop- 
ment of  Germanic  policy.  So  early  as  the  spring  of 
1914,  the  late  Herr  von  Tschirschky  (then  German 
Ambassador  in  Vienna)  "declared  that  war  must  soon 
come."  In  view  of  subsequent  events  this  declaration 
is  far  more  important  than  is  apparent  at  first  sight, 
for  Von  Tschirschky,  before  his  appointment  to  Vienna 
in  1907,  had  been,  for  some  years,  the  confidential 
representative  of  the  Foreign  Office  attached  to  the 
Private  Council  and  Cabinet  of  the  Kaiser.  This, 
coupled  with  the  facts  that  even  Prince  Lichnowsky 
admits  the  decisive  nature  of  the  Potsdam  Meeting 
of  July  5th,  that  soon  afterward  Herr  von  Jagow  (the 
German  Foreign  Secretary)  was  in  Vienna  to  discuss 
everything  with  Count  Berchtold,  (Austrian  Foreign 
Minister),  and  that  Count  Mensdorff  (Austrian  Am- 
bassador in  London)  received  a  protocol  stating  "that 
it  would  not  matter  if  war  with  Russia  resulted  "  con- 
stitute a  highly  probable  explanation  of  what  actually 
occurred.  It  is  that  drastic  steps  were  decided  upon 
in  Berlin  a  week  after  the  murders,  that  as  Doctor 


MITTEL  EUROPA  317 

Helfferich  (then  Director  of  the  Deutsche  Bank)  told 
Doctor  Miihlon  the  Kaiser  went  on  "his  northern 
cruise  only  as  a  '  blind '  .  .  .  remaining  close  at  hand 
and  keeping  in  constant  touch",  and  that  the  Austrian 
ultimatum  to  Serbia,  concocted  either  in  Berlin  or  by 
Von  Tchirschky  in  Vienna,  was  purposely  delayed  in 
order  to  enable  Germany  to  put  the  finishing  touches 
upon  her  military  preparations,  and  particularly,  as 
]Vir.  Morgenthau  explains  (upon  the  authority  of  the 
German  Ambassador  at  Constantinople),  to  allow  the 
time  necessary  for  the  bankers  to  readjust  their  finances 
for  the  coming  War. 

Up  to  the  outbreak  of  the  War  and  therefore  during 
what  may  be  called  the  "initiation"  stage  of  German 
intrigues  in  the  East,  there  seems  every  reason  to 
believe  that  the  enemy  was  working  for  the  develop- 
ment of  his  Mittel  Europa  plan  in  a  manner  destined 
not  at  once  to  bring  him  into  open  conflict  with  Great 
Britain,  or  more  correctly  in  a  way  intended  to  keep 
England  out  of  the  first  w^ar  and  to  leave  her  for  pro- 
posed defeat  in  a  subsequent  and  edrly  conflagration. 
When  Great  Britain  came  to  the  support  of  France 
and  Russia,  however,  it  became  necessary  to  modify, 
or  rather  to  speed  up  this  plan.  Instead  of  being 
able  to  utilize  the  present  War  as  a  preparatory  meas- 
ure for  the  actual  realization  of  the  Mittel  Europa 
scheme,  Germany  was  compelled  either  to  give  up 
that  programme  or  to  endeavour  to  achieve  it  during 
the  present  conflagration.  It  was  this  change  which 
resulted  in  the  substitution  of  the  "consummation" 
for  the  "initiation"  stage  in  Pan-German  intrigues. 
The  "consummation"  policy  in  its  turn  entailed  the 
ranging  of  Turkey  and  all  the  Balkan  States,  except 


318  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE  WAR 

perhaps  Greece,  on  one  side  or  the  other,  in  order  that 
the  enemy  might  secure  a  free  run  across  the  Balkans, 
which  constitute  the  one  and  only  corridor  toward  his 
real  goal  —  the  Bosphorus,  Asiatic  Turkey,  Egypt, 
Persia,  and  India. 

It  is  only  necessary  here  briefly  to  remind  my  readers 
of  the  developments  during  the  "consummation" 
stage  of  enemy  policy  in  the  East  —  a  stage  which 
must  be  divided  into  three  phases.  The  first  lasted 
from  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  until  after  the  entry 
of  Turkey  into  the  War.  That  event  was  of  supreme 
importance,  for  in  addition  to  giving  Germany  the 
actual  military  support  of  that  country,  it  provided 
her  with  a  sort  of  "island"  or  "jumping  off"  place  for 
the  development  of  her  future  plans.  This  was,  how- 
ever, a  situation  only  partially  satisfactory  to  the 
enemy,  for  owing  to  the  resolute  defence  sustained  by 
Serbia  and  to  the  continued  neutrality  of  Bulgaria 
and  Roumania,  the  lack  of  direct  and  unhindered 
communication  with  the  East  prevented  him  from 
being  able  to  develop  to  full  advantage  the  support  of 
Turkey.  Consequently  after  the  entry  of  that  country 
into  the  War  and  during  the  second  "consummation" 
phase,  the  Germans  devoted  themselves  to  the  situa- 
tion in  Bulgaria.  The  acquisition  of  that  country 
meant  the  opening  of  the  German  door  towards  the 
East  and  the  certain  and  early  possession  by  the  enemy 
of  the  whole  of  the  main  line  from  Belgrade  to  Con- 
stantinople. 

From  this  time  onwards,  and  during  the  third  "con- 
summation" phase,  it  therefore  only  remained  for  the 
Central  Powers  to  bring  about  the  consolidation  of 
their  position  by  the  actual  defeat  of  Serbia  and  by 


MITTEL  EUROPA  319 

either  the  maintenance  of  the  neutrality  of  Greece  and 
of  Roumania  or  by  the  crushing  of  these  countries 
should  they  enter  the  War  upon  the  side  of  the  AlHes. 
Here  they  appear  to  have  adopted  two  different  policies. 
In  the  case  of  Greece,  I  believe  that  the  Germanic 
object  was  to  play  for  continued  neutrality  and  not 
for  friendly  participation  in  the  War.  This  may  well 
have  been  the  case,  because,  by  her  actual  co-opera- 
tion, that  country  could  have  been  of  little  use  to  the 
Central  Powers.  Indeed,  had  Greece  actually  thrown 
in  her  lot  with  them  during  the  reign  of  King  Con- 
stantine,  her  long  and  extremely  vulnerable  seaboard 
would  have  placed  her  in  a  position  in  which  the  Allies, 
by  the  establishment  of  a  blockade  and  by  seapower 
alone,  could  either  have  brought  her  to  her  knees  or 
forced  her  into  a  position  in  which  she  would  have  been 
a  heavier  economic  and  military  burden  to  the  enemy 
than  would  have  been  recompensed  by  the  actual 
fighting  support  which  she  was  in  a  position  to  give. 
The  case  of  Roumania,  however,  was  entirely  differ- 
ent, for  so  long  as  she  remained  neutral,  Germany 
was  compelled  to  depend  upon  the  single  line  of  rail- 
way running  through  Serbia  and  Bulgaria  and  to  forego 
the  advantages  of  the  full  use  of  the  Danube  and  of 
the  numerous  railways  leading  respectively  to  its 
northern  and  southern  banks.  As  already  explained, 
it  was  these  advantages,  coupled  with  the  great  oil 
wealth  of  Roumania  and  with  the  ultimate  facilities 
of  communication  with  Southern  Russia  and  the 
Middle  East,  which  have  actuated  the  enemy  in  his 
policy  toward  a  country  even  the  temporary  subjuga- 
tion of  which  is  of  great  importance  to  him. 

The  above  remarks  are  sufficient  to  prove  the  methods 


320  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE  WAR 

by  and  the  attention  with  which  the  Germans  have 
developed  their  plans  for  conquest  in  the  East.  "Their 
objective,"  as  President  Wilson  said  in  his  address 
delivered  at  Baltimore  on  April  6,  1918,  "is  undoubt- 
edly to  make  all  the  Slavic  peoples,  all  the  free  and 
ambitious  nations  of  the  Balkan  Peninsula,  all  the 
lands  that  Turkey  has  dominated  and  misruled,  sub- 
ject to  their  will  and  ambition  and  build  upon  that 
dominion  an  empire  of  force  upon  which  they  fancy 
that  they  can  erect  an  empire  of  gain  and  commercial 
supremacy,  —  an  empire  as  hostile  to  the  Americas 
as  to  the  Europe  which  it  will  overawe,  —  an  empire 
which  will  ultimately  master  Persia,  India,  and  the 
peoples  of  the  Far  East." 

To  summarize  the  extent  to  which  this  purpose  has 
been  realized,  and  we  have  to  admit  its  considerable 
success  if  we  are  to  appreciate  the  task  of  the  Allies, 
who  must  prevent  the  permanency  of  those  successes, 
it  has  first  to  be  remembered  that,  whilst  the  relations 
between  Germany  and  Austria  had  gradually  become 
more  intimate  from  the  time  of  the  Bosnian  annexa- 
tion, it  is  only  since  the  outbreak  of  the  War  that  the 
direction  of  affairs,  within  the  Dual  Monarchy,  has 
been  practically  controlled  by  Berlin.  In  addition 
the  enemy  has  established  his  domination  over  or 
conquered  Poland,  large  sections  of  Russia,  and  all 
the  Balkan  Peninsula  (except  Southern  Albania  and 
the  greater  part  of  Greece),  besides  the  larger  part  of 
Asiatic  Turkey.  He  is  now  preparing  to  overrun 
Persia.  This  means  that  the  Central  Powers  have 
gone  a  long  way  towards  the  temporary  establishment 
of  their  position  in  the  East  and  that,  by  the  exit  of 
Russia  from  the  War,  they  have  rid  themselves  of  a 


MITTEL  EUROPA  321 

formerly  existing  danger  to  their  "Drang  nach  Osten" 
policy.  It  is  this  indirect  result  of  the  Peace  of  Brest 
Litovsk,  this  removal  of  the  greatest  menace  to  Ger- 
many's Eastern  dreams,  which  is  possessed  of  conse- 
quences almost  if  not  quite  as  far-reaching  as  are  those 
connected  with  the  vast  enemy  forces  freed  for  service 
in  the  West. 

The  peace  recently  imposed  upon  Roumania,  when 
coupled  with  other  developments  which  preceded  it, 
and  particularly  with  the  situation  in  Russia,  consti- 
tutes a  definite  Pan-Germanic  development  —  prob- 
ably a  new  development  —  for  it  means  the  opening 
of  a  fresh  door  toward  the  East.  The  domination  of 
Germany  in  Southern  Russia  itself  gives  her  routes 
to  the  northern  shore  of  the  Black  Sea,  the  importance 
of  which  is  so  obvious  that  it  requires  no  comment 
here.  But  those  routes  could  not  have  been  used  to 
full  advantage  and  with  adequate  security  so  long  as 
the  Roumanian  army,  however  small  and  isolated, 
remained  a  military  force  in  being  and  so  long  as  it 
held  even  a  section  of  Northern  Moldavia.  Thus 
whilst  prior  to  the  arrangements  made  by  the  Treaties 
of  Brest  Litovsk  and  Bucharest  the  Central  Pow- 
ers were  already  in  possession  of  a  direct  connection 
with  Constantinople  and  the  Black  Sea,  now  that 
Russia  and  Roumania  are  both  out  of  the  War,  the 
enemy  has  secured  a  route  or  routes  between  Central 
Europe  and  the  East,  not  only  partially  but  entirely 
alternative  to  that  provided  by  the  railway  from  Bel- 
grade to  Constantinople.  By  going  overland  to  Odessa 
or  Constanza,  communication  will  be  available  by  way 
of  the  Black  Sea  with  Constantinople.  The  employ- 
ment of  these  routes  will  necessitate  little  if  any  delay, 


THE   CRADLE  OF  THE  WAR 

for,  in  peace  time,  whereas  the  journey  from  Berhn 
to  Constantinople  via  Odessa  required  approximately 
sixty  hours,  by  direct  train  it  took  about  fifty-five 
hours.  That  the  difference  will  be  even  less  by  way 
of  Constanza  is  proved  by  the  fact  that,  some  years 
before  the  War,  the  Germans  arranged  for  a  special 
express  train  to  run  from  Berlin  by  way  of  Breslau, 
Cracow,  Lemberg,  and  Roumania  to  Constanza,  a 
train  so  rapid  and  well  arranged  that  the  whole  journey 
could  be  accomplished  more  quickly  and  more  cheaply 
than  by  any  other  ordinary  route  across  Europe. 

It  is  not,  however,  only  with  Constantinople,  but 
also  in  the  direction  of  the  Middle  East  and  Central 
Asia  that  Germany  has  secured  or  may  now  secure 
new  facilities  for  communication.  Thus  if  the  enemy 
continues  to  dominate  Roumania  and  Southern  Russia, 
his  troops  and  war  material  can  be  conveyed  to  Con- 
stanza and  Odessa,  thence  to  be  shipped  by  way  of  the 
Black  Sea  to  the  ports  of  Northern  Asia  Minor  and  to 
Batum  in  the  Caucasian  area,  surrendered  to  Turkey. 
This  means,  when  coupled  with  the  fact  that  the  Rus- 
sian Black  Sea  Fleet  (consisting  of  two  dreadnoughts 
and  several  older  battleships  and  cruisers  and  a  num- 
ber of  torpedo  boats  and  submarines)  is  unlikely,  to 
say  the  least  of  it,  to  act  in  a  manner  hostile  to  Ger- 
many, that  the  enemy  has  before  him  a  wholly  new 
route  from  Europe  to  Asia  —  a  route  which  does  not 
depend  upon  and  which  can  be  used  in  place  of  the 
Bagdad  Railway.  Batum  is  connected  by  a  railway 
with  Tiflis.  From  this  point  one  line  goes  to  Baku 
on  the  Caspian,  and  another  runs  in  a  more  or  less 
southerly  direction  to  Julfa,  on  the  Turco-Persian 
frontier,  from  which  point,  since  the  beginning  of  the 


MITTEL   EUROPA  323 

War,  it  has  been  extended  at  least  to  Tabriz,  situated 
only  about  three  hundred  and  thirty  miles  to  the  north- 
east of  Bagdad.  Baku,  too,  is  in  railway  connection 
with  the  remainder  of  Russia.  These  are  conditions 
and  developments  which  affect  the  whole  situation. 

The  Germano-Roumano-Russian  peace  therefore 
indicates  the  attempted  foundation  for  a  policy  not 
of  German  domination  from  the  North  Sea  to  the 
Persian  Gulf,  but  from  the  Atlantic  to  the  Pacific. 
Over  and  above  the  already  mentioned  communica- 
tions and  ignoring  the  Trans-Siberian  Railway,  the 
development  of  this  policy  is  furthered  by  lines  con- 
structed by  Russia  in  areas  often  held  in  England  to 
be  a  menace  by  that  country  to  India.  Thus  start- 
ing from  Ki-asnovodsk,  on  the  east  of  the  Caspian, 
opposite  to  Baku,  a  line  runs  through  INIerv,  Bokara  and 
Samarcand  towards  the  Chinese  frontier.  A  little 
to  the  east  of  Samarcand  this  line  is  met  by  another 
coming  from  Petrograd  by  way  of  Moscow,  Samara, 
Orenburg,  and  Tashkend  —  a  line  which,  were  it  to 
fall  into  German  hands,  could  be  employed  to  further 
her  world  domination  schemes  without  the  necessity 
for  the  one  hundred  and  ninety  miles'  passage  across 
the  Caspian.  From  the  above-mentioned  junction 
it  was  reported,  prior  to  the  exit  of  Russia  from  the 
War,  that  that  country  was  building  a  railway  towards 
the  frontier  of  Afghanistan.  The  progress  made  by 
that  line  is  uncertain,  but  even  if  it  be  not  great,  the 
distance  left  unbridgcd  between  the  completed  Rus- 
sian railways  of  Central  Asia  and  the  terminus  of  the 
Indian  system  at  Peshawar  cannot  amount  to  more 
than  between  four  Imndrcd  and  five  hundred  miles. 
Whilst  happily,  at  the  moment  of  writing,  the  enemy 


324  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE  WAR 

is  not  in  possession  of  the  railways  of  all  Russia  or  of 
the  Trans-Caspian  areas,  and  whilst  equally  happily 
the  Hindu  Kush  Range  constitutes  a  natural  barrier 
between  the  termini  in  question,  in  considering  the 
larger  aspects  of  the  situation  in  Russia,  the  existence 
of  these  railways  constitutes  a  question  the  far-reach- 
ing importance  of  which  it  is  impossible  to  ignore. 

Events  are  moving  so  rapidly  and  the  situation  has 
to  be  viewed  from  so  many  standpoints  that  it  is  im- 
possible to  indicate  the  war  measures  necessary  of 
adoption  to  counter  the  enemy's  designs  in  the  East. 
Nevertheless  it  is  desirable  briefly  to  discuss  two  condi- 
tions which  must  be  realized  after  the  War  —  condi- 
tions in  a  way  interdependent  and  conditions  which 
must  be  brought  about  if  the  danger  of  prolonged 
Teutonic  domination  in  the  East  is  to  be  averted.  I 
refer  to  the  necessity  for  the  establishment  of  an  anti- 
German  barrier  and  to  the  distribution  of  Near-Eastern 
territories  upon  a  basis  sufficiently  fair  and  just  to  be 
a  safeguard  against  future  wars.  In  regard  to  the  first 
of  these  conditions  there  were  or  there  are  two  schools 
of  thought.  According  to  the  first,  whilst  some  form 
of  government  with  the  consent  of  the  governed  should 
be  inaugurated  in  favour  of  the  various  nationalities  of 
Austria-Hungary  who  have  not  heretofore  had  an  ade- 
quate voice  in  the  direction  of  their  own  affairs,  the 
Dual  Monarchy  should  remain  more  or  less  intact  or 
even  be  strengthened  in  certain  directions  with  the 
object  of  enabling  its  rulers  to  withstand  Germanic 
influence  and  of  creating  of  it  an  anti-Prussian  barrier. 
This  sounds  satisfactory  and  it  might  at  one  time  have 
been  satisfactory.  But  in  view  of  recent  events  it 
seems  difficult  to  believe  that  the  adoption  of  such  a 


MITTEL  EUROPA  325 

course  would  in  itself  bring  about  the  necessary  security. 
This  is  the  case  because  no  guarantees  would  exist  that 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  would  or  could 
break  away  from  the  domination  of  Berlin  or  that  it 
would  introduce  or  still  more  maintain  a  regime  accept- 
able to  all  or  many  of  its  present  subject  peoples. 

As  an  alternative  or  as  a  supplementary  course  we 
are  therefore  compelled  to  look  to  the  setting  up  of 
safeguards  only  partly  in  and  largely  to  the  East  of 
the  Dual  Monarchy.  I  refer  to  a  Balkan  Barrier. 
It  is  said  by  some,  as  it  was  said  in  1913,  that  an  en- 
larged and  strengthened  Serbia,  or  a  Balkan  League 
composed  of  a  satisfied  Serbia,  Roumania,  and  Greece 
would  be  a  sufficient  assurance.  This  theory  is  with- 
out a  sound  basis,  for  I  am  convinced  that  no  one  Bal- 
kan country  or  no  group  of  countries  which  left  out 
one  or  more  of  the  neighbouring  States,  would  con- 
stitute an  adequate  precaution  against  a  further  Ger- 
manic effort  to  dominate  the  East  or  against  a  renewed 
outbreak  of  war  as  a  result  of  conditions  prevailing 
in  ihli  ever  "Danger  Zone  of  Europe."  Thus  were 
Serbia,  Roumania,  or  Greece  to  be  increased  in  size 
by  the  inclusion  of  all  the  areas  which  they  covet,  and 
were  the  name  of  Bulgaria  to  be  entirely  or  practically 
blotted  off  the  map  of  Europe,  so  long  as  the  Bulgarian 
race  existed  under  Bulgarian  or  alien  rule,  so  long 
would  there  be  a  certainty  of  unrest  in  the  Balkans  — 
unrest  which  in  its  turn  would  be  an  excuse  for  foreign 
intrigue.  Equally  well  were  Serbia  and  Greece  al- 
lowed practically  to  divide  Albania,  this  would  not 
only  be  an  injustice  to  the  people  of  the  areas  so  divided 
but  it  would  leave  the  way  open  for  renewed  Euroi)ean 
and  local  difficulties.     Consequently  it  is  only  by  a  fair 


326  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE  WAR 

and  equitable  distribution  of  Balkan  territories,  that 
there  can  be  established  a  state  of  things,  which  if  it  be 
not  at  once  acceptable  to  all  the  parties  concerned,  will 
none  the  less  form  a  basis  of  a  stable  peace,  a  peace 
which  will  untimately  encourage  good  Balkan  relations 
destined  automatically,  in  the  end,  to  help  to  bar  the 
gate  in  face  of  German  domination  in  the  East. 

To  consider  first  the  kind  of  arrangement  which 
should  be  substituted  for  the  fatal  Treaty  of  Bucharest 
of  1913,  whilst  I  do  not  agree  with  its  every  detail 
and  whilst  I  do  not  base  the  following  remarks  entirely 
upon  it,  I  cannot  do  better  than  to  refer  my  readers 
to  a  potent,  well-informed,  and  comprehensive  article 
which  appeared  under  the  title  "The  Final  Settlement 
in  the  Balkans"  in  The  Quarterly  Review  (Number 
453)  for  October,  1917.1  Though  the  writer  of  that 
article  speaks  of  five,  it  seems  to  me  preferable  to  say 
that  there  are  three  all-important  principles  which 
must  be  taken  into  account  in  endeavouring  to  solve 
the  Balkan  Question.  Undoubtedly  the  first  is  the. 
basis  of  nationality,  which  should  always  be  accepted 
unless  it  be  made  impossible  of  adoption  by  one  of  the 
other  two  conditions.  Coming  next  in  order  are  eco- 
nomic and  commercial  considerations,  that  is  to  saj^ 
the  provision  for  each  country  of  adequate  and  natural 
access  to  the  sea.  In  certain  cases  the  realization  of 
this  consideration  may  clash  with  and  must  take  pre- 
cedence over  the  basis  of  nationality,  for  in  various 
instances  the  seaports  are  not  inhabited  in  majority 
by  the  same  nationality  as  the  interior.  Thirdly,  in 
view  of  the  complicated  nature  of  the  geography  of  the 

'  The  author  of  this  article  is  Mr.  James  D.  Bourchier,  the  famous 
Balkan  correspondent  of  The  Times. 


MITTEL  EUROPA  327 

peninsula,  clue  weight  and  consideration  must  be  given 
to  the  existence  of  certain  natural  frontiers  and  stra- 
tegic requirements,  the  overlooking  of  which  is  not 
possible.  In  addition  to  these  principles,  though  not 
upon  the  same  level  of  importance  with  them,  there 
are  certain  pre- War  European  decisions  which  might 
well  be  taken  as  guiding  factors  and  which  should  not 
therefore  be  treated  as  mere  "scraps  of  paper." 

To  attempt  to  apply  these  principles  in  detail  would 
mean  the  expansion  of  this  volume  far  beyond  its  avail- 
able capacity  and  therefore  the  only  course  left  open 
to  me  is  very  briefly  to  allude  to  the  general  conditions 
to  be  created  by  their  adoption.  Beginning  with 
Roumania,  her  natural  southern  frontier  with  Serbia 
and  Bulgaria  would  be  the  Danube,  but  that  river 
cannot  be  taken  as  the  boundary  right  to  its  mouth 
as  special  arrangements  must  be  made  for  the  Dobrudja 
in  order  to  allow  Roumania  adequate  access  to  the  sea. 
Near  Silistria  the  Danube  frontier  should  therefore  be 
replaced  by  that  arranged  under  the  Protocol  of  Petro- 
grad  of  May,  1913,  by  which  the  town  of  Silistria  went 
to  Roumania.  On  the  west  and  northwest  the  Rou- 
manian frontiers  should  be  extended  in  a  manner  to 
give  the  Banat  and  large  areas  of  Transylvania  and 
of  the  Bukovina  to  that  country.  The  inclusion  of  the 
Banat  in  Roumania  will  constitute  a  hardship  for 
Serbia  in  that  Belgrade  would  still  remain  on  the 
frontier  and  that  a  considerable  Serl)  population  exists 
in  the  southwestern  portion  of  that  area.  On  her 
eastern  frontier  there  should  certainly  be  a  modifica- 
tion in  favour  of  Roumania  which  would  give  to  that 
country  at  least  a  portion  of  Bessarabia. 

Coming  to  Bulgaria,  I  think  that  the  Enos-Midia 


THE   CRADLE  OF  THE  WAR 

line,  arranged  by  the  Balkan  Allies  and  sanctioned  by 
the  Great  Powers  at  the  time  of  the  signature  of  the 
Treaty  of  London  (May,  1913)  should  be  taken  as  a 
basis  in  deciding  the  position  of  Bulgaria's  southeastern 
frontier.  The  delimitation  of  the  southwestern  and 
western  boundaries  of  the  dominions  of  King  Ferdinand, 
and  therefore  the  drawing  of  the  Bulgaro-Greek  and  the 
Bulgaro-Serbian  frontiers  will  be  much  more  compli- 
cated. Here  no  doubt  rests  in  my  mind  that  Bulgaria 
must  be  assured  adequate  access  to  the  Aegean  and 
that  her  frontier  should  be  extended  so  as  to  include 
Kavala  together  with  adequate  means  of  approach  to 
the  coast  at  that  point.  With  regard  to  the  Bulgaro- 
Serbian  and  to  what  may  be  a  future  Bulgaro-Greek 
frontier  in  the  neighbourhood  or  on  the  west  of  the 
Vardar  Valley,  any  solution  is  beset  by  the  ever-present 
difficulty  of  the  Macedonian  question  and  of  the  arrival 
at  a  decision  as  to  the  nationality  of  the  inhabitants 
of  doubtful  or  disputed  areas.  That  question  which 
concerns  Serbia,  Greece  and  Bulgaria  could  be  decided 
in  one  of  three  ways  —  according  to  language,  by  tak- 
ing a  plebiscite,  or  upon  the  basis  of  the  arrangements 
made  between  the  parties  concerned  in  1912.  If  the 
first  of  these  means  were  adopted  the  necessary  meas- 
ures would  have  to  be  taken  to  ascertain  the  areas 
in  which  Greek  and  Slav  are  spoken  and  to  discover 
where  the  forms  of  speech  particular  to  Bulgars  or 
Serbs  are  employed.  In  theory  the  taking  of  a  plebis- 
cite would  be  a  satisfactory  manner  of  arriving  at  a 
solution  of  the  problem.  But  to  enable  the  people 
to  vote  freely,  a  plebiscite  would  have  to  be  conducted 
under  the  direct  auspices  of  the  Allies,  or  better  still 
under  the  control  of  America. 


MITTEL  EUROPA  329 

Whilst  some  other  means  would  have  to  be  found  for 
dealing  with  the  areas  not  already  specially  mentioned 
and  in  dispute  between  Bulgaria  and  Greece,  the  third 
and  last  suggestion  for  a  solution  of  the  Serbo-Bul- 
garian  part  of  the  question  would  seem  to  be  the  one 
the  simplest  and  fairest  of  adoption.  It  is  the  simplest 
because  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  Treaty  and  its  annex  of 
1912  were  arranged  by  the  two  contracting  parties, 
without  foreign  interference,  only  five  years  ago,  and 
when  the  question  was  looming  not  in  the  distance,  but 
at  a  moment  when  a  redistribution  of  territory  was 
actually  foreseen.  To  take  that  agreement  as  the  basis 
for,  though  not  necessarily  the  actual  text  of,  a  future 
arrangement  would  be  the  fairest  settlement  .of  the 
problem  because  Bulgaria  would  thereby  secure  much 
less  than  she  now  holds  (she  would  have  to  vacate  all 
the  districts  of  Serbia  which  were  Serbian  before  the 
Balkan  Wars,  and  also  the  Macedonian  areas  which 
went  to  the  latter  country  by  the  Treaty)  and  because 
she  would  obtain  probably  only  a  section  of  the  terri- 
tory to  be  acquired  by  her  under  a  plebiscite  or  upon 
the  language  basis. 

One  of  the  most  important  problems  connected  with 
this  part  of  the  peninsula  concerns  the  future  of  Salo- 
nica..  That  question  can  hardly  be  decided  primarily 
on  the  basis  of  nationality,  for  the  Jewish  element  of 
the  population  predominates.  Consequently  it  would 
seem  that  the  allotment  of  this  all-important  city 
should  be  governed  largely  by  the  condition  that  ports 
ought  not  to  be  separated  from  the  hinterland  which 
they  serve  and  therefore  l)y  what  may  be  the  future 
distribution  of  the  hinterland  in  question.  Under 
these  circumstances  all  that  can  be  said  here  is  that 


330  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE   WAR 

three  solutions  are  feasible.  Firstly  the  city  might 
be  left  to  Greece.  This  would  have  the  advantage 
of  avoiding  a  loss  of  prestige  for  M.  Venezelos  and  a 
disappointment  for  the  Greeks.  But  on  the  other  hand 
Greece,  which  has  plenty  of  ports,  does  not  require 
Salonica,  and  the  Jews  of  that  city  would  certainly 
prefer  almost  any  regime  to  Hellenic  rule.  Secondly, 
if  Central  and  Western  Macedonia  accrue  to  Bulgaria, 
then  Salonica  might  go  with  them.  This  settlement, 
possessed  of  many  advantages,  would,  however,  be 
greatly  resented  alike  by  the  Greeks  and  the  Serbs. 
And  thirdly  Salonica,  by  itself,  might  be  constituted  a 
free  port  under  the  protection  of  the  Powers,  or  it 
might,  form  the  capital  and  port  of  an  autonomous 
Macedonia,  foreseen  by  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  Treaty 
of  1912  and  now  to  be  created  under  the  protection  of 
the  Powers  in  order  temporarily  to  get  over  the  diffi- 
culties concerning  the  future  of  areas  disputed  between 
Serbia,  Greece,  and  Bulgaria. 

Turning  to  Albania,  whilst  upon  ethnical  grounds 
the  frontiers  might  be  considerably  extended,  the 
decisions  of  the  London  Ambassadorial  Conference 
might  well  be  taken  as  a  basis  in  fixing  future  bound- 
aries. In  justice  to  Albania  herself  and  in  the  interest 
of  future  peace,  however,  there  should  be  certain  minor 
rectifications  in  favour  of  that  country.  The  prin- 
cipal directions  in  which  attention  should  be  turned 
are  towards  a  change  in  the  south,  which  would  bring 
the  whole  of  the  road  from  Santi  Quaranta  to  Korcha 
within  Albania,  instead  of  leaving  it  to  pass  through 
a  triangular  area  of  Greece,  towards  the  inclusion  in 
Albania  of  Dibra,  Prisrend,  and  Jacova  —  towns 
which  are  absolutely  essential  as  market  centres,  and 


MITTEL  EUROPA  331 

towards  the  regaining  of  the  tribes  of  Hoti  and  Gruda, 
which  are  so  absohitely  Albanian  in  sentiment  tliat  they 
will  never  peacefully  accept  any  form  of  alien  rule. 
With  such  modifications  Albania  would  be  constituted 
on  a  basis  which  would  make  her  national  existence 
practicable  instead  of  impossible,  as  it  was  prior  to  the 
War. 

As  Montenegro  and  Serbia  seem  destined  sooner  or 
later  to  be  united  either  as  one  kingdom  or  at  least  on 
terms  so  intimate  as  to  make  any  serious  rivalry  out 
of  the  question,  I  will  consider  the  gains  which  should 
be  assured  to  those  countries  as  common  and  discuss 
them  all  under  one  heading.  Here  the  most  impor- 
tant developments  recently  arising  are  the  friendly 
understanding  said  now  to  have  been  arrived  at 
between  Italy  and  the  Slavs  and  the  reported  replace- 
ment of  the  original  Treaty  between  Italy,  England, 
France,  and  Russia  by  a  new  agreement.  As  the  nature 
of  neither  of  these  arrangements  is  known,  I  will  merely 
endeavour  approximately  to  sketch  the  acquisitions 
which  should  be  secured  by  Montenegro-Serbia.  The 
Bocche  di  Cattaro  and  the  coastal  area  of  Dalmatia, 
lying  to  the  southeast  of  it,  should  be  Slav.  Bosnia 
and  Herzegovina,  together  with  a  length  of  the  Adriatic 
Coast  on  the  north  of  the  Bocche  di  Cattaro,  sufficient 
to  give  a  proper  Serbian  access  to  the  sea,  ought  to 
be  allotted  to  that  country  or  to  Montenegro.  With 
regard  to  Croatia  and  to  Slavonia,  which  should  be 
considered  separately  to  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  and 
to  the  remainder  of  Dalmatia,  the  futures  of  these 
areas  are  bound  up  with  many  questions  which  do  not 
fall  within  the  limits  of  this  volume.  Sufficient  there- 
fore be  it  to  say  that  a  friendly  agreement  between 


THE   CRADLE  OF  THE  WAR 

Italy  and  the  Southern  Slavs  is  essential  to  the  inter- 
ests of  both  parties  and  that,  when  the  time  for  a  deci- 
sion comes  and  when  it  be  possible  to  ascertain  the  true 
sentiments  of  the  inhabitants,  these  sentiments  must 
be  treated  with  all  possible  deference  in  any  solution 
of  the  Jugo-Slav  and  Adriatic  Questions  decided  upon 
by  the  Allies. 

From  the  foregoing  remarks  it  would  seem  that 
Greece  is  the  country  destined  to  lose  the  most  and  to 
gain  the  least  by  any  feasible  settlement  of  the  Balkan 
Question.  This  is  the  case  because  the  claims  of 
that  country  are  most  diflScult  of  satisfaction  in  that 
the  Hellenic  element  of  the  population  is  for  the  most 
part  scattered  and  that,  where  it  exists  in  preponder- 
ating numbers,  especially  in  numerous  coastal  regions, 
the  futures  of  those  regions  cannot,  for  reasons  already 
given,  be  decided  solely  upon  the  nationality  basis. 
This  was  of  course  foreseen  by  M.  Venezelos,  when  he 
proposed,  early  in  the  War,  to  make  concessions  to 
Bulgaria  and  to  come  to  the  support  of  the  Allies, 
presumably  on  the  understanding  that  his  country 
should  receive  compensation  without  the  Balkan 
Peninsula.  Had  the  Premier  been  able  to  secure  the 
adoption  of  his  point  of  view  at  that  time,  and  had 
the  support  of  Greece  then  been  available  against 
Turkey,  she  might  well  have  secured  valuable  gains 
at  the  expense  of  that  country.  As  things  stand  at 
present,  however,  unless  Greece  were  to  be  given 
Monastir,  to  which  she  has  better  racial  claims  than 
has  Serbia,  it  is  difficult  to  see  where  her  aspirations, 
at  any  rate  on  the  mainland,  can  be  gratified.  But 
whilst  we  do  not  know  the  nature  of  the  arrangement 
reported  to  have  taken  the  place  of  the  Treaty  said  to 


MITTEL  EUROPA  333 

have  been  signed  with  Italy  on  her  entry  into  the  War, 
it  is  possible  that  this  arrangement  has  foreseen  the 
desirability  of  rewarding  Greece  by  the  acquisition 
of  at  least  some  of  the  Aegean  Islands,  now  in  posses- 
sion of  Italy,  and  that  Cyprus,  offered  to  her  by  Great 
Britain  in  1915,  might  be  ceded  under  some  arrange- 
ment at  the  end  of  the  War.  These  are  concessions 
which  would  be  justified  on  ethnical  grounds  and  which 
would  certainly  do  something  to  make  up  for  losses 
possibly  to  be  suffered  by  Greece  in  other  directions. 

In  placing  the  above  suggestions  before  my  readers 
I  make  no  claim  that  their  adoption,  as  a  basis  for  the 
future  settlement  of  the  Balkans,  would  be  entirely 
popular  in  any  of  the  countries  concerned  or  that 
it  would  lead  to  the  immediate  cessation  of  unrest  in 
the  areas  in  question.  Neither  of  these  results  is 
possible  until  sufficient  time  has  elapsed  to  enable 
tranquillity  and  prosperity  to  do  something  to  blot 
out  the  memories  of  the  past.  Those  conditions, 
which  can  only  be  realized  by  a  justifiable  distribution 
of  territory,  can  hardly  be  brought  about  by  local 
arrangement.  When  the  proper  time  comes,  there- 
fore, it  is  still  for  the  Allies  to  adopt  the  policy  defined 
by  Sir  Edward  Grey  on  September  28,  1915,  namely, 
to  further  "the  national  aspirations  of  the  Balkan 
States  without  sacrificing  the  independence  of  any 
of  them."  The  continued  pursuit  of  such  a  policy, 
which  may  have  to  be  firmly  imposed  upon  the  chau- 
vinistic elements  of  the  various  nationalities,  will  tend 
to  put  an  end  to  a  state  of  things  largely  responsible 
for  rendering  possible  the  present  War  and  for  many  of 
the  events  which  have  taken  place  since  August,  1914. 

The  last  subject  for  discussion  here  is  that  which 


334  THE   CRADLE  OF  THE  WAR 

concerns  the  futures  of  what  would  remain  of  Turkey 
in  Europe  —  Constantinople  and  its  surroundings  — 
and  of  the  Asiatic  Dominions  of  the  Sultan.  With 
so  many  factors  still  undecided,  it  is  too  early  yet  even 
to  make  any  definite  suggestions  upon  these  compli- 
cated and  all-important  questions.  To  begin  with, 
it  is  impossible  to  forecast  whether  Turkey  will  be 
allowed  to  continue  her  independent  existence  as  a 
Great  Power,  or  whether  the  Ottoman  Empire  as  a 
whole  or  in  part  is  to  be  placed  directly  under  Euro- 
pean control.  In  either  case,  however,  although  the 
arrangements  would  be  somewhat  different,  it  is  safe 
to  say  that  the  present  status  of  Constantinople  and  of 
the  Straits  must  be  changed,  and  that  the  Dardanelles 
and  the  Bosphorus  should  in  the  future  be  unfortified 
and  open  not  only  to  the  ships  of  war  of  Turkey  but 
to  those  of  all  nations.  If  these  conditions  be  realized 
there  are  then  two  alternatives.  By  the  first  Turkey 
would  continue  to  be  the  nominal  sovereign  power 
at  Constantinople,  but  the  city,  together  with  its 
European  and  Asiatic  surroundings,  whilst  remain- 
ing under  the  Turkish  flag,  would  be  definitely  con- 
trolled under  some  form  of  international  arrange- 
ment hereafter  to  be  decided.  By  the  second,  Turkish 
rule  would  cease  altogether  in  the  European  area 
situated  to  the  southeast  of  the  Enos-Midia  line  and 
in  a  band  of  Asiatic  territory  bordering  on  the  south- 
eastern shores  of  the  Bosphorus,  the  Marmora,  and  the 
Dardanelles  —  a  band  sufficiently  wide  to  safeguard 
the  neutrality  of  those  waterways.  In  that  case  these 
areas  would  pass  under  the  direct  and  absolute  control 
of  the  Powers  or  of  some  country  or  countries  nomi- 
nated by  them. 


MITTEL  EUROPA  335 

As  in  the  case  of  Constantinople  so  with  regard  to 
the  Asiatic  Dominions  of  the  Sultan  the  primary  and 
absolute  necessity  is  that  Germanic  domination  must 
cease  and  that  measures  must  be  taken  to  prevent  the 
further  butchery  and  oppression  of  the  non-Turkish 
elements  of  the  population,  and  particularly  to  assure 
the  safety  of  the  Armenians  who  remain.  This  state 
of  things  might  conceivably  be  brought  about  whilst 
the  Turkish  flag  still  flew  over  large  areas  of  what  are 
now  Asiatic  Turkey,  but  in  that  case,  in  addition  to 
the  above  suggested  safeguards,  local  autonomy  would 
have  to  be  granted  to  the  various  now  subject  peoples. 
On  the  other  hand  if  a  policy  of  disintegration  or  of 
complete  control  be  adopted  by  the  Allies,  then  we 
shall  see  either  the  birth  of  a  number  of  new  states 
in  Western  Asia  or  the  establishment  of  several  autono- 
mous regions  each  probably  directly  or  indirectly 
under  some  kind  of  foreign  supervision.  That  super- 
vision might  take  the  form  of  a  Governor  General 
nominated  by  the  Great  Powers  and  assisted  by  an 
Ambassadorial  Council  at  Constantinople,  possessed 
of  direct  control  over  that  city  and  of  only  the  indirect 
supervisal  of  several  semi-independent  States,  each 
possessed  of  their  own  Governments.  Or  it  might  be 
carried  out  by  means  of  separate  and  independent 
regimes  for  Constantinople  and  for  the  different  areas 
of  the  interior.  These  and  many  other  problems  are 
destined  for  the  moment  to  remain  unsettled  and  to 
be  decided,  when  the  time  for  decision  comes,  upon  the 
basis  of  factors  many  of  which  cannot  be  discussed  under 
existing  circumstances. 

Throughout  this  volume  I  have  endeavoured  to  re- 
view the  situation  in  the  East  as  it  actually  was  and 


336  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE  WAR 

is  and  to  admit  enemy  successes  where  successes  have 
been  achieved.  At  the  time  of  writing,  judging  from 
the  map,  those  successes  are  considerable  and  far- 
reaching.  But  if  the  Germans  have  been  generally 
correct  in  their  diagnosis  of  the  "trees",  of  the  details 
of  the  War,  they  have  been  and  are  almost  universally 
wrong  in  their  appreciation  of  the  "woods",  the  larger 
aspects  of  the  situation.  Such  mistakes  as  those  con- 
cerning their  misinterpretation  of  the  original  attitude 
of  Great  Britain,  their  opinion  of  what  they  called 
"the  contemptible  little  British  Army"  and  their 
optimism  in  regard  to  the  policy  of  Italy,  together 
with  their  fatal  error  in  miscalculating  the  sentiments, 
the  determination,  and  the  power  of  the  people  of  the 
United  States,  have  already  caused  them  to  be  swept 
from  the  sea,  to  lose  their  colonies,  and  to  be  compelled 
to  play  for  a  draw  or  even  to  be  ready  to  make  sacri- 
fices in  the  West  in  order  to  maintain  and  keep  the 
door  open  for  their  intrigues  and  schemes  of  conquest 
in  the  East.  We  may  be  Westerners  or  we  may  be 
Easterners  in  military  policy,  but  in  either  case  it  must 
be  clear  to  every  member  of  the  thinking  public  that 
no  terms  can  be  made  and  that  no  peace  will  be  lasting 
which  does  not  free  the  East  "from  the  impudent  and 
alien  domination  of  the  Prussian  military  and  commer- 
cial autocracy."  To  fail  to  achieve  this  object  would 
be  to  prolong  the  existence  of  the  Near  East  as  "The 
Danger  Zone  of  Europe"  and  to  leave  that  area  the 
ready  "Cradle"  for  yet  another  war. 


POSTSCRIPT 

Readers  of  the  foregoing  pages  will  have  discovered 
that  they  include  a  review  of  many  of  the  conditions 
influencing  the  developments  which  began  on  the 
Balkan  front  on  July  6,  1918.  In  considering  those 
developments,  and  especially  the  events  in  the  more  or 
less  immediate  vicinity  of  the  Adriatic,  the  first  con- 
dition to  be  remembered  is  that  we  have  no  information 
as  to  the  progress  of  events  in  Northern  and  Central 
Albania  since  the  enemy  occupation  of  those  areas  early 
in  1916.  Thus  whilst  we  know  that  the  Italians  have 
built  roads,  and  I  believe  one  or  more  sections  of  rail- 
way, in  the  districts  which  they  held,  we  are  in  total 
ignorance  as  to  the  facilities  of  communication  estab- 
lished by  the  Austrians.  All  that  can  be  said,  there- 
fore, is  that,  up  to  the  time  of  the  enemy  advance  in 
1916,  there  were  no  railways  in  Albania  and  that  the 
so-called  roads  consisted  almost  exclusively  of  mere 
tracks  not  passable  for  wheeled  traffic. 

Consequently,  knowing  the  country  as  I  do,  I  think 
that  the  initial  Allied  goal  must  be  the  occupation  of 
a  line  situated  to  the  north  of  and  running  more  or  less 
parallel  to  the  Scumbi  Valley.  An  advance  to  such  a 
line,  if  it  included  the  capture  of  the  Krabe  Mountains, 
lying  to  the  north  of  Elbasan,  would  mean  the  occu- 
pation and  the  freeing  of  at  least  half  Albania  and  the 


338  THE   CRADLE   OF  THE   WAR 

almost  certain  capture  of  Diirazzo  and  perhaps  of 
Tirana.  It  would  place  in  our  hands  the  natural  line 
of  communication  from  the  Adriatic  into  the  interior 
—  a  line  which  follows  the  ancient  Via  Egnatia  and  the 
Scumbi  Valley  and  a  line  along  which,  if  it  has  not 
already  been  built,  a  modern  road  could  easily  be  con- 
structed. 

By  such  an  advance  the  Allies  w^ould  have  gained 
the  larger  part  of  the  plains  of  Central  Albania,  the 
western  section  of  the  Balkan  front  would  have  been 
straightened  out  in  a  manner  greatly  to  our  advantage, 
and  we  should  be  in  possession  of  the  section  of  Albania 
inhabited  by  the  more  enlightened  element  of  the  popu- 
lation. Moreover  the  occupation  of  Durazzo  and  of 
the  Scumbi  Valley  would  wrest  from  the  enemy  a  port, 
which  has  probably  played  its  part  in  enabling  him  to 
threaten  the  Allied  routes  across  the  Lower  Adriatic, 
and  it  would  give  to  us  a  new  point  of  entry  into  and 
means  of  communication  with  the  Western  Balkans. 
Wliether  those  facilities  would  be  utilised  for  provi- 
sioning the  Allied  forces  on  all  or  parts  of  the  Salonica 
front  or  whether  they  would  lead  to  a  far-reaching 
advance  in  the  Balkans  are  questions  which  cannot  be 
discussed  here.  Sufficient,  therefore,  be  it  to  say  that 
developments  taking  place  at  the  time  of  writing  these 
few  lines  (July  15)  once  more  thrust  the  Near  East 
into  the  forefront  of  the  War  and  that  they  justify 
our  continued  attention  to  the  progress  of  events  in  an 
area  which  becomes  ever  more  and  more  important. 


SOME    USEFUL    PUBLICATIONS    ON    THE    SAME 

SUBJECT 

Official  Documents 

Bagdad  Railway  (1911)  Parliamentary  Paper  (Cd.  5635). 
Dardanelles  Commission,  First  Report  (Cd.  8490)  1917. 
Mesopotamia  Commission,  Report  (Cd.  8G10)  1917. 

Books 

"Turkey  in  Europe"  ....  Sir  Charles  Eliot 
"Turkey  and  Its  People"  ...  Sir  Edwin  Pears 
"Macedonia,  Its  Races  and  Their 

Future" H.  N.  Brailsford 

"The  Balkan  Peninsula"  .     .     .     L.   W.   Lyde  and  A.   F. 

Mockler  Ferryman 
"Geographical  Aspects  of  Balkan 

Problems" Marion  Newbigin 

"The  Eastern  Question  :   an  his- 
torical   study    in    European 

Diplomacy" J.  A.  R.  Marriott 

"The  Danger  Zone  of  Europe"  .  H.  Charles  Woods 
"Washed  by  Four  Seas"  .  .  .  H.  Charles  Woods 
"Report    of    the    International 

Commission  to  Inquire  into 

the  Cause  and  Conduct  of 

the  Balkan  Wars,"  published 

by  the  Carnegie  Endowment 

for      International      Peace, 

Washington,  D.  C. 


340 


THE   CRADLE   OF  THE  WAR 


"Nelson's  History  of  the  War"  .     John  Buchan 

"High  Albania" M.  E.  Durham 

"The  Struggle  for  Scutari"    .     .     M.  E.  Durham 
"The  Aspirations  of  Bulgaria"  .     Balkanicus 
"  The   Reconstruction   of    South 

Eastern  Europe "    .     .     .     .     Vladislav  R.  Savic 
"The  Balkan  League"  .     .     .     .     L  E.  Gueshoff 
"Bulgaria  and  Her  People  with 

an  Account  of   the   Balkan 

Wars,    Macedonia    and    the 

Macedonian  Bulgars" 
"The  King  of  Roumania" 
"The   Life   of   King   George   of 

Greece" 

"  Forty  Years  in  Constantinople ' 
"The  Middle-Eastern  Question' 
"Corps  de  Droit  Ottoman"    . 
"Turkish  Memories"     .     .     . 
"Turkey  and  the  War"      .     . 
"The  Short  Cut  to  Lidia"      . 
"Le  Chemin  de  Fer  de  Bagdad' 
"Turkey  in  Transition" 
"Revelations    of    Prince    Lich- 

nowsky" 
Pamphlet  published  by  The  New  York  Times 


William  Seymour  Monroe 
Sidney  Whitman 

Capt.  Walter  Christmas 
Sir  Edwin  Pears 
Valentine  Chirol 
George  Young,  M.V.O. 
Sidney  Whitman 
Vladimir  Jabotinsky 
David  Eraser 
Andre  Cheradame 
G.  F.  Abbott 


Magazine  Articles. 


'The  Final  Settlement  in  the  Balkans"  with  map.  James 
D.  Bourchier.     The  Quarterly  Review,  October,  1917. 

'Communications  in  the  Balkans."  H.  Charles  Woods. 
The  Geographical  Journal,  April,  1916. 

'The  Bagdad  Railway."  Edwin  Pears.  Contemporary  Re- 
view, November,  1908. 

'The  Bagdad  Railway."  Arthur  von  G winner.  Nineteenth 
Century,  June,  1909. 


USEFTTL  PUBLICATIONS  341 

"The  Bagdad  Railway."  Hopkins.  Journal  of  the  United 
Service  Institution,  India,  October,  1909. 

"The  Bagdad  Railway."  H.  F.  B.  Lynch.  Fortnightly 
Review,  March  and  May,  1911. 

"A  New  German  Empire:  The  Story  of  the  Bagdad  Rail- 
way." Andre  Geraud.  Nineteenth  Century,  May  and 
June,  1914. 

"The  Bagdad  Railway  and  Its  Tributaries."  H.  Charles 
Woods.     The  Geographical  Journal,  July,  1917. 

"The  Bagdad  Railway  Negotiations."  Quarterly  Review, 
October,  1917. 

"Railways  in  Western  Asia."  Lieutenant-Colonel  H.  Picot. 
Proceedings  of  the  Central  Asian  Society,  1904. 

"Railways  in  the  Middle  East."  H.  F.  B.  Lynch.  Pro- 
ceedings of  the  Central  Asian  Society,  1911. 

"The  Bagdad  Railway."  Andre  Cheradame.  Proceedings 
of  the  Central  Asian  Society,  1911. 


INDEX 


Abdul  Hamid,  7,  8,  12. 

Achi  Baba,  234. 

Adabazar,  278. 

Adjud,  196. 

Adrianople,  25,  26,  28,  32,  33,  59,  60, 
90 ;    road  from  Jamboli  to,  202. 

Adrianople,  Station  of,  192  n. 

Adriatic  Sea,  question  of,  27,  331  ; 
commanding  position  of  Albania 
with  reference  to,  153 ;  plans  for 
running  railway  from  the  Danube 
to,  205,  20G ;  railways  from  the 
lower  coast  of,  to  the  interior,  20G- 
209. 

Aegean  Islands,  disposition  of,  by 
the  London  Ambassadorial  Con- 
ference, 34,  35,  60,  61 ;  the  ques- 
tion of,  137 ;  and  Germany,  314 ; 
possible  disposition  of,  after  the 
War,  333. 

Aehrcnthal,  Count,  and  the  proclama- 
tion of  Bulgarian  independence,  9, 
10 ;  and  the  annexation  of  Bosnia 
and  Herzegovina,   10,   11. 

Afghanistan,  323. 

Afiun  Karahissar,  279,  280. 

Ahmed  Djemal  Pasha,  06,  70. 

Ahwaz,  78,  80. 

Ain  Safar,  304. 

Akaba,  85. 

Ak  Kupru,  288. 

Albania,  under  the  New  Regime,  18, 
19,  164,  165 ;  Northern,  campaign 
in  Balkan  War,  25,  26 ;  autonomy 
for,  agreed  upon  by  London  Con- 
ference, 27,  33  ;  and  Scutari,  34  ; 
difficulty  of  fixing  frontiers  of,  31  ; 
significance  of  establishment  of, 
39 ;  geographical  and  political 
importance  of,  153,  154 ;  the 
question  of,  an  important  problem, 
154;    geographical  limits  of,  154- 


156 ;  creation  of  Principality  of, 
155,  166  ;  geographical  description 
of,  156,  157;  its  position  in  the 
Ottoman  Empire,  158,  159  ;  under 
the  Old  Regime,  164 ;  under  the 
regime  of  Prince  William  of  Wied, 
167-169 ;  the  northern  part  of, 
overrun  by  Austro-Germans,  169, 
170 ;  the  southern  part  of,  occu- 
pied by  the  Italians,  170-172 ; 
a  State,  proclaimed  by  Colonel 
Descoin,  170 ;  improvement  in 
conditions    in,    made    by    Italians, 

171,  172  ;  probable  future  status  of, 

172,  173  ;  routes  in,  207-209,  337  ; 
operations  in,  as  affected  by  occu- 
pation of  Monastir,  266,  267 ;  in- 
dependence of,  supported  by  Ger- 
many and  Justified,  313;  possible 
frontiers  of,  after  the  War,  330, 
331 ;  present  goal  of  Allies  in,  337, 
338. 

Albanians,  utilised  by  Young  Turks 
to  demand  constitution,  8 ;  occu- 
pations of,  156;  nationality  of, 
157;  descendants  of  the  lUyrians, 
158;  character  of,  159,  160;  two 
groups  of,  160;  religion  of,  160, 
161;  language  of,  161-164;  and 
the  Balkan  Wars,   165-167. 

Aleppo,  272,  275,  276,  291,  293,  294, 
303. 

Alexander,  King,  of  Greece,  148. 

Alexandretta,  272,  291-293,  315. 

Allies,  The,  diplomacy  of,  in  reference 
to  Bulgaria  and  Serbia,  51,  52; 
difficulties  of,  in  Turkey,  65,  66 ; 
and  Gochcn  and  Brexlau,  69 ;  im- 
portance to,  of  an  understanding 
with  Bulgaria.  94,  95;  difficult 
position  of,  with  relation  to  Bul- 
garia,   98 ;     discussion    of    states- 


344 


INDEX 


manship  of,  in  the  Balkan  question, 
102-104,  246 ;  influence  bearing 
upon  their  attitude  toward  Greece, 
130 ;  negotiations  of,  for  conces- 
sions by  Greece,  140;  troops  of, 
landed  in  Greece,  142 ;  difficulties 
of  their  relationship  with  Greece, 
143  ;  blockade  Greek  coasts,  145  ; 
land  troops  at  Piraeus,  146 ;  diffi- 
culties of  the  policy  of,  in  the 
matter  of  the  Greek  king,  14S ; 
justification  of  their  act  of  causing 
the  Greek  king  to  abdicate,  149, 
150  ;  present  goal  of,  in  Albania, 
337,  338. 

Amanian  Gates,  293. 

Amanus  Range,  274,  275,  293,  294. 

Amara,  SO. 

America,  respect  for,  in  Armenia, 
Bulgaria,  and  Albania,  5. 

American  Board  of  Commissioners 
for  Foreign  Missions,  establish- 
ments of,  in  Asia  Minor,  xiv,  5. 

Amman,  305. 

AnatoKan  Railway,  276-278,  282. 

Andorra,  54. 

Andriyevitza,  207. 

Anglo-Persian  Oil  Company,  78. 

Angora,  276-278,  283. 

Anti-German  barrier  in  the  East, 
question  of,  xi.  324-326. 

Anti-Lebanon,  the,  304. 

Antioch,  293. 

Antivari,  39,  55,  206. 

Antivari-Virbazar  Railway,  206. 

Anzac  Beach,  234. 

Arabian  Independentist  Movement, 
85. 

Arda  River,  259. 

Arjish  River,  119. 

Armenia,  part  of,  annexed  to  Russia, 
2 ;  in  the  Treaty  of  Berlin,  3,4; 
Turkey's  treatment  of,  5  ;  scheme 
for  reforms  in,  63,  64 ;  reign  of 
terror  in,  64,  70-72;  British, 
French,  and  Russian  interests  in,  315. 

Armenians,  massacre  of,  4,  5,  64, 
70-72,  290;  future  safety  of, 
should  be  assured,  335. 

Asia  Minor,  railways  of.  <See  Rail- 
way, Railways. 

Austria-Hungary,  on  Cretan  ques- 
tion withdraws   from    Concert   of 


Europe,  7 ;  and  the  Bulgarian 
declaration  of  independence,  9,  10; 
relation  of,  to  Germany,  affected 
by  the  annexation  of  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina,  10,  11 ;  relation  of 
Serbia  to,  affected  by  Bosnian 
annexation,  11  ;  attitude  of,  on 
Adriatic  question,  27 ;  status  of 
Serbia  and  Montenegro  after  the 
Balkan  Wars  a  source  of  disappoint- 
ment to,  43 ;  intended  to  attack 
Serbia  in  1913,  44  ;  her  ultimatum 
to  Serbia,  45,  46 ;  crises  between 
Montenegro  and,  55 ;  hated  by 
Montenegrins,  56 ;  her  striving  for 
influence  in  Albania,  154 ;  future 
of,  324,  325. 

Austrians,  their  first  invasion  of 
Serbia  in  August,  1914,  47  ;  their 
second  invasion  of  Serbia  in  Sep- 
tember, 1914,  48 ;  defeated  by 
Serbians,  48,  49;  take  Mt.  Lov- 
tchen,  57. 

Avlona,  153,  157,  169-171,  208,  266. 

Babuna  Pass,  262,  266. 

Bagche  turmel,  294. 

Bagdad,  79,  81-83. 

Bagdad  Loan  Contract,  284,  286. 

Bagdad  Railway,  concession,  followed 
Emperor's  visit  to  Constantinople, 
7,  281 ;  use  of,  by  Turks  in  Meso- 
potamian  campaign,  85  ;  mihtary 
importance  of,  271,  272;  Ger- 
many's scheme  for,  271,  272,  292; 
objects  of,  military,  272 ;  earlier 
projects  for,  272,  273 ;  signing  of 
charter  of,  282  ;  features  of  Con- 
vention of  1903,  283  ;  financial  ar- 
rangements, 283,  284  ;  from  Konia 
to  Eregli,  285 ;  delays  after  com- 
pletion of  first  section,  286,  287 ; 
description  of  the  Taurus  section, 
287-291 ;  the  Alexandretta  line, 
291-293 ;  the  Amanus  section, 
293-295 ;  new  Conventions  of 
March  19,  1911,  295-298;  sec- 
tions completed  or  not  since  the 
new  Conventions,  295-297 ;  sec- 
tion from  Bagdad  to  Persian  Gulf, 
297 ;  agreement  of  Tsar  and  Kai- 
ser in  1910  relative  to,  297,  298; 
Anglo-Germano-Turkish     negotia- 


INDEX 


345 


tions  in  1913  and  1914,  298;  facil- 
ities for  travel  on, 299-301 ; journey 
from  London  to  Bombay,  299,  300  ; 
conveniences  of  travel  by,  300, 
301  ;  cost  of,  to  Turkey,  301,  302  ; 
military  results  of,  302,  303  ;  pro- 
jected improvements  in,  affected 
AUied  campaign  in  Mesopotamia, 
307,  308  ;  future  of,  309  ;  arrange- 
ment between  Sir  Edward  Grey 
and  Prince  Lichnowsky  concern- 
ing, 314-316. 

Baiburt,  75. 

Baku,  323. 

Balance  of  Power,  37,  38. 

Balkan  alliance,  20-25,  39,  41,  90, 
128. 

Balkan  Barrier,  question  of,  325,  326. 

Balkan  Peninsula,  description  of, 
174-176 ;  the  meeting-place  of 
East  and  West,  176,  177;  a  land 
of  contrasts,  178;  climate  of,  17S, 
179  ;  travelling  and  accommoda- 
tions in,  181 ;  railways  and  roads 
of,  186-213;  rivers  of,  213,  214. 
See  Balkans. 

Balkan  Question,  the  occasion  of  the 
War,  vii,  ix,  x ;  principles  to  be 
observed  in  settling,  326,  327,  333  ; 
suggested  definition  of  boundaries 
of  the  different  nationalities,  327- 
333. 

Balkan  Range,  175. 

Balkan  War,  Eirst,  beginning  and  four 
campaigns  of,  25, 26;  Second, 30-33, 
38,  264;  opposed  by  Powers,  36; 
possibilities  of,  37;  summaiy  of 
causes  and  results  of,  38,  39  ;  result 
of,  for  Montenegro.  56. 

Balkans,  the,  importance  of  condi- 
tions in,  1 ;  the  Danger  Zone  of 
Europe,  1 ;  war  of  1877  in,  2  ;  far- 
reaching  importance  of  events  in, 
from  1908  to  close  of  Balkan  War.s, 
35 ;  mentality  of  Governments 
of,  103.     See  Balkan  Peninsula. 

Banat,  the,  J07,  327. 

Basra,  79,  SO,  83,  283,  297,  299,  315. 

Batum.  76,  322. 

Bavaria,  131. 

Bayazid,  73. 

Beersheba,  87,  276. 

Beikos,  222-224. 


Beirut,  273,  304. 

Beirut-Damascus-Hauran  Railway, 
304. 

Belgrade,  attacked  by  Austrians,  47  ; 
surrendered,  48 ;  retaken,  49 ; 
again  taken  by  the  enemy,  53. 

Belgrade-Constantinople  Railway, 
187-189. 

Berane,  207. 

Berat,  208,  267. 

Berchtold,  Count,  44,  316. 

Berlin,  Congress  of  (1878),  3 ;  Treaty 
of  (1878),  3,  184,  185,  188;  Rou- 
mania  at  Congress  of,  107. 

Berlin-Constanza  Express,  195. 

Beshik  Dagh,  254,  256. 

Bessarabia,  question  of,  106,  107, 327  ; 
partly  annexed  to  Roumania,  125. 

Beyshehr,  Lake,  285. 

Bible,  the,  translated  into  Albanian, 
163. 

Bibliography,  339-341. 

Bieberstein,  Baron  Marshal  von, 
appointment  of,  as  Ambassador 
in  Constantinople,  6,  281  ;  clever- 
ness and  regardlessness  of,  35 ; 
recalled  from  Constantinople,  36 ; 
his  instructions,  311. 

Bir  Auja,  276,  307. 

Bismarck,  retirement  of,  G. 

Bistritza  River,  265. 

Bitlis,  75. 

Bitlis  Gap,  75. 

Bitumen,  mine  in  Albania,  156. 

Black  Sea,  321. 

Bocche  di  Cattaro,  178,  331. 

Bokara,  323. 

Bolu,  278. 

Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  revolt  in, 
1  ;  annexation  of,  9-11 ;  roads  and 
railways  of,  204,  205 ;  future  of, 
331. 

Bosnish  Brod,  204. 

Bosphorus,  the,  216,  220 ;  description 
of,  221,  222;  forts  of,  222,  223; 
future  status  of,  334. 

Bosra,  305. 

Bourchier,  James  D.,  21,  326  n. 

Bouvct,  233. 

Boyana  River,  207,  213,  214. 

Bozanti,  Vale  of,  288,  290. 

Bozanti  Han,  290. 

BraUa,  119,  182,  184,  196. 


346 


INDEX 


Breslau,  arrival  at  Constantinople, 
68 ;  so-called  purchase  of,  69 ; 
how  presence  at  Constantinople 
might  have  affected  the  Darda- 
nelles campaign,  235. 

Brest-Litovsk,  Treaty  of  (1918),  76, 
321. 

Bright,  John,  2. 

British  and  Foreign  Bible  Society, 
162. 

British  Pictorial  Service,  xiv. 

British,  railway  concessions  to,  277, 
279,  281,  291,  306. 

Brusa,  281. 

Buchan,  John,  Roumanian  events 
described  by,  115,  116. 

Bucharest,  Treaty  of  (1913),  31,  32, 
111 ;  Peace  of  (1812),  disposition 
of  Moldavia  and  Wallachia  made 
by,  106 ;  taken  by  the  Germans, 
119. 

Bucharest-Suczawa  Railway,  196 ; 
branches  of,  196. 

Bukovina,  the,  107,  327. 

Bulair,  236-238. 

Bulair  Lines,  227. 

Bulgaria,  Principality  of,  created,  2 ; 
Eastern  Roumelia  incorporated 
in,  4  ;  declaration  of  independence 
of,  9,  10 ;  and  Turkey,  Russian 
settlement  of  difficulties  between, 
in  1909,  11,  12;  attitude  of  the 
Government  at  the  beginining  of 
the  Turco-Italian  War,  19,  20; 
agrees  to  proposals  from  Greece, 
21 ;  makes  Treaty  of  Alliance 
with  Secret  Annex  with  Serbia,  21- 
23,  329,  330  ;  military  convention 
between  Serbia  and,  23 ;  treaty 
with  Greece  made  by,  in  1912, 
24;  military  convention  between 
Greece  and,  24  ;  relations  to  Greece 
at  the  outbreak  of  the  War,  24,  25  ; 
in  the  first  Balkan  War,  25,  28; 
strained  relations  of  Serbia  and,  as 
result  of  the  Adriatic  question,  27, 
28 ;    and  the  Second  Balkan  War, 

30,  31 ;  in  the  Treaty  of  Bucharest, 

31,  32;  in  the  Treaty  of  Constan- 
tinople, 32,  33 ;  position  of,  at  the 
end  of  the  Balkan  Wars,  39 ;  at- 
titude of  Serbia  regarding  con- 
cessions to,  51 ;    entry  of,  into  the 


War,  53  ;  improving  relations  with 
Turkey,  62 ;  a  young  state,  89 ; 
increase  in  prosperity  of,  89  ;  area 
of,  before  the  Balkan  Wars,  89 ; 
area  of,  after  the  Balkan  Wars,  89, 
90 ;  on  strained  terms  with  Serbia 
and  Greece  after  the  Balkan  Wars, 
90 ;  attitude  of,  toward  Serbia, 
Greece,  and  Roumania,  on  the  one 
hand,  and  toward  Turkey  on  the 
other,  at  the  beginning  of  the  War, 

91,  92;     conditions    required    by, 

92,  99 ;  war  importance  of,  due 
largely  to  her  geographical  posi- 
tion, 93 ;  her  importance  out  of 
proportion  to  her  fighting  efficiency, 

93,  94 ;  was  able  to  immobilise 
military  forces  of  her  neighbours, 
94 ;  importance  to  the  Allies  of  an 
understanding  with,  94,  95;  value 
of,  to  the  Central  Powers,  95 ; 
general  considerations  regarding 
the  concessions  required  by,  95, 
96  ;  Germanic  intrigue  in,  97,  98 ; 
relations  of  Turkey  and,  97,  98 ; 
question  of  agreement  between 
Central  Powers  and,  98 ;  negotia- 
tions preliminary  to  entrance  of, 
into  the  War,  99,  100;  mobilisa- 
tion ordered  by,  100,  101 ;  object 
of  her  entry  into  the  War,  101,  102  ; 
Allied  statesmanship  and,  102, 
104;  and  the  Dobrudja,  110; 
relations  of,  to  Roumania  with  ref- 
erence to  the  Dobrudja,  110 ;  Allied 
proposals  for  concessions  from 
Greece  to,  140,  141 ;  shows  marked 
contrast  to  Turkey,  177,  178 ; 
railways  of,  199-202 ;  roads  lead- 
ing into,  210-214 ;  shut  from 
Aegean  by  strip  of  Greek  territory, 
248 ;  cause  of  her  entrance  into 
the  Second  Balkan  War,  264; 
meaning  to  Germany  of  her  en- 
trance into  the  War,  318;  the 
author's  suggestions  as  to  fron- 
tiers of,  327,  328. 

Bulgarian  Exarchate,  the,  2. 
Bulgarians,  massacre  of,  2;  advance 

of,  into  Roumanian  territory,  1 16 ; 

lose  Monastir,  264-266. 
Bulghar  Dagh,  288. 
Bulgurlu,  285-287. 


INDEX 


347 


Burgas,  200,  201. 

Burgas  Chai,  259. 

Burhan  Eddin,  Prince,  169. 

Burney,  Sir  Cecil,  34. 

Buyuk  Chekmedche,  Lake,  221. 

Buyukdero,  220,  222. 

Buzeu,  195,  196. 

Buzeu  Pass,  the,  115. 

Cape  Abydos,  230. 

Cape  Heiles,  226. 

Capitulations,  Turkish,  abolished,  07, 

Carol,  King,  of  Roumania,   112. 

Castellorizzo,  35,  60. 

Cattaro,  57. 

Caucasus  campaign,  72-76. 

Central  Powers,  the,  reasons  for 
desiring  to  prevent  disruption  of 
Turkey,  36  ;  propose  decentralisa- 
tion of  European  Turkey,  30 ;  gain 
to,  of  alliance  of  Bulgaria,  95  ;  ques- 
tion of  agreement  between  Bul- 
garia and,  98.  See  Germany, 
Austria-Hungary,  Bulgaria,  Tur- 
key. 

Cerna  Voda,  109,  110,  118,  182,  183, 
194.  196. 

Cettinje,  54  ;  taken  by  the  Austrians, 
57  ;    railway  to,  206. 

Chakra  Su  River,  288. 

Chalkis  Peninsula,  254-256. 

Chanak,  224,  227-229,  237. 

Charshembe  River,  285. 

Chatalja  Lines,  the,  25,  220,  221. 

Ch6radame,  Andr6,  on  Bagdad  Rail- 
way, 282. 

Chesney,  Colonel,  272,  273. 

Chios,  61,  138. 

Cliirol,  Sir  Valentine,  his  Middle 
Eastern  Question,  282. 

Chiulnitza-Slobodzie-Ployesti  Rail- 
way, 195. 

Chunuk  Bair  Ridge,  234,  235. 

Cilician  Gates,  288,  290. 

Cilician  Plain,  290,  293. 

Cirpan,   201. 

College  for  Girls  at  Constantinople,  5. 

Cologna,  171,  266. 

Committee  of  the  Bulgarian  Internal 
Organisation,  memorandum  of, 
17,   18. 

Committee  of  Union  and  Progress,  8, 
12,  13,  15-17,  59,  66. 


Conference  of  London  (1830),  131. 

Congress  of  Berlin  (1878),  3. 

Congress  of  London,  first  (1912),  26; 
second  (191.3),  28. 

Congress  of  Vienna   (1815),    184. 

Constantine,  King,  of  Greece,  reason 
for  popularity  of,  134 ;  flattered 
by  attentions  of  the  Kaiser,  134; 
reasons  for  his  policy  of  neutrality, 
135  ;  detested  Venezelos,  135,  136  ; 
unable  to  forget  personal  feelings, 
135,  136 ;  first  struggle  between 
Venezelos  and,  138  ;  his  insistence 
on  neutrality,  143 ;  abdicates, 
148. 

Constantinople,  Treaty  of  (1913), 
32,  33  ;  terminus  of  Belgrade-Con- 
stantinople route,  187,  189 ;  im- 
portance of  position  of,  216;  land 
defences  of,  220,  221 ;  Lines  of,  220  ; 
the  Chatalja  Lines,  220,  221 ;  the 
Bosphorus  forts,  221-223  ;  forming 
connection  with  the  East  for  Ger- 
many, 321,  322;  future  disposi- 
tion of,  334. 

Constanza,  109,  110,  118,  183,  312, 
322. 

Constanza-Verciorova  Railway,  194, 
195. 

"Conventionnel  ",  the,  188. 

Corfu,  53. 

Crajova,  118. 

Crete,  autonomous  regime  granted 
to,  4. 

Crimean  War,  the,  2. 

Croatia,  331. 

Ctesiphon,  79. 

Cyprus,  lease  of,  to  Great  Britain, 
3 ;  possible  future  disposition  of, 
333. 

Dalmatia,  331. 

Damascus,  276,  304. 

Danube,  the,  description  of,  181,  182; 
importance  of,  as  thoroughfare  and 
as  obstacle  to  commimication,  1S2, 
183  ;  viaduct  across,  at  Cerna  Voda, 
183 ;  railways  running  to,  183, 
195,  196,  199,  200;  international 
.status  of,  184  ;  work  of  the  Danulie 
Conmiission,  184,  1S5;  the  larger 
political  status  of,  LS5,  ISO;  pl:u»s 
for     running     railway     from     the 


348 


INDEX 


Adriatic  to,  205,  206;  in  part 
natural  frontier  of  Roumania,  327. 

Dardanelles,  the,  description  of,  223, 
224;  forts  of,  223-227,  229,  230; 
unfavourable  position  of  fleet  try- 
ing to  force,  231,  232  ;  future  status 
of,  334. 

Dardanelles,  town  of,  228. 

Dardanelles  Campaign,  the  conduct 
of,  139,  140,  240 ;  the  raison  d'etre 
and  the  cause  of,  215,  216 ;  prob- 
able far-reaching  results  of,  if 
successful,  216,  217;  caused  by 
important  telegram  from  Russia, 
217-219,  241,  242;  difficulties  of, 
219,  230,  239-241 ;  first  stage 
of  (naval  attack) ,  233 ;  second 
stage  of  (operations  beginning 
April  25),  233,  234;  third  stage  of 
(Suvla  Bay  operations),  234,  235; 
question  concerning  possibility  of 
forcing  Dardanelles  without  help 
of  troops,  235,  236  ;  question  con- 
cerning undertaking  of  operations 
on  Asiatic  shore,  236 ;  question 
concerning  a  landing  at  Bulair, 
236-238 ;  considerations  contribut- 
ing to  withdrawal  from,  238;  gen- 
eral remarks  on  withdrawal  from, 
238,  239 ;  considerations  for  and 
against,  241,  242 ;  result  achieved 
by,  242,  243. 

Dede  Agatch,  33,  91,  93,  98,  100,  176, 
190-192. 

Demir  Hissar,  191,  212,  248,  256, 
262. 

Demotika,  33. 

Denmark,  131. 

Deportations,  German  policy  of,  314. 

Deraia,  276,  305. 

Derkos  Gol,  221. 

Descoin,  Colonel,  170. 

Deve  Bair,  Mt.,  213. 

Diarbekr,  278,  295. 

Dibra,  166,  208,  330. 

Djavid  Pasha,  18. 

Djehun  River,  291. 

Dobrudja,  the,  section  of,  desired  by 
Bulgaria,  91 ;  meaning  of  the 
question  of,  106,  109-111  ;  present 
status  of,  124 ;  special  arrange- 
ments must  be  made  for,  327. 

Dodecannese  Islands,  60. 


Doiran,  Lake,  262,  267. 

Doiran-Ghevgeli   Enclave,    140,   141. 

Dorak,  289. 

Dospat  Dagh,  258. 

Dounmes,  in  Salonica,  251. 

Drama,  191,  211,  248. 

Drin  River,  176. 

Dulcigno,  55,  213. 

Durazzo,  153,  156,  169,  208,  338. 

Eastern  Roumelia,  Province  of,  cre- 
ated, 2,  89 ;  incorporated  in  Bul- 
garia, 4. 

Edward,  King,  8. 

Egerdir,  281. 

Egypt,  campaign  near  frontier  of, 
85-88 ;  attack  on,  made  possible 
by  railway  to  Bir  Auja,  307. 

El-Arish,  86. 

Elasona,  210. 

Elbasan,  157,  208,  337. 

El  Fule,  307. 

El  Fule-Bir  Auja  Railway,  307. 

England,  attitude  of,  toward  the 
Treaty  of  San  Stefano,  3 ;  policy 
of,  during  the  thirty  years  follow- 
ing the  Treaty  of  Berlin,  5,  6 ; 
attitude  of,  toward  reforms  in 
Ottoman  Empire,  35,  36.  See 
Great  Britain. 

Enos-Midia  line,  32,  93,  327. 

Envor  Pasha,  59,  62,  66,  314. 

Epirote  Independent  Government, 
168. 

Epirus,  frontier  of,  35 ;  the  question 
of,  170. 

Eregli,  285. 

Erivan,  76. 

Erzerum,  70,  73,  278 ;   fall  of,  74. 

Erzingan,  75. 

Eskishehr,  279,  281. 

Essad  Pasha,  168,  169. 

Es  Salt,  305. 

Falkenhayn,  General  von,  117,  119. 

Falliferes,  President,  10. 

Fateshti,  196. 

Fateshti-Buzeu  Railway,  195. 

Feluja,  275. 

Ferdinand,  Prince,  of  Bulgaria,  and 
the  declaration  of  Bulgarian  inde- 
pendence, 9,  10 ;  visits  King 
Nicholas  of  Montenegro,  24 ;    glad 


INDEX 


349 


of  an  argument  in  favour  of  a  pro- 
German  policy,  98. 

Ferisovitch,  Congress  at,  8. 

Fitzmaurice,  Lord  (Lord  Edmond 
Fitzmaurice) ,  his  statement  of  the 
boundaries  of  Albania,  155. 

Fiume,  204. 

Fiorina,  193,  261,  264,  265. 

Fort  Rupel,  surrender  of,  145,  262. 

Forts,  defending  Constantinople,  220, 
221;  of  the  Bosphorus,  221-223; 
of  the  Dardanelles,  223-227,  229, 
230. 

Fournet,  Admiral  de,  146. 

France,  her  relation  to  Greece,  130- 
132. 

Franz  Ferdinand,  Archduke,  murder 
of,  X,  44  ;  his  murder  inflammatory, 
45 ;  action  of  Germany  in  connec- 
tion with,  316,  317. 

French,  railway  concessions  to,  279, 
280, 303,  304,  306. 

Frontiers,  and  strategic  requirements, 
principle  to  be  observed  in  settling 
the  Balkan  Question,  327. 

Gaba  Tepe,  232,  234. 

Galatz,  184,  185. 

Galiko,  River,  254. 

Gallipoli,  Peninsula  of,  importance  of 
Bulgaria  to  resistance  in,  93  ;  land 
communication  with,  203 ;  dif- 
ficulties of  the  author  in  gaining 
information  about,  219;  descrip- 
tion of,  224,  225  ;  forts  of,  226,  227. 

Gallipoli,  town  of,  226. 

Gaulois,  233. 

Gaza,  86,  87. 

George,  King,  of  Greece,  assassinated, 
28;  his  co-operation  with  M.  Vcnc- 
zelos,  128-130;  given  title  of  "Roi 
des  Hellenes"  by  the  Powers,  136. 

Germany,  policy  of,  in  the  East,  after 
the  Treaty  of  Berlin,  6,  7 ;  on 
Cretan  question,  withdraws  from 
Concert  of  Europe,  7 ;  support 
given  the  Sultan  by,  7 ;  and  the 
annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herze- 
govina, 10,  11  ;  secretly  supports 
Austria  on  Adriatic  question,  27  ; 
effect  of  Turkish  Revolution  of 
1908  on  prestige  and  power  of,  at 
Constantinople,    35 ;     attitude    of, 


toward  reforms  in  Ottoman  Em- 
pire, 35,  36 ;  her  policy  in  the  Bal- 
kan Wars,  37,  38 ;  her  attitude 
toward  Austrian  proposal  to  at- 
tack Serbia  in  1913,  44  ;  Austrian 
ultimatum  to  Serbia  the  work  of, 
45,  46 ;  growth  of  her  influence  in 
Turkey,  62 ;  intrigues  of,  in  Tur- 
key, 64-66  ;  succeeds  in  dragging 
Turkey  into  the  War,  67-70;  her 
connection  with  the  Armenian 
massacres  of  1915,  72;  intrigues 
of,  in  Bulgaria,  97,  98  ;  long-stand- 
ing alliance  of  Roumania  with, 
111,  112;  intrigues  to  bring  Rou- 
mania into  the  War,  113-115,  196; 
purpose  of  her  "Drang  nach 
Osten,"  215;  her  interest  in  the 
Bagdad  Railway  and  its  route, 
271,  272,  292;  railways  of  Asia 
Minor  connected  with  influence  of, 
277-282;  present  War  and  Mittel 
Europa  scheme  planned  long  be- 
fore by,  X,  310 ;  so-called  rivalry 
between  England  and,  310;  pre- 
pared for  the  making  of  the  War 
at  opportune  time,  311 ;  the  War 
made  by,  to  improve  her  position 
in  the  East,  312 ;  her  policy  of 
domination  from  Hamburg  to  the 
Persian  Gulf,  312,  313;  deter- 
mined on  improvement  in  rela- 
tions to  Turkey,  313,  314;  and 
the  Aegean  Islands,  314 ;  en- 
courages Turks  to  expel  Greeks 
from  Asia  Minor,  314 ;  action  of, 
in  connection  with  the  murder  of 
Archduke  I'ranz  Ferdinand,  in  the 
light  of  disclosures  of  Prince 
Lichnowsky  and  Doctor  Miihlon, 
316,  317;  "initiation"  stage  of 
her  intrigues  in  the  East,  317 ; 
changed  plan  of  scheme  after  out- 
break of  War,  317;  the  "con- 
summation" policy  of,  317-319; 
her  attitude  toward  Turkey,  Bul- 
garia, Serbia,  Greece,  and  Rou- 
mania, 318,  319;  President  Wil- 
son's statement  of  her  claims  in 
the  East,  320 ;  the  extent  to  which 
her  aims  have  been  realized,  ,320- 
324 ;  a  fresh  door  to  the  East 
opened  to,  321,  322  ;  is  attempting 


350 


INDEX 


to  dominate  from  the  Atlantic  to 
the  Pacific,  323  ;  suggested  ways  of 
barring  her  advance  in  the  East, 
324-326 ;  generally  wrong  in  ap- 
preciation of  larger  aspects  of  the 
War,  336. 

Gidia,  193,  210,  261. 

Giolitti,  Signer,  speech  of,  in  the 
Italian  chamber,  44. 

Giurgevo,  119. 

Goeben,  arrival  at  Constantinople,  08  ; 
so-called  purchase  of,  69 ;  how 
presence  at  Constantinople  might 
have  affected  the  Dardanelles 
campaign,  235. 

Gorringe,  General,  operations  of,  in 
Persian  territory,  80 ;  takes  Amara, 
80. 

Gounaris,  M.,  138,  145. 

Graeco-Serbian  Treaty  (June  1, 1913), 
29. 

Granville,  Earl,  155. 

Gravosa,  204. 

Great  Britain,  the  Mesopotamian 
campaign  of,  77-85 ;  operations 
of,  near  the  Turco-Egyptian  fron- 
tier and  in  Palestine,  85-88 ;  her 
relation  to  Greece,  130-132 ;  so- 
called  rivalry  between  Germany 
and,  310.     See  England. 

Greece,  attitude  of  the  Government 
at  the  beginning  of  the  Turco- 
Italian  War,  19,  20;  makes  pro- 
posals to  Bulgaria,  21 ;  treaty  with 
Bulgaria  made  by,  in  1912,  24 ; 
military  convention  between  Bul- 
garia and,  24 ;  in  the  Balkan  War, 
26 ;  negotiates  with  Serbia,  28 ; 
enters  into  secret  arrangement 
with  Serbia,  29  ;  makes  treaty  with 
Serbia  (June  1,  1913),  29;  in  the 
Treaty  of  Bucharest,  32 ;  and  the 
Aegean  Islands,  34,  35 ;  and  the 
Epirus  frontier,  35 ;  position  of, 
at  the  end  of  the  Balkan  Wars, 
39 ;  effect  on  Serbia  of  policy  of, 
51  ;  crisis  with  Turkey  over  the 
Aegean  Islands,  60-62 ;  annexes 
Chios  and  Mitylene,  61 ;  purchases 
battleships  from  America,  61 ; 
importance  of  geographical  posi- 
tiou  of  Bulgaria  with  reference  to, 
94 ;   advantages  to,  of  concessions 


to  Bulgaria,  96,  97 ;  misgovern- 
ment  and  revolution  in,  127  ;  con- 
trolled by  Military  League,  127 ; 
successful  statesmanship  of  M. 
Venezelos  in,  127,  128 ;  increase 
of  size  of,  as  result  of  Balkan  Wars, 
128 ;  saved  by  co-operation  of 
King  George  and  M.  Venezelos, 
128-130 ;  the  influences  upon  her 
attitude  and  that  of  the  Allies 
toward  her,  130 ;  owes  her  exis- 
tence to  the  protection  of  England, 
France,  and  Russia,  130-132 ; 
declared  independent,  131  ;  nature 
of  her  treaty  with  Serbia,  132,  133 ; 
Government  of,  must  be  influenced 
by  individual  feelings  of  the  people, 
134  ;  importance  of  Aegean  Island 
question  to,  137  ;  the  first  struggle 
between  Venezelos  and  the  King, 
138 ;  effect  of  the  Dardanelles 
campaign  on  policy  of,  139,  140; 
Allied  negotiations  for  concessions 
by,  140 ;  the  period  from  October, 
1915,  to  June,  1917,  of  great  im- 
portance to,  141  ;  landing  of  Allied 
troops  in,  142  ;  the  Allied  attitude 
toward,  143 ;  neutrality  and 
regimes  of  Zaimis  and  Skouloudis, 
144,  145 ;  Allied  blockade  of  coast 
of,  145 ;  Allies  land  troops  at 
Piraeus,  146 ;  renewed  blockade 
of,  147;  King  of,  abdicates,  148; 
wherein  her  case  differs  from  that  of 
Belgium,  148,  149 ;  reorganisation 
of  Government  and  army,  151 ; 
the  future  of,  151,  152 ;  has  striven 
to  denationalise  the  Albanians, 
154  ;  and  the  Epirus  question,  170; 
railways  and  roads  connecting 
other  countries  to,  209,  210;  strip 
annexed  by,  after  Balkan  Wars, 
248 ;  how  conditions  in  the  coun- 
try helped  the  baffling  of  Allied 
plans  by,  200,  261 ;  Germany's 
policy  toward,  319;  question  of 
Bulgaro-Greek  frontier,  328 ;  ques- 
tion of  her  frontiers  after  the  War, 
332,  333. 
Greeks,  persecuted  and  massacred 
by  Turks,  61  ;  the  mentality  of, 
133,  134 ;  exportation  of,  from 
Asia  Minor,  314. 


INDEX 


351 


Gregovitch,  M.,  attitude  of,  at  the 
beginning  of  the  Turco-ItaUan 
War,  20. 

Grey,  Sir  Edward  (Lord  Grey),  at 
the  second  peace  congress,  29 ; 
at  the  Ambassadorial  Conference, 
38  ;  views  of  Dardanelles  campaign, 
217 ;  his  arrangement  with  Prince 
Lichnowsky  about  the  Bagdad 
Railway,  314-316;  Allies  should 
follow  his  policy  in  the  Balkans, 
333. 

Gruda,  tribe  of,  331. 

GueshofT,  M.,  attitude  of,  at  the 
beginning  of  the  Turco-Italian 
War,  20 ;  proposals  concerning 
Greece  made  to,  20,  21  ;  negotiates 
with  M.  Spalaikovitch  concerning 
treaty  with  Serbia,  21  ;  Graeco- 
Bulgarian  Treaty  published  by, 
24 ;    favours  arbitration,  30. 

Gulek  Boghaz,  290. 

Gumuljina,  191,  211. 

Gumushhane,  75. 

Gyimes  Pass,  the,  115,  118,  196. 

Gjoiveshevo,  201,  206,  212,  213,  258. 

Hadrie,  256. 

Haidar  Pasha,  274. 

Haidar  Pasha  (Scutari)-Ismid  Rail- 
way, 277,  278,  281. 

Haifa,  276. 

Haifa  Railway,  306. 

Hakki  Pasha,  298. 

Hama,  303. 

Haskovo,  211. 

ITedjaz,  the,  302. 

Hedjaz,  King  of,  88. 

Hedjaz  Railway,  87,  276,  305. 

Helfferich,  Doctor,  310,  317. 

Hehf,  275,  287,  295,  296. 

Ilermannstadt,  117. 

Herzegovina.     See  Bosnia. 

Hindenburg,  von,  117. 

Hindu  Rush  Range,  324. 

Hirsch,  Baron,  187-189,  198. 

Hohcnlohe,  ftince,  98. 

Holland,  Thomas  Erskinc,  his  The 
European  Concert  in  the  Eastern 
Question,  130. 

Horns,  304. 

Hortach  Dagh,  255. 

Hoti,  tribe  of,  331. 


Illyrians,  the,  158. 

Imbros,  34,  60. 

India,  323 ;  time  from  London  to, 
299,  300. 

India,  on  Belgrade-Vienna  Railway, 
204. 

India-Fiume  Railway,  204. 

Inflexible,  233. 

Ionian  Bible  Society,  163. 

Ionian  Islands,  131. 

Ipek,  166. 

Iron  Gates,  182,  185. 

Irresistible,  233. 

Irrigation,  ditches,  in  Mesopotamia, 
84 ;   of  plain  of  Kornia,  285. 

Ishtib,  26. 

Islahiya,  294. 

Ismailia,  273. 

Ismail  Kernel  Bey,  166. 

Issus,  Plain  of,  293. 

Italy,  opposed  Austrian  proposal  of 
action  against  Serbia  in  1913,  44 ; 
prevented  action  of  Austria  in  Ser- 
bia, 50 ;  Dodecannese  Islands  in 
the  hands  of,  60 ;  her  interest  in 
Albania,  153 ;  and  the  Epirus 
question,  170 ;  occupation  of 
southern  Albania  by,  170-172; 
and  southern  Slavs,  necessity  of 
harmony  between,  331,  332. 

Jackson,    Doctor,    and    the    typhus 

epidemic  in  Serbia,  50. 
Jacova,  166,  330. 
Jadar,  Battle  of,  47. 
Jaffa,  87. 

Jaffa-Jerusalem  Railway,  306. 
Jagow,  Herr  von,  316. 
Jajce,  204. 
Jamboli,  201,  202. 
Janina,  26,  28,  170,  209,  210. 
Jassy,  119. 

Jerablus,  275  ;    bridge,  294. 
Jerusalem,    taken    by    British,    87; 

importance  of  capture  of,  87,  88 ; 

and  the  Hedjaz  Railway,  306. 
Jews  in  Salonica,  251. 
Jonespu,  Take,  108,  112. 
Jonnart.  M.,  147. 
Julfa,  322. 

Kaisariya,  278. 
Kalabaka,  210. 


352 


INDEX 


Kara  Balkan,  258. 

Karachi,  300. 

Karagatch,  192  n. 

Karaman,  285. 

Karapunar,  2S7,  289. 

Kara  Su  River,  294. 

Karasulu,  256,  257. 

Karaviran,  Lake,  285. 

Karndash  Bel,  287. 

Kars,  76. 

Katal  Dagh,  176. 

Katia,  86. 

Kavala,  93,  94,  259;  allotted  to 
Greece,  32  ;  question  of  possession 
of,  92,  96,  135,  140,  212,  248 ;  sur- 
render of,  to  Bulgaria,  145,  263 ; 
should  go  to  Bulgaria,  328. 

Kelia  Bay,  223. 

Kephez  Point,  229. 

Kerbela,  297. 

Kermanshah,  76. 

Keshan,  203. 

Khanikin,  283,  296,  298. 

Kharput,  276. 

Khoja  Chemen  Dagh,  234. 

Kiel  Canal,  ceremony  of  enlargement 
of,  45. 

Kighi,  75. 

Kilid  Bahr,  224-228,  232. 

Kilindir,  256. 

Kilomotric  guarantee,  180,  277,  278. 

Kirk  Kilissa,  33,  202. 

Kitchener,  Lord,  217,  241. 

Kolomonda  Dagh,  255. 

Kolousheff,  M.,  Bulgarian  Min- 
ister at  Cettinje,  24. 

Komanovo,  206,  212,  213,  257 ;  battle 
at,  26. 

Konia,  railway  to,  279,  281-283, 
285 ;    irrigation  of  plain  of,  285. 

Korcha,  166,  170,  171,  209,  267. 

Koweit,  77,  272. 

Kozani,  210. 

Krabe  Mts.,  337. 

Kraguyevatz,  48,  53. 

Krasnovodsk,  323. 

Krishim  River,  259. 

Kronstadt,  117. 

Krusha  Balkan,  254. 

Kiihlmann,  Herr  von,  311. 

Kum  Kale,  229. 

Kuprukenie,  73. 

Kuprulu,  257,  266. 


Kuprulu-Monastir    (proposed)    Rail- 
way, 193. 
Kurds,  159. 
Kurna,  78-80. 
Kut-el-Amara,  78-81. 
Kyrias,  Gerasim,  163. 

Lake,  Sir  Percy,  82. 

Lambros  Ministry,  146. 

Lamsaki,  228. 

Larissa-Gidia  Railway,  193,  210,  261. 

Lausanne,  Treaty  of  (October  12, 
1912),  60. 

Lebanon,  the,  304. 

Lichnowsky,  Prince,  importance  of 
his  disclosures,  310;  purpose  for 
which  he  was  sent  to  England,  310, 
311  ;  disclosures  prove  that  Ger- 
many made  the  War  with  a  view 
to  the  East,  312;  on  the  Near- 
Eastern  question,  312,  313 ;  on 
appointment  of  Liman  von  Sanders 
to  post  in  Turkish  Army,  314 ; 
his  discussion  of  English  attitude 
toward  the  Bagdad  Railway,  314, 
316;  his  proof  that  Germany  uti- 
lized the  murder  of  Archduke  Franz 
Ferdinand  to  promote  the  War, 
316,  317;  on  the  Potsdam  Meet- 
ing, 316. 

Limpus,  Admiral,  67,  228. 

Lincoln,  Abraham,  on  the  American 
view  of  slavery,  vii. 

London,  fust  peace  congress  of  (1912), 
26  ;  second  peace  congress  of  (1913), 
28;  Treaty  of  (1913),  29;  Treaty 
of  (1883),  184. 

London  Ambassadorial  Conference, 
the;  27,  33,  38,  60,  155,  167,  208, 
330. 

Losnitza,  47. 

Lowell  Institute,  xi. 

Luleh  Burgas,  188,  189. 

Luleh  Burgas-Salonica  Railway,  190, 
191. 

Lydda,  307. 

Lynch,  H.  F.  B.,  291. 

Lynch,  Messrs.,  vessels  of,  84. 

Macedonia,  in  the  Treaty  of  Berlin, 
3  ;  massacre  of  1903  in,  4 ;  after 
the  Murzteg  Scheme  of  Reforms, 
4,  5 ;    under  the  New  Regime,  15- 


INDEX 


353 


18 ;  Central  and  Northern,  cam- 
paign in,  25,  26 ;  Southern,  cam- 
paign in,  25,  26 ;  disposition  of, 
in  Treaty  of  Bucharest,  31  ;  dis- 
puted areas  of,  51 ;  hard  to  con- 
sider as  a  concrete  whole,  247,  248  ; 
description  of,  248,  267 ;  difRcul- 
ties  in  the  way  of  campaigning  in, 
267,   268. 

Mackensen,  General  von,  advances 
into  Serbia,  53 ;  advances  into 
Roumania,  116,  118,  119. 

Maidos,  225-227,  232. 

Makri  Keuie,  220. 

Malgara,  203. 

Malissori  Revolution,  18,  19. 

Maritza  River,  176,  214. 

Maritza  Valley  Railway,  191. 

Marmora,  Sea  of,  217,  220. 

Marshall,  General  Sir  W.  R.,  82. 

Massacres,  of  Bulgarians,  1  ;  of 
Armenians,  4,  5,  64,  70-72,  290; 
of  Greeks,  61. 

Maude,  Sir  Stanley,  82. 

Mecca,  87,  88 ;  Grand  Shereef  of,  85. 

Mecklenburg-Schwerin,  Duke  of,  98. 

Medgidia,  194, 195. 

Medina,  87,  88,  276,  .305. 

Mehrmann,  his  Diplomatise  her  Kricg 
in  Vorder  Asien,  278. 

Meissner  Pasha,  305.  • 

Mensdorff,  Count,  316. 

Mersina,  291. 

Mersina-Adana  Railway,  277,  291. 

Merv,  323. 

Mesopotamia,  geography  of,  78 ; 
Sir  Edward  Grey's  agreement  with 
Prince  Licjinowsky  concerning, 
315. 

Mesopotamian  campaign,  77-85 ; 
stages  of,  79-82 ;  difficulties  of, 
83-85;  affected  by  Allied  knowl- 
edge of  projected  improvements 
in  Bagdad  Railway,  307,  308. 

Messudiyeh,  flagship  of  Admiral 
Limpus,  228,  229. 

Mesta  River,  259. 

Mesta  Valley,  92. 

Metsovo,  210. 

Mezerib,  304. 

Midia,  202. 

Military  League,  power  of,  estab- 
lished in  Greece,  127,  129. 


Milne,  General,  263. 

Milovanovitch,  M.,  attitude  of,  at 
the  beginning  of  the  Turco-Italian 
War,  20 ;  confers  with  M.  Gues- 
hoff,  21. 

Minerva,  shells  Akaba,  85. 

Mishitch,  General,  264,  265. 

Missionaries,  American,  5. 

Mitrovitza,  198,  205,  206. 

Mittel  Europa,  scheme  of,  planned 
long  before  by  Germany,  x,  310; 
change  of  plan  in  scheme  of,  after 
the  outbreak  of  the  War,  317. 

Mitylene,  61,  1.38. 

Moglena  Mts.,  248,  260,  265. 

Moldavia,  105. 

Monaco,  54. 

Monastir,  170,  206;  taken  by  the 
Serbians,  26 ;  in  Graeco-Serbian 
Treaty,  29 ;  taken  by  Bulgarians, 
54;  railway  to,  193,  260;  road 
from  Santi  Quaranta  to,  209 ; 
political  importance  of,  263,  264 ; 
taken  by  the  Allies,  263-266 ;  im- 
portance of  capture  of,  266,  267. 

Monro,  Sir  Charles,  239. 

Montenegro,  attitude  of  the  Govern- 
ment at  the  beginning  of  the  Turco- 
Italian  War,   19,  20  ;    relations  to 
Bulgaria  prior  to  the  first  Balkan 
War,   24,   25 ;    relations  to  Serbia 
before    that  war,    24 ;    begins    the 
Balkan    War,   25;   in    the    Balkan 
War,  26, 28  ;  and  Scutari,  33, 34,  57  ; 
position  of,  at  the  end  of  the  Balkan 
Wars,  39  ;    size  of,  54  ;    independ- 
ence of,  54 ;    form  of  government 
of,   54 ;   recent  history  of,  .54,   55 
under    the    Treaty    of   Berlin,    55 
crises    between    Austria    and,    55 
result    of    Balkan    Wars    for,    56 
close    relations    with    Serbia,    56 
Austria's  hatred  of,  56 ;    her  part 
in  the  War,  56-58 ;    loss  of  inde- 
pendence of,  57  ;    size  of  her  army 
and    her   losses,  58 ;    railways   in, 
206,  207. 

Montenegro-Serbia,  acquisitions  of, 
after  the  War,  331,  332. 

Morava  River,  176,  253. 

Morgenthau,  Mr.,  American  Ambas- 
sador to  Turkey,  his  account  of 
Turkish  affairs,  45,  59  n.,  GS  n.. 


354 


INDEX 


317  ;  confession  of  Admiral  Uzidon 

to,  314. 
Mosul,  275,  296. 
Mount  Ararat,  73. 
Mount  Kaimakchalan,  265. 
Mt.  Lovtchen,  57. 
Mt.  Olympus,  249. 
Mudania-Brusa  Railway,  280. 
Muhammera,  78. 
Miihlon,    Doctor,  his  evidence    that 

Germany  promoted  the  War,  310, 

317. 
Murzteg  Scheme  of  Reforms,  4. 
Musa  Alia,  176. 
Mush,  75. 
Muslimiya,  294. 
Mustafa  Pasha,  98,  192. 

Nagara  Point,  227,  230. 

Nasrieh,  7S-80. 

Nazim,  Doctor,  13. 

Near  East,  the  Danger  Zone  of 
Europe,  1.  See  Balkan  Penin- 
sular, Balkans. 

Nedjef,  297. 

Newbigin,  Doctor  Marion,  174. 

Nicholas,  Grand  Duke,  73. 

Nicholas,  King,  of  Montenegro, 
visited  by  King  Ferdinand  of 
Bulgaria,  24  ;  his  rule  absolute,  54  ; 
flight  of,  57. 

Nigde,  278. 

Niksics,  206. 

Nish,  Serbian  Government  estab- 
lished in,  48 ;  taken  by  the  enemy, 
53. 

Nish-Salonica  Railway,  the,  189,  190. 

Nisibin,  275,  295. 

Northern  Bulgaria,  created  a  prin- 
cipality, 89. 

Nova  Zagora,  201. 

Novibazar,  Sanjak  of,  26,  198. 

Ocean,  233. 

Odessa,  70,  321,  322. 

OkjUar,  192. 

Orenburg,  323. 

Oriental  Railway  Company,  188. 

Orsova,  119. 

Osmaniya,  293. 

Ostrovo,  Lake,  261,  264. 

Otho,  Prince,  of  Bavaria,  131,  135. 

Otranto,  Straits  of,  153. 


Paget,  Lady,  Red  Cross  mission  of, 
in  Serbia,  50. 

Palestine,  Southern,  advance  of 
British  into,  86  ;  further  advance, 
87  ;    railways  of,  276. 

Palmerston,  Lord,  2. 

Palm^Ta,  273. 

Pandemia,  280. 

Paris,  Treaty  of  (1856),  disposition 
of  Bessarabia  and  Moldavia  by, 
100,  107 ;  definition  of  status  of 
Danube  in,  184  ;  Treaty  of  (1814), 
184. 

Pashkani,  196. 

Persia,  73;  oil  fields  of,  77,  78; 
Northern,  agreement  of  Tsar  and 
Kaiser  relative  to,  298 ;  Germany 
preparing  to  overrun,  320. 

Persian  Gulf,  coasts  of,  arrangement 
between  Sir  Edward  Grey  and 
Prince  Lichnowsky  concerning, 
315.     See  Bagdad  Railway. 

Peshawar,  323. 

Peter,  King,  of  Serbia,  48. 

Peterwardein,  182. 

Petrograd,  Protocol  of  May,  1913,  92, 
110,  327. 

Philippopolis,  176. 

Philippopolis-Burgas  Railway,  200, 
201. 

Pirot,  53. 

Ployesti,  119,  196,  197. 

Podgoritza,  206,  207. 

Porto  Lagos,  93,  191. 

Potsdam  Conference  on  July  5,  1914, 
45,  316. 

Prahov.  198,  206. 

Predeal,  117. 

Predeal  Pass,  the,  115,  196. 

Prevesa,  210. 

Prilep,  266. 

Prisrend,  53,  166,  208,  330. 

Queen  Elizabeth,  233. 

Railway,  the  Belgrade-Constanti- 
nople, 187-189 ;  the  Nish-Salonica, 
189,  190;  the  Luleh  Burgas-Sa- 
lonica,  190,  191 ;  the  Maritza  Val- 
ley, 191 ;  the  Salonica-Monastir, 
193,  255,  260;  the  Kuprulu-Mon- 
astir  (proposed),  193;  the  Con- 
stanza- Verciorova,   194,   195 ;    the 


INDEX 


355 


Fateshti-Buzeu,  105;  the  Chiul- 
nitza-Slobodzio-Ployesti,  105;  the 
Riatra-Cainen,  195  ;  the  Bucharest- 
Suczawa,    196 ;     the    Sofia- Varna, 

199,  200;  the  Philippopolis-Bur- 
gas,  200,  201  ;  through  the  Travna 
Gap,  200;  the  Sofia-Gyuveshevo, 
201 ;  the  Turnovo-SiemeuH-Nova 
Zagora,  201  ;  the  India-Fiume, 
204 ;  the  Antivari-Virbazar,  206  ; 
the  Cattaro-Niksics,  206 ;  the 
Uskub-Mitrovitza,  208 ;  the 
Larissa-Gidia,  210,  261 ;  the  Vardar 
Valley,  255,  257,  25S ;  the  Salonica 
Junction,  255,  256 ;  to  the  Persian 
Gulf,  early  projects  for,  272-274 ; 
reasons  for  Bosphorus-Persian  Gulf 
route,  273,  274 ;  Anatolian,  276, 
277 ;  the  Smyrna-Aidin,  277,  280, 
281,  315;  the  Smyrna-Cassaba, 
277,  279,  280  ;  the  Morsina-Adana, 
277,  291 ;  the  Haidar  Pasha 
(Scutari) -Ismid,  277,  278,  281 ;  the 
Mudania-Brusa,  280  ;  to  Pandemia, 
has  played  important  part  in  War, 
280 ;  the  Beirut-Damascus-Hauran, 
304  ;  the  Hedjaz,  305  ;  the  Haifa, 
306 ;  the  Jaffa-Jerusalem,  306 ; 
the  El  Fule-Bir  Auja,  307.  See 
Bagdad  Railway. 

Railways,  opposed  by  the  Turks, 
180;  to  the  Danube  from  north 
and  south,  183,  195  ;  military  im- 
portance  of,    190,    191,    193,    195, 

196,  200-203;  working  of,  af- 
fected by  Balkan  Wars,  191,  192; 
of  Roumauia,  194-197  ;    of  Serbia, 

197,  198;  of  Bulgaria,  199-202; 
in  Turkish  Thrace,  202  ;  of  Bosnia 
and  Herzegovina,  204,  205 ;  pro- 
posed, for  connecting  the  Danube 
with  the  Adriatic,  205,  200 ;  from 
the  lower  Adriatic  coast  to  the 
interior,  206-209  ;    in  Montenegro, 

200,  207;  connecting  Greece  with 
othercountries,209,210 ;  connecting 
Salonica  with  the  interior,  255,  25(5 ; 
in  Macedonia,  condition  of,  when 
the  Allies  entered  the  country,  268  ; 
of  Asiatic  Turkey,  military  and 
political  importance  of,  274-277 ; 
of  importance  for  Germany  for 
reconquering     Northeastern     Asia 


Minor,  276 ;  of  Syria  and  Pales- 
tine, 276,  303-307  ;  in  Asia  Minor, 
German  influence  in,  277-282. 

Ramie,  306. 

Rayak,  270,  303,  304. 

Revolution,  Young  Turkish  in  1908, 
7-9,  12;  Malissori,  18,  19.  See 
Young  Turkish  Revolution. 

Rhine,  the,  184. 

Rhodes,  60. 

Rhodope  Balkans,  26,  175 ;  signifi- 
cance of,  258,  259 ;  ways  of  pen- 
etrating, 259. 

Riatra-Cainen  Railway,  195. 

Ripany,  188. 

Riva,  223. 

Rivers  of  the  Balkan  Peninsula,  213, 
214. 

Roads,  in  the  Balkans,  178 ;  the 
building  of,  opposed  by  the  Turks, 
180  ;  in  Turkish  Thrace,  202,  203  ; 
in  Montenegro  and  Albania,  206- 
209,  337  ;  connecting  Greece  with 
the  outside  world,  210 ;  leading  into 
Bulgaria,  210-214 ;  leading  from 
Salonica  into  the  interior,  256 ; 
leading  from  the  Vardar  Valley 
eastward,  259 ;  in  Macedonia, 
condition  of,  268. 

Robert  College,  5. 

Rodosto,  202,  203. 

Rotherturm  Pass,  the,  115,  117,  195. 

Roimiania,  independence  of,  recog- 
nised, 2 ;  in  the  First  and  Second 
Balkan  Wars,  31  ;  significance  of 
her  entry  into  Balkan  politics,  39 ; 
effect  on  Serbia  of  policy  of,  51 ; 
importance  of  geographical  posi- 
tion of  Bulgaria  with  reference  to, 
93,  94 ;  advantage  to,  of  conces- 
sions to  Bulgaria,  97  ;  two  parts  of, 
105  ;  occupies  important  strategi- 
cal position,  105 ;  forms  link  be- 
tween East  and  West,  105 ;  policy 
of,  105,  106;  and  Bessaraljian, 
Transjdvanian,  and  Dobrudjan 
questions,  106,  107  ;  foreign  policy 
of,  107,  108;  explanation  of  her 
movements  at  her  entry  into  the 
War,  108  ;  took  no  part  in  the  First 
Balkan  War,  but  took  corrtpensa- 
tion  in  the  Dobrudja,  108,  109; 
relations  of,  to  Bulgaria  with  ref- 


INDEX 


erence  to  the  Dobrudja  and  the 
Bulgaro-Roumanian  frontier,  109- 
111;  increase  in  size  of,  as  result 
of  Second  Balkan  War,  110,  111; 
difficult  position  of,  after  the  out- 
break of  the  War,  111,  112;  long- 
standing alliance  of,  with  Ger- 
many, 111,  112;  her  probable 
action  if  granted  concessions  by 
Russia,  112,  113;  value  of,  to 
Germany  as  a  route  to  the  south 
and  east,  113-115  ;  her  entry  into 
the  War,  115;  the  northwestern 
frontier  of,  115;  advance  of,  into 
enemy  territory,  115;  advance  of 
enemy  into  territory  of,  116,  117; 
conquests  of  Central  Powers  in, 
118-120;  military  system  of,  120, 
121 ;  her  plan  of  campaign,  121 ; 
mitigating  circumstances  of  her 
campaign,  122 ;  international  rea- 
sons for  her  disaster,  122,  123 ; 
peace  terms  imposed  upon,  123- 
126,  321 ;  importance  to,  of  properly 
defensible  frontier  on  the  south, 
183 ;  description  and  strategical 
significance  of  railways  of,  194— 
197 ;  Germany's  policy  toward, 
319 ;  the  author's  suggestions  as 
to  frontiers  of,  327. 

Royal  Geographical  Society,  xii,  xiv. 

Rumeli  Hissar,  222. 

Russia,  policy  of,  during  the  thirty 
years  following  the  Treaty  of  Ber- 
lin, 5,  6  ;  her  settlement  of  Turkish- 
Bulgarian  difficulties  in  1909,  11, 
12 ;  aimed  to  prevent  Balkan 
Wars,  36 ;  her  position  after  the 
Balkan  Wars,  43,  44  ;  makes  ar- 
rangement with  Turkey  respect- 
ing reforms  in  Armenia,  63  ;  Cau- 
casus campaign  of,  72,  76 ;  under- 
takings of,  according  to  Brest- 
Litovsk  Treaty,  76 ;  relation  to 
Serbia,  and  Bulgaria,  98 ;  and  the 
question  of  concessions  to  Rou- 
mania,  112,  113;  and  the  Rouma- 
nian disaster,  123  ;  her  relation  to 
Greece,  130-132;  effect  of  im- 
portant telegram  from,  with  ref- 
erence to  Dardanelles  campaign, 
217-219,  241,  242;  agreement 
with    Kaiser   relative    to    Bagdad 


Railway  and  Persia,  297,  29S ; 
no  longer  a  menace  to  Germany, 
320,321. 

Russians,  advance  into  Turkey  by 
three  routes,  73 ;  take  Erzerum, 
74 ;  occupy  entire  route  from 
Erzerum  to  Trebizond,  75 ;  line 
of,  in  Asia  at  high-water  mark, 
75. 

Russo-Turkish  War  (1877),  2. 

Rustchuk,  206 ;  cabinet  council  held 
at,  9. 

Sadijeh,  283. 

Salonica,  taken  by  the  Greeks,  26 ; 
in  Graeco-Serbian  Treaty,  29 ;  in 
the  Treaty  of  Bucharest,  32; 
Allied  landing  at,  141 ;  Venezelos 
forms  Cabinet  at,  146 ;  railway 
from  Nish  to,  189,  190;  posi- 
tion of,  248-250;  harbour,  249, 
250 ;  description  of,  250 ;  popula- 
tion of,  250,  251 ;  fire  of  August, 
1917,  251;  climate  of,  252;  three 
commercial  routes  into  the  interior 
of  the  country  from,  253 ;  area 
closely  surrounding,  254 ;  moun- 
tains in  the  neighborhood  of,  254, 
255 ;  railways  and  roads  from,  to 
the  interior,  255—258 ;  signifi- 
cance of  Rhodope  Balkans  to, 
258,  259  ;  favourable  and  unfavour- 
able conditions  of  area  northwest 
of,  260,  261 ;  disposition  of,  after 
the  War,  329,  330. 

Salonica  campaign,  partly  result  of 
withdrawal  from  the  Dardanelles, 
95,  244  ;  objects  of,  244-246  ;  first 
stage  of  (attempt  to  advance  into 
the  interior),  261,  262;  second 
stage  of  (defensive),  262,  263; 
third  stage  of,  263-267  ;  difficulties 
of,  267-269 ;  results  of,  269,  270. 

Salonica-Dede  Agatch  Railway  Com- 
pany, 212. 

Salonica,  Gulf  of,  249. 

Salonica-Monastir  Railway,  193. 

Samara,  323. 

Samarcand,  323. 

Samarra,  275,  296. 

Samos,  61,  138. 

Sanders,  General  Liman  von,  62, 
314. 


INDEX 


357 


San  Giovanni  di  Medua,  153,  206, 
207,  213. 

San  Marino,  rA. 

San  Stefano,  Treaty  of,  3,  107. 

Santi  Quaranta,  166,  171,  209. 

Sari  Bair,  234. 

Sarikamish,  73. 

Saros,  Gulf  of,  225,  233,  237. 

Save  River,  213. 

Savoff,  General,  31. 

Sazonoff,  M.,  31. 

Scanderbeg,  Albanian  hero,  158. 

Scumbi  River,  160,  176. 

Scumbi  VaUey,  337,  338. 

Scutari,  20  ;  taken  by  Montenegrins, 
33  ;  question  of,  34  ;  Government 
moved  to,  53 ;  permanent  posses- 
sion of,  desired  by  Montenegrins, 
56 ;  annexed  by  King  Nicholas, 
57;  fertile  plains  near,  156;  size 
of,  156 ;  Albanians  obtain,  166 ; 
connections   with,   207. 

Scutari,  Lake,  207. 

Sedd-el-Bahr,  226. 

Seihun  River,  291. 

Selenitza,  156. 

Semondria,  198. 

Serajevo,  x,  44,  178. 

Serbia,  independence  of,  recognised, 
2 ;  policy  of  Count  Aehrenthal  as 
affecting  the  relation  of  Austria  to, 
11 ;  attitude  of  the  Government 
at  the  Ijeginiiing  of  the  Turco- 
Italian  War,  19,  20;  makes 
Treaty  of  Alliance  with  Secret 
Annex  with  Bulgaria,  21-23,  329, 
330  ;  military  convention  between 
Bulgaria  and,  23  ;  and  Montenegro 
before  the  Balkan  War,  24 ;  in 
the  Balkan  War,  25,  20 ;  and  the 
Adriatic  question,  27 ;  strained 
relations  with  Bulgaria  as  result 
of  the  Adriatic  question,  27,  28 ; 
negotiates  with  Greece,  28;  de- 
mands revision  of  Serbo-Bulgarian 
Treaty,  28,  29 ;  enters  into  secret 
arrangement  with  Greece,  29 ; 
makes  treaty  with  Greece  (June  1, 
1913),  29;  and  the  Second  Balkan 
War,  30,  31 ;  in  the  Treaty  of 
Bucharest,  32 ;  position  of,  at  the 
end  of  the  Balkan  Wars,  39 ; 
her    need    of    an    outlet    to    the 


Adriatic,  42  ;  her  aim  not  attained 
by  the  Balkan  Wars,  42,  45 ;  the 
annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herze- 
govina a  blow  to  her  aspiration, 
42  ;  the  real  source  of  danger  to, 
43 ;  Austrian  ultimatum  to,  45, 
46 ;  first  invasion  of,  in  August, 
1914,  47 ;  second  invasion  of,  in 
September,  1914,  48 ;  epidemic  of 
typhus  in,  49  ;  internal  disaffection 
in  the  south  of,  51 ;  her  attitude 
toward  concessions  to  Bulgaria, 
51 ;  diplomacy  of  Allies  with  ref- 
erence to  Bulgaria  and,  51,  52; 
loss  of  independence  of,  53,  54 ; 
close  relations  with  Montenegro, 
56 ;  importance  of  her  role  in  the 
War,  58 ;  size  of  her  army  and  her 
losses,  58;  rapid  subjugation  of, 
to  what  due,  93  ;  great  advantages 
to,  of  concessions  to  Bulgaria,  96 ; 
concessions  of,  to  Bulgaria,  99, 
100;  natiire  of  her  treaty  with 
Greece,  132,  133 ;  railways  of, 
197,  198 ;  failure  to  save,  due  to 
strategic  position  of  the  enemy, 
246,  247 ;  Germany's  policy  to- 
ward, 318 ;  question  of  Bulgaro- 
Serbian  frontier,  328,  329. 

Scr])ians,  defeat  Austrians,  48,  49 ; 
retreat  and  transference  of,  to 
Corfu,  53,  54. 

Seres,  191,  253,  256,  262. 

Seugudlu  River,  259. 

Shabatz,  47. 

Shabatz-Losnitza  Railway,  198. 

Shat-el-Arab,  the,  78,  83. 

Shat-el-Hai  Canal,  78,  79. 

Shedna  Gora,  176. 

Shustar,  78. 

Siemens,  Doctor,  282. 

Silistria,  32,  92,  110,  116,  327. 

Siminhan,  204. 

Sinaia,  196. 

Sistova,  200, 

Sivas,  278. 

Skouloudis,  M.,  144,  145. 

Slavery,  the  American  view  of,  vii ; 
the  real  cause  of  the  Civil  War, 
vii. 

Slavonia,  331. 

Smyrua-Aidin  Railway,  277,  280, 
281 ;      arrangement    between    Sir 


358 


INDEX 


Edward  Grey  and  Prince  Lich- 
nowsky  concerning,  315. 

Smyrna-Cassaba  Railway,  277,  279, 
280. 

Sofia,  176,  178,  253. 

Sofia-Gyuveshevo   Railway,   201. 

Sofia- Varna  Railway,  199,  200. 

Spalaikovitch,  M.,  negotiates  with  M. 
Gueshoff,  21. 

Spitza,  39,  55. 

Strong,  Doctor,  and  the  typhus  epi- 
demic in  Serbia,  50. 

Struma  River,  212,  256,  262. 

Struma  Valley,  212,  253,  256,  258,  262. 

Strumnitza,  258. 

Suczawa,  196,  197. 

Suez  Canal,  Turks  defeated  near, 
85,  86 ;  shares  of,  purchased  by 
England,  273. 

Suvla  Bay  operations,  234,  235. 

Syria,  railways  of,  276,  303-307 ; 
British,  French,  and  Russian  in- 
terests in,  315. 

Syrian  campaign,  affected  by  Allied 
knowledge  of  contemplated  im- 
provements in  Turkish  railroad 
systems,  308. 

Tabriz,  73,  323. 

Talaat  Pasha,  66. 

Tarsus  Chai  (Cydnus)  River,  290. 

Tashkend,  323. 

Taurus,  the,  274,  286,  287;  section 
of  Bagdad  Railway,  287-291. 

Tcherna  Bend,  265. 

Tcherna  River,  265. 

Tchorlu,  202. 

Tehran,  298. 

Tekeh  Fort,  227. 

Tekir  Plateau,  290. 

Tenedos,  34,  35,  60. 

Thrace,  campaign  in,  25 ;  Bul- 
garians lose  large  part  of,  by  Treaty 
of  Constantinople,  33 ;  Turkish, 
part  of,  desired  by  Bulgaria,  91, 
93 ;  Turkish,  means  of  communi- 
cation in,  202. 

Tifiis,  322. 

Tigris  River,  83,  84. 

Tirana,  208,  338. 

Torsburg  Pass,  the,  115,  117. 

Townshend,  General,  surrender  of, 
79,  81. 


Transylvania,  question  of,  106-108, 
115,327. 

Travna  Gap,  railway  through,  200. 

Treaty,  of  San  Stefano  (March  17, 
1878),  3;  of  Berlin  (1878),  3,  107; 
of  Alliance  between  Bulgaria  and 
Serbia  (1912),  21-23,  329,  330; 
between  Greece  and  Bulgaria 
(1912),  24;  of  London  (1913), 
29  ;  Graeco-Serbian  (June  1,  1913), 
29,  132,  133;  of  Bucharest  (Au- 
gust 10,  1913),  31,  32,  111 ;  of  Con- 
stantinople (1913),  32,  33;  be- 
tween Italy,  and  Great  Britain, 
France,  and  Russia,  55;  of  Lau- 
sanne (October  12,  1912),  60; 
of  Brest-Litovsk,  76 ;  of  Paris 
(1856),  106,  107,  184;  of  Paris 
(1814),  184;  of  Berlin  (1878), 
184,  185,  188;  of  London  (1883), 
184. 

Trebizond,  75. 

Tripoli,  304. 

Tripoli  War,  19,  35,  60,  298. 

Tsar,  meeting  with  Kaiser  at  Pots- 
dam, November,  1910,  297,  298. 

Tsaribrod,  187,  188. 

Tschirschky,  Herr  von,  316,  317. 

Turco-Bulgarian  frontier,  60. 

Turco-Greek  War  of  1897,  7. 

Turco-Italian  War,  19,  35,  60,  298. 

Turkey,  Asiatic,  importance  of  con- 
ditions in,  1 ;  in  war  with  Russia 
(1853-55),  2;  in  war  with  Russia 
(1877),  2;  after  the  Treaty  of 
Berlin,  3,  4 ;  and  the  Murzteg 
Scheme  of  Reforms,  4,  5  ;  army  of, 
under  Germanic  control,  6 ;  sup- 
port given  to,  by  Germany,  7 ; 
revolution  of  1908  in,  7-9,  12; 
and  Bulgaria,  Russian  settlement 
of  difficulties  between,  in  1909,  11, 
12  ;  the  Committee  of  Union  and 
Progress,  12,  13 ;  the  outstanding 
feature  in  the  situation  in,  13,  14 ; 
the  motto  of  the  Young  Turks,  14  ; 
Ottomanisation,  14 ;  first  year  of 
the  New  R6gime  in,  14-16 ; 
second  and  third  years  of  the  New 
Regime,  16-20 ;  in  the  First  Balkan 
War,  25,  26  ;  in  the  Second  Balkan 
War,  32,  33;  Imbros,  Tenedos, 
and  Castellorizzo  allotted  to,  34, 


INDEX 


359 


35 ;  attitude  of  England  and  of 
Germany  toward  reforms  in,  35, 
36 ;  attitude  of  Great  Powers 
toward,  before  Balkan  Wars,  36, 
37 ;  loss  in  territory  through 
Balkan  Wars,  37 ;  position  of,  at 
the  end  of  the  Balkan  Wars,  39, 
40 ;  conditions  in,  just  before  the 
outbreak  of  the  War,  59 ;  dis- 
pleased with  results  of  the  Balkan 
Wars,  60 ;  crisis  with  Greece  over 
the  Aegean  Islands,  60-62 ;  per- 
secution and  massacre  of  Greeks 
by,  61 ;  improving  relations  with 
Bulgaria,  62 ;  growth  of  German 
influence  in,  62 ;  agreement  of, 
respecting  reforms  in  Armenia, 
63,  64  ;  German  intrigues  in,  64- 
66 ;  position  of  the  Allies  in,  65, 
66 ;  her  fear  and  hatred  of  Russia, 
65,  66 ;  reasons  for  her  inclination 
toward  Germany,  00 ;  brought 
into  the  War  by  Germany,  67-70 ; 
abolishes  capitulations,  67  ;  enters 
Triple  Alliance,  68;  Armenian 
massacres  of  1915,  70-72 ;  oper- 
ations of,  in  Northeastern  Asia 
Minor,  72-76;  and  the  Brest- 
Litovsk  Treaty,  76  ;  operations  of, 
between  head  of  Persian  Gulf  and 
Bagdad,  77-85 ;  operations  of, 
near  the  Egyptian  frontier,  85- 
88 ;  relations  of  Bulgaria  and,  97, 
98 ;  attitude  of,  toward  Albania, 
158 ;  position  of  Albania  in  the 
Empire,  158,'  159 ;  Bulgaria  shows 
marked  contrast  to,  177,  178 ; 
railways  and  roads  in,  202,  203 ; 
Asiatic,  military  and  political  im- 
portance of  railways  of,  274-277  ; 
cost  of  Bagdad  Railway  to,  301, 
302 ;  military  results  to,  of  Bag- 
dad Railway,  302,  303;  Gentral 
Powers  aimed  to  improve  relations 
with,  313,  314;  army  of,  under 
General  Liman  von  Sanders,  314 ; 
importance  to  Germany  of  en- 
trance of,  into  the  War,  318; 
future  of,  333-335. 
Turks,  defeated  near  Suez  Canal, 
86  ;  defeated  near  Katia,  86  ;  op- 
posed to  the  building  of  roads  and 
railways,   180. 


Turnovo,  191  ;  declaration  of  Bul- 
garian independence  made  at,  9. 

Turnovo-Siemenli-Nova  Zagora  Rail- 
way, 201. 

Turnu  Severin,  124. 

Turtukeuie,  116. 

Typhus,  epidemic  of,  in  Serbia,  49, 

'so. 

Ujitse,  204. 

Ultimatum,  Austrian,  to  Serbia,  45, 

46,   317. 
Ulu  Kushlar,  278,  288. 
Urumiah,  Lake,  73,  75. 
Uskub,  53,  176,  198,  201,  206,  257, 

258. 
Uskub-Mitrovitza  Railway,  208. 
Uvats,  205. 
Uzidon,  Admiral,  314. 
Uzun  Kupru,  237. 

Valievo,  48,  49,  204. 

Van,  lake  and  town,  73,  75,  76. 

Vardar  River,  176 ;  importance  of, 
252,  253 ;  the  country  to  the  west 
of,  254  ;  the  country  to  the  east  of, 
254,  255. 

Vardar  Valley,  the,  25,  26,  213,  248; 
importance  of,  252,  253 ;  railway 
of,  255,  257,  258;  description  of, 
257. 

Vardishte,  204. 

Varna,  199,  200. 

Veliko  Plana,  188,  198. 

Venezelos,  M.,  94,  97;  attitude  of, 
at  the  beginning  of  the  Turco- 
Italian  War,  20 ;  Saviour  of 
Greece,  127,  128 ;  his  devotion  to 
Greece  and  co-ope  ration  with 
King  George,  128-130  ;  a  statesman 
and  patriot,  136;  desired  to  co- 
operate with  King  Constantiue, 
136 ;  cause  of  his  decline  in  popu- 
larity, 137  ;  first  struggle  between 
King  Constantine  and,  138  ;  second 
resignation  of,  141,  142;  the  ques- 
tion of  his  attitude  toward  the 
landing  of  Allied  troops  in  Greece, 
142 ;  abstention  of  his  followers 
from  voting,  145 ;  departs  from 
Athens  and  forms  Independent 
C'abinct  at  Salonica,  146 ;  Pre- 
mier since  June,  1915,  150;   return 


360 


INDEX 


to  power  of,  150;  difficulties  of 
his  position,  151 ;  how  far  the 
future  of  Greece  depends  upon, 
151,  152;    foresight  of,  332. 

Verciorova,  terminus  of  railway, 
194,  195,  197. 

Veria,  193,  210,  260,  261, 

Via  Egnatia,  208,  338. 

Vidin,  206,  253. 

Vienna,  Congress  of  (1815),  184. 

Viosa  River,  171,  266. 

Virbazar,  206,  207. 

Vishegrad,  48. 

Vodena,  260. 

Von  Bluhm  Pasha,  220,  221. 

Von  der  Gohz  Pasha,  power  of,  6. 

Vulcan  Pass,  the,  115. 

Wallaehia,  105. 

Wash-trains,  system  of,  established 
by  American  doctors  in  Serbia,  50. 

Wilhelm  II,  of  Germany,  his  policy 
in  the  East,  6 ;  his  first  visit  to 
Constantinople,  6 ;  his  second 
visit  to  Constantinople,  7,  281 ; 
meeting  with  Tsar  at  Potsdam, 
November,  1910, 297, 298  ;  obsessed 
by  desire  for  domination  from 
Hamburg  to  Persian  Gulf,  312, 
313. 


William  of  Wied,  Prince,  regime  of, 
167-169. 

Wilson,  President,  quoted  on  Ger- 
man aims  in  the  East,  320. 

Woods,  H.  Charles,  his  Washed  by 
Four  Seas,  278 ;  his  The  Danger 
Zone  of  Europe,  285. 

Yenidje  Vardar,  254. 

YildiB,  227. 

Young,  George,  his  Corps  de  Droit 
Ottoman,  279,  303. 

Young  Turkish  Revolution  of  1908, 
7,  8 ;  importance  of,  in  Balkan 
afTairs,  8,  9 ;  the  meaning  of,  12  ; 
the  Committee  of  Union  and  Prog- 
ress, 12,  13,  15-17,  59,  66;  effect 
of,  on  German  prestige  and  power 
at  Constantinople,  35.    .Sec  Turkey. 

Young  Turks,  and  the  Revolution  of 
1908,  7,  8,  12,  13  ;  their  policy  and 
shortcomings,  14-19  ;  motto  of,  14  ; 
power  of,  just  before  the  outbreak 
of  the  War,  60 ;  their  treatment 
of  Albania,  164,  165. 

Zaimis,  M.,  138,  144,  145,  147,  150, 

263. 
Zelenika,  204. 
Zobeir.  297. 


Railroads 

Railroads  PropoHed 

Capitals 

Size  of  type  indicates  relative 
importance  of  place 


]M      E       D       I       J 


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"''  10  1940 

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MAIV  ,.I9T7 

LD  21-100m-8,'34 

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